WISDOM-LOGOS CHRISTOLOGY AND GNOSTIC SPECULATION

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In Application
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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by
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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the following thesis is based upon the results of research carried out by me, that it is my own composition, and that it has not been presented previously for a higher degree.

The research was carried out in St. Mary's College of the University of St. Andrews under the direction of the Reverend Dr. Robin McLachlan Wilson.

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CERTIFICATE

I certify that Glenn Earle McMillan has fulfilled the requirements of Ordinance No. 16 (St. Andrews) and is qualified to submit the accompanying thesis in application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of St. Andrews.

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Finally, my thanks go to so many individuals in and around St. Andrews who in so many ways made our entire stay an experience of a lifetime.

PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS

ANCL	Ante-Nicene Christian Library
HTR	Harvard Theological Review
JBL	Journal of Biblical Literature
JTS	Journal of Theological Studies
NTS	New Testament Studies
OLZ	Orientalistische Literaturzeitung
RGG	*Die Religion in Geschichte u. Gegenwart*
SJT	Scottish Journal of Theology
TLZ	Theologische Literaturzeitung
TU	*Texte u. Untersuchungen*
TWNT	*Theologisches Wörterbuch zum NT*
VC	Vigilae Christianae
ZKG	Zeitschrift f. Kirchengeschichte
ZNW	Zeitschrift f. neutestamentliche Wissenschaft
ZTK	Zeitschrift f. Theologie u. Kirche

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INTRODUCTION

The most exact and expressive doctrines of the Church were hammered out under the pressure of controversy. It was in this way that the Church was most successfully forced to grapple with the profundities of revelation. The literature of the early Fathers provides us with their own statements as well as a description of their opponents. That which they say concerning themselves stands or falls in itself. Their descriptions of the Gnostics--the opponents of the Fathers with whom we are concerned--have been approached with a certain scepticism because the Fathers had every reason to be prejudiced. Although a few documents of varying importance have been available for some time, our information was long confined in the main to Patristic refutations, but in recent years the discovery of a fairly extensive Gnostic library at Nag Hammadi (Egypt)[1] has provided greater accessibility to the thought world of these heretics and has at the same time made more detailed comparison possible. Indeed we now have reasonably direct access to a part of the conflict out of which certain doctrines emerged.

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[1] At this point one must assume some awareness of this discovery. Details will be given at appropriate points. An introductory bibliography would include: G. Quispel, H. C. Puech and W. C. van Unnik, The Jung Codex, tr. F. L. Cross (London: 1955); J. Doresse, The Secret Books of the Egyptian Gnostics (English translation, London: 1960); W. C. van Unnik, Newly Discovered Gnostic Writings (English translation, London: 1960), etc.

This possibility of comparison is of supreme importance. A treatment of any specific theme from the orthodox side only would amount to an abstraction with little if any of its really vital character remaining. Access to these Gnostic documents renews the living reality of the original controversy as it has not been since the days of the Gnostics themselves. However little it may be possible to conclude with certainty at the close of our investigation--and one should not become too optimistic--a greater understanding of the nature of this conflict stands as justification for the effort expended.

Beginning with elements dating centuries prior to Christ, this is a study of one aspect of the Jewish-Christian tradition in a life and death struggle for survival. Although the Gnostic aspect of this investigation is of crucial importance, this is not a study of the Gnostic Sophia myth. Rather, it is a new study of the Wisdom-Logos tradition in the light of recent developments in certain areas, especially 1 Corinthians 1-4, the "Christological hymns," etc., with the Gnostic speculation drawn in in order to give the study a genuine dimension of struggle.[2]

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[2] For an examination of this point see S. Laeuchli, The Language of Faith, 230.

Our study is divided as follows: Chapter one will examine Old Testament backgrounds, observing the self-imposed restrictions of the relation to Wisdom speculation in other cultures. Chapter two will examine possible areas of affinity in the Greek world as well as developments in Diaspora Judaism. Chapter three will follow this tradition in the New Testament and chapter four will observe its continuation and development in the second century. All of this will serve as a background for our examination of similar material within Gnostic thought. Chapter five will begin by examining the early Church Fathers' description of the Gnostic phenomenon and continue with a discussion of certain manifestations of what we have come to call the "non-Valentinian Sophia myth." Chapter six will observe the Valentinian type of this particular mythical form. A brief conclusion will close the examination. However, before beginning there are a number of introductory matters requiring discussion.

It will be our purpose in this study to survey these various areas noting similarities (and as far as possible their relation), differences, dependence, individuality, interpenetration, etc., with regard to the Wisdom-Logos theme as well as areas that are tangent but relevant to a clear understanding of that theme. Although it is felt here that such an examination of tangent areas is important, it should be noted that some have felt that it is not necessary to go outside Judaism to account for the Jewish Wisdom figure.[3] Indeed, whatever the relationships may have been to other cultures, etc., the Jewish-Wisdom figure certainly had its own distinctive character.

There is within the "Wisdom-Logos" tradition a rather extensive development of doctrine. This of course is the point of interest. Often the phrase "development of doctrine" means nothing more than that there was a formal explanation/exploration of a particular realization. This is true generally, but when working in the area of Christology, it is especially true. All who treat the matter seriously will be constantly revising their convictions, not because the reality is changing but because their comprehension of it is. Christianity will always be in need of better and more complete categories with which to attempt an explanation of the incarnation.

It will soon become quite evident that we are working in an area where many similar as well as divergent elements merged. The three basic constituents in the original situation were Judaism, Hellenism, and Christianity--not all at the same time of course. Complicating this however were subjects which may only be described as "Hellenistic-Jewish" or Jewish-Christian." Then, too, one must reckon with the Hellenistic mission of the church. That the church--originally a Jewish phenomenon--changed as it encountered other cultures is generally accepted. The extent of this change has been and will continue to be the object of scholarly investigation. All of this results in a complex situation wherein many questions must be left to one degree or another unanswered. Quispel says:

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[3] See e.g., W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, 173.

> Late antiquity is a land of three streams in which Greek philosophy, Christian faith, and Gnosticism flow side by side. In a fruitful confrontation Christian theology purged out rationalism and mysticism, while it integrated the Logos of the Hellenes and the Myths of the Orient. The history of the Church is the Christianization of Greek thought and Eastern mysticism on the basis of the Gospel.[4]

Because of its very nature, the kind of Wisdom speculation that went on in Israel may be paralleled elsewhere. Indeed, there were reflective men in many cultures who were concerned for truth and the right way to conduct one's life. Among other things this meant that Wisdom speculation took on a "non-national" or "international" character. More will be said about this later, but the point to be drawn out here is that men who stood in any given "Wisdom tradition" drew freely from any available source. Truth or correct opinion was the controlling factor. As one might expect, such a thrust would serve as a unifying force in any culture. This was particularly true within Judaism.[5]

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[4] G. Quispel, "The Jung Codex and its Significance" in The Jung Codex, ed. F. L. Cross, 78. For Harnack's famous dictum that Gnosticism was "the acute Hellenization of Christianity" see A. Harnack, Dogmengeschichte (Third edition), I, 215.

It is certainly legitimate to trace the history of a specific idea or concept as is our intention here, but one must keep in mind that this is not the whole story. The "When," "How," and "By Whom" of associations, developments, changes, etc., is of vital concern. Indeed the challenge of this study will prove to be the extent to which one can make specific observations in this regard. What one hoped for at the outset was a detailed comparison of the different things that were happening more or less concurrently, especially in the second century. What developed however were two basically different traditions with little evidence of links between them beyond their common heritage. We shall see that Jonas observed this some time ago. The Gnostics for example do not offer a rationale for doing a thing a certain way. For that matter neither do the more "orthodox" groups or individuals. Although it will always be an unreliable guide, we are largely left to our imagination as to the inner workings of this complex phenomenon.

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[5] See G. von Rad, Old Testament Theology, I, 441. Cf. R. N. Whybray, Wisdom in Proverbs, 7.

We will observe in our investigation of the pre-Christian tradition little association with a Messianic figure. This association of older categories with newer reality seems to have been made subsequent to the incarnation. It might be asked, "Why was this link between Israel's wisdom figure and Jesus established at all?" Part of the answer lies in the principle that unknowns are apprehended by means of knowns. There were at least a few in the earliest days of Christianity who had a significantly deep realization of the reality of the incarnation. Although it took the church at large several hundred years to achieve worthy standards in this regard, at least some had the insight to lead the way. *Σοφία* and *Λόγος* were two of the categories that they used as means of expressing their conviction. These were the "knowns" in this particular situation.

The form of this study might be described in terms of *Religionsgeschichte*. It is approached in this way mainly for convenience, that similarities and differences may be more easily observed. In the case of similarity, no inference should be made with regard to any sort of dependence.

However, occasionally some type of dependence is reasonably evident. Sometimes it is not. One of the basic questions to be kept in mind is, "What links were there between Jewish-Christian tradition and Gnosticism with particular regard to Sophia?" As we have already indicated and as we shall have occasion to repeat, conclusions that possess any reasonable degree of certainty are extremely difficult to make.

Again, more will be said later, but something by way of introduction should be said concerning the emergence of independent deities or demigods within Judaism, especially in view of well known convictions with regard to monotheism. Just how did this apparent paradox occur? Grant describes this situation as follows:

> But even the purest monotheism did not rule out the recognition of subordinate spiritual beings, inferior to God as his creatures but superior to man in nature, power, knowledge, and nearness to God. They were deathless, and were endowed with supernatural abilities and knowledge, true denizens of heaven, and obedient ministers of the divine will. These were the angels, archangels, "sons of Elohim," the seven or the four spirits about the throne; or the personified "Wisdom" of Proverbs and the Wisdom of Solomon; or--viewed from some aspects--the Logos and the divine "Powers" of Philo. Certain passages in the Old Testament apparently described them as fleeting existences, comparable to winds and flames (Ps. 94:4; cf. Heb. 1:7); but first century Judaism took for granted their permanence, if not their hypostatic or independent existence. Once having created them, God did not return them to nothingness--not even when some of them fell into sin and disobedience and became wicked spirits.[6]

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[6] F. C. Grant, Ancient Judaism and the New Testament, 59f.

Although this situation may be viewed logically as a paradox, it is seen to have been "natural" from a Jewish point of view originally.

Through the years there have been many different opinions of the Gnostics. Some have dismissed them while others have given them very serious consideration. It would be fair to observe that opinions in this century have generally tended to be more respectful with the passing of time. The discovery at Nag Hammadi in the late 1940's has definitely led to a more positive assessment of this movement. In view of these comparatively recent developments one is struck by Harnack's assessment that these men were the first theologians of the church.[7] Indeed, the Gnostics were the first to transform Christianity into a set of doctrines and to treat the scriptures systematically. Their results were made essentially equal to those of their contemporaries in the "philosophy of religion." The difference was that a foundation had been found in revelation. It is for this reason that Harnack in the discussion just mentioned describes the Gnostics as "a class of Christians who essayed through a sharp onset to conquer Christianity for Hellenic culture, and Hellenic culture for Christianity."

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[7] A. von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte (Tubingen: 1931) I, see especially 243-61.

With these points in mind we are ready to begin. Procedural points beyond those already mentioned will appear as they are needed through the discussion.

PART ONE

PRE-CHRISTIAN BACKGROUND

CHAPTER I

THE TRADITION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT AND PALESTINIAN JUDAISM

I. INTRODUCTION

The very nature of the Palestinian wisdom tradition--especially that found in the Old Testament--leads one to the conviction that it was the product of a long process of evolution, a process in which many different elements were exerting their influence and were being woven into the patterns which appear in the text. Such a situation among other things results in extremely complicated background questions. However, it has not been necessary in this study to commit ourselves to any particular set of assumptions in the attempt to solve these problems. We have rather judged these things to be outside our concern. We do generally however follow Eissfeldt in holding that neither the study of literary types nor the analysis of the development of conceptual forms gives either final or complete answers. We also agree and feel that we must urge in spite of the many problems occupying scholars in this field, that this same wisdom tradition contains a significant though perhaps indeterminable amount of pre-exilic material.[1] Although there may be pre-exilic material in the wisdom literature, any exact dating of the Old Testament material is impossible. As we have observed, the chief contributing factor to this situation is the very nature of the material itself. The aphoristic "saying" type of text is consistently regarded as the collection of the ages. Even the reflective type (e.g., Job, Ecclesiastes) deals with problems that have concerned man through the centuries. It may contain late accretions that are fairly easily recognized, but much of it has been gathered in such a way that literary analysis is at best of little value. The tendency of scholarship a generation or two past was to emphasize the later elements in this material, whereas today the inclination seems to be almost exactly the opposite.

Wisdom speculation demanded an environment that was conducive, one that not only permitted but even demanded the production of these particular types of thought forms. It is not our purpose to attempt a detailed description but this set of circumstances occurred within the Jewish tradition mainly after Solomon came to the throne. If nothing else his conception and implementation of the royal court contributed heavily toward making this activity a natural thing. That is, wise men whose duty it was to speak wisdom to the king were a part of the trappings of many seats of government of that period.[2] Although the evidence surely indicates Solomon's prowess in matters of judgment, it may also be that one of the factors was that he was simply the focal point of this particular set of circumstances.[3]

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[1] For a summary statement of the problems in this area see: O. Eissfeldt, The Old Testament, esp. 1-7.

Further, we have been led to the conclusion that the wisdom literature of the Old Testament sustained complex relationships to literature of similar types outside Judaism. However any investigation of this question has been judged arbitrarily outside the scope of the present study.[4] Our emphasis ultimately falls on second century

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[2] Cf. Jeremiah 49.7 and Obadiah 8.

[3] See Sirach 47.13.

[4] Literature in this area would include the following: W. F. Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, (Garden City, N. Y.: 1957, originally published in Berne and Munich: 1949): J. Fichtner, *Die altorientalische Weisheit in ihrer israelitisch-jüdischen Auspragung*, *BZAW* 62 (Giessen: 1933); P. Humpert, *Recherches sur les sources Egyptiennes de la litteráture sapientiale d'Israel*, (1929); A. Jeremias, *Das Alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients*, (Leipzig, 1904); O. S. Rankin, *Israel's Wisdom Literature*, (Edinburgh: 1936); H. H. Schmid, *Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit*, *BZAW*, (Berlin: 1966).

A.D. heretical forms, which are represented as we shall see by literature that has not been surveyed with the present purpose in mind. Our task therefore in this first chapter is to examine the products of Palestinian Judaism as we now have them.[5] It is our view that this material, largely in its present form, served as part of the source material for later developments both inside and outside the Jewish Christian tradition.[6] However, before turning to this survey there are certain introductory issues that must be examined.

Justification for considering the wisdom tradition as a separate and distinct area in Jewish studies is found in a familiar but important reference in Jeremiah. Earlier in the context Jeremiah had been extremely direct once again in his judgment against Israel. The people responded:

> Come, let us make plots against Jeremiah,
> for the law shall not perish from the
> priest, nor counsel from the wise,
> nor the word from the prophet. Come let
> us smite him with the tongue, and
> let us not heed any of his words.
>
> Jeremiah 18:18[7]

The passage clearly recognizes the "offices" of priest, wise man and prophet. And although the action proposed is designed against the prophet Jeremiah, it is recognized that the words of truth spoken by all of these men will not be permitted to perish. The fact that the wise man is made equal to the others makes the passage an unusual confirmation of the importance of his position in Israel's history.[8]

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[5] This has been done by different scholars, as we shall see, but the need for this review we feel is based on the fact that there is ample room for these older studies to be examined in terms of more recent trends in modern scholarship.

[6] W.D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, 163f.

[7] Cf. Isaiah 5.21; Jeremiah 9.23. For the goals and ideals of these men see Ecclesiasticus 38.24-39.11.

Before going further it would be useful to make certain basic distinctions mainly by way of definition.[9] As we shall see later in some detail the Hebrew word חָכְמָה is most often used in the Old Testament with reference to a quality, both divine and human. Early in the process of development, the divine quality tended to be abstracted and given personal characteristics such as a voice, a body, etc. We have chosen to refer to this process as "personification." Later in the process of development this personification became "hypostatization," that is, the speculation formulated an independent entity set over against God and acting at least to some extent independently as his companion. The transition, particularly from personification to hypostatization, is often extremely difficult to detect. We have attempted to be consistent in employing the capital letter only of the hypostatized figure. Our judgment may of course be open to question in certain "borderline" cases. It should also be apparent that the extent of personification or hypostatization in an author's mind and what may have been seen by others at a later date may often be two quite different things.[10]

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[8] Cf. Eissfeldt, op. cit., 86f.

[9] For one concise conceptual definition of Wisdom as it appears in the Jewish-Christian tradition see: J.W. Montgomery "Wisdom as Gift" Interpretation XVI, 1 (January 1962), 43-57.

The evidence is to be considered in detail later, but it is probably fair to say that it is doubtful that wisdom is anywhere in the Old Testament fully hypostatized. It is generally felt that this occurred later. However, to say the least, there were strong tendencies in this direction in the Old Testament itself. In spite of all protests otherwise, it should be observed that many commentators are inclined to feel that "something more" than simple personification is to be found in a passage like Proverbs 8. For example Whybray says:

> There are other examples in the Old Testament of extended and elaborate personification, where it is clear that the figures are allegorical and not to be regarded as real persons: but in the case of these passages which represent wisdom as a person there are circumstances which have given rise to the view that something more than a mere literary

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[10] *Ibid.*, 50.

> metaphor is intended: that in the mind of the author wisdom had assumed a degree of reality as a being distinguishable from, though not independent of, God, a divine agent rather than merely a divine characteristic.[11]

There are certain characteristics which are common to almost all the Jewish wisdom books. The writers regularly speak in their own name. They claim no special inspiration, nor do they use the law of Moses as a foundation or source. They may in fact on occasion go beyond the decrees of Moses (cf. Proverbs 6.32-35). They certainly do not mention any collection of sacred books. When these sages do refer to any part of the Old Testament, they do so freely, without any other purpose than to discover the truth on a given matter. The writers conceive their function to be the pursuit of universal moral and religious knowledge. They make their appeal solely on the basis of human reason. Occasionally they may have pursued their purpose in such a way as to attract the suspicion of the prophets (cf. Jeremiah 9.23).

The wisdom literature is also primarily "non-national."[12] Generally speaking, the religion of the

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[11] R. N. Whybray, Wisdom in Proverbs, 13. For Whybray's assessment of Ecclesiasticus and the Wisdom of Solomon, see page 11.

[12] See W.O.E. Oesterley, The Books of the Apocrypha, 225f, Davies, op. cit.; however, see: Rankin, op. cit., 11f.

Jews was quite nationalistic in character. The faith of Israel as well as their law was couched in events of national history. The wisdom books depart from this mood completely. Their quest for truth rises above any national barrier.

An introduction to the most basic uses of the word "wisdom" is to be found in a range of associations which extends from the mundane to the very religious. It is possible, for example, to cite certain insects as models of industrious wisdom:

> Go to the ant, O sluggard;
> consider her ways, and be wise
> Without having any chief,
> officer or ruler,
> she prepares her food in summer,
> and gathers her sustenance in harvest.
> Proverbs 6.6-8

Here it is "wise" in the example to be industrious and to prepare for the future.

The word is often found in a context in which it refers to technical skill in a craft or trade. Solomon, when building the temple, sent for Hiram of Tyre because he "was full of wisdom and understanding, and skill, for making any work in bronze." (1 Kings 7.14; cf. 2 Chronicles 2.13ff.).

Ezekiel (28.4) records the fact that God announced to the prince of Tyre, ". . . by your wisdom and your understanding you have gotten wealth for yourself." In this passage the characteristic has to do with a certain shrewdness with regard to business manipulation. The word here does not have altogether good connotations because it is also recorded (Ezekiel 28.7ff.) that this same characteristic was responsible for his premature dethronement. The use of the term to speak of something bad is further evidenced in 2 Samuel 13.3 where Jonadab is described as a "crafty" man in conceiving a plan for Absalom to seduce Tamar.

Further, in a rather different situation, the term is also applied to the woman who counselled Joab (2 Samuel 20.16ff.) that the continued existence of an important city was of more value than the life of a single man. Here a woman's good judgement receives the epithet.

In a context that is both religious and political, Joshua is said to have been "full of the spirit of wisdom" (Deuteronomy 34.9). The context indicates that this possession was a divine gift through his predecessor Moses. The gift itself had to do with Joshua's ability to offer the kind of leadership needed by the children of Israel.

More frequently, however, "wisdom" is used to speak of a human quality which expressed itself in more ethical and sometimes almost purely religious terms. In this type of context "wisdom" implies the ability to know what is right and therefore consistency in doing the right thing. Deane describes this as, "The habit of making a right choice".[13] Depth of understanding and comprehension within the individual concerned are always present. The sheer force of right judgements is its primary manifestation. And, somewhat paradoxically at first glance, the "fear of the Lord" is its beginning point.[14] Though it presents certain obvious difficulties this "fear" of the Lord had very natural beginnings in Israelite religious history.

> The term fear goes back historically to the dread which was felt in the presence of the powerful and stern tribal or national deity; Semitic deities were in the historical period generally conceived of as lords or kings, exercising constant control over their peoples, and inflicting punishment on them for disobedience. This is the prevailing attitude of the pious man toward God throughout the OT; only the sentiment gradually advances from the form of mere dread of the divine anger to that of reverence for the divine law.[15]

Job was a righteous man, "one who feared God, and turned away from evil.(1.1)." It seems more than coincidental that this same formula occurs in what appears to be an independent oracle at the end of a well-known wisdom passage.

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[13] W. J. Deane, The Book of Wisdom, 25.

[14] Proverbs 1.7; 9.10; 10.27; 14.26f.; 15.33; 16.6; 19.23, etc.

[15] C. H. Toy, Proverbs, 10.

> And he said to man,
> 'Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom;
> And to depart from evil is understanding.'
> Job 28.28 [16]

Though the verse stands independently, the relationship expressed between "fear" and "wisdom" is important, i.e.,

> "fear"="wisdom", and
> "departure from evil"="understanding".

In the typical Jewish legalistic view, not to keep the law is to do evil. To do evil is to make punishment inevitable. To expect punishment results in fear or dread. In a positive expression: wisdom as a human quality manifests itself in keeping the law.

The best solution to the problem is to recognize it and treat it as one of the genuine limitations of the Hebrew mind of the period. To attempt to gloss over or explain away is unsatisfactory. It is also inadequate to read back twentieth-century theological treatments of the question. Cohen comments on Proverbs 1.7.

> Not dread, but reverence of God expressed in submission to his will. It is 'that fear of reverential awe which is perfectly consistent with aspiration, trust and love.' (Maclaren)[17]

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[16] *Infra*, 28.

[17] A. Cohen, *Proverbs*, 3. Cf. R. Bultmann, *Primitive Christianity*, 25.

This "fear of the Lord" may have arisen at least partly out of a deterioration of a more genuine concept of wisdom.[18] Psalms 1 and 128 are particularly important in the elevation of those who let the law determine their practical lives. Of these two Psalms, Eissfeldt says:

> They are in fact not real wisdom poems, but they belong with this group in so far as they reveal its special characteristics, though they have replaced the wisdom which is normally glorified in the poems of the group by faithfulness to the law and the fear of God, and they thus reflect the development which wisdom literature in general went through in Israel.[19]

Eissfeldt discusses the possibility that there are other Psalms that may belong to this kind of a classification, being characterized by a dissolution of wisdom into piety.[20]

This dissolution contained a tendency to equate wisdom with Torah. This association was made as early as Deuteronomy, "Keep them and do them (the commandments); for that will be your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the peoples." (Deuteronomy 4.6). Bevan goes so far as to say:

> Yes, the Hebrew sage feels vividly that this Law handed down among his people, is no mere code of a single small race, not even merely of the earth,

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[18] Eissfeldt, op. cit., 126f.

[19] *Ibid*.

[20] *Infra*, 18.

> but the incarnation, if one may say so, of a cosmic principle and akin to the stars.[21]

One should not however imply that the Old Testament concept of Law always led to legalism. Even Deuteronomy encompasses a genuine concept of love. We will have occasion to return to this aspect of wisdom studiės a number of times. Nevertheless it is in order to notice Davies' three-point summary. He argues that through its association with Wisdom, Torah came to be considered: 1) older than the world, 2) connected with creation, and 3) the beneficiary of the creation of the world.[22] If this is true we have another insight into the complexity of the line of development which we are investigating.

It will be apparent at many points that the conceptual world which we are considering includes the Old Testament notion of the "word [דָבָר] of the Lord." This word was associated both with the creative and saving activity of God.[23] Cullmann summarizes:

> There are many passages in the Old Testament in which, following the first chapter of Genesis, the 'Word of God' is made the object of independent consideration because of its powerful effect, even though it may not yet be personified. These passages

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[21] E. Bevan, *Jerusalem Under the High Priests*, 60.

[22] Davies, *op. cit.*, 170f.

[23] A. Richardson, *An Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament*, 159f.

are connected above all with the creation story, in which everything happens as a result of the word which God speaks. 'Let there be light, and there was light.' When one reflects on this, the idea comes that every creative self-revelation of God to the world happens through his word. *His word is the side of God turned toward the world*.[24]

Although this idea played an important role in the Old Testament the opinion reached in this study is that it does not reach either genuine personification or hypostatization. Moore argues that this kind of development was the product of the Targums.[25] It does seem true however that the reality present in the Semitic mind was so vivid that when it passed into Hellenic thought hypostatization was in a sense inevitable.[26]

There can be no reasonable doubt that the ideas of Word and Wisdom in the Old Testament grew up together.[27] It may even be possible to observe a certain interpenetration of the ideas surrounding the two words in the authors of the wisdom literature.[28] It will be possible to see a number of points of development in the course of

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[24] O. Cullmann, *The Christology of the New Testament*, 255.

[25] G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, 417ff.

[26] S. Laeuchli, *The Language of Faith*, 181.

[27] E. M. Sidebottom, *The Christ of the Fourth Gospel*, 32. For a broad discussion of these words in this context see H. Ringgren, *Word and Wisdom* (Uppsala: 1947).

[28] Richardson, *op. cit.*, 160.

this investigation. However, it is fair at this point to anticipate a direct link between the various Old Testament manifestations and New Testament passages such as John's prologue.

One familiar passage that enters almost every discussion of this Old Testament theme is Psalm 33.6. Whiteley with penetrating insight says:

> . . . it is tempting to quote Ps. 33.6, 'By the word of the Lord the heavens were made,' and to say that the 'word of the Lord' has been hypostatized. But if we complete the verse, 'And all their host by the breath of his mouth', we are led to suspect that the Psalmist is merely reproducing or anticipating in a more vivid poetical form, the thought of Gen. 1.14-15, 'And God said, Let there be lights . . . and it was so.'[29]

Even when exercising necessary caution it is evident that we have here background material for later New Testament themes. This will be supported a number of times as our discussion proceeds.

II. THE OLD TESTAMENT

Solomon. Of Israel's wise men, Solomon was idealized as the greatest.[30] This occurred in spite of the well-known factors which might have set themselves over against such an idealization. The relative freedom from outside interference and the comparative wealth of Israel at the time must have been two of the elements which contributed to the development. Easily remembered associations are also important. From the story of the two harlots arguing over the one live child to the visit of the Queen of Sheba, associations were drawn together which still stir the imagination.

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[29] D. E. H. Whiteley, The Theology of St. Paul, 111f.

[30] See R. B. Y Scott, "Solomonic Tradition" in Wisdom in Israel and in the Ancient Near East, Supplements to Vetus Testamentum 3 (Leiden: 1955).

The story goes that the Lord spoke to Solomon telling him to ask whatever he would. This rather ambiguous command has the overtones of a testing if not a temptation. Solomon did not consider wealth or length of life, but reflecting on the extreme difficulties of leading the Lord's people, he realized his most fundamental need.

> Give thy servant an understanding mind (cf. "wisdom and knowledge", 1 Chronicles 1.10) to govern thy people that I may discern between good and evil; for who is able to govern this thy great people?
> 1 Kings 3.9

Not only was his request honored, but because it took this form, wealth and long life were given in addition. Not only is the situation thus described, but divine reasons are given for the facts.

The summary of this episode of Israel's history soars to great literary heights. It not only includes the "facts," but was something of an achievement in itself.

> And God gave Solomon wisdom and understanding beyond measure, and largeness of mind like the sand on the seashore, so that Solomon's wisdom surpassed the wisdom of all the people of the east, and all the wisdom of Egypt. For he was wiser than Ethan the Ezrahite, and Herman, Calcol, and Darda, the sons of Mahol; and his fame was in all the nations round about. He also uttered three thousand proverbs; and his songs were a thousand and five. He spoke of trees, from the cedar that is in Lebanon to the hyssop that grows out of the wall; he spoke also of beasts, and of birds, and of reptiles, and of fish. And men came from all peoples to hear the wisdom of Solomon, and from all the Kings of the earth, who had heard of his wisdom.
>
> 1 Kings 4.29-34

Although Solomon is usually associated with wisdom, such is not always the case. In Ecclesiastes he is cast in the role of disparaging its quest as one other of the impossible tasks of men. This is clearly evident in the following quotations.

> For in much wisdom is much vexation,
> and he who increases knowledge increases
> sorrow.
>
> The wise man has his eyes in his
> head, but the fool walks in darkness;
> and yet I perceived that one fate
> comes to all of them.
>
> Ecclesiastes 1.18; 2.14

Although one should not over-emphasize elements of this sort, they must be taken into account if we are to achieve a balanced view.

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Psalms. Certain of the Psalms reflect characteristics generally attributed to "wisdom" literature.[31] There lies behind this reality a strong tendency of the psalmists to equate right living with an observance of the law.[32]

> The whole range of religious interests reflected in the hymns, the prayers, and the meditations of the Psalter are directly or indirectly related to the ordinances of the law.[33]

It is here that wisdom itself is measured by the standard of the law; thus another Torah association is observed.

It is difficult to characterize this set of attitudes without being unfair in one way or another. There is the problem of theodicy as well as the tendency in reviewing this kind of situation to telescope the development of attitudes that could only have taken centuries to occur. It is our contention that it is possible to find traces or at least implications in the Psalms of all the attitudes mentioned here.

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[31] The suggested list varies from source to source. Regularly included however are: Psalms 1; 19; 37; 49; 73; 112; 119; 128; 133. For an introductory article in this area see: S. Mowinckel, "Psalms and Wisdom," essay in Wisdom in Israel and the Ancient Near East, Supplements to Vetus Testamentum, vol. 3 (Leiden: 1955), 205-224.

[32] Supra, 9ff.

[33] Interpreter's Bible, Vol. 4, 17.

There seems to have been at least something of a desire to make security and prosperity in this life direct results of observing the law. Difficulty arose when one observed a wicked man, i.e., one who did not regard the law, who also prospered. There were times of national historical interest when such a theology could be put to a severe test. This is of course the point at which theodicy becomes a problem. This sort of thing had the potential for the individual of causing him to reflect on his own keeping of the law; if he had overlooked something, or perhaps failed altogether. There were therefore elements that one might describe as "typically Pharisaic" at an early period.

The wicked were so judged because they refused to keep the law. The pious keeper of the law expected the judgment of God to descend upon the wicked in some drastic form momentarily. Their prosperity could only be a temporary delusion. They were surely expected to come to nought -- and that within this life. Any attempt to give birth to a longer theological view within the Israel reflected by this literature was destined to meet with great difficulty.

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These "wisdom" psalms have only to do with right and wrong living. That is to say that "wisdom" in them is seen as a human quality only. The "divine principle", as defined earlier, is only distantly related to these "rules for living." Only in so far as the rules themselves are good and true, do they represent God. They are usually viewed as coming from the eternal, but there is no attempt to personify wisdom itself. It is viewed as a human quality, inseparably related to the law, but which dwells in the hearts of men.

As well as serving as a beautiful prelude to the collection itself, Psalm 1 demonstrates the great dichotomy that exists between the righteous and the wicked, the wise and the foolish -- indeed, right and wrong.

1.1 Blessed is the man
    who walks not in the counsel of the wicked,
  nor stands in the way of sinners,
    nor sits in the seat of scoffers;
2 but his delight is in the law of the Lord,
    and on his law he meditates day and night.

4 The wicked are not so,
    but are like the chaff which the wind drives
      away.
5 Therefore the wicked will not stand in the judgment,
    nor sinners in the congregation of the righteous;
6 for the Lord knows the way of the righteous,
    but the way of the wicked will perish.

Though unique in a number of ways itself, Psalm 119 contains most of the elements characteristic of this type of literature. The Psalm contains the cry of a man who has done right in his own eyes. He is, however, undergoing taunting and persecution by certain of the prosperous wicked. This creates doubt. Why is he, a pious keeper of the law, subjected to this kind of treatment from this kind of person? It occurs to him that he may not have kept the law as well as he thought he had. His is a legal righteousness and his fear rises directly out of his observance of the law.

The psalmist insists that he loves the law. Indeed, he insists on the fact to the point of distraction. It may be that above all he is attempting to convince himself.[34] He had apparently expected the "good life" to follow from his observance of the law. It had not. He observes some who openly disregard the law who are prospering by all material (and spiritual?) standards. They are in fact the sources of his own trouble. He prays that his hope will not be so destroyed. He calls on the Lord to act because his law had been disregarded. The action is not forthcoming. He despairs at an attempt to reconcile his own attempts at righteousness with his anguish in this life and the prosperity of the wicked. When viewed in its most revealing light his problem is not unlike that of Job.

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[34] The Psalm is usually interpreted more positively. Cf., e.g., Whiteley, _op_. _cit_., 78.

It is just this problem in its many manifestations that is fundamental to the reflective wisdom literature of the Old Testament.

Job. Though impossible to date because of its very nature, the book of Job represents one of man's earliest reflections on the dilemma of good and evil within the spectrum of human existence. The book contains elements that go well back into antiquity, though its form as it now stands may be as late as the Greek period (333-165 B.C.).[35] The setting of the book is patriarchal and no doubt some of the attitudes it manifests were current during that period.

Before considering the key wisdom passage, it is in order to consider the book as a unit. In addition to the fact that the book is a part of Israel's wisdom literature, Job himself, though a fictitious character, was considered by the author as a wise man.

> There was a man in the land of Uz, whose name
> was Job; and that man was blameless and upright,
> one who feared God, and turned away from evil.
> Job 1.1

The key phrase is "that man was blameless and upright." The English "blameless" and the LXX ἄμεμπτος fall somewhat short of rendering the Hebrew תָם. It implies a complete character, "all of a piece, not, as the Satan and after him the friends insinuate, one thing on the surface and another within."[36] "Upright" (יָשָׁר) reflects a concept of loyalty. Job was loyal to God and this loyalty is measured against the standard of the law. Job would have "measured up" to the most rigorous legal standard. This relationship to Torah is stated here in terms of turning away from evil.[37]

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[35] Anthony and Miriam Hanson, The Book of Job, 87. Somewhat more conservatively Dhorme (E. Dhorme, Job, Paris: 1926, E. T. Leiden: 1967, clxix ff.) suggests 500-450 B.C.

After the narrative introduction (chapters 1 and 2) the book follows a definite pattern. Job makes the first speech, then his three friends speak one at a time alternating with Job. This continues until Job's friends complete eight speeches. The pattern is broken at this point and a number of questions concerning the development of the text arise. It is possible that 27.1 and 29.1 indicate a pause on Job's part awaiting a response; and, when no response was forthcoming, Job picked up again. Chapter 28 appears as an insertion in this wider context. Dhorme, while recognizing this, describes the chapter as

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[36] S. R. Driver, *Job* (ICC), 3f.

[37] See the discussion of 28.28 for a treatment of this principle in a "wisdom" context, *infra* 28. It should not be necessary to call special attention to the fact that Torah associations are present every time they occur.

a "magnificent poem on wisdom."[38] Although the chapter seems to have little if any literary connection with what precedes or follows, the insertion itself possesses a certain logical claim. This is seen especially in Job's lament for his former respect found in chapter 29.

The present form of chapter 28 itself is not without question, e.g., the LXX omits vv. 14-19. However, as it stands this poem about wisdom is divided into three sections. The first reflects on the fact that man spares no effort to force the depths of the earth to yield their treasures which make man's earthly existence either better or more pleasant.

28.1 Surely there is a mine for silver,
    and a place for gold which they refine.
2 Iron is taken out of the earth,
    and copper is smelted from the ore.
3 Men put an end to darkness,
    and search out to the farthest bound
    the ore in gloom and deep darkness.
4 They open shafts in a valley away
    from where men live;
    they are forgotten by travelers,
    they hang afar from men,
    they swing to and fro.
5 As for the earth, out of it comes bread;
    but underneath it is turned up as by fire.
6 Its stones are the place of sapphires,
    and it has dust of gold.

7 That path no bird of prey knows,
    and the falcon's eye has not seen it.
8 The proud beasts have not trodden it,
    the lion has not passed over it.

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[38] Dhorme, _op_. _cit_., li.

9 Man puts his hand to the flinty rock,
and overturns mountains by the roots.
10 He cuts out channels in the rocks,
and his eye sees every precious thing.
11 He binds up the streams so that they do not trickle,
and the thing that is hid he brings forth to light.

The second section (vv. 12-22; LXX 12, 13, 20-22) points out that wisdom cannot be thus sought or valued. In this section it is to be noted that man has no means of access to the domain of wisdom.

28.12 But where shall wisdom be found?
and where is the place of understanding?
13 Man does not know the way to it,
and it is not found in the land of the living.
14 The deep says, 'It is not in me',
and the sea says, 'It is not with me'.
15 It cannot be gotten for gold,
and silver cannot be weighed as its price.
16 It cannot be valued in the gold of Ophir,
in precious onyx or sapphire.
17 Gold and glass cannot equal it,
nor can it be exchanged for jewels of fine gold.
18 No mention shall be made of coral or of crystal;
the price of wisdom is above pearls.
19 The topaz of Ethiopia cannot compare with it,
nor can it be valued in pure gold.

20 Whence then comes wisdom?
and where is the place of understanding?
21 It is hid from the eyes of all living,
and concealed from the birds of the air.
22 Abaddon and Death say,
'We have heard a rumor of it with our ears.'

After laying such a foundation the author then comes to answer the supreme question, "Whence then comes wisdom?"

28.23 God understands the way to it,
and he knows its place.
24 For he looks to the ends of the earth,
and sees everything under the heavens.

25 When he gave to the wind its weight,
    and meted out the waters by measure;
26 when he made a decree for the rain,
    and a way for the lightning of the thunder,
27 then he saw it and declared it;
    he established it, and searched it out.
28 And he said to man,
    'Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom;
    and to depart from evil is understanding'.

In these verses: 1) only God is aware of the approach to wisdom (vv. 23f.), and 2) at creation, sustained a rather complex relationship to it (vv. 25-27). The concluding statement concerning human wisdom (v. 28) should be regarded as an independent epilogue.

An analysis of this last section--especially verse 27--is vital. That is, the exact way in which this relationship was conceptualized is important for it is here that we may obtain a glimpse of the earliest development toward the notion of a wisdom figure as an independent reality.

Verse 27 reads:

אָז רָאָהּ וַיְסַפְּרָהּ
הֱכִינָהּ וְגַם־חֲקָרָהּ

Though it has been argued that the text should be emended to read more like a typical synonymous parallel, the general conclusion is that the four verbs represent a single "progression".

> A careful progression is observed in the succession of the verbs used here: God first perceives the existence of wisdom (ראה) and thereupon he measures and computes its significance (ספר); then after he has tested its value, he fixes and settles it, or sets it up, thereby ensuring its stability and its duration (הכין); finally he scrutinizes and explores it to its ultimate consequences (חקר).[39]

"The last verb חֲקָרָהּ 'He examined it' marks the climax of these intellectual operations."[40]

It should be carefully noted that there is no concern in the passage to establish the fact that God created wisdom. This element comes in at a later stage. Here it is recorded that God recognized wisdom at creation and that he determined that its existence should continue. This continued existence is based on the fact that he completely explored it. This exploration determined its absolute goodness. This inherent goodness demanded the right of eternal existence.

The basic point rests upon the eternal validity of truth. The word "wisdom" here stands for that which is right and good. Overlooking relative factors, what is "right and good" will always be so. Such completely valid truth deserves and here receives assurance of eternal existence.

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[39] Interpreter's Bible, Vol. 3, 1104.

[40] Dhorme, op. cit., 413.

Verse 28 (cf. 1.1) stands as an independent oracle.

> And he said to man,
> 'Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom;
> and to depart from evil is understanding'.

To this point in chapter 28, the discussion has had as its object that eternal principle--not yet personified[41]-- which was thought to exist only alongside God. Indeed, only God had access to it. Here that other kind of wisdom is introduced which is accessible to man and which he may make a part of his own existence. This synthesis would have been made by one who saw the similarity of subject matter without apprehending the finer distinction as to type. That is, it is not likely that an accessible wisdom would have been placed side by side with an inaccessible one if the author had realized that such a distinction should be made.

Proverbs. The most important single passage which contributes to the Old Testament foundation for the later development of the wisdom theme is Proverbs 8.22-31.

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[41] It should be observed that some have seen personification here. Richardson, for example (op. cit., 156) speaks of Job 28.12-27 as "the earliest personification of Wisdom." He does however go on to say that it is "little more" than "poetic emphasis" of the broader concept of wisdom.

The significance of its contribution will become evident as the relevant passages from the inter-testamental period onwards are considered. Although the entire book is included within Israel's wisdom literature, chapters 1-9, because of their concern for wisdom, will occupy our attention here.

Proverbs is a collection of material which continues to defy detailed literary analysis. It is apparently impossible to reach any widely accepted view of its literary history.[42] In the midst of this uncertainty, however, it is almost universally concluded that chapters 1-9 belong to the last stratum of material. Yet they too reflect changes, developments and accretions. Before considering any passages in detail, it is important to consider general impressions.

Though often attributed to Solomon (1.1; 10.1; 25.1), the Hebrew title is simply Mishle (משלי, i.e., Proverbs). It is also indicated (24.23; 31.1) that material was gathered from other sources. In addition, it is confided (25.1) that at least a portion of the book was subjected to a certain transition at a later period. The present literary form would seem to presuppose a long

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[42] For the latest, but highly imaginative view see: R. N. Whybray, Wisdom in Proverbs (London: 1965).

period of time during which popular sayings, which arose out of the experience and observation of life, gradually became proverbial. Oesterley sees variation in outlook as one evidence of a long period of development.[43]

The wise men were deeply concerned about walking righteously in the sight of God. Every phase of life was religious for them. This principle not only explains their reason for addressing themselves to diverse subjects, but also reveals their deeply religious mind. Their concern was for the broadest development of character and they laid down principles of guidance toward this end.

This means that the most practical suggestions made by these wise men were, for them, set in a religious context.[44] Though in a scholar's reconstruction a definite dichotomy of thought can be observed between the two types of wisdom, it must be emphasized, especially in Proverbs, that this does not entirely do justice to at least some aspects of this material. "Worldly wisdom in its manifold forms does not differ in kind, but only in

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[43] W. O. E. Oesterley, The Book of Proverbs, xiii, cf. xxii.

[44] Cf. 11.5; 23.17.

degree, from wisdom at its highest."[45] All of the elements which go to make up the realities of any man's daily life are considered to be a part of God's order. The obligation of every man to seek truth is recognized in chapters 1-9, but the 'truth' is a law of conduct, obedience to which makes prosperity and happiness secure.

In agreement with the other wisdom books, Proverbs equates virtue and knowledge. This may manifest a tendency of the wisdom literature to move away from the remainder of the Old Testament.

In the latter portion of Proverbs (i.e., chapter 10 onwards) wisdom is a human quality which exerts its influence in the ordinary affairs of men. In the opening chapters it appears in the larger character of "sovereign of life." It should be apparent that it is only a single step from this to the portrayal of 8:22-31, in which "she" is a divine attribute. It is not altogether clear, however, whether the sages themselves had taken this step and/or to what extent they were aware of it. The material at hand does not present any self-consistent pattern.

In addition to the influential passage in chapter 8, there are occasional references in the early chapters of Proverbs that merit attention. The first of these is found in chapter 1.

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[45] Oesterley, Proverbs, LX.

1.24 Because I have called and you refused to listen,
have stretched out my hand and no one has heeded,
25 and you have ignored all my counsel
and would have none of my reproof,
26 I also will laugh at your calamity;
I will mock when panic strikes you,
27 when panic strikes you like a storm,
and your calamity comes like a whirlwind,
when distress and anguish come upon you.

Surely the thing that strikes the reader is that wisdom is here for the first time openly personified. As regards the intention of the author, there may be nothing more in 1.24f. than the fact that it was unpopular at the time of writing to follow the wise way. However, in the later developments of the wisdom theme,[46] the rejection of wisdom by various individuals or groups plays an important role. This is the earliest hint of such a phenomenon in the Jewish-Christian tradition.

In the latter portion of the above quotation (vv. 26f.) wisdom manifests a rather strange attitude, i. e., mockery, etc., which any developed view would reject as extremely primitive. However, it must be emphasized that that point of view was quite acceptable at the time.

> The attitude of the personified Wisdom here does not appeal to us, being neither dignified nor wise, according to our ideas; but the enemies of Wisdom

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[46] See especially, Enoch 42; John 1.11, etc.

are regarded in the same light as ordinary enemies, and to exult over them in the day of their defeat was the natural thing to do.[47]

It has been observed that Job 28 asserts that wisdom was present at and existed prior to the material creation. It is also the case that the author of Job appears to be extremely careful not to involve wisdom in the fact of creation itself. It may simply be that this question had not yet occurred. In any case, presence and pre-existence only are mentioned. It is in Proverbs that we find wisdom drawn into creative activity for the first time.

3.19 The Lord by wisdom founded the earth;
by understanding he established the heavens;
20 by his knowledge the deeps broke forth,
and the clouds drop down the dew.

There is a remarkably similar reference in Jeremiah.

It is he who made the earth by his power,
who established the world by his wisdom,
and by his understanding stretched out the heavens.
Jeremiah 10.12

If we only possessed the first phrase of the Proverbs passage it might be possible to argue that the

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[47] Oesterley, *op. cit.*, 12, cf. 2 Chronicles 20.27; however Micah 7.8 and Proverbs 24.17 seem to put another view. That this attitude may ultimately depend upon the Ugaritic myth of Baal and Anath; see R.B.Y. Scott, *Proverbs*, 39; J. B. Pritchard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament* (2nd. ed.), 136.

author was thinking of a personified figure. However, when "understanding" and "knowledge" appear as parallels in the context, wisdom must be limited to a quality.[48] Here wisdom is an attribute of the creator. The skill manifest in the created order itself would seem to be the primary emphasis.

> Wisdom here seems to be simply an attribute, with no approach to hypostatization. --The expressions founded and established belong to the old Hebrew cosmogonical ideas. The earth was conceived of as a plane mass, resting on an ocean (Ps 24.2; 136.6), as having foundations (Isa 51.13; Ps 104.5; Pr 8.29) and as supported by pillars (Job 9.6; Ps 75.3(4)); Sheol was apparently supposed to be beneath the subjacent ocean (cf. Am 9.2, 3). Above the earth the heavens or sky was thought of as a material expanse (Gen 1.2), fixed in its place by God and supported by pillars (Job 26.11; Ps 18.7 (8)), by which we are probably to understand the mountains.[49]

To look momentarily at the wider circumstance, the link between creation and wisdom seems to have been established quite naturally. The eternal nature of the rightness of wisdom demanded existence at the time of creation; and involvement was a "natural" result of presence. There is also here an important step towards hypostasis. "Creation" is conceived as a "time" when

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[48] Cf. Scott, op. cit., 48.

[49] Toy, Proverbs, 71.

God "acted." Once wisdom appeared in the creative situation, it could not be long until "it" would be drawn into an active role alongside and in conjunction with God. That is to say that there is what one must call a "natural" mutual dependence between conceptions of an anthropomorphic type and hypostasis. One would assume that the ease of anthropomorphic statement would depend upon nearness to hypostasis.

The author of Proverbs 8.22ff., in drawing a number of things together, demonstrates a rather extensive effort on his part toward a systematic presentation of the complex of ideas surrounding wisdom.

8.22 The Lord created me at the beginning of his work,
the first of his acts of old.
23 Ages ago I was set up,
at the first, before the beginning of the earth.
24 When there were no depths I was brought forth,
when there were no springs abounding with water.
25 Before the mountains had been shaped,
before the hills, I was brought forth;
26 before he had made the earth with its fields,
or the first of the dust of the world.
27 When he established the heavens, I was there,
when he drew a circle on the face of the deep,
28 when he made firm the skies above,
when he established the fountains of the deep,
29 when he assigned to the sea its limit,
so that the waters might not transgress his command,
30 when he marked out the foundations of the earth,
then I was beside him, like a master workman;
and I was daily his delight,
rejoicing before him always,
31 rejoicing in his inhabited world
and delighting in the sons of men.

The passage includes three basic points: (1) wisdom was brought into being before the material order (vv. 22-26), (2) was present (vv. 27-29), and (3) in some sense active (vv. 30f.) at the creation of the material order. The nature and extent of its activity is the primary question to be asked of the passage.

It is right to say of wisdom in the passage that it is "so distinctly personalized (personified) that it is well on the way to being hypostatized."[50] However, it is our conviction that the author of the passage had in mind no concept approaching hypostasis.[51] On the other hand, it should be apparent that the wording of the section certainly admits to that kind of interpretation. It would appear, as we shall see, that this was the way the passage was often taken in the later tradition. In this way it played an important part in the developing thought patterns. As we have observed earlier, the potential of the passage was so great that even certain

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[50] Interpreter's Bible, Vol. 4, 774.

[51] Scott holds that the passage does not contain a hypostasis. He (op. cit., 71f.) comments: "What is here being affirmed is not that Wisdom is creator, but that Yahweh's attribute of wisdom "existed" prior to its expression in his acts of creation."

modern commentators tend to read back into the passage later interpretations.[52] One must always be aware of the possibility of interpretations technically legitimate and yet at possible/probable variation with the original author's intention.

The meanings as well as the implications of the verbs used to describe Yahweh's relationship to wisdom at its origin are of supreme importance. The first of these [קנה] has received a great deal of attention.[53] The most common meaning is to acquire or possess. However, a less regular, but quite legitimate translation is to create.

> And he (Melchizedek) blessed him (Abram) and said
> Blessed be Abram by God Most High
> maker (קֹנֵה) of heaven and earth.
> Genesis 14.19 (cf.v. 22)

And,

> For thou didst form (קָנִיתָ) my inward parts,
> thou didst knit me together in my mother's womb.
> Psalm 139.13[54]

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[52] Supra, 6f.

[53] See especially, C. F. Burney, JTS, xxvii (1926), 160-177. In an elaborate and well known treatment of the problem Burney explores the possible meanings.

[54] Cf. Sirach 1.4, 9; 24.8, etc.

Burney,[55] in view of the specific nature of the situation, concludes that "begat" would be the best translation of the verb in Proverbs 8.22. Cohen, partly perhaps because of his point of view, makes a unique contribution at this point.

> The verb kanah, usually 'acquire', has the meaning create in Gen 14.19, 22; Deut 32.6; Ps 139.13. It is to be noted how the writer stresses the thought that wisdom is something apart from, brought into being by, and therefore subservient to God, by asserting the fact of its creation at the outset. "What distinguishes this conception of wisdom is the fact that here wisdom is, as it were, temporarily detached from its divine source and treated as a Personality . . . . But what is of importance to point out is, that its detachment from its divine source was not meant by the writer to imply 'any theory of permanent distinctions within the divine nature, each endowed with its own separate self-consciousness'. Wisdom has no personal life of its own and points to no profound mystery on the Being of God. Right through the passage it is "God's wisdom" (Abelson). For the Jewish reader this interpretation is of much importance in view of the Christological use made of this section by the early Church Fathers.[56]

Few thinking Christians would argue about this assessment of the original meaning of the passage. However, regardless of its correctness, Cohen's comment puts in sharp relief the problem of the use of scripture in explaining events or phenomena occurring later than the writing of the scripture being interpreted.

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[55] Burney, *op. cit.*, 166

[56] Cohen, *op. cit.*, 48.

The second verb in the sequence (Hebrew text: נִסַּכְתִּי, 'I was set up') was apparently considered difficult by some early translators. ". . . the renderings of the Versions presuppose the reading נוֹסַדְתִּי, 'I was founded'".[57] In this connection Burney analyses Psalm 139.13,[58] and Job 10.11.

> Thou didst clothe me with skin and flesh,
> and knit me together (תְּשֹׂכְכֵנִי) with bones and sinews.

However, he concludes, ". . . in Proverbs 8.23 . . . נִסַּכְתִּי means 'I was woven' (prenatal growth of the embryo). . . .[59]

If, therefore, the first two verbs are properly translated "begat", and "knit together" (in the womb), there is only one more step, and that is clearly provided by חוֹלָלְתִּי, "I was brought forth." The four verbs of the sequence found in vv. 22-25 (the last is used twice) would therefore seem to indicate a process analogous to the birth of a child from conception onwards.[60]

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[57] Oesterley, op. cit., 62.

[58] Supra, page 37.

[59] Burney, op. cit., 166.

As this study unfolds we shall see a number of variations in the employment either of this passage or what appear to be aspects of it in the explanation of the incarnation. It is our conviction that this conception of the incarnation was the result of what to the Jewish mind were logical associations and that it was originally based on the thoughts of conception and birth as an aspect of human existence.

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[60] It is widely known that the interpretations of this passage have differed somewhat through the years. We do not have the space to give any adequate review of them here. One modern treatment of the passage is that of Scott (op. cit., 69ff.). He translates as follows:

8.22 The Lord possessed me, the first principle of
his sovereignty,
Before any of his acts,
23 Ere then, from of old I was poured out,
From the first, before the beginnings of the world;
24 I was brought forth when there were no watery deeps,
No primeval sources or springs of the sea,
25 Before the mountains were settled on their bases,
Before the hills, was I born.

Scott thus follows the more traditional meaning of קנה. He concludes that the birth figure should be confined to vv. 24f. Our interpretation on the other hand may be open to criticism in that we have given over to this birth analogy in the wider context. Perhaps the most apparent unanswered question in Scott is why this should not be so. The obvious point of course is that a certain amount of uncertainty must remain in the passage. In either case our final conclusions are not materially different from those of Scott.

It is important to assess the time suggestions made in the passage. The Hebrew prepositions, it would appear, introduce the point of time not before which but at which wisdom came into being. Nothing is said of the status of wisdom before creation began. This would seem to imply that wisdom was conceived to have been created at a definite point in time.[61] It will be observed later in detail that this differs from the Logos of Philo and the gospel of John.

As we have observed, it is outside the scope of this investigation to probe in detail into the relationships of the biblical material with the literature of other cultures. However, the similarity of this passage to the opening lines of the Babylonian Creation myth cannot be overlooked. Although the following quotation is incomplete grammatically, it is possible to see certain vague

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[61] The simplest explanation may be that this particular point had not been raised. T. W. Manson (On Paul and John, 142) says that in this passage "Wisdom" (apparently viewed as a hypostatized figure) claims pre-existence. "The pre-existence is real pre-existence: Wisdom was there before the world or any part of it was formed." Manson nevertheless goes ahead to urge that "Wisdom" was a created being.

For a modern examination of בְּרֵשִׁית see W. Eichrodt, "In the Beginning" in Israel's Prophetic Heritage, edited by B. W. Anderson and W. Harrelson (London: 1962), 1-10. See also: Dodd, The Bible and the Greeks, 109; Burney, op. cit.; and Davies, op. cit., 152.

Further, see discussion of Colossians 1, infra 193ff.

similarities in tone and phrasing between it and Proverbs 8.22ff.

> 'When the heaven above was not yet named,
> And the earth below had not yet been created,
> But the primeval Ocean, the begotten . . .
> When no fields had been formed,
> And no marsh land yet existed;
> When the gods had not come forth, not one,
> And no destinies were decided . . . .'[62]

Returning to Proverbs 8, the stanza contained in verses 27-29 states that wisdom was with the creator God when material things were brought into existence. Wisdom was therefore active in the creation itself only so far as the creator God was "wise" in his creative actions. This conclusion is of course based on the opinion that although elements tending toward hypostasis are in the passage, hypostasis itself is yet some distance away. Oesterley concludes that this stanza, "describes . . . what God created by the instrumentality of wisdom."[63]

It seems that an unquestionable conclusion concerning verse 30 is impossible. The facts, however, are clear. The Hebrew אָמוֹן occurs here and nowhere else in the Old Testament. There is uncertainty about its meaning but "ward' and "little child" are possibilities. From very early times however the word has been understood as אָמָן, "architect". Rabbi Hoshajah seems to reflect such an interpretation. He says:

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[62] Oesterley, op. cit., 63.

[63] Ibid., 61

> 'The Torah says, "I was God's instrument." When a king builds a palace he does not build according to his ideas, but according to those of an architect; nor does the latter build arbitrarily; but he has parchments and tablets whereon the divisions of the apartments and chambers are specified. In the same way God looked into the Torah, and then created the world'.[64]
>
> *Bereshith Rabba*

Here, too, wisdom and Torah are drawn very close together; indeed, Torah stands in the place of wisdom. However, if it can be assumed that Wisdom of Solomon is dependent upon Proverbs 8, a similar interpretation was made somewhat earlier in the Greek *τεχνίτις* of the Wisdom of Solomon.

> I learned both what is secret and
> what is manifest,
> for wisdom, the *fashioner* of all
> things, taught me.
>
> Wisdom of Solomon 7.21

A certain amount of support may be found for both of the preceding suggestions. However, they both require vowels different from those of the Masoretic tradition. Both may also be related to a desire to find hypostasis in the passage. And, no doubt, once these interpretations had been made, in themselves they contributed to the to the conviction that the original author intended to speak of a hypostasis.[65] Scott observes:

> In fact there are three other possible readings with some ancient support: (i) the noun *ʼômēn*,

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[64] Quoted in Oesterley, *op*. *cit*., 64f. Cf. Moore, *Judaism*, vol.1, 266f. This work is assigned to the third century A.D. Attention should be called to the fact that a similar concept was attached at an earlier date to the Philonic Logos, note *infra* 133.

[65] Cf. Scott, *op*. *cit*., 72.

"guardian, teacher"; (ii) the participle ’ōmēn, "uniting, binding"; (iii) the adjective ’āmēn, "true, faithful." In the present writer's view the poet intended the vocalization ’ōmēn, with the meaning "uniting, binding together," as in Sirach xlii 26, "by his word all things hold together."[66]

In view of these observations Scott translates 8.30f. as follows:

Then I was beside him binding [all] together;
  I was his daily joy,
  Constantly making merry in his presence,
Rejoicing in the habitable world
  And delighting in the human race.

To say the least, Scott's suggested pointing and translations are technically legitimate. The clarity of the translation enables the poetic personification to appear in what we feel must be its true form. That is, one is not overly inclined to see hypostasis. In our opinion Scott has clearly opened to view the author's original intention.

The final verb of Proverbs 8.30 מְשַׂחֶקֶת has been translated "sporting"[67] and, perhaps better, "rejoicing" (RSV). It is obvious that such words are not usually associated with an "architect." Again, Scott's translation resolves the difficulty.

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[66] Ibid. See also Scott's article "Wisdom in Creation: the amon of Proverbs 8.30" in Vetus Testamentum 10 (1960), 213-223.

[67] Toy, op. cit., 177.

To some extent the difficulty of the passage remains. However this will not prevent our understanding how the passage was later interpreted and used. Again, it is our opinion that this passage appeared to some readers to possess a hypostasis but only after other developments had taken place. The passage appears in a developing tradition which was often disturbed by interpreters who tended to read back developments which they knew for a certainty only at some later point in the tradition.[68]

III. INTER-TESTAMENTAL LITERATURE[68a]

Sirach. The last document still in our possession produced by the Jewish wisdom tradition that was relatively untouched by Greek thought of a similar type is Sirach. In a significant way it anticipated a new trend of developments within Judaism.

> The importance of the book of Ecclesiasticus as a whole is to be found in its function as an important link in the development of ancient Judaism,

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[68] Cf. J.A.F. Gregg, *Wisdom of Solomon*, xxxii; W. J. Deane, *The Book of Wisdom*, 24; J. Geyer, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, 30; H. Jaeger, "Patristic Conception of Wisdom in the Light of Biblical and Rabinnical Research," in *Studia Patristica IV* (*Texte und Untersuchungen 79*), 93f. Somewhat confusingly, and in contrast to these other scholars, A. Richardson (*An Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament*, 156) says that in Proverbs 8.22-31 "Wisdom is personified and hypostatized."

[68a] It should be noted that in this section we are concerned only with Palestinian intertestamental literature. Documents such as the Wisdom of Solomon will be examined within the structure of "Diaspora Judaism" (see *infra* 97ff.).

It is the last great example of the type of wisdom literature represented in the Old Testament; it is the first specimen of a form of Judaism part of which thereafter developed into the sect of the Sadducees and part into Talmudic rabbinism.[69]

The book itself demonstrates an awareness of Israel's past wisdom tradition. Although it claims no heritage here itself, the links are present. For example:

> The Lord himself created wisdom,
> he saw her and apportioned her,
> he poured her out upon all his works.
> 1.9 (cf. v. 19)

The similarity to Job 28.27, is obvious.

> Then he saw it [wisdom] and declared it;[70]
> he established it, and searched it out.

Not only does Sirach reflect this dimension backwards, but it established itself in the tradition in such a way that its influence was widely known later. For example:

> If you desire wisdom, keep the commandments,
> and the Lord will supply it for you.
> 1.26

Compare:

> If any of you lacks wisdom, let him ask God, who gives to all men generously and without reproaching, and it will be given him.
> James 1.5

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[69] B. M. Metzger, *Introduction to the Apocrypha*, 88.

[70] For a list of parallels between Sirach and Proverbs see R. Harris, *The Origin of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel*, 12.

This one example shows the far-reaching influence of this particular work. The discussion to follow will only serve to underline this observation.

The prologue (to the Greek text) was written by the translator who was the grandson of the author (which of course raises the question of reliability). By his own witness it is possible to date the translation. He went to Egypt "in the thirty-eighth year of the reign of Euergetes."

> Allusions in the body of the work make it certain that the king was Euergetes II (Ptolemy Physkon), whose 38th year was 132 B.C. It is, therefore, customary to say that Jesus bar Sira wrote his proverbs at about the year 180 B.C.[71]

The book has appeared under several valid titles. In some of them, as one might expect, the name of the only known apocryphal writer is included. The title which reflects Hebrew background is, "The Wisdom of Joshua ben Sira." The Greek equivalent is, ". . . Jesus the son of Sirach." Fairly early in the history of the Latin church it came to be known as "Ecclesiasticus," which seems roughly to mean "church book." This title owes its

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[71] C.C. Torrey, The Apocryphal Literature, 94. Because of the nature of the evidence there is little question here. The major authorities agree. Oesterley (The Books of the Apocrypha, 327f.) and Pfeiffer (History of New Testament Times, 366f) include complete discussions. The importance of the date for the structure and development of this investigation is obvious.

existence to the high regard which the early Latin church had for the work.[72] Out of such a background, "Sirach" seems to be a convenient modern abbreviation.

Ben Sira wrote in such a way that he quite sincerely and innocently betrayed some of his own feelings that most authors would be careful to conceal. For example, he would seem to include himself among Israel's wise men.

24.30 I went forth like a canal from a river
and like a water channel into a garden.
31 I said, "I will water my orchard and
drench my garden plot";
and lo, my canal became a river,
and my river became a sea.
32 I will again make instruction shine
forth like the dawn,
and I will make it shine afar;
33 I will again pour out teaching like prophecy,
and leave it to all future generations.
34 Observe that I have not labored for myself alone,
but for all who seek instruction.[73]

There seems also to have been a certain amount of deliberate preparation on ben Sira's part for the role he intended to play as one of Israel's wise men. He had both traveled and been in courts of royalty.[74] If his absolute sincerity were not so obvious, it would be easy to conclude that he was somewhat vain.

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[72] Torrey, _op_. _cit_., 93; Metzger, _op_. _cit_., 80.

[73] Cf. 33.16ff. and 39.12ff.

[74] See esp. 39.1-4.

34.9 An educated man knows many things,
and one with much experience
will speak with understanding.
10 He that is inexperienced knows few things,
but he that has traveled acquires much cleverness.
11 I have seen many things in my travels,
and I understand more than I can express.
12 I have often been in danger of death,
but have escaped because of these experiences.

The most detailed reflection of this nature is found in chapter thirty-eight. Torrey rightly observes;

> In chapter 38, in the contrast drawn between the man of learning (vs. 24) who wields influence in his city, and the ploughman in the country who can talk only of his bullocks (vs. 25), all commentators have seen that Bar Sira is thinking with satisfaction of his own favored status. Not that he could despise any laborer: the craftsman, the smith, the engraver, the potter, each absorbed, like the ploughman, in perfecting his own work (vss. 26-30), may not indeed sit high in the council of the people nor shine as teachers, "but they maintain the fabric of the world." (vs. 34)[75]

Ben Sira, with his limitations, was possessed by a desire to know and make known the "wise way." Although it is possible to view the passage metaphorically, he may have organized a school. He says:

> Draw near to me, you who are untaught,
> and lodge in my school.
> 51.23

The author of Sirach was concerned to further the cause of "wisdom." In exploring this area of thought he seems to be primarily concerned with the way in which it relates to day-to-day living. At least the major portion of his book is so occupied. However, he also includes a wisdom figure that is at least personified.[76] The combination is such that it is evident that great care must be exercised to ensure the comprehension of Sirach's own understanding. If the two-fold distinction is pressed it may become misleading. In fact, Sirach occasionally puts his material in such a way that certain aspects of "worldly wisdom" are very closely related to the personified figure. For example:

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[75] See also, 39.1-11, 12, 13; 24.30-34; 50.27-51.30.

> 1.9 The Lord himself created wisdom,
> he saw her and apportioned her,
> he poured her out upon all his works.
> 10 She dwells with all flesh according to his gift,
> and he supplied her to those who love him.

This phenomenon underlines the fact that his own distinction between the two things was not absolute in any sense. Metzger comments, ". . . according to Ecclesiasticus, worldly wisdom is the same in kind as divine wisdom, and differs from it only in degree.[77]

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[76] Pfeiffer (op. cit. 385-92), in his discussion of "wisdom" in Sirach, hardly mentions the personified figure. He evidently feels that Sirach's own treatment of the subject demands such a response. However, for the purposes of this investigation, the emphasis must be placed upon the personification of wisdom.

[77] Metzger, op. cit., 77. Cf. note 45 supra and the quotation there referred to from Oesterley.

It would be true to say of Sirach generally that it lacks the insight of some of the earlier canonical books. Among other things, this implies that the concepts surrounding wisdom may not be quite as penetrating. Because of this, Sirach probably represents a more widely accepted view. Whereas the canonical writers were, for their time, more among the avant-garde, ben Sira would represent a better cross section of Judaism.

Though couched in language very much its own, Sirach contains familiar ideas; ideas that we have come to expect as a part of the wisdom tradition. According to Sirach, wisdom had her[78] origin with the Lord (1.1). She was in fact "created" by him "before all things" (1.4, 9; 24.8,9). More specifically, she proceeded "from the mouth of the Most High" (24.3). Once brought into being, she was endowed with eternal existence (1.1; 24.9). Though given to "all flesh" (1.10), she possesses a special relationship with Israel (24.8ff.). In spite of this, she is unsearchable (1.6). In one, somewhat indefinite reference, she seems to be involved in God's creative work (24.3).

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[78] Somewhat arbitrarily we have decided at this point to use feminine pronouns. The question of hypostasis in Sirach will be discussed below.

Her continuing function is summarized in that she "exalts her sons" (4.11).

Wisdom, in Sirach, has an existence in her own right.[79] Yet, all commentators recognize that the concept as a whole is drawn very near that of law. In fact, on occasion they are identified.

> All of this (wisdom) is the book of the covenant
> of the Most High God,
> the law which Moses commanded us.
> 24.23

It is in this way that human wisdom is made approximate to the divine. Worldly wisdom in all its forms comes in line with the divine precepts as they are expressed in the law. As we have seen, such a concept was not unknown in the Old Testament.

> Keep them and do them; for that will be your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the peoples, who when they hear all these statutes, will say, 'Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people."[80]
> Deuteronomy 4.6

Again we see the "fear of the Lord" as a part of this complex of ideas.

Personal piety is called by Sirach, according to Old Testament usage, "fear of God" or "of the Lord" (the noun fear occurs 23 times; the verb "to fear"

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[79] Pfeiffer, op. cit., 384, however, cf., 400.

[80] Cf. Ezra 7.25.

> 31 times) or "love of God" (only in the form "those who love the Lord", occurring four times): since the publication of the Deuteronomic Code (621 B. C.) the two expressions were used interchangeably and mean primarily obedience to God's law (2.15f.).[81]

Smend has added, "subjectively wisdom is the fear of God, objectively the law book of Moses."[82]

Elsewhere in Sirach, the "fear of the Lord" is "wisdom's full measure" (1.16). It is both the "crown" and "root" of wisdom (1.18, 20). Wisdom is the "fulfillment of the fear of the Lord" (21.11). Indeed, wisdom is identified with fear (1.27; 19.20).

> That this "fear" essentially implies obedience (i.e., "personal piety") is evident. The man who fears the Lord will do this [seek wisdom] and he who holds to the law will obtain wisdom.[83]
>
> 15.1

This obedience seems to be solely dependent upon man's own desire.

> If you will, you can keep the commandments,
> and to act faithfully is a matter of your own choice.
>
> 15.15

The fact that this "fear" was conceived by ben Sira in a positive way is evidenced by the fact that it is closely related to obedience (10.19), "trust" (2.9, 10), and even "love" (2.15f.). Thus it is that for ben Sira the "fear of the Lord" is a completely good thing. His "fear" certainly does not rise out of legal obedience (32.15-17). Therefore, what seems quite impossible to most modern minds is almost casually accomplished in Sirach.

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[81] Pfeiffer, op. cit., 376

[82] R. Smend, Die Weisheit des Jesus Sirach, p. xxiii, quoted in Pfeiffer, op. cit., 368.

[83] Cf. 19.20; 23.27; 33.2, etc.

It is evident that the concepts which are included in ben Sira's investigation of wisdom are neither new or unique. They do establish the fact that the book itself is definitely a part of the wisdom tradition. Yet these old ideas are fresh and vibrant with the desire for that which is right and good. Thus the seed-bed is prepared for later developments. A desperate need is all that is required to bring these concepts into completely new usage.

We observed earlier that wisdom in Sirach is "at least personified." Opinions on this point have varied. Gregg,[84] comparing wisdom in Sirach with that in Proverbs, suggests that "no real advance" may be discerned. On the other hand Brockington says:

> Whereas in Proverbs the figure is probably nothing more than personification of wisdom, it is almost certain that ben Sira wrote of it in terms amounting nearly, if not quite, to hypostasis.[85]

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[84] Gregg, op. cit., xxxii.

[85] L. H. Brockington, A Critical Introduction to the Apocrypha, 66.

Finally, Fuller[86] declares without reservation, "She is now fully hypostatized."

Our opinion is that hypostasis in Sirach is more nearly a complete reality than it is in Proverbs. What happened in this regard must have been very subtle. We have concluded that Proverbs does not contain a hypostasis. Yet it may have been viewed as such at a very early date. One could even wonder if wisdom in Proverbs was already (*circa* 180 B. C.) viewed as some sort of abstraction. One does not find--nor should he expect--any argument that wisdom should be viewed as a separate entity over against God. As far as it is possible to determine from the available evidence this separation of wisdom simply occurred. It was not planned, thought out, or argued. It just happened. Sirach reflects one other stage in this development, one controlled largely by the needs of people. This is its significance. It is here possible to see an entity more separate than that found in the earlier tradition; yet one not yet fully distinct as may be found later.

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[86] R. H. Fuller, *Foundations of New Testament Christology*, 73.

Enoch.

> Enoch pleased the Lord, and was taken up,
> he was an example of repentance
> to all generations.
> Sirach 44.16 (cf. 49.14)

Enoch was the object of much "spiritual" contemplation. It may be that the ancients thought he was taken by God as a reward for his good life. The scripture says,

> Enoch walked with God; and he was
> not, for God took him.
> Genesis 5.24

It is interesting to note that the Genesis record says that, "Enoch walked with God after the birth of Methuselah." In the parallel statements connected with all the other characters introduced in Genesis 5, the wording is, "lived." Though Genesis does not say so specifically, it does seem to imply that God's action toward Enoch was in the nature of a reward. In view of these things it is not surprising to find Enoch's name in apocalyptic connections.

In the last two centuries before Christ, particularly, it became quite customary, when desiring to obscure the authorship of a writing that could be provocative, to reach back into history for the name of a man that in some way or ways peculiarly related to what the real author wanted to say. The actual author would then write from the assumed man's point of view. Enoch was just such a man. His well-known spiritual reputation was in his favor as well as the length of his life. Three hundred and sixty-five years is a natural framework for cosmological speculation.[87] Enoch's life is the shortest of those mentioned and this too may have contributed to his "reputation." It would appear that some thought God "took him" in order that his "wisdom" might not be corrupted.[88]

The Book of Enoch is not included in "The Apocrypha of the Old Testament", though in a wider sense it is often referred to as "apocryphal." This need not be taken to mean "false." In the broadest sense, the word is used in modern times to refer to various works written at the time and in similar context of "scripture," but not strictly speaking "canonical." With regard to usefulness or validity, each work must be considered separately. Enoch happens to compare favorably. It is in fact the only "apocryphal" book to be quoted in the New Testament (Jude 14f.). This fact stimulated considerable discussion both during and after the formation of the canon. It was not easy to determine the implications of the fact that a "canonical" writer had quoted an "uncanonical" one.[89]

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[87] Cf. e.g., Enoch 72-82, "The Book of the Courses of the Heavenly Luminaries."

[88] Cf. Wisdom of Solomon 4.10-14.

[89] For a discussion of this point see, B.M. Metzger, Introduction to the Apocrypha, 172.

The Book of Enoch is also "the best typical example of an apocalypse."[90] This is to say that it deals with a consummation, like the end of the world, when all the injustices of present life will be corrected. This type of document was written primarily in times of oppression. It seems reasonably certain that Daniel's new doctrine of the resurrection had not yet been widely accepted, therefore the future promised in Enoch must be terrestrial, not celestial.[91] Enoch is the most important book of its type because of its wide use and, therefore, its effect on doctrinal development.

There has been considerable variation of opinion with regard both to the nature of the book's authorship as well as its date. Charles conclusively states:

> As all critics are now agreed that the Similitudes are distinct in origin from the rest of the book, there is no occasion for treating exhaustively the grounds for this conclusion.[92]

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[90] Ibid., 5.

[91] R. H. Pfeiffer, History of New Testament Times, 77.

[92] R. H. Charles, The Book of Enoch (Commentary, 1893), 106; cf. W.O.E. Oesterley, The Books of the Apocrypha, 203ff., R. H. Pfeiffer, History of New Testament Times, 75. As far as we are able to discover, there is as yet no trace of chapters 37-71 among the Qumran scrolls. This would seem to confirm the opinion stated above. Exclusion at Qumran does not however rule out the possibility of their existence elsewhere. Because of this and their Messianic view they are included here in the "intertestamental" period.

On the other hand Torrey concludes that though there may be relatively minor accretions, the work should be thought of as "mainly the work of one author."[93] The question of the composite authorship and nature of the book are, of course, one. It should be observed that it was the tendency of late nineteenth century scholars to view books like Enoch as composites. Since then the movement has been away from such a pre-disposition.

In the earlier days, some also thought that Enoch was originally written in different languages.[94] It now seems that Torrey has settled the question.[95] Though he does not so argue himself, it is apparent that unity of language naturally affects his attitude toward authorship. If, as Torrey argues, the book was written in Aramaic, the unity of authorship is much more likely than otherwise.

The question of the date of writing is much the same as that of its composite nature. Pfeiffer represents a typical composite view.[96] He divides the book into ten sections and the dates given to these sections range from 163 to 80 B. C. Again, Torrey, representing the unity of authorship says, "The book is thus to be dated in the first decade of the last century B. C., probably in or soon after the year 95.[97]

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[93] C. C. Torrey, The Apocryphal Literature, 112.

[94] Charles, The Book of Enoch (Commentary), 22.

[95] C. C. Torrey, "Notes on the Greek Text of Enoch," Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 62 (1942), 52-60.

[96] Pfeiffer, op. cit., 75f.

Apocalyptic books, because they often deal with a consummation of one sort or another, are not always self-consistent. This is a natural result of their attempt to look into the future. It is interesting to note however that Enoch's inconsistency has been attributed to its composite authorship[98] as well as its apocalyptic nature.[99] Both elements have such potential. The apocalyptic element may be simply observed, but adequate proof would be necessary to establish the point with regard to authorship.

Evidence of Greek influence is minimal. Generally speaking, the book reflects a Jewish background. This is important in this investigation as the difference between developments in Palestine proper and other places, particularly Alexandria, will become quite evident.

There is no room for doubt as to the Palestinian origin of the book. The various authors are at home in Palestine and accurately acquainted with the

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[97] Torrey, The Apocryphal Literature, 114.

[98] Oesterley, op. cit., 207.

[99] Charles, The Book of Enoch (Text), x.

> various localities close to Jerusalem, the valleys, brooks, and other natural features in its immediate neighborhood. To them further Jerusalem is the city of the elect, the centre of the coming Messianic kingdom, the Gehenna is the destined habitation of the apostate. Greek elements have no doubt found an entrance in certain fragments of the book, but as a rule there is a deliberate and sustained opposition rendered to all Hellenistic ideas and influences. The whole tone and exegesis of the book are Palestinian in character.[100]

Charles' view on these points has not been questioned.

Inasmuch as 'Enoch' contributes substantially to the development of Jewish messianic expectations, it will be necessary to briefly examine his presentation of this ideal figure before turning attention to the wisdom theme and the relationships between the two. It should be indicated here that although the wisdom theme is related to 'Enoch's' presentation of his messianic figure it is not a primary category.

'Enoch' presents a more definitely personified Messiah than any other Jewish writer before him. It is in this way that he greatly advances the Messianic thinking of his people. His emphasis on the super-human character of the Messiah is remarkably confined to the "Parables" (i.e., chapters 37-71). This is one of the arguments in favor of composite authorship. However, we have not found it necessary for our purposes to pursue such a distinction.

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[100] Charles, The Book of Enoch (Commentary), 22. Cf. supra 58, note 92.

The significant titles used by 'Enoch' are: "Anointed One" (i.e., Messiah), "Righteous One," "Elect One," and "Son of Man."[101] It is in and with these designations that the writer of Enoch constructs his figure of the Messiah. His most significant contribution surely is to be found in his "Son of Man" figure. Charles says that Enoch's use of "Son of Man" is both "definite and distinctive," and therefore is "the first instance in which the definite personal title appears in literature."[102] Although many questions still remain, 'Enoch's' Messiah appears quite clearly. The essential features of this distinctly personalized character are as follows: (1) he is pre-existent (48.1-3), (2) he sits on the throne of God (55.4) which is in fact his own (62.3, 5; 69.27, 29), (3) he possesses universal dominion (62.6), (4) judgment is his (41.9; 55.4; 61.9, 27), and (5) the wicked are slain with the "word of his mouth."

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[101] The references are: "Anointed One," 48.10, 52.4; "Righteous One," 38.2; 53.6; "Elect One," 39.6; 40.5; 45.3, 4; 49.2, 4; 51.3, 5; 52.6, 9; 55.4; 61.5, 8, 10; 62.1; "Son of Man," 29 (2); 70.1; 71.14, 17.

[102] Charles, The Book of Enoch (Commentary), 315. The question of the relationship between Enoch's Son of Man and the depiction of Jesus under that title in the gospels has been one of great concern. See: T.W. Manson, The Teaching of Jesus (Cambridge: 1936); H. E. Tödt, The Son of Man in the Synoptic Tradition (E.T., London: 1963); A. J. B. Higgins, Jesus and the Son of Man (London: 1964); R. H. Fuller, The Foundations of New Testament Christology (London: 1965); F.H. Borsch, The Son of Man in Myth and History (Philadelphia: 1967); and M. Hooker, The Son of Man in Mark (London: 1967).

With regard to wisdom, it should be urged that any reconstruction is apt to do injustice both to the author's own mind as well as his intentions. The author of Enoch makes one statement in particular that seems to indicate that any careful distinction between a heavenly and earthly wisdom was not in his mind.

> And the righteous shall arise from their sleep,
> And wisdom shall arise and be given unto them.
> 91.10

The scene is a part of the apocalyptic vision. The confusion occurs when 'Enoch' says, "wisdom shall arise," in which wisdom is personified; and then he immediately speaks of it as a characteristic to be given to men. In this connection, the author of the book speaks a number of times of wisdom as an apocalyptic gift to men (5.8; 48.1; 49.1; 99.10). Those who graciously receive it are to be blessed (99.10), and upon reception there should follow a joyous response in like spirit (62.7, 11; 63.2).

The word "wisdom" itself is not always used in a good sense. Once (69.8), the knowledge imparted to men by those angels who forsook their heavenly abode and came to men is referred to as "wisdom."[103]

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[103] Cf. Genesis 6.1ff.

Then, in a curious passage (32) the tree of "knowledge" (E, "wisdom") which originally enlightened Adam and Eve is cast in a remarkably good light. It is somewhat strange to hear this tree styled as, "very great, beautiful, glorious, and magnificent."[104] Pfeiffer traces the history of both of Eden's trees as they are mentioned in Enoch.

> . . . after the resurrection (20.8) . . . the righteous Jews will enjoy a happy life on earth--after partaking of the fruit of the tree of life. This tree was transplanted from Eden to a high mountain of God (where it was inaccessible) and thence to the Temple for the benefit of the righteous and elect (25.4-6); whether they will also partake of the tree of knowledge (32.3-6) is not stated, but is not to be excluded.[105]

'Enoch' himself is both a source (82.2, 3; 92.1) and mediator of wisdom (37.1-4), though its ultimate origin is to be found in God (14.3; 101.8). In the apocalyptic vision (48), 'Enoch' saw "fountains of wisdom."[106] The thirsty drank and were filled. Though he had been "named" before the Lord of Spirits prior to

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[104] The thought here is similar in kind at least to the Gnostic (and other) emphasis upon γνῶσις, as we shall see.

[105] Pfeiffer, op. cit., 78.

[106] Davies (op. cit., 158f.) examines the possible influences of this passage on Paul. Our estimate of Davies' position is found mainly in our examination of Pauline literature, infra 170ff.

creation, the Son of Man was so "named" again. This Messiah "chosen and hidden" before creation was revealed by "the wisdom of the Lord of Spirits." Thus, in these ways, wisdom is closely related to though not identified with the messianic figure.

In the consummation the "Elect One" is to sit on God's throne and pour forth wisdom, for it dwells in him:

> And the Elect One shall in those days sit on My throne,
> And his mouth shall pour forth all the secrets of
> wisdom and counsel:
> For the Lord of Spirits hath given (them) to him and
> hath glorified him.
> 51.3

> And in him (the Elect One) dwells the spirit of wisdom,
> And the spirit which gives insight,
> And the spirit of understanding and of might,
> And the spirit of those who have fallen asleep
> in righteousness.
> 49.3

As has been noticed, in the apocalyptic vision the messianic figure was to sit on God's throne, which is also spoken of as his. It is interesting to note that wisdom is drawn into this kind of context.

> For thou hast made and Thou rulest all things,
> And nothing is too hard for Thee,
> Wisdom departs not from the place of Thy throne,
> Nor turns away from Thy presence.
> And thou knowest and seest and hearest everything,
> And there is nothing hidden from Thee.[107]
> 34.3

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[107] Cf. Wisdom of Solomon 9.4.

Charles comments,

> . . . Wisdom is represented in both these passages as the assessor or πάρεδρος of God. The idea is to be traced to Prov. 8.30 in the LXX version, ἤμην παρ' αὐτῷ: cf. Ecclus. 1.1, μετ' αὐτοῦ ἐστιν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα.[108]

It should be emphasized that though 'Enoch' places wisdom eternally at "the place" of God's throne, he does not describe her as sitting on it.

Though perhaps fragmentary and out of its proper place, the passage most regularly noticed in the development of the wisdom theme is chapter 42. Wisdom is definitely personified. The significant development is, however, that the passage suggests that wisdom found her place among the angels after she had been rejected by men. We find in effect for the first time the concept of descent and reascent. This element plays such an important role in later Christian thinking that the passage should be noted in full.

> Wisdom found no place where she might dwell;
> Then a dwelling-place was assigned her in the heavens.
> Wisdom went forth to make her dwelling
>   among the children of men,
> And found no dwelling place:
> Wisdom returned to her place:
> And took her seat among the angels.
>
> And unrighteousness went forth from her chambers:
> Whom she sought not she found,
> and dwelt with them,

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[108] Charles, The Book of Enoch (Commentary), 226.

> As rain in a desert,[109]
> And dew on a thirsty land.
>
> 42.1-3

Humanity's rejection of wisdom is here detailed carefully for the first time. There have been numerous mentions before of those "unwise" who did not follow in the wise way, etc., but the rejection itself has not been so carefully described. Thus, another factor enters the picture which was of extensive benefit to those who wanted later to speak of the rejection of the Son of God.

In connection with chapter 42, it is interesting to note as a side point that "unrighteousness" is set over against "wisdom" in the discussion. This in itself tends to stress the legalistic element in "wisdom." However, in chapter 46, the messianic figure, here styled "Son of Man," "hath righteousness."

> This is the Son of Man who hath righteousness,
> With whom dwelleth righteousness,
> And who revealeth all the treasures of that
> which is hidden.
>
> 46.3b

"Unrighteousness" is "wisdom's" opposite. Righteousness therefore must in some indirect way be roughly equal to wisdom. Later, it is discovered that the Son of Man possesses righteousness. Though this is far from any identification, it is fair to observe that the two pietistic concepts are placed in similar contexts.

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[109] Cf. Sirach 24. Although admittedly vague there does seem to be some parallel phrasing, etc.

With regard to the question of hypostasis, we must conclude that although it is unclear, it is in our opinion doubtful. We feel that to some extent we do not understand the author's mind and this restricts our judgement. If there was a hypostasis in some dark corner of his mind, or if he was aware of it, however vaguely, from elsewhere, he was certainly not clear in his presentation.

We would suppose that the more or less muddled nature of the wisdom theme in Enoch was typical of the period in which the book was written. However, it is nevertheless clear that 'Enoch' contributed substantially to a number of New Testament themes. Although wisdom itself is not directly associated with the messianic figure, the relationship is indeed close. Again, the conclusion must be that all that was required to bring the full association was the desperate need felt by those who attempted to inform humanity of the events surrounding the incarnation.

IV. CONCLUSION

Odes of Solomon. Roughly contemporary with the establishment of Christianity we find that one of these odes, messianic in tone, also speaks of a "perfect virgin" who can easily be identified with Wisdom.[110] We quote in full.

> And again Grace ran and forsook corruption, and came down in Him to bring it to nought; and He destroyed perdition from before Him, and devastated all its order; and He stood on a lofty summit and uttered His voice from one end of the earth to the other: and drew to Him all those who obeyed Him; and there did not appear as it were an evil person, but there arose a perfect virgin who was proclaiming and calling and saying, O ye sons of men, return ye, and ye daughters of men, live ye: and forsake the ways of that corruption and draw near unto me, and I will enter in to you, and will bring you forth from perdition, and make you wise in the ways of truth: you shall not be destroyed nor perish: hear ye me and be redeemed. For the grace of God I am telling among you: and by my means you shall be redeemed, and become blessed. I am your judge; and they who have put me on shall not be injured: but they shall possess the new world that is incorrupt: my chosen ones walk in me, and my ways I will make known to them that seek me, and I will make them trust in me. Hallelujah.[111]
>
> Ode 33

In the passage the "virgin" promises salvation through "Grace" and immortality to those that walk in her ways.[112] The point of emphasis is therefore to be found in the goal to be achieved. Because of this it is impossible to determine just how the Wisdom figure is conceived. Although it is perhaps impossible to prove we have come to feel that hypostasis was well established by the time of

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[110] R. Harris, An Early Christian Psalter, vii, 56f.

[111] The translation is that of Harris, ibid., 55f.

[112] Ibid., 57.

Christ. Whatever the exact nature of the conception may have been, we have here an excellent example of the kind of thing that was free to appear in Palestine in the first century A. D.

Pirke Aboth. In the course of our investigation one other Palestinian example of the association of Wisdom and Torah appeared. It is also roughly contemporary with the later books of the New Testament and is therefore of special interest. The principle taught was that God's instrument in the creation of the world was the Torah, not wisdom.

> "Beloved are Israel to whom was given a precious instrument wherewith the world was created. It was greater love that it was made known to them that there was given unto them a precious instrument whereby the world was created, as it is said: 'For a good doctrine have I given you; forsake not my Law'".
>
> Pirke Aboth 3.21

The saying is attributed to Rabbi Akiba (cf. 3.17). Proverbs 4.2, is quoted at the end. Oesterley[113] has made a detailed investigation of both the man and the saying. We are told that the name of Rabbi Akiba was "second to none." He was born about the middle of the first century A. D. and was killed about 135, because he was one of Bar Cochba's supporters.

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[113] W.O.E. Oesterley, The Sayings of the Jewish Fathers, 41f. Cf. G. F. Moore, Judaism, 413.

In the quotation cited above, Akiba himself implies that the "instrument" mentioned is the Torah. In this connection we should note that the pre-existence of the Torah was clearly taught.

> Six things preceded the creation of the world; among them were such as were themselves truly created, and such as were decided upon before the Creation; the Torah and the throne of glory were truly created.[114]
>
> Bereshith Rabba

The establishment of pre-existence made other associations easy. Oesterley makes the explanation of associations almost too simple in a very condensed statement.

> The doctrine that the world was created by the Torah is logically evolved from various other doctrines of Judaism; first, the Torah is the expression of the divine mind and will; then, the Torah and Wisdom are again and again identified (e.g. Sir. 5.23; Baruch 4.1; etc.); moreover, an identification, or something very close to it, is taught between the Torah and the Memra (="Word" of God). Bearing these identifications in mind, and remembering how distinctly it is taught that the world was created by Wisdom (e.g. Wisd. 8.22-31, etc.) and by the Word (e.g. Ps. 33.6; cp. 148.9; Sir. 42.15; Wisd. 4.1; 4 Esdras 6.38; cp. John 1.1ff.) of God, it is easy to understand how the idea arose of the world having been created by the instrumentality of the Torah.[115]

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[114] Quoted by Oesterley, op. cit., 42.

[115] Ibid. The reference should be to Proverbs (not Wisdom) 8.22-31.

The extreme interest of the period in a legal code for the everyday affairs of life must have dominated this transfer of interest, wherever it occurs. There were many other factors, of course, but the type of conception found in Akiba marked the end of any genuine interest in the "wisdom" tradition as it had been known. Factors of major significance were causing important changes elsewhere.

Summary. It is our opinion that there was within Palestinian Judaism both a rise and a decline of interest in wisdom/Wisdom and all the variety of things that attached themselves to that term. It would appear that it was Palestinian Judaism that provided the greater portion of the raw material for the wisdom theme as it appears in the New Testament. Yet, as we shall see, it would just as surely appear that these associations with the Christ event did not occur altogether as a result of an impetus received from Palestinian Judaism. Firmly fixed in between the Palestinian background and the New Testament reality is the phenomenon of diaspora Judaism, with its singular association of Jew and Greek, particularly at Alexandria. We shall find in this context items of some importance which at least complement the Palestinian phenomenon as we have observed it. We shall examine these things in the next chapter.

Thus we have seen the various contributing factors that make up the body of thought that encompasses the words wisdom (חָכְמָה), law (תֹּרָה), and word (דָבָר, etc.). The phenomenon as a whole manifests a strange and unusual character. One reason for this nature, which is shadowy, may have been the dominating influence of the concept of Jewish monotheism. Any open suggestion of alteration on this point would have met with great difficulty. Whatever development occurred, it had to happen in at least apparent consistency with this fundamental conviction.

We feel that we are correct in viewing the total picture at this stage as complex, loosely arranged, and not thought out in any organized fashion. It is necessary to leave the concept (or figure) in this figurative limbo if we would see it as it was. This is, simply put, the misty edge of Jewish speculative thought.

CHAPTER II

THE EXTRA-BIBLICAL TRADITION AND DIASPORA JUDAISM

I. INTRODUCTION

That there are "relevant areas" in the Greek world is certain. However, whether or not the Christian writers of the New Testament drew upon them as sources is quite another question. In the course of this study we have come to the conclusion that the most fundamental certainty here is that the Christian message was at certain points compatible, at least apparently, with the Greek tradition. Such a suggestion recognizes the affinities while reserving judgement on the question of dependence.

Although the current trend is generally away from the opinion that the New Testament, etc., was to any extensive degree dependent upon Greek thought, Sidebottom, commenting on the essence of Gnostic thought says:

> . . . the Greek idea of Wisdom has an intellectual twist which is foreign to the Semitic; it thus appears in connection with the gnostic myth of mind imprisoned in matter. In view of the dubious connection of this type of dualism with Persian religion, Quispel is probably right that the oldest form of the gnostic myth, which transforms the Man into a prisoner of matter, goes back, not to Gayomart, but to the Greek Wisdom who brings forth the seven planets. We are back at the essential factor in all gnosticism.[1]

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[1] E. M. Sidebottom, The Christ of the Fourth Gospel, 111.

The primary point here surely is that the further one goes in the thought world of this study, the more he realizes the complexity of the relationships between the various areas of thought.

The points of interest in the Greek tradition are by nature rather nebulous. Some things not directly in our area of thought must be brought in in order to understand other things that made a more open contribution. Our concern will be with those areas that bear some relation to the Wisdom-Logos of the New Testament and the later tradition, both "orthodox" and heretical.[2]

II. GREEK BACKGROUND

Plato. This study has its essential beginning in the writings of Plato (429-347 B. C.), particularly the

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[2] Whatever we say here with regard to Greek backgrounds must of necessity be extremely brief and therefore not the least inclusive. Our debt to Armstrong, (A.H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy), Taylor, (A.E.Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, etc.), and others will be obvious. Armstrong includes quite an adequate bibliography (op. cit., 227-233). Out of this list we found the following particularly useful. G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge: 1957). Included here are introductions to a number of primitive cosmogonies. Although strictly speaking they are outside our area of concern, they are quite useful for the purpose of determining the kind of thing going on elsewhere at the time of the concern of this study. See also: F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, esp. vol. 1 (London: 1946); C. J. DeVogel, Greek Philosophy, esp. vol. 1 (Leiden: 1950); W.C.K. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vols. 1 and 2 (Cambridge: 1962, 1965).

Timaeus. It must be stressed that the interpretation of the Timaeus is not an easy matter. Just when a basic comprehension of the work seems to be within grasp, the mythological character of the writing asserts itself again and uncertainty wins the day. However, despair should not be our point of departure. Plato himself says:

> . . . if in our treatment of a great host of matters regarding the Gods and the generation of the Universe we prove unable to give accounts that are always in all respects self-consistent and perfectly exact, be not thou surprised; rather we should be content if we can furnish accounts that are inferior to none in likelihood, remembering that both I who speak and you who judge are but human creatures, so that it becomes us to accept the likely account of these matters and forbear to search beyond it.
> Timaeus 29C, D[3]

To attempt a systematized study of outstanding thinkers more often than not does them a distinct injustice. This is certainly true of Plato. Taylor says of Plato:

> If he had a system, he has refused to tell us what it was, and if we attempt to force a system on a mind which was always growing, we are sure to end by misrepresentation.[4]

We must therefore take great care in formulating firm conclusions. It should be urged however that much can be

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[3] Quotations from Plato are taken from the translation found in the Loeb Classical Library.

[4] A. E. Taylor, Plato, vii.

stated with relative clarity and the main stream of Plato's thought can be sketched reasonably well.

It is, of course, somewhat arbitrary to begin with Plato as there were a number of capable thinkers who preceded him. Yet, it is recognized that in Platonic thought the Greek tradition reached a high point in many respects that was seldom, if ever, achieved again. However, to some extent Plato built on the foundation laid by his predecessors. It would therefore be useful to indicate a few of the items that he borrowed or at least expanded, which are also relevant to this discussion.[5]

Plato was deeply convinced that the world was directed by good intelligent powers toward good purposes. It was Socrates who had developed this concept, and in so doing, had broken with the tradition that the gods were capricious beings. It was Pythagoras who taught that the "soul" had a part both in the divine and eternal world of "Being" as well as in the material and transitory world of "Becoming." Anaxagoras had first conceived that "Mind" or "Intelligence" was "the cause of all motion and the coming to be of things."[6] All these things converge to one degree or another in Plato's concept of "Soul."

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[5] Armstrong, *op. cit.*, 46f.

[6] *Ibid.*, 47.

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[5] Armstrong, op. cit., 46f.

[6] Ibid., 47.

It should also be stated at the outset that Plato's approach to these matters results in a kind of "natural theology." "Natural theology, then, meant originally a doctrine about God which is neither imaginative fiction nor socially useful fiction, but science. . . ."[7] Plato was genuinely convinced that there was a system within and behind observable reality and that it could be comprehended if one had the time and energy to devote to the task. The nature of his approach is important because it inevitably colors the results.

Plato was convinced that knowledge in the strict sense could be obtained. Sense-perception was, however, considered invalid because it was so variable and transient.[8] This led to his construction of the world of "Ideas" or Forms." These had to do with the intelligible world behind that of sense perception. For example, because one could sense "beauty" in specific objects, it was thought that it must exist as an objective essence in itself. Plato assumed that these universal concepts were not merely subjective.[9] Because the Forms belonged to

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[7] Taylor, Platonism and Its Influence, 99.

[8] J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 10.

[9] Coplestone, op. cit., I, 164. For a selection of Platonic texts on "The origin of the theory of Ideas" see C. J. DeVogel, Greek Philosophy, I, 172ff.

the divine and eternal world they were consistent and everlasting. Things both concrete and abstract in nature were conceived in this ideal fashion and enjoyed existence, at least metaphorically, "apart from" the world of sense perception.[10] Something similar is intended by modern philosophers when they speak of "universals." The primary difference is that for Plato this transcendent, non-sensible world had objective existence.[11]

In the world of Forms the highest was the Form of the Good. Because of the way Plato speaks of this highest form it is possible for some to conclude that his conception was "something like what we mean by God."[12] It should be immediately urged, however, that God-like elements may also be found elsewhere. Armstrong later adds:

> There is good reason, as we have seen, for regarding the Good as in a real sense Plato's God, but not as the Creator of heaven and earth.[13]

Such has to do with the "God" which is the natural product of Plato's method. Any similarity between this figure and the God of the Jewish-Christian tradition is coincidental.

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[10] Coplestone, op. cit., I, 167ff.

[11] Kelly, op. cit., 10.

[12] Armstrong, op.cit., 39.

[13] Ibid., 49. As we shall see, the unclear relation between the world of Forms and the concept of Soul makes "something like God" appear in both areas.

Inasmuch as the form of the Good is given the characteristics that it is, it becomes more than a Form in the usual meaning of the word. The form of the Good is both the cause of the other Forms and the means by which it is possible for the human mind to apprehend them. "It is the single transcendent reality of absolute perfection which is the ultimate cause and explanation of the universe."[14] The Good however does not order or rule the universe. This, for Plato, is the function of Soul.

The exact relation between the world of Forms and that of particulars is not altogether clear. It is certain however that there is a distinct separation between the transcendent and the material. This was to come under severe criticism later from Aristotle in his attempt to clarify the relationships. The question here to a large extent is bound up with the difficulty of using earth-bound terminology and language to speak of more or less "spiritual" objects.

Unlike the Forms which were conceived of as being characteristic of the transcendent world, the Platonic concept of Soul is directly related to material things.

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[14] *Ibid.*, 39.

In fact, Soul does more than anything else in Platonic thought to bridge the gap between the conceptually transcendent and the material. Basic to the complex of ideas is the concept of motion. It is referred to as the "motion which can move itself."

> In the Phaedrus (245C5ff.) he [Plato] lays the foundations by proving that Soul . . . is immortal, ungenerated and self-moving and is the source of motion or change in all which is not soul.[15]

For Plato, as for Socrates, the soul is the most important part of man. It is his moral and intellectual personality. Plato even considers it in a genuinely profound sense more real than the body. It is immortal in its own right because it belongs to Plato's divine world, i.e., that transcendent world essentially a part of contemporary Greek speculation. It does not in this respect depend upon any higher being. It has always existed and will always continue to do so. That is its nature.[16]

Not only is soul responsible for movement, but it also knows.[17] This is perhaps its more important function. It is, further, the seat of both the higher and lower

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[15] Ibid., 47.

[16] Ibid., 40

[17] Taylor, Platonism and Its Influence, 102.

emotions. Within man, soul is that which animates him. The very fact of life and activity is proof of the presence of soul. Such is also true of the cosmos. It would appear that in Plato's mind the souls that are responsible for the cosmical movements are perfectly good souls. Over all is a supreme soul which is the medium through which the material world partakes of the world of Forms.[18] This soul may also be referred to as God.

> It is important to remember that, according to Plato, God is a soul and not a Form and that a soul is a "motion which moves itself." This is really the last word of Platonism on the question of how things come to 'partake of' Forms; they do so because God apprehends the Forms, and his apprehension of them inspires his 'orderly' motions.[19]

Before passing to other matters it would be in order to let Plato speak for himself.

> And when the construction of the Soul had all been completed to the satisfaction of its Constructor, then he fabricated within it all the Corporeal, and uniting them centre to centre He made them fit

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[18] Timaeus, 46D; cf. 47E.

[19] Taylor, Platonism and Its Influence, 103. We therefore see the term "God" used of the form of the Good, the supreme Soul, and later of the Demiurge. What we have in Plato is three different (although in his philosophy related) uses of the word God. Such use of terms was bound to lead to confusion when the Jewish-Christian tradition was brought into relation to this different conceptual world.

> together. And the Soul, being woven throughout the Heaven every way from the centre to the extremity, and enveloping it in a circle from without, and herself revolving within herself, began a divine beginning of unceasing and intelligent life lasting throughout all time. And whereas the body of the Heaven is visible, the Soul is herself invisible but partakes in reasoning and in harmony, having come into existence by the agency of the best of things intelligible and ever-existing as the best of things generated.[20]

This raises the point of the role of the "Constructor" or "Demiurge" (*δημιουργός*). "The 'artisan' or 'craftsman' who makes the world thus comes into the story, and it is assumed that this maker is God."[21] That the Demiurge is eternal is implied in that the effect of which he is the cause, i.e., the sensible world, is a copy of an eternal "likeness."

> Thus, in the scheme of Timaeus, we see that the 'efficient cause' of the world is thought of definitely as a 'personal' God, and this 'creator' or 'maker' is, strictly speaking, the only God, in our sense of the word, the dialogue recognizes. Later on we shall find the *name* *θεός* given both to the world itself as a whole and to certain parts or denizens of it, but this must not mislead us. These *θεοί* are all 'created'; their

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[20] *Timaeus*, 36E-37A; cf. 30C f.

[21] Taylor, *Plato*, 440. One wonders if it might not be better to omit the word "god/God" from this discussion altogether.

> *raison d'etre* is the will of the *δημιουργός* (29e, 41b), who is thus distinguished from them as God is from 'creatures' in Christian theology. The formal cause of the world, however, is not God but the 'intelligible living creature', the *ἀυτὸ ὅ ἔστι ζῷον*, which God contemplates as the model for his work. The language used about this model shows that we are to think of it as a form, the 'form' of an organism of which all other organisms are parts.[22]

Speaking of God "in our sense of the word" Taylor can only be referring to the western "Christian" world. Thus it would appear that in Plato there are two primary principles. First is Soul in its best form. It is the most perfect and rational. It is the "ultimate principle of life and ordered motion."[23] It is indeed, goodness in action. "This is the Good Craftsman of the Timaeus."[24] Then, on the other hand, there is the Good itself. It is "the ultimate principle of the World of Forms."[25] It is the source of the model which the Craftsman copies.

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[22] *Ibid*., 441f.

[23] Armstrong, *op*. *cit*., 49.

[24] *Ibid*.

[25] *Ibid*.

One other area of Plato's thought demands consideration. The material with which the Craftsman is required to work is irrational. Order is imposed upon it from without. Running through material things is also a characteristic that Plato refers to as "Necessity." It is a sort of "blind brutal chance." It would seem to be an attempt to account for the irregularities of nature as well as serving as an explanation for certain forms of "evil." The Craftsman is cast in the role of making the best possible with the material at hand.[27]

It is partly in these ways then that Plato attempts to explain the origin and form of the created world. As has been pointed out, it is largely mythological and therefore any interpretation which depends on a clear and concise identification of the elements is destined for difficulty from the start. Plato's genius manifests itself primarily in his tremendous depth of observation and his consequent mythological structure which so admirably accounts for the facts that he observed. That there are

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[27] *Ibid.*, 51

many "points of contact" in the later tradition, both Jewish-Christian and other, is widely recognized.

Heraclitus. Λόγος is not among the terms employed by Plato in describing the origin or function of the cosmos. This is remarkable inasmuch as it had been introduced in these connections by Heraclitus (fl.c. 500 B.C.) a century earlier.[28] Heraclitus' gift was an extremely vivid intuition with regard to the nature of the world. This intuition led him to the basic conclusion that the world perceived by the senses was not chaotic as it appeared to some, but that order and harmony penetrated it consistently, if only one were able to comprehend it. This inherent character he conceived as an immanent principle, which was also the cause of proportion and balance. He named this principle Λόγος. The significant thing is that not only was this term used first by Heraclitus in these philosophical senses, but he also gave it objective existence. For him, it was a living reality, indeed, "God." "It is this union of life and rationality in the single concept of the Logos which is one of Heraclitus'

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[28] *Ibid*., 10f. For a broadly based and penetrating analysis of Heraclitus' Logos see: Guthrie, *op. cit*., 419-434. Guthrie includes a list of current definitions of Λόγος, and points out how Heraclitus used the word in these ways also, in addition to his divine figure.

great contributions to our traditional inheritance of thought."[29] The Logos, for Heraclitus, was law because it was God, i.e., a "living all-ruling intelligence." The fact that the Logos was law meant that it imparted as well as possessed its distinguishing characteristics. Though somewhat obscure in Heraclitus' thought, the Logos is related to the "Ever-Living Fire," which is the "stuff of the universe."[30]

True perceptions, no matter what the source, demand their own right to continued existence. It is, of course, axiomatic that truth and revelation are consistent with each other. This is the validation for "Christian use." It is indeed in Heraclitus that we find the earliest recorded roots of this particular category (i.e., λόγος) which after much time and development was employed to describe the reality of Jesus.

Aristotle.[31] Plato's pupil, Aristotle, both followed in his master's footsteps, and took his own path. It is difficult to know which point to stress for he accomplished both successfully. Paradoxically,

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[29] Ibid., 11. [30] Ibid., 10

[31] For this review of Aristotle, see especially Armstrong, op. cit., 73-81, 87-92, etc.

Aristotle's conclusions were most distinctive precisely in those areas where he attempted to follow his teacher with the greatest devotion.

Aristotle's most widely known disagreement with Plato lies in his rejection of the world of Forms. The primary reason for this rejection seems to have its roots in his deep concern with the visible world, the world of sense that presented itself to him at any given moment. This concern may have been imparted to Aristotle by Plato late in his life. Though his arguments often leave something to be desired, Aristotle here sensed Platonism's greatest weakness. Plato, as has been noted, left the two worlds inadequately related. Though he did supply the concept of Soul, it was often neglected or misunderstood by those who came later. Aristotle's second reason for rejecting the Forms was their transcendent nature. Because Plato had posited the two worlds so far apart it was extremely difficult to understand any causal relationship between them.

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In agreement with Plato, Aristotle felt that it was the business of rational beings to pursue objective truth. He also agreed that these truths were immaterial and unchanging. The difference was that Aristotle felt that the Form was to be found within the material object, not in another world transcendent to it. He recognized the ever changing nature of the world, but argued that consistent objective truth was to be found in the midst of these changing material objects. Individual things were, for him, the primary realities. The universals do have objective existence, but as characteristics of individual things. This means, among other things, that the world of sense perception was real in a sense never allowed by Plato.[32]

For Aristotle, body and soul form a single unity. In his own well-known statement, Aristotle illustrates the unity, "If the eye was an animal, its sight would be its soul."[33] The body serves as matter for the soul. The soul gives Form to the body.

Aristotle concluded that every motion must have a cause. This, through its various ramifications, led him to posit the "Unmoved Mover." Since matter suggests potency, the Mover was totally immaterial. It ceaselessly exercised its ability to create motion. This is a necessary characteristic. It could not by its very nature merely have this power potentially.

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[32] There is a line of development here, outside our present concern, which ultimately leads to the Nominalist and Realist controversies of the Middle Ages.

[33] De Anima 412b.

The Mover was related to the movement of the heavenly luminaries. However, because certain of the luminaries were observed to be moving in opposing directions, it became necessary to assume a multiplicity of movers. Ultimately, he suggested fifty-five. It is not completely clear, but even here it seems that one was still considered supreme. It must be remembered that Aristotle reached these conclusions solely by speculative intuition; dependent, of course, on his predecessors. Whatever truth they may have contained (or implied) was considered the rightful inheritance of those in the Jewish-Christian tradition who were attempting to articulate revealed truth.

Stoicism. The Stoic school was founded by Zeno of Citium (c. 300 B. C.), and therefore arose entirely after Alexander the Great. The evolution from the city-state concept into a wider historical perspective was virtually complete. The new perspective made demands of the philosophers never before felt. It became somewhat commonplace to construct systems of thought hastily and later examine them for defects. The Stoics probably made the most adequate reaction to this extreme set of circumstances.

The Stoic theory of knowledge was a part of the continuing trend established by Aristotle. The emphasis was upon the material world that presented itself to the senses. They concluded that only bodies had a real substantial existence.[34] They emphasized this point so much that when they spoke of things normally considered "spiritual" (i.e., immaterial), they insisted that they possessed "body" "Comprehensions" presented themselves to the senses, but they required testing before they could be considered "knowledge." "This systematic and absolutely certain knowledge, the final concentrated grip of the mind on facts, was the exclusive property of the Sage or Wise Man."[35]

It is evident that the Stoics reacted in extremely negative terms to the Platonic Forms. For them, there could be no transcendent world. As a result, their theology became a "pantheistic materialism."[36]

In their concept of "body" they distinguished between an active and a passive principle. This is a

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[34] Armstrong, *op*. *cit*., 121

[35] *Ibid*., 122. R. H. Pfeiffer, *History of New Testament Times*, 122, refers to a definition of Stoic wisdom found in C.L.W. Grimm, *Kurzgefasstes Exegetisches Handbuch zu den Apokryphen*, Vol. 4, 305. Grimm cites Plutarch, Cicero, and Seneca. The definition is quoted in 4 *Maccabees* 1:16, and Philo, *De congressu eruditionis gratia* 14 [MI, 531]. The definition: "the knowledge [or science] of divine and human things and their causes." *ἐπιστήμη θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ τῶν τούτων αἰτίων*.

[36] Kelly, *op*. *cit*., 12

new solution to the old problem of the dualism of form and matter.[37] "There is crude, unformed matter, without character or quality; and there is the dynamic reason or plan (*λόγος*) which forms and organizes it."[38] This *λόγος* of the Stoics should therefore be considered an abstraction, not a hypostasis.[39] Consistent with this type of dualism, the Stoics distinguished two senses in the term *λόγος*, *reason* and *word*, therefore mental (*ἐνδιάθετος*) and *spoken* or *uttered* (*προφορικός*). This distinction is valid although neither concept isolated from the other would leave an accurate impression.

The cosmos was conceived as one complete entity. It was permeated and governed by a divine power known as the Logos. The Logos was the divine reason that bound the physical world into one complete and integrated whole.

> The Stoic active principle, the forming and vitalizing fire, is a materialization of Aristotle's Soul as form of the body, the principle at once of life and definite reality, the cause of existence as a particular living being.[40]

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[37] R. Bultmann, *Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting*, 135.

[38] Kelly, *op. cit.*, 13.

[39] O. Cullmann, *The Christology of the New Testament*, 251.

[40] Armstrong, *op. cit.*, 123.

The Logos is also conceived as breath (πνεῦμα), or as an air-like substance (as σῶμα). It is 'air in motion' (ἀὴρ κινούμενος), 'ether' (αἴθηρ), 'fiery reason' (νοῦς πυρινός), 'rational and fiery breath' (πνευμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες), 'Form-imparting fire' (πῦρ τεχνικόν), permeating the universe and giving it articulation. It is the 'breath which passes through all things' (πνεῦμα διῆκον διὰ πάντων), giving unity to the whole.[41]

In addition to the supreme Logos there were 'seminal logoi.' These were parts of the universal principle but, because of the unified concept of the universe, they were not cut off from the whole. They were in fact pieces of God.[42] The soul was identified as "the logos in man."[43] Man's activity, integrated within the totality of all things, was governed and directed by this particle of 'God.'

For the individual the Logos is a pointer, showing him the direction in which he must go (λόγος ὄρθος), the nomos or law. Man is essentially a Logos-being. It is important for him to recognize his identity with the universal Logos and give his assent to it (συγκατάθεσις).[44]

The orderly working of Nature was its [ὅ λόγος] operation. Organic beings grow according to regular types, because the Divine Reason was in them as a logos spermatikos, a formula of life developing from a germ.[45]

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[41] Bultmann, op. cit., 135.

[42] Armstrong, op. cit., 124 [43] Ibid., 122.

[44] Bultmann, op. cit., 136

[45] E. Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics, 43.

Every movement in the world was as much the expression of a Supreme Purpose as the voluntary movements of an animal were of its individual purpose. Chance had no place in the close-knit process which might be called Fate or Destiny (εἱμαρμένη), but which was really intelligent Law and all-pervading Providence (προνοῖα).[46]

The Stoics added to this a somewhat unusual doctrine of cyclical history. They suggested that the passive matter of the universe was to be periodically re-absorbed into the "Divine Fire."[47] They held that the same people, incidents, and relationships would re-occur. "The universe is thus not eternal or indestructible, but is eternally destroyed and re-created in an endless series of cycles."[48]

This, therefore, is the world and its motivating and controlling forces envisioned by the Stoics. It has a number of at least apparent affinities with later Christian thought, especially the Logos doctrine. Yet Bultmann rightly states of the Stoic λόγος,

> It is neither a divine spark fallen from the world of light, as in Gnosticism, nor is it a super-natural gift, as in Christianity. It is the Logos of man, identical with the universal Logos, his intellect and will. It is the divine element in him, which lies within his own control.[49]

Thus it is evident once again that the evidence must be evaluated very carefully in order to avoid presenting an incorrect picture. At any rate it is at least true that these Greek philosophical categories were ready to hand in the first century A. D. when the "gospel" was sweeping across the Mediterranean world. To anticipate, there seems to be a tendency among modern scholars to view these Greek forms as important but not extremely influential in the Christian revelation. Probably their greatest asset was that they were at least outwardly in harmony with certain Christian categories. An appreciation of the extent of their use will depend upon a careful examination of the evidence of that period.

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[46] Ibid., 44. [47] Armstrong, op. cit., 124

[48] Ibid. [49] Bultmann, op. cit., 142.

III. DIASPORA JUDAISM

This study now turns to Diaspora Judaism in which the Jews with all their rich background met their contemporary counterparts from the Greek world. This encounter occurred at a number of places in the Mediterranean world, but no where was it more dramatic, extensive, or complete than at Alexandria. Other sources may make their contribution from time to time, but our concern here is with the Alexandrian phenomenon. A number of elements contribute to this, but most decisive is the fact that the Wisdom of Solomon as well as the writings of Philo were produced by men who lived in Alexandria and had experienced the severe encounter just mentioned. The reality and nature of this encounter must be examined with the greatest possible care. Deane states with insight;

> The civilization of both quarters of the world here met at a common centre, and from this point sent forth an influence that extended through all countries. It was however only by slow degrees that the rigid and unbending Oriental deigned to examine the tenets of other peoples. And when this investigation took place, the Greek did not absorb the Eastern philosophy, nor the Eastern the Greek; but from the fusion of the two a new system arose, a combination of revealed truth and speculative opinion, which has received the name of Neo-Platonism, and of which Philo Judaeus was the most eminent supporter, if not the founder.[50]

Though the quotation to a considerable extent anticipates this study, it is nevertheless true. This will become apparent as the discussion proceeds. If questions were to be raised about its validity they would deal with the extent of the influence.

Aristobulus.[51] The first preserved literary link between Jewish Wisdom and the immanent causative principle of the Greeks is found in a fragment from Aristobulus, preserved by Eusebius.[52] Aristobulus (2nd Century B. C.)

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[50] W. J. Deane, The Book of Wisdom, 8. See also B. M. Metzger, Introduction to the Apocrypha, 66, 73, 74, etc.

[51] With regard to the date and credibility of Aristobulus see J. Drummond, Philo, I, 242-255.

[52] R. McL. Wilson, The Gnostic Problem, 38. See W. L. Knox, St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles, 68f.

was regarded by the early Christian Fathers as the founder of Jewish philosophy in Alexandria. This fact puts Aristobulus in a unique position. He believed that all the genuine insight achieved by the Greeks was ultimately dependent upon the truth of God revealed to Moses. He was also concerned to spiritualize or allegorize the anthropomorphisms in the Old Testament.

The passage in question reads:

> . . . it has been said by some who were of the Peripatetic School that wisdom is in place of a beacon-light, for by following it constantly men will be rendered free from trouble through their whole life.
>
> But more clearly and more beautifully one of our forefathers, Solomon, said that it has existed before heaven and earth; which indeed agrees with what has been said above.[53]

This fragment is of inestimable value for this study. It not only manifests the thought of the times, but it also demonstrates the kind of cross-fertilization that was taking place between two very different traditions. Aristobulus is probably referring to Proverbs 8.22ff., even though vague links may be established elsewhere. The exact statement made by Aristobulus is not found in

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[53] Aristobulus, in Eusebius Praeparatio Evangelica, XIII, xii. For a complete discussion of the passage see E. Schürer, The Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ, II.iii, 237-243. Schürer does not discuss the fragment in Eusebius but rather gathers all the known references to Aristobulus.

Proverbs but both "heaven" (8.27) and "earth" (8.23) are mentioned as having come into existence in the presence of wisdom. Although the quotation is not direct the thoughts contained in the two passages are almost identical.

Once this link was established it was preserved. There is no recorded argument to justify it. Perhaps no need was felt. The situation may well have been such that the association seemed apparent and natural, and therefore no apology was felt necessary.

Wisdom of Solomon. As it appears that the Wisdom of Solomon was written before the emergence of Philo,[54] it is in order to consider it before turning to the great Alexandrian. The book made an extensive contribution to the wisdom tradition. In order to adequately encompass this contribution our investigation will make two approaches. After introductory matters we will turn to a commentary on the passages important for this study. This will be followed by a summary which will attempt to gather the salient points taking into consideration their more natural affinities.

Goodrick insisted that the overtones of persecution contained in the Book of Wisdom referred to those under

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[54] Pfeiffer, op.cit., 327.

Caligula (37-41 A.D.).[55] This was rejected for two reasons. First it is unnecessary to suggest that the author of the book himself experienced the difficulties to which allusion is made.[56] Second, it seems quite decisive now that the book must be pre-Philonic. This conclusion is based largely on observations with regard to doctrinal development. For example:

> The Logos-idea is the leading feature of Philo's system, and there is in Wisdom no trace of the Philonian Logos, nor is the Divine Wisdom ever even identified with the Logos.[57]

As to the *terminus a quo* the chief issue seems to be the translation especially of Job and Isaiah in the LXX. It would appear that the writer of Wisdom was aware of both books in their Greek dress.[58] In view of the various

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[55] W. O. E. Oesterley, *The Book of Wisdom*, xcii f. This is the basis for the *terminus ad quem* suggested both by Torrey (*The Apocryphal Literature*, 103f.) and Metzger (*op. cit.*, 67).

[56] If it is necessary to suggest a specific persecution it is more likely that it was that suffered under Ptolemy Physcon at the end of the second century B. C. See J. Geyer, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, 17.

[57] Oesterley, *The Book of Wisdom*, xviii. The last assertion is open to some question, cf. Wisdom 9.1, 2. See discussion infra 114f.

[58] J.A.F. Gregg, The Wisdom of Solomon, x f. Cf. Wisdom 2.12 with Isaiah 3.10; Wisdom 15.10 with Isaiah 44.20, and Wisdom 12.12 with Job 9.12, 19.

aspects of the discussion, it would seem best to assign the book to the first half of the first century B. C.

It is obvious that if any part of the preceding discussion is true the book could not have been written by Solomon. Such designation can only be literary artifice. It has already been pointed out that this type of anonymity was originally a means of avoiding the displeasure of the authorities. Later it became acceptable more for its own sake as a literary device and was widely used. In all likelihood the original author intended to deceive no one. His desire was to identify with regard to type what he had written with that produced by Israel's ideal wisdom figure. The author of the book of Wisdom is therefore unknown.[59]

Although both single and dual authorship have been argued,[60] in our opinion the evidence is inconclusive. The number of authors is in fact comparatively unimportant. What is of more interest is the underlying convictions or desires that may lie behind the book as it is now known. Metzger suggests:

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[59] L. H. Brockington, A Critical Introduction to the Apocrypha, 68.

[60] Single authorship: Gregg, op. cit., xxvii-xxviii. Dual authorship: Torrey, op. cit., 98. For the more conservative approach see: Oesterley, The Books of the Apocrypha, 469; The Book of Wisdom, xiv; Pfeiffer, op. cit. 321-325.

> It may well be, however, that pseudo-Solomon discovered what many another author has discovered, namely, that the sublimest inspiration does not abide forever, and that in place of noble thoughts mere commonplaces and bathos can also come from one's pen.[61]

That there are differences between the two sections of the book (i.e. chapters 1-9; 10-19) is easily recognized. The reasons behind these variations are not so easily determined. It is generally concluded however that the author was "an orthodox Hellenistic Jew of Alexandria with a philosophical education."[62] He may have introduced the kind of allegorical method so extensively used later by Philo.[63] With overall purpose in mind Geyer pointedly says;

> Our author was not so enthusiastic about these new-fangled ways as some of his friends were, and he wrote his book to appeal to his fellow Jews to remain faithful to the true religion. . . . But his main purpose was to consolidate, not to expand the community to which he belonged.[64]

We must repeatedly insist that systematization more often than not does violence in one way or another to an author's intention. In the comments on the pages to follow we have tried to avoid over-systematization.

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[61] Metzger, op. cit., 70

[62] Ibid., 67f.

[63] Gregg, op. cit., xvii.

[64] Geyer, op. cit., 19.

Yet, even in this more flexible approach, the extent of the contribution made by the book of Wisdom to the wisdom tradition will be apparent. The passages themselves are relatively easy to gather being primarily found in chapters 1, 6-9.

The first passage to be considered is the opening statement.

1.1 Love righteousness, you rulers of the earth,
think of the Lord with uprightness,
and seek him with sincerity of heart,
2 because he is found by those who do not
put him to the test,
and manifests himself to those who do not distrust
him.
3 For perverse thoughts separate men from God,
and when his power is tested, it convicts the
foolish;
4 because wisdom will not enter a deceitful soul,
nor dwell in a body enslaved to sin.
5 For a holy and disciplined spirit will flee from
deceit,
and will rise and depart from foolish thoughts,
and will be ashamed at the approach of unrighteousness.
6 For wisdom is a kindly spirit and will not free
a blasphemer from the guilt of his words;
because God is witness of his inmost feelings,
and a true observer of his heart, and a hearer of
his tongue.

The address to "rulers of the earth" is in keeping with the fact that the book is attributed to Solomon. It is, ". . . an address in keeping with the _ex hypothesi_ Solomonic authorship: to none would a king appeal more fitly than to kings."[65] With regard to _δικαιοσύνη_ Deane says;

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[65] Gregg, _op. cit._, 1; cf. Geyer, _op. cit._, 59f.

> . . . 'righteousness,' not merely justice between man and man, but moral uprightness, which is equivalent to Wisdom in its full theoretical and practical meaning.[66]

It should be urged that the entire passage speaks of men who live in accord with the principles of Wisdom. In addition to δικαιοσύνη such men are also characterized by "thoughts of uprightness," "sincerity of heart" and a "disciplined spirit." These are placed opposite those with whom Wisdom has nothing to do. Wisdom "will not enter a deceitful soul, nor dwell in a body enslaved to sin" (v.4).

Wisdom is casually hypostatized in the book.[67] The author does not make any move to defend the fact which surely must mean that he felt it needed no defense. Such clear and easy hypostatization is particularly evident in verse six of the passage under consideration.

Although a hypostatized Wisdom figure is generally recognized in the Wisdom of Solomon, it should be noted that the author of the book is the most vivid example among those who pass easily in their writing from the hypostatized figure to the characteristic and back again.[68]

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[66] Deane, op.cit., 111. [67] Pfeiffer, op. cit., 333.

[68] Wilson, The Gnostic Problem, 39.

This peculiar phenomenon is important in that it apparently represents a later stage of transition when the hypostatized figure was in the final stages of acquiring complete independent existence. This is just one example of the fact that Wisdom passed through some strange conceptual situations on her way toward hypostatization.

Verse six also suggests that Wisdom is a humane being, both kind and exacting as the situation demands. The first two lines of verse six read:

φιλάνθρωπον γὰρ πνεῦμα σοφία
καὶ οὐκ ἀθώωσει βλασφήμον ἀπὸ χειλέων αὐτοῦ

> She is indeed humane, but exacts punishment when deserved, so loving is she towards the souls of men. Cf. Ps. 62.12. Wisdom reflects the mind of God who created all things but loves men best of all, as being the noblest product of Wisdom's work.[69]

It should be noted that there is a change of subject in verse six from "wisdom" to "God." A further change is made in verse seven to the "Spirit of the Lord." It is impossible to be certain exactly what the author intends in this. It is apparent that sharp distinctions between these terms were not made. The primary point in the section would seem to be that either directly or indirectly God fills the universe. More specifically:

> The Alexandrine idea was that God acted upon the world through the Logos, while the Wisdom mediated His immanence. And so here, it seems more in keeping

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[69] Gregg, op. cit., 4.

> with the author's view of the universal activity of Wisdom, to see in her the medium whereby knowledge of the words of men is brought to God: Wisdom is the "ear of jealousy."[70]

It is also possible to interpret the passage in terms of the Old Testament concept that "the spirit of God denotes God in His activity in the world."[71] The first interpretation must surely be more in keeping with what would be expected to arise in Alexandria.[72]

Another similar statement is found later.

9.17 Who has learned thy counsel,
  unless thou hast given wisdom
and sent thy holy Spirit
  from on high?

The identification between "Wisdom" and the "spirit" cannot be denied.[73] It is evident that the author of the material is himself still exploring the possibilities of the various ways in which these truths might be expressed. We shall see similar identifications a number of times in the course of this study.

In chapters 6-9, the author exalts wisdom and describes her qualities and actions. The section begins

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[70] *Ibid*., 5. [71] *Ibid*.

[72] See Geyer, *op*. *cit*., 60. Geyer (34) also discusses in some detail the relation between Wisdom and the Spirit of the Lord in the Book of Wisdom. See also Deane, *op*. *cit*., 25f.

[73] Oesterley, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, x, and 53.

(6.1-11) with an address to "kings," "judges," and "monarchs" which recalls the opening appeal (1.1). It is promised that the Lord will search out and punish the wicked. The only way to avoid destruction is to "learn wisdom" (v. 9). Wisdom comes through "words" of the Lord (v. 11). The context also connects these things closely to a legal righteousness (vv. 4, 9).

The author's first description of Wisdom immediately follows.

> 6.12 Wisdom is radiant and unfading,
> and she is easily discerned by those who love her,
> and is found by those who seek her.
> 13 She hastens to make herself known
> to those who desire her.
> 14 He who rises early to seek her will have no difficulty,
> for he will find her sitting at his gates.
> 15 To fix one's thought on her is perfect understanding,
> and he who is vigilant on her account
> will soon be free from care,
> 16 because she goes about seeking those worthy of her,
> and she graciously appears to them in their paths;
> and meets them in every thought.

It has been mentioned repeatedly that Wisdom has nothing to do with those who are determined to live foolishly. From this it would be possible to expect her to approach carefully even those who are inclined toward her. This is however not the case as the preceding quotation vividly points out. She not only waits for those that seek her but she searches them out. Indeed she meets them in the way.

One of the strikingly Greek elements of the Book of Wisdom is the Sorites found in chapter six. "Sorites is a cumulative series of syllogisms, in which the conclusion of each becomes the premise of the next, until the main conclusion is reached."[74] It reads,

> 6.17 The beginning of wisdom is the most
> sincere desire for instruction,
> and concern for instruction is love of her,
> 18 and love of her is the keeping of her laws,
> and giving heed to her laws is
> assurance of immortality,
> 19 and immortality brings one near to God;
> 20 so the desire for wisdom leads to a kingdom.

The Sorites or "Chain" is not quite complete. A well-turned concluding line would make it more satisfying as well as supply that final "touch" that would drive the argument home. Gregg suggests the addition of the following line: "Desire for wisdom makes men kings."[75] Inasmuch as "kingdom" seems to be the more likely rendering of βασιλεία, Oesterley concludes:

> By "kingdom" in this verse is, of course, not meant the kingdom of heaven, but dominion, i.e. the ascendancy over the mind of men possessed by one whose desire for Wisdom has enabled him to attain her.[76]

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[74] Gregg, op. cit., 60.

[75] Ibid. Cf. Brockington, op. cit., 59.

[76] Oesterley, The Wisdom of Solomon, 42.

The writer of Wisdom mentions or implies the immortality of man a number of times.[77] Since it is the result of wisdom in the Chain it should be mentioned here. "Righteousness" is closely related. To know God is "complete righteousness" (15.3). The righteous live forever (5.15). There is therefore a link between righteousness and immortality. But Wisdom also leads to immortality (8.13). Therefore there must be a close connection between wisdom and righteousness. It is apparent that this "righteousness" is only a thin veneer over a legal relationship. It is wise to obey. Obedience is righteousness in action. At any rate the end product of this spiraling cycle is immortality. Wilckens summarizes with characteristic completeness;

> Darum vermittelt die Weisheit, indem sie dem Schuler die Erkenntniss ihrer selbst schenkt, zugleich ihre eigene Unmittelbarkeit zu Gott: namlich ἀφθαρσία (vgl 8, 17), welche ἐγγὺς εἶναι ποιεῖ θεοῦ (6, 19).[78]

The sixth chapter of Wisdom concludes (vv. 21-25) with what amounts to an introduction to chapters seven through nine. The author sets his task to trace the course of Wisdom "from the beginning of creation" (v. 22).[79] Again he addresses himself to "monarchs" (v. 21) and as he begins he speaks in the first person as though he were Solomon.

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[77] Cf. 3.4; 4.1; 5.15; 8.13, 17; 15.3 and especially 2.23.

[78] Wilckens, in TWNT, Vol. 7, 500.

Even though he accepts his position as king, he insists that his birth and early life were like that of any other man (7.1-6). In fact it is for this very reason that he prayed for Wisdom[80] and sought her with the greatest concern (7.7). Though he counted riches less important than wisdom, he received from Wisdom's hands "uncounted wealth" (7.11). Even his insight into nature he accounted to be the gift of Wisdom (7.20), perhaps because she was the "fashioner of all things."[81] It should be noted that God (7.15) and Wisdom (7.22) are very nearly identified in the passage.

The first serious attempt to describe Wisdom follows:

> 7.22b For in her there is a spirit that is
> intelligent, holy,
> unique, manifold, subtle, mobile, clear, unpolluted,

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[79] For the disparity between the promise made by the author in this regard and his actual accomplishment, see Gregg, op. cit., 62.

[80] Or, "Wisdom." "The ideas of divine and human wisdom are not always clearly distinguished, and run into each other." Deane, op. cit., 149. See discussion supra 102f.

[81] Wisdom as τεχνίτις will be discussed in connection with 8.6, 114f.

distinct, invulnerable, loving the good, keen,
irresistible,
23 beneficent, humane,
steadfast, sure, free from anxiety,
all-powerful, overseeing all,
and penetrating through all spirits
that are intelligent and pure and most subtle.
24 For Wisdom is more mobile than any motion;
because of her pureness she pervades
  and penetrates all things.
25 For she is a breath of the power of God,
and a pure emanation of the glory
  of the Almighty;
therefore nothing defiled gains entrance to her.
26 For she is a reflection of eternal light,
a spotless mirror of the working of God,
and an image of his goodness.
27 Though she is but one, she can do all things,
and while remaining in herself, she renews
  all things;
in every generation she passes into holy souls
and makes them friends of God, and prophets;
28 for God loves nothing so much as the man
  who lives with wisdom.
29 For she is more beautiful than the sun,
and excels every constellation of the stars,
compared with the light she is found to be superior
30 for it is succeeded by the night,
but against wisdom evil does not prevail
8.1 She reaches mightily from one end of
  the earth to the other,
and she orders all things well.

In the list of Wisdom's attributes (7.22b, 23) there are twenty-one terms. Some have seen in the number itself a secret symbol, i.e. 3 X 7. Three is, of course, the symbol of the divine and seven that of completion. Be that as it may, some of the terms have philosophical associations. The difficult question is the extent to which they were intended to convey philosophical meaning.

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> In this bold attempt 'Solomon' falls back on the terms used by the Greek philosophers, particularly the Stoics, when they were describing the world-soul in which they believed. But the reader must not be so misguided as to suppose that 'Solomon' was describing the same thing as they were. This book never deviates from a firm belief in the God of Israel as he made himself known in the Old Testament.[82]

It would in fact be impossible to deny that 'Solomon's' intention is Jewish and that his thinking is basically consistent with the thought of the Old Testament. Geyer's conclusion must be based on a reflection which would only be possible at some later point in time. At this early stage of the confrontation of the Hebrew world with the Greek these distinctions surely had not been made. The author of Wisdom would most likely be open to truth in Greek thought while still holding firmly to his own Jewish views. It is quite possible that these difficulties were either unknown or only partially realized.

There is a textual question about *αύτὴ* (7.22). It is found in A. Though only a technical point, it is not without significance. The identification of Wisdom with the Holy Spirit mentioned above is involved. Oesterley

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[82] Geyer, *op. cit.*, 85. That the author of Wisdom was dependent upon Stoic thought see also T. W. Manson, *On Paul and John*, 143. This is a commonly held position as will be indicated elsewhere.

cites Goodrick with approval:

> A good deal depends upon the reading here. If the variant be accepted we have something very like an identification of Wisdom with the Holy Spirit, which was favored by the Fathers, who did not understand that this was to ascribe the doctrine of the Holy Ghost to an Alexandrian origin, a mistake of which full use has been made in modern times. It is likely that the variant was due to some supporters of this identification.[83]

Deane thinks that the notion is "somewhat in advance of the author's theology, though half implied in 9.17."[84]

Certain of "Wisdom's attributes" (7.22, 23) require special attention. "Intelligent" stands for νοερὸν. The word is used in philosophical connections by the Stoics.

> The Stoics called the Supreme Being τὸ περιέχον τὰ ὅλα νοερὸν (Cudworth, Syst. Intell. iv. 25, p.655, ed. Mosh.), and πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες, Plut. Plac. Philos. c. vi.[85]

"Unique" translates μονογενὲς and is deliberately set opposite πολυμερὲς, "manifold." This term (μονογενής) is well-known because it later found its way into the creed and is there translated "only begotten." Its basic meanings are: "single in nature," "alone of its kind."[86]

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[83] Oesterley, The Wisdom of Solomon, 46.

[84] Deane, op. cit., 149. Cf., Wisdom 1.6, 7.

[85] Ibid., 150.

[86] Ibid. That these suggestions correctly translate μονογενής here see R. Harris, The Origin of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel, 13. The New Testament use of μονογενής is established in John 1.14, 18. On μονογενής

The two terms may suggest certain philosophical speculations. The Greeks generally were at the same time somewhat dumbfounded by the vast diversity of the phenomena that presented themselves to the senses and convinced that it was possible to discover an underlying unity. It is natural that both concepts came to be associated with Wisdom. It has been said that μονογενής "implies that Wisdom, the creator, was not herself created, but like God is eternal."[87] Though such implications may be drawn out it is doubtful if 'Solomon' was so advanced in his thinking.

These are the words which have either philosophical or Christian associations. The involvement with the Greek world is minimal. Only one has been extensively applied to Christ. It should be noted here that of these twenty-one terms Philo uses five either directly or in variant forms to speak of the Logos.[88]

Because of her pureness, Wisdom is to be found in all things (7.24). The concept has a Stoic ring to it.

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see: E. Böklen, "μονογενής," Theologische Studien und Kritiken 101 (1929), 55-90; F. M. Warden, "God's Only Son" Review and Expositor 50 (1953), 216-223; and F. Büchsel, TWNT IV, 745-750.

[87] Geyer, op. cit., 85.

[88] For the details see Gregg, op. cit., 73, 74.

She is like the air, whose omnipresence explained or suggested to the Stoics the Divine omnipresence. To pervade and to penetrate were technical words in Stoic philosophy for describing the diffusion of the world-soul, cp. Diog. La. vii. 70, 138, 139, 147.[89]

Wisdom is a means of knowing God (7.25). She is the power that sustains all things (7.27). The verse reads in such a way that both philosophical and biblical overtones can be seen in it. The closing note of the section (7.29-8.1) urges both Wisdom's power and goodness.

In the next section (8.2-21) 'Solomon' explores his deep yearning for Wisdom. The desire possesses him. He wooed her as if she were his only love. He desired her to be his bride. In so searching his desire he occasionally speaks of certain of Wisdom's attributes.

8.3 She glorifies her noble birth by living with God.
and the Lord of all loves her.
4 For she is an initiate in the knowledge of God,
and an associate in his works.
5 If riches are a desirable possession in life,
what is richer than wisdom who effects all things
6 and if understanding is effective,
who more than she is fashioner of what exists?
7 And if any one loves righteousness,
her labors are virtues;
for she teaches self-control and prudence,
justice and courage;
nothing in life is more profitable for men than these.
8 And if any one longs for wide experience,
she knows the things of old, and infers
  the things to come;
she understands turns of speech and
  the solutions of riddles;
she has foreknowledge of signs and wonders
and of the outcome of seasons and times.

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[89] Ibid., 74.

Wisdom lives with God (8.3, cf. 9.9). Elsewhere she more specifically sits by God's throne (9.4). She is loved by the Lord (9.3). Not only has she been made aware of the knowledge which God possesses but she is also a part of his works (9.4). Her relationship to God's creative work is mentioned or alluded to several times. God is however always the creator (1.14; 2.23; 9.1). Once God's "hand" is mentioned as the creative instrument (11.17). This text presents a problem in that it expresses the Greek concept of creation out of "formless matter" instead of *ex nihilo*.[90] Wisdom was present at creation (9.9). She is spoken of both as God's "associate" (*αἱρετὶς*, 8.4) in the creation as well as "fashioner (*τεχνῖτις*, 7.22; 8.6) of that which exists. God's "word" is also involved in the creation along with Wisdom.

9.1 'O God of my fathers and Lord of mercy,
who hast made all things by thy word,
2 and by thy wisdom hast formed man. . . .'

The Greek text reads:

9.1 *Θεὲ πατέρων καὶ Κύριε τοῦ ἐλέους*
ὁ ποιήσας τὰ πάντα ἐν λόγῳ σου,
καὶ τῇ σοφία σου κατασκευάσας ἄνθρωπον....

This is the first time the two words are used in the same context referring to the creative activity of God. The far-reaching importance of this link will become evident as the discussion proceeds. "There is, of course, no idea here yet of the Logos doctrine, but expressions like these contain the germ of the later conception."[91] The two words are parallel in the passage, "'wisdom' is used in the second as a poetic variant for 'word' in the first."[92]

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[90] For a discussion of the problem see Oesterley, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, 60f.

The Greek word τεχνῖτις is found three times in the Book of Wisdom (7.22; 8.6; 14.2). It seems to have been introduced into the Wisdom tradition in the LXX translation of אָמָן (originally אָמוֹן) in Proverbs 8.30.[93] It has been suggested therefore that Wisdom is to be understood as the Creator.[94] This probably oversteps the original intention of the author. "The word does not imply the idea of creating; God alone is the Creator, but He uses Wisdom to carry out His will in the created world."[95]

Two further points arise out of this division (8.2-21). As well as possessing the foregoing qualities, Wisdom is a great teacher. She is such because she possesses all knowledge. The two things are inseparable.

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[91] Ibid., 51 [92] Gregg, op. cit., xxxvii.

[93] See discussion supra 42ff. [94] Geyer, op. cit., 84.

[95] Oesterley, The Wisdom of Solomon, 46; cf. Gregg, op. cit., 71; Deane, op. cit., 149.

It should also be noted that at least a portion of that which she teaches has its roots in Greek philosophy.

> The sage tells how he had begun to seek wisdom in his youth, and describes how she teaches men all the virtues (he enumerates the four cardinal virtues of Plato and the Stoics, 8.7) and instructs them in all knowledge (8.2-9)[96]

The desires contained in the preceding section form a base for the chapter to follow. In the Old Testament record, Solomon prayed for wisdom. The same is true here. Though the prayer form of chapter nine is rather loose it is recognizable. The important features concerning Wisdom that are included in this chapter have been incorporated into this discussion elsewhere.

Wisdom is mentioned nine times in the tenth chapter. She is characterized as the "guide and savior" of mankind from Adam onwards. Noah, Abraham, Lot, Jacob, Joseph, and Moses received her guidance. Cain "departed from her."

> The main theme of this section of the book (10.1-19.22) is the demonstration from history that wisdom, by God's providence, saved the Israelites and chastized her adversaries, the Egyptians and other heathen.[97]

Oesterley again quotes Goodrick with approval.

> "In this and the succeeding chapters we have perhaps the first attempt, at all events in Hebrew Literature, at a philosophy of history. . . ."[98]

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[96] Metzger, op. cit., 69. [97] Ibid., 70

[98] Oesterley, The Wisdom of Solomon, 54.

It is interesting to note that although the word "wisdom" often appears in chapter ten, its use diminishes rapidly after that point. In fact, it is found only four times in chapters eleven through nineteen.[99] Although the question of significance is difficult to determine, it is interesting to note in contrast that the Greek word λόγος is found in Wisdom six times, only one of which occurs before chapter eleven.

Gregg has an excellent treatment of these passages.[100] Four passages are discussed as simply representing "the will of God in action."[101] One text is translated "reason" (2.2); but even here there is apparently no reflection of Greek background. Only one instance merits careful attention. Of the Egyptians at the time of the last plague, 'Solomon' says,

> 18.13 For though they had disbelieved everything
> because of their magical acts,
> yet, when their first-born were destroyed,
> they acknowledged thy people to be God's son.
> 14 For while gentle silence enveloped all things,
> and night in its swift course was now half gone,
> 15 thy all-powerful word leaped from heaven,
> from the royal throne,
> into the midst of the land that was doomed,

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[99] 11.1; 14.2, 5; 17.7.

[100] *Op. cit.*, xxxvi-xxxix. The discussion included above is largely a summary of these pages.

[101] Wisdom 9.1, 2; 12.9; 16.12; 18.22.

> a stern warrior
> 16 carrying the sharp sword of thy authentic command,
> and stood and filled all things with death,
> and touched heaven while standing on the earth.

With regard to the affinity of this passage with the Philonic Logos, Gregg says:

> . . . the celebrated passage in 18.15 has been claimed as an example of the Philonic use of the Logos. This, however, is not the case. The use of Logos in this passage must be determined both by its use elsewhere in Wisdom and by the character of the chapter.[102]

Two reasons militate against a Philonic interpretation: (1) the use of the word elsewhere in Wisdom, and (2) the Hebrew character of this chapter.[103] It would be difficult to deny the reflection of the Old Testament.

> And David lifted his eyes and saw the angel of the Lord standing between earth and heaven, and in his hand a drawn sword stretched out over Jerusalem.
> 1 Chronicles 21.16

The shift from "angel" to "word" seems to arise from the fact that there is little place in Wisdom for the ministry of angels.[104] Though it may be concluded that the use of λόγος here is only a "rhetorical personification,"[105] it must be a development on the usual Old

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[102] Gregg, op. cit., xxxvii.

[103] Ibid., xxxvii f.

[104] Ibid., xxxviii.

[105] Ibid., xxxix. Cf. G. F. Moore, Judaism, 415.

Testament usage[106] toward that of the Targums.

> This hypostatization of the word of God . . . comes very close to its fully developed personality in the Targums; thus, in the Targum of Onqelos, Exod. 19.17 is explained as meaning that "Moses led the people forth to meet the Word of God." Similarly the words of Deut. 1.30, 'The Lord God goeth before you', is paraphrased in the same Targum: 'Jehovah, your God, whose Word leadeth you.'[107]

With regard to Wisdom 18.15, Gregg concludes: ". . . no valid reason exists for regarding the Logos as more than a rhetorico-poetical personification of the Divine will and energy."[108] Yet, we should note future development:

> In the second century, the Christian theologian, Ignatius of Antioch, gave these verses a Christological content. He maintained that, before creation, God existed in silence, and that when he sent out his Word (Christ) the world was brought into being.[109]

Having sketched the preceding notes on the relevant passages in the Book of Wisdom it is in order to note the summaries of others. Deane says:

> In the Book of Wisdom this idea Wisdom has become more definite and precise. The nature and sphere and operation of Wisdom are clearly stated. She is the breath of the power of God and a pure influence flowing from the glory of the Almighty, the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror

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[106] See Isaiah 55.10f.; Psalm 33.6; 147.15, etc.

[107] Oesterley, The Wisdom of Solomon, 87.

[108] Gregg, loc. cit.

[109] Geyer, op. cit., 125

> of the power of God, and the image of his goodness. Being One she can do all things, remaining immutable herself she maketh all things new, and in all ages entering into holy souls she maketh them friends of God and prophets. She is privy to the mysteries of God, sits by His throne, loves His works, was present when He formed the world, and gives to men all the virtues which they need in every station and condition of life.[110]

Metzger makes a slightly different approach:

> The Wisdom of Solomon carries the personification of Wisdom to its highest point in the Apocrypha. In a manner analogous to that of the Stoic teaching concerning the all-pervading Logos, the author identifies Wisdom with the spirit of the Lord (9.17), with the hand of God (14.6), with God's providence (14.3) and power (1.3). In an enumeration of the attributes of Wisdom (7.22-24), she is said to possess intelligence, holiness, beneficence, omnipotence, and omniscience (see also 9.11). These functions and attributes mark her as being very near to God himself. The writer regards her as far more than a literary personification; he accumulates such expressions as breath, effluence, mirror, and image of God (7.25, 26) in order to assert her divineness. Yet the author stops short of attributing to Wisdom deity, separate from and outside of God himself.[111]

Indeed the author of Wisdom achieved a unique advance on traditional Wisdom speculation. Whereas in the past various aspects of the subject have received emphasis, the author of Wisdom represents a more complete and balanced outlook. For him Wisdom is with God (8.3; 9.4), and has been so since "the beginning of creation" (6.22). Such concepts imply pre-existence although one cannot be sure.

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[110] Deane, op. cit., 25

[111] Metzger, op. cit., 67

While remaining one in herself (7.27) she is found throughout the cosmos (1.4; 7.27, etc.). She dwells in men, but not all (1.4, etc.). She both teaches (7.22) and aids the learner in understanding (1.4-6). This is a very elementary form of her later role as an agent of revelation.

Wisdom's relationship to God and matter at creation is mentioned in the greatest detail. For the author of Wisdom, God himself is the supreme creator (1.14; 2.23; 9.1f.). Wisdom is his "associate" (8.4) who was present at creation (9.9). Further, she is the "fashioner" of created things (7.22; 8.6). Once she is called the "hand" of God in creation (11.17).[112] She is referred to as the instrument of God in creation (9.2). In general, she "effects all things" (8.5).

The discussion of the Book of Wisdom to this point includes the concepts which attach themselves to Wisdom. The relationship of these ideas to earlier, as well as later, literature is impossible to determine exactly.[113]

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[112] *Ibid*. The concept of the hand(s) of God was involved in later Patristic speculation. See R. McL. Wilson, "The Early History of the Exegesis of Gen. 1.26" in *Studia Patristica* I (*Texte und Untersuchungen* 63, Berlin: 1957), 423ff.

[113] There are many references to this area of thought as the discussion to follow will indicate. Pfeiffer, *op.cit.*, 328ff. is particularly concise. Presuppositions are especially important in an area of this sort. Probably the most balanced treatment of Platonic background is that of Stella Lange, "The Wisdom of Solomon and Plato," *JBL* LV (1936), 293-302.

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Relative certainty of connections is apparent, however, on certain basic points. Gregg says of the author in question:

> . . . he is a Platonist in his sense of the beauty of the world, and in his argument that its beauty points to a supreme First Cause. He draws on Plato for his doctrine of pre-existing matter (11.17), of the pre-existence of the soul (8.19), and of the body as an obstacle in the path to spiritual knowledge (9.15).
>
> The teaching of the Stoics suggested to him the penetratingness of Wisdom (7.24), and her quickness of understanding (*νοερὸν*, 7.22). The doctrine of Providence (14.3), and the conception of the four cardinal virtues (8.7), were a loan partly from Plato and partly from the Stoics.[114]

Gregg adds further:

> . . . he [the author] propounds his doctrine of Wisdom as a fundamental unifying principle, which coordinates Greek thought with Hebrew revelation (as functions of the same being) the various operations of creative activity, guidance of history, advancement of science and philosophy, moral elevation of mankind, and mediation between God and man.
>
> In this way, he hopes, while never passing the bounds of orthodoxy, to show that Judaism is not merely an insulated national creed, but one standing in relation with truth wherever found. Further nothing but the Wisdom revealed to the Hebrews can avert the doom threatening those rulers who have wrongly administered God's kingdom on earth.[115]

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[114] Gregg, *op. cit.*, xvii. The passage in Gregg was taken almost verbatim from Oesterley, *The Books of the Apocrypha*, 458. See further, Metzger, *op. cit.*, 73f.

[115] Gregg, *op. cit.*, xxiv.

The Greek world of thought unquestionably lies in the background of this book. The very existence of this world of thought would seem to be one of the reasons Wisdom was written. Yet, in opposition to this in a way, it is not possible to compile a lengthy list of specific points of contact. The book itself demands to be left in this indefinite and somewhat obscure position.

This is not the place to discuss in detail the relation between the Book of Wisdom and later documents, New Testament and otherwise. This will be done as specific incidents present themselves in the course of this investigation. However, we should indicate that there appears to be no direct quotation in the New Testament.[116] Yet there are numerous affinities of thought. Beyond the New Testament, the Book of Wisdom was used (and misused) by various individuals within the Christian tradition.[117] As well as various involvements with "orthodoxy," it is not difficult to see certain concepts that were at least inclined toward "gnostic" thought.

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[116] *Ibid*., liii. For a discussion of Wisdom and the New Testament, see liii-lx. More recently significant contributions have been made in this area by A. Feuillet (*Le Christ Sagesse de Dieu*, Paris: 1966). Cf. also C. Romaniuk, "Le Livre Sagesse dans le Nouveau Testament" *NTS* 14 (1968), 551ff.

[117] Metzger, *op*. *cit*., 75.

As for man, his body is regarded as a mere weight and clog to the soul (9.15), a view which is foreign to both Old Testament and New alike. It was but a short step from this strain of thought to that gnostic heresy in the early Church which regarded all matter as inherently and irredeemably evil.[118]

This therefore concludes our examination of the Wisdom of Solomon. We turn to Philo.

Philo. Philo was a dedicated Jew, "inflexible in faith and practice."[119] He also possessed a scholarly inclination, remarkable for his time in spite of its limitations, which was in turn combined with a mystical element. As a Jew he was deeply committed to the God revealed in the Jewish tradition, especially the writings attributed to Moses. However, he was honest enough as a scholar to see that truth was also to be found outside the Jewish tradition. He was fascinated by the Greeks, particularly Plato and the Stoics.

Of Philo's syncretistic reflection of Greek thought, Wilckens says:

> So findet sich die stoische Definition der *σοφία* als *ἐπιστήμη θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων* und vor allem das stoische Ideal des Weisen neben der platonischen Charakteristik der Weisheit als das erstrebte Ziel des philosophischen *ἔρως* und der Bestimmung von *σοφία* als *τέχνη τεχνῶν* im aristotelischen Sinne.[120]

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[118] *Ibid*., 74.

[119] Kelly, *op*. *cit*., 19.

[120] Wilckens, *TWNT*, Vol. 7, 501.

points of contact with the philosophers will be seen a number of times.

Philo wholeheartedly accepted "the Platonic distinction between the ideal, or intelligible, and the material worlds."[121] Yet, he was unalterably convinced and dedicated to the proposition that all the best Greek ideas had been anticipated in the revealed tradition of the Jews. In practice, therefore, he interpreted Moses in terms of Greek ideas and then argued that the Greeks were somehow dependent upon Moses.

Philo's openness to Greek thought is related to two very important facts that regularly assert themselves in his writings: (1) the use of allegory, and (2) the lapse of criticism. In his treatment of the Scriptures he regularly employs allegory to find the "deeper meaning" which often turns out to be a point he in fact had acquired from philosophical sources. His allegory therefore often becomes a means of reading Greek thought into Moses, simply as a result of his desire to see the influence of Moses on the various philosophical systems.

> In other words, Philo deduces formally from the Old Testament all those philosophical doctrines which he had in fact appropriated from the Greek

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[121] Kelly, loc. cit.

philosophers. . . . Thus Moses is the true teacher of mankind, and it is from him -- as Philo, like Aristobulus, presupposes -- that the Greek philosophers derived their wisdom.[122]

His absorption in this "reading in" process led him to include certain things without giving due consideration to their content and therefore to the more fundamental question of whether or not a given concept should be included at all. Among other things this in turn led to a broader commitment to Greek thought than could be justified on reflection.

It is also known that Philo was not consistent with himself. At least, as we shall have occasion to see, it was possible for Philo to concentrate on one set of standards at a given time, while setting others aside which he obviously considered valid at other times. While it is possible to recognize this and still appreciate his contribution, it is also possible to discount his work simply because of this inconsistency. Representing an extremely negative sentiment in this regard, Deane says:

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[122] Schürer, op. cit., II, iii, 367. It should be obvious that from one standpoint at least this sort of view tends to attribute divine revelation to the Greeks. As Schürer indicates, both Aristobulus and Philo accepted this principle, as did some other apologists for Judaism fragments of whose writing are preserved in Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica (ed. E. H. Gifford, with ET, Oxford: 1903). See also W. N. Stearns, Fragments from Graeco-Jewish Writers, Chicago: 1908. Later Christian writers often followed in this tradition. Of those examined in this study Clement is worthy of particular note (see esp. Stromata I, 5; VI, 6, 8, 13, 17; and VII, 2.).

For a valuable note on Philo's interpretive method see A. Harnack, Outlines of the History of Dogma, 31.

> Studious rather than original, more fanciful than profound, he was incapable of forming a complete system of theology, and being led away by side issues and verbal niceties, he is often inconsistent with himself, fails to convey a distinct impression, because he has but vague notions or unrealized conceptions to offer. Of his piety and earnestness there can be no doubt; equally certain it is that, owing to his want of logical method and division, his expressions are indefinite; and to frame any regular doctrine from his works is a matter of extreme difficulty, if it be possible.[123]

More positively, it must be argued that Philo was unique in many ways. He must represent the extreme to which a Jew might go in his acceptance of Greek thought and still remain a Jew. "Philo is a highly daring thinker, given to a more adventurous syncretism than any other Hellenistic Jewish writer."[124] This fact is emphasized in that later Judaism had little regard for his extreme views. Philo must therefore represent a minority; yet, it must have been an important minority. Goodenough even wonders if this "minority" might not have been a "majority."[125]

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[123] Deane, op. cit., 11f.

[124] R. H. Fuller, The Foundations of New Testament Christianity, 75.

[125] E. R. Goodenough, By Light, Light, 9.

Whatever the size of his constituency, it was an important one and merits careful consideration. If it had not been for the historical situation in the century following Philo, his influence would surely have been greater.[126]

Though he stands in the same tradition, Philo's writing differs considerably from the Wisdom of Solomon. Wisdom was "a genuine product of the developed Wisdom-literature of the Jews."[127] It no doubt reflects the assimilation of a certain philosophical viewpoint, but only to a limited degree. However, "the thought of the book has not been steeped in Greek metaphysics as Philo's has been."[128] The extent of Philo's acceptance and use of Greek thought goes far in making Judaism a philosophy. Wilson says:

> In Philo, Judaism appears as both a philosophy and a religion, embracing in itself the best that other faiths could offer and speaking with an authority which they could not claim. It is not simply another mystery but above all others, the only complete and perfect faith.[129]

Schürer is even more emphatic:

> Philo has so profoundly absorbed their [the Greek philosophers] doctrines and so peculiarly worked them

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[126] Wilson, *op. cit.*, 48.

[127] H. A. A. Kennedy, *Philo's Contribution to Religion*, 8.

[128] *Ibid.*, 9.

[129] Wilson, *op. cit.*, 36.

> up into a new whole, as himself to belong to the series of Greek philosophers. His system may on the whole be entitled an eclectic one, Platonic, Stoic, and Neo-Pythagorean doctrines being the most prominent. Just in proportion as now one now the other was embraced, has he been designated at one time, a Platonist, at another a Pythagorean. He might just as correctly be called a Stoic, for the influence of Stoicism was at least as strong upon him as that of Platonism or Neo-Platonism.[130]

Schürer immediately adds:

> Notwithstanding however this profound appropriation of Greek philosophy, Philo remained a Jew: and the wisdom of the Greeks did not make him unfaithful to the religion of his fathers.[131]

One of the perplexing problems throughout this study has been the extent of the personifications in the writer under consideration. It is no less a problem with Philo. Speaking of Philo specifically, Kennedy says with insight:

> Philosophical or religious thinkers, in attempting to make any affirmations at all within the realm of spirit, are compelled to formulate such distinctions, although reflection at once reminds them that they are working with anthropomorphic categories, and that this picture-language must be recognized for what it is, an inadequate effort to express the inexpressible. Philo is no more and no less successful in his efforts than Christian theologies or idealistic philosophies. But it can scarcely be doubted that his particular differentiation of the Logos from the Supreme God had an exceptional influence on the subsequent Christology of the Church.[132]

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[130] Schürer, op. cit., II, iii, 364.

[131] Ibid., 364f.

[132] Kennedy, op. cit., 168f.

It may be that Philo's Logos was for him sometimes a hypostasis (or approaching such) and sometimes not. In view of his broader inconsistency this would not be surprising. With regard to the dilemma posed by this question Goodenough, in terms very much his own, says:

> If Philo were asked the question he would undoubtedly have fallen back into his purer metaphysics and denied that the Logos was anything but the flow of divine Reality, and that the Logos had no more reality in itself than has a ray of sunshine apart from the sun. Yet his soul was so warmed by the Logos-ray of God that he often thought of that ray as a thing in itself, something which could be made vivid by personification, even a rudimentary mythology, as he tried to express the fullness of his thought and experience.[133]

Philo's inconsistency and the obscurity of his method have already been mentioned. It should be added, however, that in all likelihood he conceived no plan of approach to the things he desired to say. He "simply uses one theory or another as suits the biblical context with which he is dealing."[134] It should be noted that this is specifically true of his Logos doctrine. "When Philo thinks purely in terms of Judaism the Logos disappears."[135] This point is of extreme importance. Philo only gave place to the Logos when thinking in a particular vein or manner.

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[133] E. R. Goodenough, *An Introduction to Philo Judaeus*, 102.

[134] Wilson, *op*. *cit*., 43.

[135] *Ibid*., 44.

Platonic dualism is particularly evident when Philo speaks of creation:

> For God, being God, assumed that a beautiful copy would not be produced apart from a beautiful pattern, and that no object of perception would be faultless which was not made in the likeness of an original discerned only by the intellect. So when he willed to create this visible world He first formed the intelligible world, in order that He might have the use of a pattern wholly God-like and incorporeal in producing the material world, as a later creation, the very image of an earlier, to embrace in itself objects of perception of as many kinds as the other contained objects of intelligence.[136]

As might be expected in this type of dualistic thinking, Philo's God is utterly transcendent. In sharp contrast, the God of the Old Testament, that is, the God of Philo's heritage, was a God of action.

> Philo's God is pure Being, of which nothing can be predicated but that It is, abstract static Unity, eternally, unchangeably the same; pure immaterial intellect.[137]

Because God represents absolute perfection he cannot have direct contact with matter in any form. Such contact would mean defilement. All of God's actions toward or upon the world must be through intermediary causes. The

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[136] Op. 4, 16. Cf. note 64, page 43, supra. Quotations from Philo are taken from the Loeb translation unless otherwise noted. The abbreviations are also those suggested in the Loeb edition.

[137] G. F. Moore, Judaism, Vol. I, 416.

background of his thinking here comes from several sources; the Platonic doctrine of ideas, the Stoic doctrine of active causes, as well as the Jewish doctrine of angels, and the Greek doctrine of demons.[138]

The fact that Philo conceived God in transcendent terms to some extent involved a Platonic conception of the supreme being. Although he does not openly declare that the nature of matter is evil, he may have been moving in that direction. One may at least observe that the trend current in Philo's time continued after him.

The increasingly transcendent nature of the Platonic conception of the supreme being naturally increased the demand for intermediaries. The Stoic Logos as we have noted was conceived as immanent. This involved a certain blending into the material order. This blending attached to the Logos the status of a δεύτερος θεός. Philo reflects such a view. Ultimately the Christian doctrine inherited this deficiency.

For Philo, God alone is creator. Because of this he receives exclusively the Platonic terms, Demiurge (δημιουργός), Maker (ποιητής), Planter (φυτουργός), Parent (γεννητής),

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[138] Schürer, op. cit., II, iii, 371f.

Father (πατήρ), and Cause (αἴτιος).[139] It is not without significance that none of these titles is applied to the intermediaries.

Even though Philo regarded God as the creator, he accepted the fundamental principle of the Wisdom-Logos tradition that an intermediary was involved in the creation itself. Therefore we are not surprised to find the Logos conceived as an instrument δι' οὗ creation was realized. For example:

> λόγος δ'ἐστὶν εἰκών, δι' οὗ σύμπας
> ὁ κόσμος ἐδημιουργεῖτο *Sac*. 5[140]

It should be repeated that a system of intermediaries is the natural and even necessary result of positing an utterly transcendent God.[141] Philo's primary intermediary is the Logos, which may on occasion be called Wisdom.[142]

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[139] H. A. Wolfson, *Philo*, Vol. I, 211. Examples of the use of these names may be found respectively in *Leg. All*. II, 1, 3; *Spec. Leg*. I, 5, 30; *Conf*. 38, 196; *Spec. Leg*. II, 32, 198; *Op*. 24, 74; *Som*. I, 11, 67.

[140] Cf. *Cher*. 35, etc., for wisdom in this role see *Fug*. 20, 109, etc. "Instrument" in this concept of Philo may be partly dependent on philosophical sources and sometimes mean "pattern." See Wolfson, *op. cit*., 266, 270f.

[141] Oesterley, *The Books of the Apocrypha*, 61ff.

[142] See discussion *infra* 137ff. The Logos is also called "the fountain of Wisdom" (*Fug*. 18, 97). Elsewhere the Logos "descends from the fountain of wisdom" (*Som*. II, 36, 242).

For a summary of the functions of Philo's Logos see J. Drummond, *Philo Judaeus*, I, 273 (156-273).

There are also "powers" and "ideas." Sometimes Philo considers the ideas and the powers as a totality, "no longer as the patterns or causes of individual things in our world but as the pattern or cause of the world as a whole."[143] When they are so treated by Philo he calls them "intelligible world" and "Logos."[144]

In attempting to clarify the relationships between these beings Wolfson says;

> In our analysis of Philo we have found that the relation of God to the Logos is that of Creator to the created, that the relation of the Logos to the intelligible world is that of mind, an actually thinking mind, to its object of thought, and that the relation of the intelligible world to the ideas is that of the whole to the parts of which it consists.[145]

Thus for Philo the powers are usually subordinate to the Logos. "As in the case of the Logos, he so objectifies the Powers as over against God, that their inferiority is clearly manifest."[146] In this secondary position it is convenient for them to be the agents of punishment.

> For it is unbecoming to God to punish, seeing that He is the original and perfect Lawgiver: He punishes not by His own hands but by those of others who act

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[143] Wolfson, *op*. *cit*., Vol. I, 226f.

[144] *Ibid*.

[145] *Ibid*., 240.

[146] Kennedy, *op*. *cit*., 165.

> as His ministers. Boons, gifts, benefits it is fitting that He should extend, since He is by nature good and bountiful, but punishments by the agency of others who are ready to perform such services, though not without his command given in virtue of his sovereignty.[147]

As the soul makes progress toward the upper regions, it must, at an intermediate stage, pass through the Logos. He says:

> . . . not that God, who is already present in all directions, needs informants, but that it was a boon to us in our sad case to avail ourselves of the services of "words" [λογοις] acting on our behalf as mediators, so great is our awe and shuddering dread of the universal Monarch and the exceeding might of His sovereignty.[148]

Further,

> . . . all that follows in the wake of God is within the good man's apprehension, while He Himself alone is beyond it, beyond, that is, in the line of straight and direct approach, a mode of approach by which (had it been possible) His quality would have been made known; but brought within ken by the powers that follow and attend Him; for these make evident not His essence but His subsistence from the things which He accomplishes.[149]

It is apparent therefore that for Philo God is quite separate and distinct from the intermediaries. It is the case also that he thought of the ideas as created.[150] The *Timaeus* is certainly in the background of Philo's

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[147] *Fug*. 13, 66.

[148] *Som*. I, 22, 142.

[149] *Post*. 48, 169.

[150] Wolfson, *op*. *cit*., Vol. I, 222.

thought, but in exactly what way is uncertain. Philo's system may therefore be conceived of as either an interpretation of or a deviation from Plato's treatise.

Different schemes have been devised to aid in understanding Philo's Logos. No doubt to some degree they force Philo's thought into an organized whole which does something of an injustice to it. Yet they are helpful and should not be overlooked. Kelly suggests that Philo's Logos plays a double role, (1) as God's agent in creation, and (2) the means by which the mind apprehends God.[151] Wolfson with a slightly different approach discovers three stages of existence in the Logos: (1) a reality in the mind of God, (2) a separate intermediary, and (3) a being immanent in the world.[152] Though somewhat limited because of the way they are conceived as well as by Philo's presentation, such distinctions will prove to be helpful in the consideration of specific texts.

Philo makes extensive use of both the terms σοφία and λόγος, though he prefers λόγος. He employs σοφία in excess of two hundred times;[153] his preference for λόγος

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[151] Kelly, op. cit., 21.

[152] Wolfson, op. cit., Vol. I, 239f., 291.

[153] Wilckens in TWNT, Vol. VII, 501.

is demonstrated in the fact that he uses it over 1,300 times.[154] Though inconsistency is present in his use of both terms,[155] it is in order here to examine the overlap first before examining his use of λόγος in detail. Even in view of inconsistencies and problem passages Philo's teaching on these points is reasonably clear. The difficulties should not be allowed to dominate the consideration.

Kennedy summarizes the problem:

> Philo's attempts to bridge the gulf which he assumes between a God who is pure Being and the world of Becoming circle round the conception of the Logos, who is God's Thought or Reason . . . . The Logos-hypothesis itself, as it appears in Philo, is full of confusion. This is no doubt partly due to its composition from heterogeneous elements, Platonic dualism, Stoic monism, and Jewish monotheism, modified by the later belief in hypostases of God, of which the most notable was Wisdom. In part it depends on the fluctuating boundary in ancient thought between personality and personification, and on Philo's own tendency to glide from what he conceived as truth to symbols of truth. To some extent it results from his failure in constructive power.[156]

It is thought that either Philo or someone else not long before him urged the use of Logos for Wisdom.

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[154] Kleinknecht in TWNT, Vol. IV, 86.

[155] Deane, op. cit., 25, note 2; Kelly, op. cit., 21.

[156] Kennedy, op. cit., 162f.

This is taken to be one further step in the reconciliation of Judaism and philosophy.[157] In this connection Völker says: "Er [Philo] sieht in der göttlichen *σοφία* den Quell aller irdischen *σοφία* und verbindet damit mythologische oder philosophische Vorstellungen."[158]

Philo, indeed, finds his Logos in both the wisdom and the word of God."[159] The fact that Philo does use both terms indicates that the change was not complete. His preference for Logos may indicate that it was in an advanced stage.

Wolfson observes:

> As in the case of the created Logos, God is called the Father of Wisdom, and, while Wisdom, unlike Logos, is not called the son of God, it is called the daughter of God, because both in Greek and in Hebrew the word for wisdom is of feminine gender.[160]

Philo makes even further use of the feminine gender of Wisdom. She is spoken of both as the mother of the

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[157] Wilson, *op. cit.*, 40.

[158] W. Völker, *Fortschritt und Vollendung bei Philo von Alexandrien*, 164.

[159] Moore, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, 416. That Philo's Logos roughly equals wisdom in most contexts see E. Bréhier, *Les Idées Philosophique et Religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie*, 115.

[160] Wolfson, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, 256. For God as the Father of Wisdom, see *Leg. All.* I, 19, 64.

Logos[161] (though the two are more often identified) and the mother of the universe,[162] which implies that she is the spouse of God. There would be a point of contact here with those religious forms which conceive deity as a male-female partnership.

It is obvious that the masculine gender of λόγος was more desirable for Christological purposes than the feminine σοφία. However, it would also be quite easy to stress the point to distortion. It is therefore of interest that Philo comments on the point at this particular stage of the terminological shift.

> For thou shalt find the house of wisdom a calm and fair haven, which will welcome thee kindly as thou comest to thy moorings in it; and it is wisdom's name that the holy oracles proclaim by "Bethuel," a name meaning in our speech "Daughter of God"; yea a true-born and ever-virgin daughter, who, by reason alike of her own modesty and of the glory of Him that begot her, hath obtained a nature free from every defiling touch. He called Bethuel Rebecca's father. How, pray, can Wisdom, the daughter of God, be rightly spoken of as a father? Is it because, while Wisdom's name is feminine, her nature is manly? As indeed all the virtues have women's titles, but powers and activities of consummate men. For that which comes after God, even though it were chiefest of all other things, occupies a second place, and therefore was termed feminine to express its contrast with the Maker of the Universe who is masculine, and its affinity to

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[161] Fug. 20, 109.

[162] Ebr. 8, 31. That the אמון of Proverbs 8.30 may be involved here see Wolfson, op. cit., Vol. I, 267ff.

> everything else. For pre-eminence always pertains to the masculine, and the feminine always comes short of and is lesser than it. Let us, then, pay no heed to the discrepancy in the gender of words, and say that the daughter of God, even Wisdom, is not only masculine but father, sowing and begetting in souls aptness to learn, discipline, knowledge, sound sense, good and laudable actions. It is from this household that Jacob the Practiser seeks to win a bride. To what other place than to the house of wisdom shall he go to find a partner, a faultless judgement, with whom to spend his days for ever.
>
> *Fug*. 9, 50-52

"With his substitution of the scriptural term Logos for the term Nous, it was quite natural for Philo to use also the term Wisdom as the equivalent of Logos."[163] In this practice Philo is of course following the example set by scripture.[164] There was also example from the side of Greek literature.[165] Plato on occasion equates wisdom and mind (νοῦς).[166] Of the period in question, it is possible to say of the transition, "In the Wisdom of Solomon, wisdom is treated exactly as the Logos in Philo."[167]

As to Philo's identification of Wisdom and Logos it would be in order to quote a passage in which he makes such

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[163] Wolfson, *op. cit*., Vol. I, 254f.

[164] *Ibid*.

[165] *Ibid*., Vol. I, 255.

[166] *Philebus* 30C

[167] Wolfson, *op. cit*., Vol. I, 255; cf. 287.

an identification.

> Let us look too at the particular words used. "A river," it says, "issues forth from Eden to water the garden." "River" is generic virtue, goodness. This issues forth out of Eden, the wisdom of God, and this is the Reason of God; for after that has generic virtue been made.[168]

The last sentence of the quotation merits closer attention. The identification between the two terms *σοφία* and *λόγος* is beyond question. The sentence reads,

> *αὕτη ἐκπορεύεται ἐκ τῆς Ἐδέμ, τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ σοφίας· ἡ δέ ἐστιν ὁ θεοῦ λόγος· κατὰ γὰρ τοῦτον πεποίηται ἡ γενικὴ ἀρετή.*

Both Wisdom and Law (among other things) are, for Philo also, pre-existent. He blends this conviction with his own version of Platonic ideas.[169] Thus it is possible to observe that, for Philo, Wisdom means, "both the totality of ideas which was created before the creation of the world and the Law which was revealed to Moses."[170]

Further,

> . . . the revealed Law which is to govern the conduct of man is nothing but the Logos or wisdom which is both the pattern after which the world was created and the law by which the world is governed, for the revealed Law is in conformity with the law of the universe.[171]

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[168] *Leg. All.* I, 19, 65.

[169] Wolfson, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, 184.

[170] *Ibid.*

[171] *Ibid.*

Philo's use of *σοφία* to refer to the Law is, of course, different from the philosophers. Yet, as we have seen, within the revealed Law he defines wisdom in the traditional philosophical manner as *ἐπιστήμη θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ τῶν τούτων αἰτίων*.[172] Further, he makes on occasion Aristotle's distinction between "wisdom which is 'the service of God' and prudence which is 'the regulation of human life.'"[173] Yet, "like the Stoics . . . he uses the term prudence in his various enumerations of the cardinal virtues."[174] It is therefore possible to conclude that "wisdom becomes with Philo a designation of the intellectual or divine virtues together with the actions corresponding to them."[175] It is reasonably obvious that Philo also moves easily both to and from the hypostatized figure.

Philo specifically speaks of Wisdom as the divine prophetic spirit.[176] In the same context he equates *σόφος* with prophet.[177] However, he uses *λόγος θεῖος* to describe

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[172] *Congr*. 14, 79.

[173] Wolfson, *op*. *cit*., Vol. II, 212. See *Praem*.14, 81.

[174] Wolfson, *loc*. *cit*. See *Post*. 37, 128.

[175] Wolfson, *loc*. *cit*.

[176] *Gig*. 5, 23.

[177] *Ibid*., 5, 22.

the prophetic revelations contained in scripture.[178] Though λόγος is not used of the prophetic spirit itself the two are apparently linked in Philo's mind.

Wisdom, though of great importance for Philo, does not occupy the place of dominance. As we have seen, Logos is by far the more significant term. A more specific examination is therefore in order.

> Philo's intermediary is the Logos. Stoic influence is manifest in the name and the functions of the Logos, as it is in many other features of Philo's system; but in making it a 'secondary deity', above which is a transcendent God, he has made of it something widely different from the immanent energetic Reason of the universe which is the only God of Stoicism.[179]

Bréhier apparently does not view the contrast quite so clearly.

> L'on sait par un texte de Plutarque, que les Stoïciens admettaient un logos de la nature, suivant lequel arrivaient tous les evenements de l'univers. Ce logos universel (κοινὸς λόγος) n'est pas pour eux différent du principe suprême, qu'ils appellent nature commune, destin, providence et Zeus. Philo a accepté, sans la transformer, cette notion du logos.[180]

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[178] Mut. 31, 169.

[179] Moore, loc. cit. Cf. Goodenough, Philo Judaeus, 108f.

[180] Bréhier, op. cit., 84f.

Wolfson introduces the matter with insight.

> Then also, through the general philosophic view that thoughts must be the object of a thinking mind, Philo considered the ideas, while they were yet thoughts of God, as having been conceived by the mind of God, which mind, of course, was identical with God's essence. This mind of God is called by him, for various reasons, the Logos of God and sometimes also the Wisdom of God. Moreover, when God compacted these ideas and created them as an intelligible world, He also created a mind in which the intelligible world and hence also the ideas were to be contained. This mind, created by God as the container of the intelligible world, is similarly called by him Logos and sometimes also Wisdom.[181]

In view of these three different statements, one wonders if Bréhier may not have been overly committed to Philo's dependence upon Stoic thought. Further, it is our opinion that Moore slightly overstated the case in the quotation above. In any case, it is apparent that extreme care must be taken when attempting to restate the opinions of any ancient writer.

As has already been indicated, Philo casts the Logos in many different roles in different contexts. The range of associations is phenomenal. The Logos is the oldest and most generic of created things.[182] Its pre-existence is implied.[183] The position of the Logos between the created and the uncreated is strangely but logically explored.

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[181] Wolfson, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, 291.

[182] *Leg. All.* II, 61, 175.

[183] *Mig.* 1, 6.

> He [the Word] glories in this prerogative [his position] and proudly describes it in these words 'and I stood between the Lord and you' (Deut. 5.5), that is neither uncreated as God, nor created as you, but midway between the two extremes, a surety to both sides; to the parent, pledging the creature that it should never altogether rebel against the rein and choose disorder rather than order; to the child, warranting his hopes that the merciful God will never forget His own work. For I am the harbinger of peace to creation from that God whose will is to bring wars to an end, who is ever the guardian of peace.[184]

The Logos is called the "man of God,"[185] the "image of God",[186] "second to God,"[187] and "second God."[188] He is even referred to as the "first-born son of God."[189] The fact that Philo in the last reference was not extending himself beyond a number of his other explanations of the Logos can be best seen by looking at the text itself.

> This is the way in which the Psalmist speaks: 'The Lord shepherds me and nothing shall be lacking to me (Ps. 23.1). It well befits every lover of God to rehearse this Psalm. But for the universe it is a still more fitting theme. For land and water and air and fire, and all plants and animals which are in these, whether mortal or divine, yea and the sky,

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[184] *Quis Her*. 42, 206.

[185] *Conf*. 11, 41.

[186] *Ibid*., 28, 147.

[187] *Leg*. *All*. II, 21, 86.

[188] *Quaestiones in Genesin* II, 62.

[189] *Agr*. 12, 51.

> and the circuits of sun and moon, and the revolutions and rhythmic movements of the other heavenly bodies, are like some flock under the hand of God its King and Shepherd. This hallowed flock He leads in accordance with right and law, setting over it His true Word and Firstborn Son [πρωτόγονον υἱόν] who shall take upon Him its government like some viceroy of a great king; for it is said in a certain place: "Behold I AM, I send My Angel before thy face to guard thee in the way" (Exod. 23.20).[190]

In a context where sonship is at least mentioned, Philo himself says that the Logos has "many names."

> But they who live in the knowledge of the One are rightly called "Sons of God". . . . But if there be any as yet unfit to be called a Son of God, let him press to take his place under God's First-born [τὸν πρωτόγονον], the Word, who holds the eldership among the angels, their ruler as it were. And many names are his, for he is called, "the Beginning," and the Name of God, and His Word, and the Man after His image, and "he that sees," that is Israel.[191]

Philo, as a Jew, is bound to the Old Testament. The "word of the Lord" is certainly a part of that tradition. The heavens were made by it.[192] The forces of nature fulfil the word as they perform their functions.[193] The word of God was communicated to the prophets.[194] And the

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[190] Ibid., 12, 50b-51.

[191] Conf. 28, 145-146.

[192] Psalm 33.6.

[193] Psalm 147.18; 148.8.

[194] Isaiah 2.1; Jeremiah 1.2; Ezekiel 3.16.

word of God was revealed in the Law.[195] The sheer variety of uses found in the Old Testament helped recommend the usage employed by Philo. His explanation of the scriptures with the assistance of the philosophers represents a significant advance in Israel's wisdom tradition.

In Philo's theology the Logos is a deity both manifest and active. One of Philo's most important usages of the term is to explain all the appearances of God in the Old Testament. Whenever God is spoken of as appearing to man, conversing, or as revealing his purpose, it is the Logos that should be called to mind.

> The twofold meaning of the Greek word (reason, utterance) made it natural to appropriate for the Logos what was said of the divine wisdom (*σοφία*) and the word of God (*λόγος*, *ῥῆμα*); and allegorical ingenuity enabled Philo to find the Logos in many other places and associations.[196]

Philo himself, of course, has much to say about the Logos. Those quotations included to this point have helped to give a general perspective. There are others which will add to this.

> To His Word, His chief messenger, highest in age and honour, the Father of all has given the special prerogative, to stand on the border and separate the creature from the Creator. This same Word both

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[195] Exodus 34.27, 28; Deuteronomy 10.4.

[196] Moore, *loc*. *cit*.

pleads with the immortal as suppliant for afflicted mortality and acts as ambassador of the ruler to the subject.[197]

The religious color of Philo's Logos is especially evident when he quite casually speaks of him as "the heavenly incorruptible food of the soul which delights in the vision."[198] Or, again:

> The Divine Word descends from the fountain of wisdom like a river to lave and water the heaven-sent celestial shoots and plants of virtue-loving souls which are as a garden.[199]

For Philo, Abraham was the great wise man. The basic reason for this feeling is that, allegorically, when Abraham left home and family he left ignorance and set out for true knowledge and redemption of the soul. Philo wrote an entire treatise on the subject, in which the Logos plays an important role. The following is a concise summary (note that Sarah is conceived as a name for Sophia).

> When the three men came to visit Abraham at Mamre the experience was that of Abraham's coming at last to a vision of the three Powers just under God himself, the Logos and the two Powers of Creation and Rulership. To the beginner these three appear as three, but to Abraham they could appear as one,

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[197] Quis Her. 42, 205. [198] Ibid., 15, 79.

[199] Som. II, 36, 242b.

since . . . they are really one in the Logos: The two have no independent existence apart from the Logos. After the departure of these heavenly guests Abraham had intercourse with Sarah with new potency, for he was now masculine since he had the divine seeds with him: he begat the perfect Isaac. It is apparent that Abraham went to the top of mystical experience, had the power to be masculine, to beget, with Sarah or Sophia. The result was that for the purpose of allegory Isaac was a child of God, not of the man Abraham, and was born of the eternal Virgin, Sophia or Virtue. This is the achievement possible for the man who has gone all the way in spiritual development. He begets not pedagogues, masters of science, as he had begotten earlier in his education Ishmael by Hagar, but he begat the Son of God by heavenly Sophia or Wisdom or Virtue for he was now mystically at one with the Logos.[200]

When Philo refers to the Logos as "the ideal world," or "the image of God" he is thinking of the pattern by which the material world was created.[201]

> Should a man desire to use words in a more simple and direct way, he would say that the world discerned only by the intellect is nothing else than the Word of God when He was already engaged in the act of creation. For (to revert to our illustration) the city discernable by the intellect alone is nothing else than the reasoning faculty of the architect in the act of planning to found the city. It is Moses who lays down this, not I. Witness his express acknowledgment in the sequel, when setting on record the creation of man, that he was moulded after the image of God (Gen. 1.27). Now if the part is an image of

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[200] Goodenough, Philo Judaeus, 142. For references to a virgin of similar character see Ode of Solomon 33, supra 68ff. For a discussion of Sarah and Rebecca of the Abraham narrative cast in the role of Sophia see Goodenough, Philo Judaeus, 141ff.

[201] Kennedy, op. cit., 163.

> an image, it is manifest that the whole is so too, and if the whole creation, this entire world perceived by our senses (seeing that it is greater than any human image) is a copy of the Divine image, it is manifest that the archetypal seal also, which we aver to be the world described by the mind, would be the very Word of God.[202]

Philo often applies the metaphor of "Divine seal" to the Logos. This seal is stamped on created things and they thereby receive their permanent quality.[203] A variation of the same figure is used when he speaks of the rational soul, stamped by the seal of God.[204]

It has been mentioned that for Philo, the Logos is the "image" of God. In its highest form, human reason is the "image" of the Logos.

> But this shadow, and what we may describe as the representation, is the archetype for further creations. For just as God is the Pattern of the Image, to which the title of Shadow has been given, even so the Image becomes the pattern of other beings, as the prophet made clear at the very outset of the Law-giving by saying, "And God made the man after the Image of God" (Gen. 1.27), implying that the Image had been made such as representing God, but that the man was made after the Image when it had acquired the force of a pattern.[205]

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[202] *Op*. 6, 24-25.

[203] Kennedy, *loc. cit*. See *Fug*. 12f.

[204] *Plant*. 18.

[205] *Leg*. *All*. III, 31, 96b.

Kennedy has said that figures of this sort are, more or less, abstractions of the Divine being placed beside him in a "semi-personified" form.[206]

Philo's inconsistency and indistinct way of speaking are apparent in many places. It has been the determination here to be as positive as is reasonably possible in the treatment of his Logos. However, it would be useful to show that sometimes even in limited contexts his variations in usage can achieve remarkable transition. One such passage is De Somniis I, 17, 103ff. In the opening part of the passage, Philo intends "reason" when he speaks of the Logos. This, however, fades into the sense of "speech." As God's gift to man he is spoken of as "bulwark," "body-guard," "protagonist" and the power that "furthers his aspirations." Further, he is "counselor and champion," the "saving remedy for the passions of the soul." However, at the conclusion of the passage, all that has been said is combined with the divine figure. Philo there speaks of the self-renouncing soul that "awaits as a visitant coming invisibly from without."[207]

At least once, when Philo is speaking of the incomprehensibility of the supreme being, he calls the Logos

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[206] Kennedy, op. cit., 164.

[207] Ibid., 171f.

"God of the imperfect," while the Father is the God "of the wise and perfect."[208] Probably such a class was only an ideal for Philo, as it was for the Stoics.[209]

The High Priest in post-exilic Judaism had been given a more honorable status than was the case earlier.[210] Philo follows closely in the same tradition. Most significant is his attribution of the title, i.e., "High Priest," to the Logos.[211]

> . . . it is probably legitimate to regard this as one of the factors which set the Priesthood of Christ in the centre of the Epistle to the Hebrews, a document whose Alexandrian and Philonic associations are evident throughout.[212]

When speaking of the exiles who must ultimately return to their homeland, he says that they are to be "guided by some vision, more divine than is compatible with its being of the nature of man, invisible indeed to everyone else, but manifest only to those who were saved."[213] Understanding of the passage is divided.

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[208] *Leg*. *All*. III, 74, 207. [209] Kennedy, *loc*. *cit*.

[210] *Ibid*., 161f.

[211] *Fug*. 20, 108ff; *Mig*. 18, 102ff.

[212] Kennedy, *op*. *cit*., 162

[213] *Praem*. 29, 165.

> According to one interpretation, it refers to the Messiah as well as the Logos, thus identifying the two. According to another interpretation, it refers to the Logos but not the Messiah. According to a third interpretation, it refers to something like the cloud by which people were guided in their first deliverance from Egypt.[214]

The trend seems to be to play down the messianic concept.[215]

Philo's appreciation of human nature is particularly evident in the very practical role which he assigns to the Logos.

> For the Word of God, when it arrives at our earthly composition, in the case of those who are akin to virtue and turn away to her, gives help and succour, thus affording them a refuge and perfect safety, but sends upon her adversaries irreparable ruin.[216]

CONCLUSION

It is evident that Philo represents a new and different stage in the development of the Wisdom-Logos tradition. It should also be evident that Philo's thought was one stage of a development which was destined by its very nature to continue. However, it is becoming increasingly unlikely that the Logos doctrine as it appears in

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[214] Wolfson, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, 414f.

[215] See Bréhier, *op. cit.*, and H. Windisch, *Die Frömmigkeit Philos* (Leipzig: 1909).

[216] *Som.* I, 15, 82.

the prologue to the gospel of John was in any sense dependent upon Philo. Rather, the consensus seems to be that the two--Philo and John--developed two different conceptual worlds largely on the basis of the same material.[217] Indeed there may be more genuine associations between Philo and certain Gnostics than there ever were between Philo and John.[218] Knox concludes:

> However artificial the allegorizing of Philo may seem to us, it did represent a serious attempt to preserve the main fabric of Judaism as a revelation made by God on the stage of history. The tendency of the second century A. D. to substitute cosmological speculation for historical redemption might have had a far wider measure of success if Judaism had not already paved the way for a religion that united the temporal and the eternal.[219]

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[217] Manson, Paul and John, 149; Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, 162.

[218] H. Chadwick, "St. Paul and Philo of Alexandria," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 48.2 (1966), 305.

[219] W. L. Knox, "Pharisaism and Hellenism" essay in Judaism and Christianity vol. 2, ed. by H. Loewe (London: 1937).

PART II

CHRISTIAN APPLICATION

CHAPTER III

THE NEW TESTAMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Some fifty years ago Mackintosh declared that primitive Christology could be apprehended best if it were understood as "the fruit of adoring memory quickened by the experience of a risen and glorified Redeemer."[1] In the preceding sentence he approved of Feine's contention that the "lofty predicates" used of Jesus are "only intelligible if we suppose that the disciples in retrospect were conscious that even Jesus' earthly life revealed traces of His higher being." Though this approach conveys a great truth, the intensive work that has been done in the period since has revealed that the writers of the New Testament were much more subtle and sensitive than Mackintosh apparently took them to be. The various manifestations of the Wisdom-Logos theme in the New Testament make this abundantly clear. After certain introductory items we will turn to these specifics as they appear in

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[1] H. R. Mackintosh, The Person of Jesus Christ, 43.

the books of the New Testament.

With the investigation of the New Testament tradition this study moves into a new and different area. As we have seen, the development of Jewish Wisdom speculation may be viewed largely as an elaborate effort to reconcile the transcendence and the immanence of God.[2] Attempts have been made to show that Judaism identified Messiah with Wisdom, but they have met with little success.[3] In our opinion, Judaism had no comprehension of the fact that it was preparing a category which could be used to explain the "Christ event." After Easter, when deeply struck disciples began to search for categories in which they might couch their own convictions, they found ready to hand the conception of the Wisdom of God.

In this connection it must be remembered that Christianity borrowed words, phrases, concepts, etc. from various sources and used them to its own advantage.[4]

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[2] W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, 166.

[3] Ibid., 158-162; W. Manson, The Epistle to the Hebrews, refers to the Wisdom concept as, "at best only a Messianic potential."

[4] For a fresh and an innovative approach to problems in this area see J. Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (Oxford: 1961), and Biblical Words for Time (London: 1962).

One must exercise great care in assessing what actually happened to and within Christianity in this regard. There are fundamentally two false emphases. On the one hand, an overbearing etymological approach that seems to find meaning only in the history of usage is out of order. On the other hand, it is also misleading to speak indiscriminately of the "language moulding power" of Christianity. Yet the fact remains that Christianity at least occasionally *did* give certain words new significance and depth of meaning. The urgency of conveying a vital spiritual message was the controlling factor in this situation. The degree to which Wisdom was involved in this kind of thing is the question before us in this chapter. Obviously, *caution* must be the watchword.

In a similar vein Cullmann urges:

> . . . one must reckon *a priori* with the possibility--even the probability--first, that in his teaching and life Jesus accomplished something new from which the first Christians had to proceed in their attempt to explain his person and work; second, that their experience of Christ exhibited special features not present in every obvious analogy to related religious forms.[5]

Before going further, it is in order to set down the various factors, presuppositions, assumptions, etc., that must inevitably influence this presentation. Because of

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[5] O. Cullmann, *The Christology of the New Testament*, 5.

space limitations some can only be mentioned. Others will require more detailed treatment later in connection with specific problems. They are all gathered here for the sake of convenience.

The New Testament is to be thought of as a product of the Jewish-Christian tradition. Questions such as date, authorship, or authenticity of sayings recede into the background. Such things will always be important, but not so much in this section as, for example, in the earlier parts of this study where shades of development might contribute to questions of dating, etc. The question here is not so much the thought of individuals as that of the church as a whole. In other words, the New Testament is to be taken as somehow representative of the views and feelings of the earliest church.

With regard to the possibility of valid and constructive conclusions we are inclined to agree with the sentiment expressed by Taylor:

> . . . it may be claimed, within their limitations, the Gospels, while always subject to literary and historical criticism, are a reliable guide to the study of the mind and purpose of Jesus. . . . In the Gospels Jesus himself can be seen and the outlines of his ministry can be traced, provided we have the courage, imagination, and insight to read the primitive records aright.[6]

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[6] V. Taylor, The Life and Ministry of Jesus, 27.

Such a view understands the problems but with the optimism that something good can be attained when due care is taken. In this connection, although the method is largely outside our concern, we feel that the Form Critical approach, especially to the gospels, is useful if one is cautious in the application of principle.[7]

With regard to recent more or less controversial studies which are related to this investigation, the following positions have been adopted in this study. In the first place we feel that Colpe[8] has fairly conclusively "laid to rest" the "redeemer myth." The single redeemer should in fact be replaced by an ever-developing mythological situation in which, at various times and places, several different figures fulfilled similar roles. Secondly, though the studies of both men are extremely valuable, we

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[7] Useful early works in this area include V. Taylor, The Formation of the Gospel Tradition, (London: 1933); M. Dibelius, From Tradition to Gospel, (E. T. London: 1934); R. H. Lightfoot, History and Interpretation in the Gospels, (London: 1935); C. H. Dodd, History and the Gospel, (New York: 1938).

[8] C. Colpe, Die religiongeschichtliche Schule: Darstellung und Kritik ihres Bildes vom gnostischen Erlösermythus, (Göttingen: 1961). See further discussion infra 166ff.

have concluded that Wilckens[9] and Schmithals[10] overstepped good judgement in their final conclusions with regard to the Corinthian heresy. And finally, in opposition to Bultmann, and in agreement with more recent trends in German theological circles, we feel that the Gospel of John is not gnostic in any derivative sense. That is, "The Gospel of John is, in spite of many traits which sound gnostic, not a gnostic gospel."[11]

Before going further it is in order to define as precisely as possible the terms we intend to use in connection with a number of things which, in one way or another, may be described as "gnostic."[12] "Gnosis" is to be used of the broader phenomenon of the Hellenistic world; referred to as "knowledge of the divine mysteries reserved for an elite."[13] "Gnosticism" refers to the

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[9] U. Wilckens, TWNT, VII, 518-523; Weisheit und Torheit: Eine exegetisch-religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zu 1 Kor. 1 and 2, (Tubingen: 1959). For a critical evaluation of Wilckens see K. Prümm, "Zur neutestamentlichen Gnosis-Problematic. Gnostischer Hintergrund und Lehreinschlag in den beiden Eingangskapiteln von I Kor ?," Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie 87 (1965), 399-442; 88 (1966), 1-50.

[10] W. Schmithals, Die Gnosis in Korinth: Eine Untersuchung zu den Korintherbriefen. (Göttingen: 1965).

[11] E. Haenchen, "Neuere Literatur zu den Johannesbriefen", Theologische Rundschau n.F., 26 (1960), 276.

[12] For a review of the discussions of the Messina Colloquium (April, 1966) with regard to definitions see U. Bianchi, NUMEN, XIII (1966), 151ff. and G. MacRae, Catholic Biblical Quarterly, XXVII (1966), 331f.

[13] Bianchi, op. cit., 156.

developed second century heresy. The adjective "gnostic" may be used to describe both areas of thought. By the term "pre-Gnosticism" we refer to "various thematic elements which existed separately prior to their being assembled into Gnosticism."[14] If anything is referred to as "gnosticizing" the reference is intended to be descriptive of a trend or tendency which would fall under the general head of "pre-Gnosticism"; again, the overtone is that the specific is moving in the direction of the fully developed system. Nothing with regard to proximity is implied.

When dealing with any work translated from German, one must keep in mind that "Gnosticism" often represents what was originally "die Gnosis."[15] This word may not be such a problem when reading the original although the very presence of the capital letter in the noun form has not been without effect. One must never read these words (English or German) without asking for definitions. To approach this area of thought with only one's own definition of terms would not only be irresponsible scholarship,

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[14] McRae, *op*. *cit*., 332. Further "proto Gnosticism" is the term suggested for use by those who hold that "Gnosticism (as defined in this statement) is already to be found in earlier systems or in contemporary ones not included in the second-century 'Christian' gnosticism."

[15] Bultmann, for example, consistently uses "die Gnosis" and clearly understands the term in the wider sense.

but would lead to completely unreliable results.

There was an extreme syncretistic tendency present within Hellenistic Judaism of the first Christian century. Within this tendency there was present a certain Gnosis. This Gnosis was not only present but working in certain groups represented in the New Testament.[16] It is extremely difficult to assess the development of this movement within the New Testament itself, but we have concluded that it is manifest in an increasingly obvious way from Galatians and Corinthians to Ephesians and Colossians and finally to the Johannine literature. That is to say, the books ascribed to John manifest more "traits which sound gnostic" than the writings of any other New Testament author.

Although these conclusions can be rather simply stated they possess far-reaching ramifications. For example, one cannot hastily reject without good reason the carefully thought out conclusions of reputable scholars, especially when such a conclusion affects the foundation on which a study is to be constructed. One can only submit when the weight of the evidence seems to point in a certain direction. Wherever we express disagreement, we are simply trying to follow the weight of evidence. Opinions are of course involved.

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[16] The tedious nature of this point will become more and more apparent as the discussion unfolds.

The encounter between Jew and Greek is something that will never be fully assessed. After reviewing the various terms used in Greek thought and noting how they are used, one could easily conclude that the writers of the New Testament borrowed to one degree or another from Greek sources. Indeed, in at least one instance, Harris takes such a view:

> Sophia is the Hebrew way of expressing what the Greeks described by Logos, and the substitution of one term for the other is due to the supremacy of Greek influence in the early Church, accompanied by a sense of difficulty which was felt in giving to Christ a feminine title.[17]

That Greek influence was at work here is impossible to deny, but the statement does not allow for the fact that the shift in emphasis from σοφία to λόγος occurred mainly before New Testament times.

The fact is that the early church extensively used categories found in the Old Testament, especially the LXX. No exception is found in σοφία, and there are basic usages of λόγος as well. However, in the case of the shift in emphasis from Wisdom to Logos there was the added advantage of familiarity in Greek circles. Wisdom as a title remained, but in New Testament times Logos would have had useful associations, particularly in the mission out-reach

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[17] R. Harris, *The Origin of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, 31.

of the church. It is significant that, "it is Paul and the Fourth Evangelist, both trained in Palestinian rabbinism, who make use of the category of the *σοφία θεοῦ*."[18]

Before proceeding, it will be necessary to review the present position of the debate concerning the so-called "redeemer myth." The widely-known pioneer in this area and early member of the "*Religionsgeschichtliche Schule*" was Reitzenstein,[19] though a number of others have contributed substantially: e.g., Bousset,[20] Kraeling,[21] Bultmann,[22] etc. According to Kraeling, Reitzenstein held that ". . . the Jewish-Christian Son of Man (literally 'the man') is but one manifestation of an ubiquitous Oriental figure known in certain syncretistic circles

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[18] A. Richardson, *An Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament*, 158.

[19] For a complete bibliography of Reitzenstein's works see: Colpe, *op. cit.*, 228.

[20] See especially: W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, (Göttingen: 1907), and *Kurios Christos*, (Göttingen: 1913).

[21] C. H. Kraeling, *Anthropos and Son of Man*, (New York: 1927).

[22] See especially: R. Bultmann, *Das Evangelium des Johannes*, (Göttingen: tenth edition 1941). It has been said of Bultmann, "Of all the concepts which, in Bultmann's opinion, were borrowed from Gnostic sources the one most directly relevant to our present purpose is that of the Redeemer as a cosmic figure." D.E.H. Whiteley, *The Theology of St. Paul*, 115.

circles as 'the Anthropos'".[23]

What was attempted by the earlier theorists was to gather the various bits and pieces concerning "ideal" figures and fit them into one complete whole. As we have mentioned, the theory (stressed in varying degrees) was that these different elements derived originally from a single "redeemer myth."

One detailed effort to distinguish the various elements of such a myth is that of Mowinckel.[24] That Mowinckel understood the problems is seen in the fact that he expected "to some extent . . . an artificial picture."[25] He further indicated, in disagreement with Reitzenstein, "there is certainly no ground for holding that the late Jewish conceptions of the Son of Man were directly borrowed from any simple development of the Anthropos myth."[26]

Generally speaking, the attempt made by these scholars was a noble one. However, the ever-present fact was that the evidence that would indicate a single source theory was extremely meager. Certainly, there were a

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[23] Kraeling, op. cit., vii.

[24] S. Mowinckel, He That Cometh, 427-429.

[25] Ibid., 427.

[26] Ibid. Cf. Kraeling, op. cit., 127, also 128-186; H. M. Schenke, Der Gott "Mensch" in der Gnosis, 148.

number of "ideal" figures, but the link between them amounted to little more than their similar inherent character. The more the various elements were pondered the more it was felt that the developed myth came later and that it borrowed from various sources rather than that the various elements were dependent upon one original.

More recently, in a very well-balanced study, Colpe has reasserted that the various elements could indeed be documented:

> Das Modell "gnostischer Erlösermythus" ist insofern richtig, als sich alle Vorstellungen, die in das Modell integriert sind, aus Systemen, wie wir sie uns eben vergegenwärtigt haben, auch wirklich belegen lassen.[27]

Though this may well be true there is a "flaw":

> The real flaw is the idea that the myth of the Gnostic Redeemer originated at some time in dim antiquity, somewhere in the remoter east (vaguely conceived as "Iran"), and then passed across the world and down the centuries, leaving behind scattered fragments in different circles of tradition until at last it was reconstituted as a unity in Manicheism and finally disintegrated into its several components in Mandeism.[28]

It is wrong to "formulate a synthesis" on the basis of sources that must be dated in the second or even the

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[27] Colpe, op. cit., 191.

[28] R. McL. Wilson, Gnosis and the New Testament (Oxford: 1968), 28. The quotation is in fact a summary of Colpe, op. cit., 191. For a different but nevertheless effective rejection of the myth see Whiteley, op. cit., 116f.

third century and apply the results to the literature of the New Testament. The theory of the redeemer myth was constructed in just this fashion.[29] The conviction here is that any projection backwards is vulnerable, and that the further back the projection is forced the more it is open to fault.

Schenke puts the current conclusion concisely when he says:

> Unsere ganze bisherige Untersuchung lief ja darauf hinaus, dass es den Mythus vom erlösten Erlöser vor dem Manichäismus uberhaupt nicht gegeben hat.[30]

If Colpe has been successful in setting aside the "Gnostic Redeemer," it must be concluded that any such concept present in the Gnostic literature must be dependent--though perhaps in different ways and in different degrees--upon Christian sources.[31]

Throughout the examination of pre-Christian Wisdom speculation notice has been given to the fact that concepts applied to Wisdom often come very near to concepts which the Jews regularly associated with Torah. If Wisdom and Torah touch each other at a given number of points, it is only natural, if Jesus is thought of as the Wisdom of God, that those characteristics formerly applied to Torah will be applied to him.[32]

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[29] Bultmann, Johannes, 11f., meets this accusation squarely by asserting that though the documents are later the ideas contained in the myth show a much older character. Even though one admits the existence of "ideas," their combination into a particular pattern is quite another question.

[30] Schenke, op. cit., 148.

[31] For the role of "Adam speculation" in the Jung Codex see Quispel, The Jung Codex, 59, 76-78.

Although the characteristics common to Wisdom and Torah in pre-Christian times are widely recognized, Knox must have represented a minority opinion when he said that he was "pretty confident that even in Proverbs, as certainly in Ecclesiasticus, Wisdom is a personification of the Torah."[33] Perhaps more on *a priori* grounds than on evidence, Knox also argued that with the rise in the influence of Greek thought there was a decline in such an emphasis.[34] Richardson recognized another dimension,

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[32] Reference has already been made to Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*. Chapter Seven (147-176) is entitled, "The Old and the New Torah: Christ the Wisdom of God." The discussion is excellent and would serve well as an introduction not only to this division of the present study, but to the study as a whole. It may be possible to make a clearer case of relationships between Wisdom and Jesus via characteristics of the Torah than can be made for the simple identification of Jesus with Wisdom.

[33] W. L. Knox, "Pharisaism and Hellenism," essay in *Judaism and Christianity*, Volume 2, edited by H. Loewe, 66f.

[34] *Ibid*., 67.

"It was by New Testament times a rabbinic commonplace that the Torah was identical with the Wisdom of God. . . ."[35] Davies' treatment of the matter has convincingly shown that these speculations were consistently important from Old Testament times onwards.

Whiteley argues that the substructure of Paul's thought about the Torah encompassed four basic convictions:

> The first, shared with all Jews, was that the Law was God's gift and therefore good. The second, shared with many Jews, was that no one in fact obeyed the Law. The third, which a significant minority of the Jews also accepted, was that God's plan included the good of the Gentiles as well as that of Israel. The fourth, which cut him off from Judaism and made him a Christian, was that God had raised from the dead the Messiah of Israel, whom the rulers of the nation had given over to be crucified.[36]

Davies summarizes Paul's attitude:

> In a real sense conformity to Christ, His teaching and His life, has taken the place for Paul of conformity to the Jewish Torah. Jesus himself--in word and deed or fact is a New Torah.[37]

The New Testament passages relevant to this theme are not however confined to Paul's epistles. They are found in the writings of authors of widely varying backgrounds and in material written for divergent purposes, as

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[35] Richardson, op. cit., 155.

[36] Whiteley, op. cit., 79.

[37] Davies, op.cit., 148.

we shall see.

Though questions of date are not crucial at this point the movement of this study has been and will continue to be mainly chronological. As the pertinent Pauline epistles contain what many scholars claim to be very early pieces of the tradition and were actually written prior to the gospels as we know them it will be in order to examine them first.

II. PAUL

When picking up the threads of a discussion on Paul one wonders just where to begin. Although the problems are compelling as well as fascinating, they are extremely complex. They are further compounded by the fact that detailed studies have been made in some areas while, for a number of quite legitimate reasons, it has been necessary to overlook others.

The fact that there is a certain Gnosis, or perhaps better, a gnosticizing tendency, discoverable in certain of Paul's epistles has already been mentioned. At the same time it is possible to recognize what one might call anti-gnosticizing strains. In 1 Corinthians this occurs in a polemic against what some regard as a heretical brand of proto-Gnosticism. In this type of situation it is usually reasonably easy to recognize the polemic; the greater difficulty lies in trying to reconstruct the heresy. Certain features may be obvious, but it must be urged that the recognition of a given number of elements does not necessarily justify one in assuming the presence of the whole of which they later form a part. One must be extremely careful when holding a mirror to a text, as it were, to see what might be reflected. On occasion Paul himself may borrow the language of his opponents.[38] When he does he must be expected to turn it to his own advantage and purpose. Paul may also borrow from other sources and further, he may not always be aware of the fact. One would assume that influences could be graded from those which are direct and conscious to those which are quite indirect and no longer remembered.[39] The latter of course may be of greater importance because of the subtle nature of its influence.

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[38] Cf. J. M. Robinson, "Basic Shifts," 79.

[39] The question of dependence on earlier material is an eternal one. It would be fair to generalize that scholars have been more accurate as the science of investigation has developed. Gregg (J.A.F. Gregg, The Wisdom of Solomon, Cambridge: 1922, liii-lxi) for example, argued for extensive dependence of the New Testament upon the Wisdom of Solomon. Many of his examples would not be allowed today. Ellis (Paul, 77ff.), after examining the evidence with regard to Paul, decides against dependence but in favor of a certain amount of "common background." See also J. Geyer, The Wisdom of Solomon, 34f.; B. M. Metzger, Introduction to the Apocrypha, 75; C. C. Torrey, The Apocryphal Literature, 21.

With reference to Philo and Paul, Chadwick (H. Chadwick, "St. Paul and Philo of Alexandria," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 48.2, 301) speaks of "illumination." ". . . The Pauline Christology based on the typology of Adam is

As a general principle it should be stressed that each so-called "influence" must be considered on its own merit. It is the point of wisdom to be extremely cautious in pointing out specific strands of influence. Affinities should be observed yet even when one is reasonably sure that a certain thought or concept has moved from A to B the incidents in the unfolding of that development may well be impossible to trace. A danger which constantly threatens the scholar, as Ellis has observed in a well-turned phrase is "to convert parallels into influences and influences into sources."[40]

In all these cases it must regularly be asked, "What does Paul mean?" No matter what lies in the background, it must be assumed on a priori grounds that Paul himself had a specific intention in his own mind. For

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partly illuminated by Philo's interpretation of the creation story in Genesis 1, to refer to the heavenly archetypal man who is also the divine Logos, 'God's Man,' as Philo calls him. . . ." an earlier statement (Ibid., 290) aids in the understanding of his comprehension of the relationships, "Both writers draw on a common stock of hellenistic Jewish tradition. The principal interest lies in the different ways in which they make use of it."

See also W. Manson, Jesus the Messiah, passim, and A.E.J. Rawlinson, The New Testament Doctrine of the Church, esp. 133.

[40] E. E. Ellis, Paul's Use of the Old Testament, 82.

example, the "hymn" in Philippians 2 may indeed be pre-Pauline, but the nature of the passage is such that it is Paul's mind that is being reflected. The natural welling-up of the expression demands the conclusion that at the particular moment of writing the "original author's mind" was the furthest thing from Paul's thoughts.

It is also the case that Paul was saying something on his own in his "Wisdom Christology," Whiteley recognizes this in a very carefully worded statement:

> When St. Paul speaks of Christ in terms of Wisdom his intention is not to identify Him with an hypostatization of Wisdom, but to ascribe to Him the function of being God's agent in creation, revelation and redemption. In fact, the 'Wisdom Christology' of St. Paul may be summed up in these words: What Wisdom meant to the Jews was part of what Jesus Christ meant for St. Paul.[41]

Other points could be mentioned and other examples cited. The foregoing is simply one way of putting some of the problems. The deceiving thing is that while many of these problems have an obvious side, they also possess a hidden complexity. The challenge is to adequately reflect this complexity.

1 Corinthians. The first Pauline passage to be examined is found in the opening chapters of 1 Corinthians.

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[41] Whiteley, *op. cit.*, 112.

Though the first two chapters are most important the relevant context extends through chapter four.

It would be difficult to deny that 1 Corinthians 1.18-2.16, "ist nicht eine allegorisch theologisch Reflexion, sondern eine polemische Erörterung."[42] One can admit this however and give a substantial insight into the erring group(s) as well without going as far as Wilckens suggests. Wilckens holds that Paul's polemic originally opposed a Christology which had developed out of Jewish wisdom literature. Further, he argues that this "heretical" Christology was totally incompatible with Paul's thinking:

> Paulus polemisiert in 1 K 1f gegen eine Christologie, die seiner theologia crucis, die für ihn das Zentrum christlichen Glaubens und christlichen Verkündigung ist, diametral entgegensteht.[43]

Paul, he contends, sets a *σταυρός* Christology over against the *σοφία* Christology of his opponents.[44]

Wilckens' position is summarized under two main points. First, he feels that the "gnostische Mythos vom Descensus des Erlösers" lies in the background.[45] Secondly, and perhaps somewhat of a concession, he argues that Paul summarizes the teaching of the heretical group with the "entscheidenden Stichwort *σοφία*."[46] The passage is worth quoting:

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[42] Wilckens, *TWNT* VII, 523. It should be mentioned that although Prümm (*supra* note 9) observes certain changes, Wilckens article in *TWNT* is generally speaking a concise statement of the position argued in detail in *Weisheit und Torheit*.

[43] *TWNT* VII, 519f.

[44] Wilckens, *Weisheit*, 98.

[45] *Ibid.*, 97; *TWNT* VII, 520.

> Diese Grundintention seiner Christologie hat Paulus vorher in dem Abschnitt 1, 18ff. ausführlich und völlig eindeutig expliziert, indem er gegen eine Lehre der Korinther polemisiert, die er unter dem entscheidenden Stichwort *σοφία* zusammenfasst. Wir haben gesehen, dass Paulus hier einer Korinthischen Sophia-Lehre seine *σταυρός*-Christologie entgegensetzt, wobei er auffallenderweise den Sophia-Begriff jeweils in der Formulierung seiner Antithese vermeidet.[47]

Once committed to the thesis that the "Redeemer Myth" lies in the background Wilckens examines the sources, beginning with the Valentinians and working backwards to purely Jewish material. Regardless of whether or not the sources themselves would have led to such a conclusion it is astounding just how many "points of contact" can be discovered in such an investigation. In the view represented here Wilckens' error is basically two-fold: 1) the assumption that there was in fact a proto-Gnostic movement which contained a redeemer myth, and 2) the use of second century sources to document a first century phenomenon. The method is particularly unreliable when applied to an ever-changing object such as all gnostic phenomena seem to have been.

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[46] Wilckens, *Weisheit*, 98.

[47] *Ibid*.

Wilckens' work on Corinthians was actually preceded by that of Schmithals. This interest in Paul's opponents is at least partially explained by the conviction that Christianity itself would be much better understood if the problems faced by the early church were more fully appreciated. As far as the New Testament is concerned these problems are reflected to the greatest degree in the epistles of Paul. Schmithals, like Wilckens, assumes the existence of a redeemer myth.[48] His commitment has been described as "uncritical."[49] He also holds that the Corinthian heresy was "Jewish gnostic" in character.[50] In the suggestion, Schmithals finds the complete explanation of Paul's opponents. Robinson observes that Schmithals, "overdoes his case and thus tends to discredit the truth of his position."[51] A genuine understanding of 1 Corinthians must be found in less extreme views.

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[48] Schmithals, Die Gnosis in Korinth, esp. 27ff., etc.

[49] J. M. Robinson, "Basic Shifts," 79.

[50] Ibid. Robinson also notes that Schmithals in a series of articles (now collected in Paulus und die Gnostiker, Hamburg-Bergstedt: 1965) attempted to force all of Paul's opponents into the same mould. "Thus Schmithals provides a sweeping solution to the problems of primitive Christianity, comparable to the Tübingen hypothesis of Ferdinand Christian Baur, who saw everything in terms of the struggle of Paul with the Judaizers. . . ."

[51] J. M. Robinson, "Basic Shifts," 80.

Paul begins the discussion in 1 Corinthians (1.17ff.) by suggesting that the cross is in danger of being emptied of its power. To the Jews who demanded "signs," the crucifixion had always been a "stumbling block," to the Greeks who sought "wisdom," it was "foolishness." Paul suggests that his preaching was not designed to be oratorically persuasive. The "power," he argued, must be made to lie in the overwhelming fact of Christ's sacrificial gift. There were some, perhaps with the purest of motives, who were weakening this fundamental necessity. In the course of the discussion Paul makes several different approaches to this central theme.

One reason the problem appeared as it did was that Paul's opponents were approaching the Christ event with their own "wisdom." This, in Paul's view, was a fundamental error. Paul readily speaks of "the folly of what we preach," but such "foolishness" has God as its source and is therefore wiser than the best "wisdom" any man can produce. In fact the scandal of the cross is God's wisdom.

> Paul is anxious to explain that he is not talking about any mythological Gnostic σοφία; he is not concerned with any such worldly wisdom, any Hellenistic speculation: such wisdom of men is foolishness with God. The 'word of the cross' has demonstrated the foolishness of worldly wisdom, and Christ has been revealed as the σοφία θεοῦ (1 Cor. 1.18-31). Christ

Jesus was made unto us Wisdom from God, and therefore righteousness and sanctification and redemption (1.30). In all this Paul's interest is not at all metaphysical or speculative; his concern is rather to convince the Corinthians that now that the true σοφία θεοῦ has come, they need no longer puzzle their minds with problems raised by mythology and speculation, the 'wisdom of this world.'[52]

Early in the discussion Paul quotes from Isaiah and it would appear that the ensuing discussion arises out of that quotation. If this is true there would appear to be no direct dependence upon Old Testament Wisdom-literature.

And the Lord said:
"Because this people draw near with their mouth
  and honour me with their lips,
  while their hearts are far from me,
and their fear of me is a commandment of men learned
  by rote;
therefore, behold, I will again
do marvelous things with this people,
wonderful and marvelous;
and the wisdom of their wise men
  shall perish,
and the discernment of their discerning men
  shall be hid."[53]
Isaiah 29.13-14

No doubt σοφία is the key word in the entire Corinthian passage (1.17-2.13). However, δύναμις is a close second, and the two are brought together several times and are occasionally spoken of almost as a unit.[54] One should hasten to say that Paul adds that God "made" Jesus not only σοφία, but δικαιοσύνη,[55] ἁγιασμός, and ἀπολύτρωσις as well (1.30). A realization of these broader lines of thought is necessary in the understanding of Paul's purpose.

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[52] Richardson, *op*. *cit*., 158.

[53] Cf. Isaiah 29.14b with 1 Corinthians 1.19.

Knox demonstrates the depth of his insight in a summary of the passage:

> The description of Jesus as the power and wisdom of God might simply describe the Messiah, who could be associated with the wisdom of God's purpose as easily as with the more normal thought of His power. In particular, Paul used the outpouring of the power of God in Jesus as the Messiah to point out the contrast between the fear and weakness of his own preaching at Corinth and the outpouring of the Spirit and the signs and wonders which accompanied that preaching. He still retained the Messianic category, which had been hidden even from the spiritual rulers of the universe, who in their ignorance had crucified the Lord of glory, but was now made manifest by the revelation of the secret purposes of God: the word "mystery" here retained its proper Jewish sense of a divine secret, hitherto concealed, but now revealed.[56]

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[54] Cf. 1 Corinthians 1.17, 24, 25, 26, 27; 2.4, 5. Note also: Job 12.13, and Wisdom of Solomon 15.3. An early Christian tradition associating the two terms seems to appear in Mark 6.2 and Matthew 13.54. The δύναμις may be on occasion a periphrasis for God see: V. Taylor, The Names of Jesus, 150f.

[55] For a discussion of the significance of these terms, see E. Käsemann, Essays on New Testament Themes, 161.

[56] W. L. Knox, St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles, 115.

After a resumé of the evidence with regard to earlier Jewish literary sources, Davies concludes, "We may assume that Paul has pictured Jesus in terms of the Wisdom of the Old Testament and contemporary Judaism."[57] The contention here is that this is precisely what may not be assumed. The passage is Pauline in the extreme. It has only one obviously Jewish root and that is not in any Old Testament "Wisdom" passage. Wilson says of the passage:

> . . . it can be quite adequately expounded, without introducing a hypostatised Wisdom at all, in terms of the wisdom upon which men pride themselves and the "foolishness" of God which yet is superior to all the wisdom of this world.[58]

Surely Paul is speaking out of his background. He could not do otherwise. Yet there is no hint that would justify the conclusion that he felt himself to be expounding the true meaning of Jewish Wisdom speculation.[59] There is no mention in the passage of pre-existence or activity in creation; nor is Christ characterized as a revealer or his incarnation discussed. The only element that even approaches traditional wisdom thinking is that he has made salvation possible (in the "foolishness" of the crucifixion--1.21; 2.2).[60]

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[57] Davies, op. cit., 155.

[58] Wilson, Gnosis, 54

[59] There may be some parallels to 1 Corinthians 1, in Baruch 3.14ff. See: Chadwick, op. cit., 296.

It has been pointed out that σοφία is not the only important term applied to Christ in the context. Wilckens' suggestion that the Christology of the passage is a "σταυρός-Christology" cannot be improved upon. The other terms, σοφία included, must be subsumed under this. The central point is that Christ has been crucified, and all men stand to benefit from his sacrifice. In Paul's view

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[60] See: R. H. Fuller, The Foundations of New Testament Christology, 75.
K. Prümm read an article at the Messina colloguium (April: 1966) entitled "Alttestamentliche sapientiale Bildlehre und paulinisch-philonisches Gnosisproblem," «Studie zu 2Kor. 3, 18», Verlag Otto Müller, Salzburg. 1 Corinthians was of course included in the discussion. As Professor Prümm's meaning is sometimes uncertain (although one has the impression that his thoughts were originally quite precise), an attempt was made at clarification. With regard to the extent of identification between Wisdom and Christ, Prof. Prümm sees 1 Corinthians 1.30 as particularly important. Attention should be drawn to the fact that Prümm feels that the soteriological aspect of the verse limits the identification mentioned above. In recent correspondence (April, 1968) he said:

> Vielleicht ist Paulus hier auf dem Wege zu einer personalen Gleichsetzung von Sophia und Christus. Aber doch nur auf dem Wege, weil die übrigen Gleichsetzungen des Verses nicht personal, sondern soteriologisch gemeint sind, d.h. weil Christus dem Heilsgut gleichsetzen, also nicht buchstäblich gemeint sein können.

One is somehow hesitant, but the approach is balanced and therefore appealing.

nothing should be done that would diminish in any way the importance of this reality.

Paul's Christology here is far more than one might expect, given the circumstances. It is especially high and exalted in its understanding of the often scandalous facts concerning Jesus Christ. The passage, though despairing of human earthly wisdom, does mention Christ as the Wisdom of God. And somewhat strange at first sight, Paul finds it possible to conclude by suggesting that there is after all a certain "wisdom" rightly to be imparted to those who are "mature" (τελείος, 2.6). No doubt what he has in mind is true, but at this point it seems to stand as something of a corrective, lest his earlier words be misunderstood and misused by some extreme interpretation. If it was not for the preceding sections this conclusion (2.6-13)[61] could be taken as an egotistical expression of his own self-confidence. Paul's feelings, however, were always subjected completely and absolutely to the will of God. The whole man was ἐν Χριστῷ. Once this is understood his intention is unmistakable.

There are two other passages in 1 Corinthians which must be mentioned. They are 8.6 and 10.1-4. In the first Paul in passing mentions Christ's activity in creation.

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[61] For a possible parallel see: Wisdom of Solomon 9.16-17.

ἀλλ' ἡμῖν εἷς Θεὸς ὁ πατήρ, ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα
καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν, καὶ εἷς κύριος Ἰησοῦς
Χριστός, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ.

The use of prepositions in the passage is of particular interest. "Yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom (ἐξ οὗ) are all things and for whom (εἰς αὐτόν) we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom (δι' οὗ) are all things and through whom (δι' οὗ) we exist.

Bultmann takes the statement concerning Christ as "a formula in which the cosmological and the soteriological roles of Christ are combined."[62] This insight recognizes the balance between the two halves of the statement. The fact that Paul mentions Christ's creative activity in a passage almost confessional in tone seems to indicate that he is speaking of something very near, if not a part of, his faith. One wonders if such a view was widely held in the early church.

Paul speaking of the "fathers" in the "wilderness" (1 Corinthians 10.1-4) says in 4b, "For they drank from the supernatural Rock which followed them, and the Rock was Christ." Bruce observes, "In current Jewish thinking the rock from which Israel drank in the wilderness was

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[62] R. Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, I, 132.

associated with Divine Wisdom."[63] In a context similar to Corinthians it is said of the Wisdom of God:

> When they thirsted they called upon thee,
> and water was given them out of flinty rock
> and slaking of thirst from hard stone.
> Wisdom of Solomon 11.4

Philo says, commenting on Deuteronomy 8.15, "For the flinty rock is the wisdom of God, which he marked off highest and chiefest from His powers, and from which He satisfied the thirsty souls that love God."[64]

Whiteley finds the presence of the Wisdom tradition here "possible, but not probable."[65] Knox says flatly, "The equation of the rock with Christ was simply the equation of Jesus with the Wisdom of God."[66] Surely, in view of the evidence, it must be concluded that influence is more than "possible."

Philippians 2,6-11. This great "vorpaulinische Hymnus" might be styled "The Incarnation." To avoid involvement in a discussion as to the original strophic

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[63] F. F. Bruce, "Promise and Fulfilment in Paul's Presentation of Jesus," in Promise and Fulfilment, ed. F. F. Bruce, 48. See also: E. E. Ellis, "A Note on First Corinthians 10.4," JBL, 76 (1957), 53-56.

[64] Leg. All. II, 86.

[65] Whiteley, op. cit., 110.

[66] Knox, Gentiles, 123.

arrangement, it is here reproduced as found in the new Bible Society text.

6 ὃς [Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς] ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων οὐχ
ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ, 7 ἀλλὰ ἑαυτὸν
ἐκένωσεν μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, ἐν ὁμοιώματι
ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος· καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς
ἄνθρωπος 8 ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτὸν γενόμενος ὑπήκοος
μέχρι θανάτου, θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ. 9 διὸ καὶ ὁ
θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσεν καὶ ἐχαρίσατο αὐτῷ τὸ
ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα, 10 ἵνα ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι
Ἰησοῦ πᾶν γόνυ κάμψῃ ἐπουρανίων καὶ ἐπιγείων
καὶ καταχθονίων, 11 καὶ πᾶσα γλῶσσα ἐξομολογήσηται
ὅτι κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ πατρός

Because the passage has been widely recognized to contain or, at least, to represent a "pre-Pauline hymn" it has attracted the attention of numerous scholars. It will be possible here to give only the briefest sketch of the more important articles that have been written concerning it.[67] Attention must also be drawn to the fact that the interest of this study is, primarily, to discover Paul's use of the hymn as a form in which the thought of the church is couched, and that within the context of Wisdom-Logos Christology.

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[67] For the most recent survey with regard to Philippians 2 see R. P. Martin, Carmen Christi (Cambridge: 1967). Although all of the hymnic material in the New Testament contains elements from many different sources, it is our purpose here to examine only those that may have some connection with the Wisdom-Logos tradition.

The early standard-setting study of Philippians 2 is that of Lohmeyer.[68] Lohmeyer felt that there was a relation of some substance between the Johannine Christology and that expressed in Philippians 2. Points of contact are noted throughout the discussion. He understood the bestow-of the name *κύριος*, which is synonymous with the exaltation, as designating "die innere Wesenheit dieser Gestalt."[69] He argued that this figure was "johanneisch gesprochen, der *λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ* oder kurz der Logos."[70] He suggested that the Christology of Philippians 2 was, "eine Vorstufe einer am Logosbegriff orientierten Christologie."[71] He found this preliminary stage to be rooted in the concept of the Son of Man.[72] He concludes:

> Es ist darum kein Zufall, dass im vierten Evangelium der Name Logos nur im Prolog erscheint, und hiernach in der Erzählung vor allem durch den Begriff des Menschensohnes abgelöst wird; und es ist noch weniger zufällig, dass in der Apok. Joh. ausser dem Symbol vom Lamme nur zwei deutliche Namen begegnen: "wie ein Menschensohn" und "das Wort Gottes"; und beide sind zusammengefasst in dem letzten und grossten

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[68] E. Lohmeyer, *Kurios Jesus: Eine Untersuchung zu Phil. 2, 5-11*, (Heidelberg: 1928).

[69] *Ibid.*, 52f. [70] *Ibid.*, 75.

[71] *Ibid.*

[72] Ibid., 76. See also: E. M. Sidebottom, *The Christ of the Fourth Gospel*, 79.

Namen: βασιλεὺς τῶν βασιλέων καὶ κυρίος τῶν κυρίων.[73]

Other lines of interpretation have found substantial connections with the servant-songs of Isaiah. Jeremias, for example, is quite explicit with regard to the relationship.

> The connection of Phil. 2.6-11, with Isa. 53 becomes plain as soon as it is recognized that not the LXX but the Heb. text of Isa. 53 is used; even the use of δοῦλος (instead of παῖς) loses its strangeness when it is recognized that we have here a direct rendering of the Hebrew עֶבֶד (Isa. 52.13). The decisive proof of the connexion of Phil. 2.6-11 with Isa. 53 lies in the fact that the expression ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν (Phil. 2.7), attested nowhere else in the Greek and grammatically extremely harsh, is an exact rendering of הֶעֱרָה . . . נַפְשׁוֹ (Isa. 53.12). Apart from other verbal echoes, allusion to Isa. 53 is to be seen further in the antithesis of extreme meekness and exaltation, in the willingness to be humbled and in the mention of obedience and of death.[74]

One other approach has been made to this hymn that must be mentioned here. It involves the question of the redeemer myth, et. al., as well as related thought forms, and their functions, as backgrounds to Paul's thought.

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[73] Lohmeyer, loc. cit.

[74] W. Zimmerli and J. Jeremias, The Servant of God, 97. Jeremias, in note 444 on the same page, lists a number of others who have recognized the same connections.

A leading defender of such dependence is Käsemann.[75] Käsemann, although depending primarily upon the redeemer myth, found relevant elements in other sources as well. In so doing he implied that his basic theory is not as adequate as he desired it to be. In any case, his essay has been superseded by that of Georgi[76] who both pointed out Käsemann's shortcomings[77] and carried the discussion to a further stage. Georgi found Käsemann too broad and generalizing and therefore attempted himself to be more specific and precise. He recognizes pre-Gnostic influence but does not confine himself to these points. He draws together Old Testament, pre-Gnostic and Hellenistic Jewish elements for the purpose of demonstrating that the background to Philippians 2 is both rich and varied. Although we cannot be detained with specifics here, surely it is correct to hold that many divergent elements somehow found their way into this Christological formulation.

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[75] E. Käsemann, Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, Erster Band, second edition 1960, 51-95. Selections from this book were published in: Essays on New Testament Themes, (London: 1964). However, the pages cited above were not included

[76] D. Georgi, "Der vorpaulinische Hymnus Phil. 2, 6-11," in Zeit und Geschichte, edited by E. Dinkler, (Tübingen: 1964), 263-293.

[77] Ibid., see esp. 263f.

Although he does not say so specifically, Fuller must have been thinking of Philippians 2 when he said:

> Finally, it [the figure of Wisdom] offered the possibility of the interpretation of the historical emergence of Jesus in terms of a descent from heaven, and thus made an important contribution to the doctrine of the incarnation.[78]

Even though pre-existence may be explicit in the passage, the emphasis is placed upon the change from that condition to the incarnate reality. The theme of exaltation at the end follows quite naturally from the examination of the willing humiliation. Attention must now be given to those elements of the hymn which possess qualities characteristic of the Wisdom tradition. They will be found primarily within those expressions that have to do with pre-existence and incarnation.

The demand to articulate Jesus' significance must have put tremendous pressure upon the church to recognize his pre-existence. Richardson saw this:

> But as soon as the Church found itself worshipping Jesus Christ as Son of God and Lord, the recognition of his pre-existence must have followed immediately. If Christ were one with God, if he were himself divine, he could not have an origin in time; the Son of God could have undergone a human birth and lived a human life, but he could not have begun to exist only at a particular moment during the reign of Herod the Great.[79]

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[78] Fuller, *op. cit.*, 75. In this connection Haenchen sees an association with the "Redeemer." He says, "Seine [Paul] Lehre vom Erlöser (II,4a) berührt sich mit der g. en. indem sie Jesus als unerkannt (1 Kor 2.8) herabgekommenes und aufustanden zu Gott zurückgekehrtes himmlisches Wesen darstellt (2 Kor 8,9; Phil 2,6-11).

[79] Richardson, *op. cit.*, 155.

The phrase *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ* is the first to suggest pre-existence.[80] The pre-existent One *was God* as far as his essential attributes were concerned.[81] The word *μορφή* itself deals with how the single phenomenon is in its essence.[82] "It suggests the same idea which is otherwise expressed in St. John by *ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ*."[83] The concepts clustered around *δόξα* seem to be closely related: *τῇ δόξῃ ᾗ εἶχον πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι παρὰ σοί* (John 17.5b). Martin drawing these things together says:

> Thus the meaning is that our Lord's pre-existent state was one in which He uniquely shared in the divine splendor which, to the Hebrew mind, would mean that He was the visible representation or manifestation of the presence of God himself.[84]

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[80] Not all commentators agree. See J. B. Lightfoot, *St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians*, 129f. Attention should be called to Lightfoot's "detached note" (125-131) on *μορφή* and *σχῆμα*.

[81] *Ibid*., 108, 130. Such terminology should not be pressed to contain later credal forms. Though the language itself might bear the strain of later sophistication, the fact is that the development had not taken place. The precise content of a word or phrase at a given point is the question being raised.

[82] J. Behm, *TWNT*, IV, 750.

[83] Lightfoot, *Philippians*, 130f.

[84] R. P. Martin, *An Early Christian Confession*, 18. "Divine by nature" is a common interpretation of *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ*. G. S. Duncan, *Jesus Son of Man* (New York: 1949), 193, following Héring (*Le Royaume de Dieu et sa Venue*, 161), links the phrase to Genesis 1.26. He also observes that this is confirmed by the Peshitto rendering of the Philippians passage. See our discussion of Hebrews 1, *infra* 218ff.

If these things are true the similarities to Wisdom are obvious.[85]

This existence "in the form of God" was in fact *τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεοῦ*:[86] i.e., existence "on an equality with God." Though this phrase in itself says nothing of pre-existence, such is the subject of the context. It was precisely this pre-existent condition that Christ subjected to the temptations which inevitably descend upon human flesh.

The whole of verse seven is taken to refer to the incarnation. However, it must be noted that those difficulties, ending in death, which the Lord encountered as the termination of his earthly existence approached must not, indeed cannot, be separated from the reality of the incarnation. He "emptied himself" (*ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν*). In view of the background in Isaiah, Jeremias argues that the expression "implies the surrender of life, not the *kenosis* of the incarnation."[87] Such a judgement does not allow the writer of the hymn any freedom of thought or expression.

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[85] Martin, *loc. cit.*

[86] Lightfoot, *Philippians*, 109. The questions surrounding *ἁρπαγμόν* do not concern us here. For a recent summary see Martin, *op. cit.*, 18-22.

[87] Zimmerli and Jeremias, *op. cit.*, 97, n. 445.

The passage itself seems to imply no such distinction. Incarnation ending in death is the complete thought.[88]

The pre-existent One took the form of a bond-servant (δοῦλος). "He, who is Master (κύριος) of all, became the slave of all."[89] The Servant-songs of Isaiah offer background for the thought here.[90] The discussion of μορφή in verse six is applicable also: μορφὴν δούλου is set over against μορφῇ θεοῦ. Further, he was "born in the likeness (ἐν ὁμοιώματι) of men." The word ὁμοίωμα seems to stand between μορφή and σχῆμα. The word itself does not necessarily imply "the reality of our Lord's humanity."[91] To put the alternatives more clearly:

> Phil. 2.7 . . . could mean that the Lord in his earthly ministry possessed a completely human form and that his physical body was capable of sinning as human bodies are, or that he had only the form of a man and was looked upon as a human being. . . .[92]

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[88] It is never suggested in the Christology of the Wisdom tradition that anything was subdued, lost, or given up in descent or incarnation. We therefore avoid any involvement in discussing any kenotic theory of the incarnation.

[89] Lightfoot, Philippians, 110. This theme seems to belong to the earliest gospel tradition: cf. Mark 10.44, 45; Matthew 20.27, 28.

[90] See the discussion of Jeremias, supra 187. This view is diametrically opposed by M. D. Hooker, Jesus and the Servant (London: 1959), 120f. For Jeremias' critical review of this work see JTS XI new series (1960), 140ff.

[91] Lightfoot, loc. cit.

[92] Bauer, Greek-English Lexicon, 570.

Again, he was found "in human form" (*σχήματι . . . ὡς ἄνθρωπος*); *σχήματι* having to do with changeable externals.[93] The thought is at least vulnerable to Docetic interpretation. Lightfoot summarizes:

> The former verse[94] dwells on the contrast between what He *was from the beginning* and what He *became afterwards*: hence *λαβών* (not *ἔχων*), *ὁμοίωμα* (not *μορφή*), *γενόμενος* (not *ὤν*), all words expressive of change. In the present the opposition is between what He *is* in Himself, and what He appeared in the eyes of men: hence *σχήματι* (for *ὁμοιώματι* or *μορφῇ*), *εὑρεθείς* (for *γενόμενος* or *ὑπάρχων*), *ὡς ἄνθρωπος* (for *ἄνθρωπος*), all expressions implying external semblance.[95]

Finally, Georgi penetrates the the significance of the passage, finding it to lie in the fact that the hymn here has to do with "unchangeable human history." "Das Besondere liegt darin, dass hier eine einzelne, unverwechselbare Menschgeschichte erzählt ist, nichts Typisches wie in der spekulativen Mystik, sondern etwas Einziges."[96]

Colossians 1.15-20. Long ago Lightfoot found both Jewish and "Gnostic" elements present in the heresy at

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[93] Martin, *op*. *cit*., 27f.

[94] Lightfoot's text begins verse 8: *καὶ σχήματι*. . . .

[95] Lightfoot, *op*. *cit*., 110f.

[96] Georgi, *op*. *cit*., 281. Any serious student of the hymn will appreciate its greatness and its contribution to the Christian tradition. In agreement with our observation above Grant (*op*. *cit*., 106) rightly observes that the language is open to heretical manipulation. "From these expressions he [Saturninus] could easily conclude that the Savior was not actually a man."

Colossae.[97] He inclined toward the position that these were not two separate things but probably two aspects of the same phenomenon. Although Lightfoot's position has not gone without question, there has been a certain agreement.[98]

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[97] J. B. Lightfoot, *St. Paul's Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon*, 73ff. E. Haenchen, *RGG* (third edition, 1958) II, 1654, discovers at Colossae what he calls "juden-christliche Gnosis." W. L. Knox, *Gentiles*, 44, refers to Paul's opponents as "more or less Gnostic." However, A. S. Peake (*The Expositor's Greek Testament*, III, 484ff.) argues that the Colossian heresy was Jewish but not Gnostic. Precise definition is of course one of the key issues.

[98] For a brief but inclusive survey of the work current at the time (1948, second edition, 1955) see: Davies, *op. cit.*, 150ff. See also: E. Percy, *Die Probleme der Kolosser- und Epheserbrief*, (Lund: 1946), esp. 68-78; G. Bornkamm, "Die Häresie des Kolosserbriefs" in *Das Ende des Gesetzes, Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie* 16 (Munchen: 1958) 139-156. E. Käsemann, "Eine urchristliche Taufliturgie," in *Festschrift R. Bultmann zur 65*, ed. E. Wolf, (Stuttgart: 1949), 133-148; *Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen*, I, (Göttingen: 1960), 34-51; *Essays on New Testament Themes*, (London: 1964), 149-168; J. M. Robinson, "A Formal Analysis of Colossians 1.15-20," *JBL* LXXVI (1957), 270-287, (In this article Robinson examines the possible arrangement of the original hymn, making his own suggestions.); H. Hegermann, *Die Vorstellung vom Schopfungsmittler im hellenistischen Judentum und Urchristentum* (*Texte und Untersuchungen* 82, Berlin: 1961), (Hegermann's study is surely one of the most comprehensive among the modern literature. His examination of the contribution of the Philonic tradition is quite complete. He reviews virtually all the well-known authors who have written in this area. His bibliography of material on the New Testament hymnic tradition is therefore very helpful.); E. Schweizer, "The Church as the Missionary Body of Christ," *NTS*, 8 (1961), 1-11; G. Münderlein, "Die Erwählung durch das Pleroma: Bemerkungen zu Kol. 1.19," *NTS*, 8 (1962), 264-276, (Münderlein, among other things, finds it possible to argue that

One study of this passage that approaches but does not posit a redeemer myth is that of Dibelius.[99] To begin, Dibelius discovers in Colossians 1 both cosmic and soteriological elements which he argues antedate the "conceptual world of Paul."[100] He finds parallels to the thoughts of Colossians in the Hermetic writings, Philo, and the "Iranian" texts. He concludes that Colossians is the Christian equivalent to each of these several traditions. He suggests that the Wisdom speculation of Hellenistic Judaism prepared the ground for the association of these divergent concepts. This was done, ". . . vielleicht weniger durch Identifizierung des 'Menschen' mit dem Messias, sondern eher mit der 'Weisheit.'"[101] Such a view

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πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα is a hypostasis of what is called πατήρ in 1.12); H.M. Schenke, "Der Widerstreit gnostischen und kirchlicher Christologie im Spiegel des Kolosserbriefes," ZTK 61 (1964), 391-403, (Schenke here first presents his reconstruction of the heretical Christology and then discusses the Christology positively offered in the epistle.); E. Lohse, "Christusherrschaft und Kirche im Kolosserbrief," NTS 11 (1965), 203=216; A. Feuillet, "La Creation de l'Univers 'dans le Christ' d'apres l'Epitre aux Colossiens" (1.16a), NTS 12 (1965), 1-9; F. B. Craddock, "'All Things in Him': A critical note on Col. 1.15-20," NTS 12 (1965), 78-80, (Craddock points out Hegermann's apparent misunderstanding of ἐν αὐτῷ, Col. 1.16, 17, 19).

[99] M. Dibelius, An die Kolosser Epheser an Philemon, (Tübingen: 1953) esp. 14-17.

[100] Ibid., 14.

[101] Ibid., 16.

has a certain appeal not only because it does not resort to a pre-Christian gnostic redeemer, but also because it recognizes a wide range of possible contributing factors.[102] If any single thing is clear with regard to the entire hymnic tradition it is that many divergent elements combined to constitute this New Testament phenomenon.

Käsemann,[103] assuming a redeemer myth, argues that Colossians 1.15-20, was in fact a pre-Christian hymn which, by means of a certain amount of Christian redaction, was pressed into use by the church. This redaction consisted of its conversion into a baptismal liturgy.[104] One piece of statistical evidence that could be misleading is his contention that only eight of the 112 words that comprise the hymn contain motifs that are "specifically Christian."[105] Käsemann's treatment of the passage is indeed extremely useful as will be seen in the discussion to follow; however, disagreement must be lodged with his presuppositions concerning a redeemer figure. His view is that these verses:

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[102] Notes are regularly found indicating that this indefinite nature of the background to Colossians 1 was first noted by: H. Windisch, Untersuchungen z. Neuen Testament: Die Weisheit und die Paulinische Christologie, (Leipzig: 1912), 220f. For the relation between Paul and Philo see: H. Chadwick, "St. Paul and Philo of Alexandria," BJRL 48.2 (1966), 286ff.

[103] For Käsemann's work here, see note 98 *supra*.

[104] Käsemann, New Testament Themes, 154, 164, etc.

[105] *Ibid*., 154.

> . . . contain, apart from the Christian interpolations, the supra-historical and metaphysical drama of the gnostic Redeemer, which only gains a new eschatological significance from the Christian redaction and framework.[106]

The view taken here is that, while the hymnic character of the passage should no longer be in doubt,[107] the Christian composer may well have drawn on earlier sources for the basic framework to support his own convictions. For this study, background is important primarily as it shows the way to understanding the living faith of the early church. More specifically, it must be asked just how the Wisdom tradition manifests itself in these verses.

15 ὅς [cf. v. 10 κυρίος] ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου
πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως, 16 ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη
τὰ πάντα ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, τὰ ὁρατὰ
καὶ τὰ ἀόρατα, εἴτε θρόνοι εἴτε κυριότητες εἴτε ἀρχαὶ
εἴτε ἐξουσίαι· τὰ πάντα δι᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν
ἔκτισται, 17 καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν πρὸ πάντων καὶ τὰ πάντα
ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκεν. 18 καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν ἡ κεφαλὴ
τοῦ σώματος, τῆς ἐκκλησίας· ὅς ἐστιν ἀρχή, πρωτότοκος

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[106] Ibid., 155. Feuillet, op. cit., 3, notes that Percy, op. cit., 69, as well as a number of others "repoussent avec vigueur" Käsemann's view.

[107] Käsemann, New Testament Themes, 149, etc. See: J. M. Robinson, "Formal Analysis," JBL 76 (1957), 270-287, for a review of the various possibilities at that time. V. Taylor, The Person of Christ, 63, doubts that the passage represents a pre-Pauline hymn.

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ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, ἵνα γένηται ἐν πᾶσιν αὐτὸς πρωτεύων
19 ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ εὐδόκησεν πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα
κατοικῆσαι 20 καὶ δι᾽αὐτοῦ ἀποκαταλλάξαι τὰ πάντα
εἰς αὐτόν εἰρηνοποιήσας διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ σταυροῦ
αὐτοῦ, [δι᾽ αὐτοῦ] εἴτε τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς εἴτε τὰ ἐν
τοῖς οὐρανοῖς

That the literature and thought of the Wisdom tradition has influenced this passage need not be argued.[108] Without question, Christ has been identified with Sophia.[109] Richardson notes that it is significant that Paul should have used the language of the Wisdom literature:

> . . . so readily and so naturally, without quoting precisely, but none the less clearly indicating that this was the language which had become the vehicle of his thinking.[110]

The first specific Wisdom characteristic to be noted is that of pre-existence. It is implied in verse 16, *ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα*. Even earlier--in verse 15-- Christ is entitled, *πρωτοτοκος πάσης κτίσεως*.[111] It should go without saying that, although the language itself would admit of such a possibility, Christ is not to be considered as part of the created order.[112] Burney[113] sees here a direct reference to Proverbs 8.22, "The Lord created me at the beginning of his work, the first of his acts of old." It seems that "the term רֵאשִׁית in Proverbs 8.22 was used by Rabbinic Judaism as the key to the בְּרֵאשִׁית which begins the Hebrew Bible."[114] The term was also interpreted "by wisdom."[115] Burney concludes that Colossians 1.15-18 is an "elaborate exposition of בְּרֵאשִׁית in Genesis 1.1 in the Rabbinic manner."[116]

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[108] See, e.g., Harris, *Trinity*, 30; Richardson, *op. cit.*, 158; J. M. Robinson, "Formal Analysis," 277; Whiteley, *op. cit.*, 111; *et. al.*

[109] However, Schweizer argues, *op. cit.*, 7, "This is the Christian reinterpretation of the well-attested Hellenistic concept of the cosmic body ruled by God, with either Zeus or Ether, Logos or Heaven, at its head.

[110] Richardson, *op. cit.*, 158.

[111] For a detailed examination of 16a see: Feuillet, *op. cit.* On *εἰκών* in the Christian tradition see F. W. Eltester, *EIKON im Neuen Testament* (Berlin: 1958).

Further, with regard to Christ's pre-existence, there is in verse 18 the absolute statement, ὅς ἐστιν ἀρχή. Lightfoot[117] argues that the word contains two ideas: 1) priority in time, as well as 2) originating power. The language of the verse concerns Christ's relation to the church in a way analogous to the relation between the pre-existent Word and the created order. Bruce summarizes:

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[112] C.F.D. Moule, *The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Colossians and Philemon* (*Cambridge Greek New Testament*), 63ff. Revelation 3.14, is open to the same misinterpretation. For an almost devotional note on Paul's concept of Christ's pre-existence see: J. S. Stewart, *A Man in Christ*, 316. Cf. Lightfoot, *Colossians*, 212f.

[113] C. F. Burney, "Christ as the *APXH* of Creation," *JTS* XXVII (1926), 160-177.

[114] Davies, *op*. *cit*., 151. [115] *Ibid*.

[116] Burney, *op*. *cit*., 48. Cf. Davies, *loc*. *cit*.

[117] Lightfoot, *Colossians*, 223.

> In relation to the old creation he exercises the right of heritage which is his as the Father's first-begotten; in relation to the new creation he exercises a parallel privilege because of his priority in resurrection.[118]

Finally, the most unquestionable of all Paul's statements here concerning pre-existence is found in verse 17, *αὐτός ἐστιν πρὸ πάντων*. The present tense of the verb indicates that "this pre-existence is absolute existence."[119] This pre-existent one did not only exist prior to the created order, but is forever present.

A second feature of Wisdom speculation present in Colossians 1 is the creative activity ascribed to Christ. This concept is primarily contained in verse 16. There may be a certain amount of "Stoic colouring" in the terminology but this is not out of harmony with Rabbinic usage.[120] Both the aorist *ἐκτίσθη* and the perfect *ἔκτισται* are employed in the verse; the former underlining the historical act of creation itself and the latter the

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[118] F. F. Bruce, "Promise and Fulfilment in Paul's Presentation of Jesus," in *Promise and Fulfilment*, ed. F. F. Bruce, 48.

[119] Lightfoot, *Colossians*, 221.

[120] Davies, *op. cit.*, 152.

"continuous and present relations of creation to the Creator."[121] For Philo, as we have seen, the Logos was the instrument δι' οὗ creation was effected.[122] This expression in the New Testament refers to the personalized agency of the pre-existent Logos and is not a simple instrumental as has been observed in some earlier documents. It is interesting that in only one other Pauline passage is Jesus pictured in an unquestionably creative role: . . . καὶ εἷς κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ (1 Corinthians 8.6).

It is beyond question that in Colossians Christ was conceived as the one described in the Wisdom-Logos tradition. Such an observation is not intended to imply that there were no developments at work in the tradition; nor is it felt that there were no other influences on the thought of the passage. Simply put, this is the nature of the Wisdom-Logos tradition at this point.

Probably the most difficult aspect of the Wisdom-Logos tradition to pinpoint is the exact soteriological function of the central figure. What should be noted here is that "reconciliation" is drawn into the complex of ideas. Reconciliation, implying at least two factions

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[121] Lightfoot, *Colossians*, 217.

[122] *De Cherub*, 35.

at variance with each other, is achieved through Christ who "made peace" by means of "the blood of his cross." It was within this Reconciler that *εὐδόκησεν πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα κατοικῆσαι*. It is more than obvious that this statement was open to Gnostic manipulation.[122a] However, when one combines this with 2.9, *ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς*, the conclusion must be that the point intended originally was that Jesus was genuinely and completely God. Yet the word *πληρώμα* may be on its way toward acquiring a more technical meaning. It would appear that the Hellenistic philosophical concept of a god-filled universe was in the latter half of the first century passing into the Gnostic conception of a divine *pleroma* which was conceived both as the abode of the aeons and the aggregate of them. Of Ephesians 4.10, Best says, "the Hellenistic conception was passing into the Gnostic at the time and there is no reason why both should not appear in the Epistle."[123]

The possible presence of these subtle shades of development indicates the difficulty of firm conclusions.

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[122a] Cf. this thought in Irenaeus *adv. Haer*. I.2.6. See discussion *infra*, esp. 358f. Further, Colossians 2.9 seems to be quoted in a Gnostic sense in *Excerpta Theodoto* 31.

[123] E. Best, *One Body in Christ*, 148, cf. 140. Cf. Richardson, *op. cit*., 158; W. L. Knox, *St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles*, 163.

This uncertainty appears impossible to resolve on the basis of the evidence presently available. In spite of this the Colossian hymn is a powerful witness to the faith of the early church.

Romans 10.4, 6ff. It has been regularly noted that the concept of Torah is often associated with Wisdom. In Romans 10.4 Christ is called τέλος νόμου. These words follow immediately:

> 5 Μωϋσῆς γὰρ γράφει τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ὅτι ὁ ποιήσας ἄνθρωπος ζήσεται ἐν αὐτῇ. 6 ἡ δὲ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη οὕτως λέγει, Μὴ εἴπῃς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου, Τίς ἀναβήσεται εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν; τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν Χριστὸν καταγαγεῖν· 7 ἤ, Τίς καταβήσεται εἰς τὴν ἄβυσσον; τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν Χριστὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναγαγεῖν

Either Paul is dependent on Baruch at this point or they are both recalling Deuteronomy 30.12ff. Baruch, speaking of Wisdom, says:

> Who has gone up into heaven,
> and taken her,
> and brought her down from the
> clouds?
>
> Baruch 3.29

Whiteley finds the suggestion of dependence "precarious."[124]

In a different vein, Conzelmann[125] argues that Paul brought with him a σοφία-λόγος tradition when he focused upon Gerechtigkeit in Romans 10. Suggs[126] thinks that the element, if present, is not important. He summarizes:

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[124] Whiteley, op. cit., 111.

[125] H. Conzelmann, "Paulus und die Weisheit," NTS 12 (1966), 242.

> But it does not seem to be possible to understand in what sense Christ is the telos of the Law unless Romans 10.6ff. has identified him not simply with Wisdom, but with Wisdom understood as Torah.

The passage then is taken to be one other of Pauline origin which reflects the influence of the Wisdom tradition. It is of particular interest in that it lies outside the "hymnic" material. Assuming momentarily that neither the hymn in Philippians nor the one in Colossians was of Pauline origin, this would indicate that Paul himself did think of Jesus in these terms and did not always borrow from others. In either case, whether the influence was direct or indirect, a significant portion of the epistles attributed to Paul presents Jesus in terms which have their roots in speculations concerning God's pre-existent Wisdom.

III. THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS

Reasons for placing the examination of the gospel material (especially that from the Synoptics) after the Pauline have already been given. However, there are other factors which justify this device for emphasizing the period in which the gospel tradition became a written one.

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[126] M. J. Suggs; unless otherwise noted the suggestions of Dr. Suggs arise from personal conversation or correspondence.

One is that, with regard to Wisdom speculation, there are remarkable affinities between 1 Corinthians and Q. Some years ago Arvedson observed, "Merkwurdig, dass gerade in Q Jesus und die Weisheit wiederholt mit einander in Verbindung gesetzt werden!"[127] Robinson makes the point by contending, ". . . only in Q and 1 Corinthians is Sophia clearly a Christological title."[128] He pursues the matter further:

> Thus, just as Paul is criticizing the heretics of Corinth so fully from within rather than without that he can himself refer to Christ as our Sophia (1 Cor. 1.30) and display a superior wisdom accessible only to pneumatics (1 Cor. 2.6ff.), just so Q as we know it reflects much the same structural situation of criticism from within, that is Q and Paul share the situation prior to the policy of rejecting not only false implications but also a total theological context and its vocabulary, as was to become standard policy from the Pastorals on.[129]

Robinson argues that Q--in his opinion a sayings source similar in certain ways to the Gospel of Thomas--only survived by being incorporated into a historical framework such as that provided by Mark, more specifically, "the Marcan pattern of the public ministry as the preface to the crucifixion."[130] Whether or not one agrees, viewed from a certain angle, there is a certain amount of evidence for such a conclusion. In addition to the correlation on the Christological use of σοφία, there is the apparent equation between "this evil generation" (Q-Lk 11.29-32) and "the Jews" (1 Corinthians 1.17-2.7).[131] If Robinson's contentions are true, we here catch a glimpse of a theological approach ultimately rejected by the church at large.

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[127] T. Arvedson, Das Mysterium Christi, 211 (see: 210 n. 9).

[128] J. M. Robinson, "Basic Shifts," 85f.

[129] Ibid., 86. Other notes on the Christology of Q include A. Harnack, The Sayings of Jesus, 233ff., and H. R. Mackintosh, The Person of Jesus, 6.

Therefore, it may be asked just what kind of a Wisdom tradition Q does reflect. The answer can best be given by beginning with a broader view. The following table includes every instance of σοφία in the Synoptic Gospels.

	MATTHEW	MARK	LUKE	
1)			2.40	Τὸ δὲ παιδίον . . . πληροῦμενον σοφίᾳ. . . .
2)			2.52	καὶ Ἰησοῦς προέκοπτεν [ἐν τῇ] σοφίᾳ. . . .
3)	11.19(16-19), 25, 26		7.34,35 (cf. 10.21f.)	. . . καὶ ἐδικαιώθη ἡ σοφία ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων (τέκνων) αὐτῆς.
4)	12.42		11.31	. . . τὴν σοφίαν Σολομῶνος. . . .
5)	(cf. 23.34f.)		11.49	. . . ἡ σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ εἶπεν. . . .
6)	13.54	6.2		. . . τίς ἡ σοφία ἡ δοθεῖσα τούτῳ;
7)			21.15	ἐγὼ γὰρ δώσω ὑμῖν στόμα καὶ σοφίαν

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[130] Robinson, "Basic Shifts," 85.

[131] *Ibid.*, 86.

Undoubtedly, the most striking feature about the synoptic use of the word σοφία is that it is almost completely confined to Luke's infancy narrative and Q. There is in fact only one instance of the word in the whole of Mark. Numbers one, two, four, and six have to do with wisdom, more or less human, as a phenomenon present within the earthly Jesus. Number four may have additional overtones because of its association with Solomon. Robinson observes:

> The comparison of Jesus as Sophia with the rejected prophets recalls the passage from Q found in . . . Luke 11.31f., where Jesus is compared with Solomon's Sophia and Jonah's preaching, an association which in turn recalls Proverbs 8, the presentation of Sophia as a street preacher.[132]

Number seven on the table is found in an eschatological context and contains a promise of Christ to his disciples; a promise to be fulfilled in the eschatological situation. Only numbers three and five are of great importance for this study. The latter is to be examined first.

An even larger context would be valuable, but for lack of space only verses 47-50 of Luke 11 are quoted.

> [47] οὐαὶ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οἰκοδομεῖτε τὰ μνημεῖα τῶν προφητῶν,
> οἱ δὲ πατέρες ὑμῶν ἀπέκτειναν αὐτούς. 48 ἄρα
> μάρτυρές ἐστε καὶ συνευδοκεῖτε τοῖς ἔργοις τῶν

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[132] Ibid., 81. Essentially the same observation was made by Origen, De Principiis III, 1.

πατέρων ὑμῶν, ὅτι αὐτοὶ μὲν ἀπέκτειναν αὐτοὺς
ὑμεῖς δὲ οἰκοδομεῖτε. 49 διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ σοφία
τοῦ θεοῦ εἶπεν, Ἀποστελῶ εἰς αὐτοὺς προφήτας καὶ
ἀποστόλους, καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποκτενοῦσιν καὶ διώξουσιν,
50 ἵνα ἐκζητηθῇ τὸ αἷμα πάντων τῶν προφητῶν τὸ
ἐκκεχυμένον ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου ἀπὸ τῆς γενεᾶς
ταύτης

The passage is an enigma as it stands and it appears to be impossible to reach any common agreement. At least three possibilities have been suggested. One is that verse 49 is a quotation from a lost wisdom book.[133] In a similar vein and indeed among other observations Stendahl[134] suggests that there is a certain similarity with Jubilees 1.12, "And I shall send witnesses unto them, that I may witness against them, but they will not hear, and will slay the witnesses also, and they will persecute those who seek the law. . . ." Others speculate that the quotation could be paraphrased "God in his wisdom. . . .[135] Plummer adds, "Jesus here speaks with confident knowledge of the divine counsel: comp. 10.22; 15.7, 10."[136] Thirdly,

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[133] W. Manson, The Gospel of Luke, 148; J. A. Findlay, "The Book of Testimonies and the Structure of the First Gospel," The Expositor, 8th Series, 20 (1920), 394; W. Grundmann, Das Evangelium nach Lukas, 249; et. al.

[134] K. Stendahl, The School of St. Matthew, 92 n.3. Stendahl quotes Charles' translation of Jubilees.

[135] W. Manson, Luke; G.W.H. Lampe, "Luke" in Peake's Commentary on the Bible, edited by M. Black, 834; A. Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to St. Luke, 313; et. al.

[136] Ibid.

Plummer[137] recognizes a school of thought that holds these words to be Jesus' own, spoken on an earlier occasion. Presumably this would mean that Jesus is calling himself *σοφία θεοῦ*.[138] It is not difficult to agree with Plummer that this is improbable. Neither is it likely that the Wisdom title for Jesus was common enough at this stage for it to be a substitution here for an earlier *ἐγώ*.[139]

It should be noted that in a similar passage in Matthew (23.34) Jesus is the speaker. The text begins, *διὰ τοῦτο ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ ἀποστέλλω πρὸς ὑμᾶς προφήτας καὶ σοφοὺς καὶ γραμματεῖς* . . . . Both Harris[140] and Stendahl[141] observe that Tatian's combination of the two passages results in, "Behold! I, the Wisdom of God send unto you . . . ." This, however, is not of much help in understanding the passage as it originally stood. Even Tatian in his harmonization of the two passages imposed a later understanding upon the original statements. Jesus as

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[137] *Ibid.*

[138] Conzelmann, *Theology*, 110 n.1, denies that Luke was aware of any identification of Jesus and Sophia. However, see Stendahl, *School*, 92 n. 3.

[139] Plummer, *loc. cit.*

[140] R. Harris, *The Origin of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel*, 4.

[141] Stendahl, *School*, 92 n. 3.

Wisdom may be "involved," but surely Harris too overstates his case when he says:

> . . . inasmuch as God is personified and speaks through Sophia, when He sends His processional array of prophets and wise men, we have what in Greek looks like a feminine form of the Johannine Logos.[142]

All that should be said can be briefly summarized. First, there is probably something of the Wisdom tradition in the passage. Exactly in what way or to what extent is impossible to say. Second, such passages were surely used in support of later "orthodoxy."[143]

The last and most important synoptic reference is found in Matthew 11. For lack of space only verses 16-19; 25-30 are quoted.

16 Τίνι δὲ ὁμοιώσω τὴν γενεὰν ταύτην; ὁμοία ἐστὶν
παιδίοις καθημένοις ἐν ταῖς ἀγοραῖς ἃ προσφωνοῦντα
τοῖς ἑτέροις 17 λέγουσιν
Ηὐλήσαμεν ὑμῖν καὶ οὐκ ὠρχήσασθε·
ἐθρηνήσαμεν καὶ οὐκ ἐκόψασθε.
18 ἦλθεν γὰρ Ἰωάννης μήτε ἐσθίων μήτε πίνων,
καὶ λέγουσιν, Δαιμόνιον ἔχει· 19 ἦλθεν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου ἐσθίων καὶ πίνων, καὶ λέγουσιν Ἰδοὺ
ἄνθρωπος φάγος καὶ οἰνοπότης, τελωνῶν φίλος καὶ
ἁμαρτωλῶν. καὶ ἐδικαιώθη ἡ σοφία ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων
αὐτῆς.

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[142] Harris, *loc. cit.*

[143] On this passage further see J. M. Robinson, "*ΛΟΓΟΙ ΣΟΦΩΝ* Zur Gattung der Spruchquelle Q" in *Zeit und Geschichte*, ed. E. Dinkler (Tubingen: 1964).

Verses 20-24 contain "Woes to Unrepentant Cities."

> 25 Ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ καιρῷ ἀποκριθεὶς ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν,
> Ἐξομολογοῦμαί σοι, πάτερ, κύριε τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς
> γῆς, ὅτι ἔκρυψας ταῦτα ἀπὸ σοφῶν καὶ συνετῶν
> καὶ ἀπεκάλυψας αὐτὰ νηπίοις· 26 ναί, ὁ πατήρ,
> ὅτι οὕτως εὐδοκία ἔμπροσθεν σου. 27 Πάντα μοι
> παρεδόθη ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός μου, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐπι-
> γινώσκει τὸν υἱὸν εἰ μὴ ὁ πατήρ, οὐδὲ τὸν
> πατέρα τις ἐπιγινώσκει εἰ μὴ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ ᾧ ἐὰν
> βούληται ὁ υἱὸς ἀποκαλύψαι. 28 Δεῦτε πρός με
> πάντες οἱ κοπιῶντες καὶ πεφορτισμένοι, κἀγὼ
> ἀναπαύσω ὑμᾶς. 29 ἄρατε τὸν ζυγόν μου ἐφ'
> ὑμᾶς καὶ μάθετε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ ὅτι πραΰς εἰμι καὶ
> ταπεινὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ, καὶ εὑρήσετε ἀνάπαυσιν
> ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑμῶν· 30 ὁ γὰρ ζυγός μου χρηστὸς
> καὶ φορτίον μου ἐλαφρόν ἐστιν.

Stendahl[144] criticizes Findlay in his treatment of Matthew's gospel as a work divided into five sections on the pattern of the Testimonies, yet Findlay's insight is quite enlightening. Section three, according to his division (i.e. 11.2-13.53) is entitled: "Jesus, the Sophia and the Logos." "Key words" are important indicators to Findlay's divisions.

> We begin the next section [i.e. number three] with "the works of the Christ"; we end it with "Whence hath this man this wisdom and these powers?" (13.54). In the course of this section, it will be observed, attention has passed from actual achievements to the nature of the power which such achievements express. We have learnt to look a little closely at the closing words of any section of this Gospel for a summary of its contents: so we must take a note of the other word which occurs in the reluctant tribute of the men of Nazareth--"Whence hath this man this wisdom?" they asked. This suggestion is made quite early in the third section of the gospel:

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[144] Stendahl, School, 27; cf. Findlay, op. cit., esp. 392-394.

> "Wisdom is justified by her *works* (11.19). The connection of Wisdom with works is now clear, and we pass from what Jesus did to what he was. He is shown to be greater than David, stronger than Beelzebul, greater than Solomon and the temple he built. Who then is He? Solomon's name gives us the clue. Solomon is master of the wise, the maker of parables *par excellence*. We go to the Wisdom books and discover. . . .[145]

Findlay goes ahead to argue for a series of detailed relationships between this division of Matthew and the Wisdom literature. If he is right in the points of detail, Matthew is indeed a "masterpiece." He concludes:

> It is clear that we are not far away from the Logos doctrine of the Fourth Gospel here; if Matthew's presentation of the claim of Jesus is anywhere near the truth, we may well ask the question, may the idea that Jesus was the pre-existent word made flesh have been inspired *not by Philo*, but by the Master himself, explaining His own self-consciousness by help of the Wisdom literature, with which there is abundant evidence that He was familiar.[146]

Stendahl's[147] most serious criticism of Findlay is that his argument does not sufficiently take into account that Matthew is a reworking of Mark with the addition and supplementation of certain other material. Surely, the criticism is valid. Yet there can be no doubt that the verses which concern this study, which also provided Findlay with evidence for his conclusions, are undeniably a part of the Wisdom tradition. Attention is therefore turned to them. First, Matthew 11.16-19.

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[145] Findlay, *op. cit.*, 393.

[146] *Ibid.*, 394.

[147] Stendahl, *School*, 27.

Speaking of this short section, Stendahl says specifically of verse 19, ". . . the final logion remains obscure, as it seems to have been almost from the very beginning, since the manuscripts both in Lk. and Mt. vary: 'deed'/'children'."[148] Stendahl continues, "It is unlikely that Wisdom here is identified with Jesus."[149] He does however note that verses 25-30 have a great affinity with traditional Wisdom thinking. Elsewhere he argues that the study of quotations from Matthew leads to the assumption that, "the Wisdom literature was familiar to the Matthean church and that it considered Jesus as the Wisdom of God."[150] Some feel that Jesus is identified with Wisdom in the passage.[151] The more considered view seems to be something short of this, like Stendahl, either implying or, as in his case, stating that the actual identification was made by the early church.[152] Then there are those, like M'Neile, who neither affirm nor deny an identification. M'Neile, for example, asserts of the Divine Wisdom that it is "God himself in action."[153] He interprets this to mean that Wisdom was Jesus' inspiration. The lack of precision in this kind of exegesis is unsettling.

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[148] Stendahl, "Matthew," 784. M.-J. Lagrange, *Evangile selon Saint Matthew*, 223, argues that Matthew probably read *ἔργων*. That the saying does in fact belong to Q is commonly agreed. See: T.W. Manson, *The Teaching of Jesus*, 213; H. E. Tödt, *The Son of Man in the Synoptic Tradition*, 114-118; *et*. *al*.

[149] Stendahl, *loc*. *cit*.

[150] Stendahl, *School*, 27.

[151] O.S. Rankin, *Israel's Wisdom Literature*, x; Findlay, *op*. *cit*., 394.

Those who see the developing theological realizations of the early church seem to occupy the strongest position. Robinson's statement is concise and to the point:

> Wisdom . . . is the personified agent and power of God, identified by the theology of the church with Jesus himself. He is attacked and slandered for his actions during his earthly ministry, but the course of time shews that he and he alone was right. There is, as it were, a legal case between him and his opponents, and it is only the verdict of history that can settle the matter. This is given clearly and without hesitation in favour of him and he is seen to be that true and divine Wisdom.[154]

If Luke's *τέκνων* is under consideration, the justification originates in Jesus' followers[155] instead of his deeds.

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[152] T. H. Robinson, *The Gospel of Matthew*, 103; Davies, *op. cit.*, 158.

[153] A. H. M'Neile, *Matthew*, 158.

[154] T. H. Robinson, *loc. cit.*; cf., Stendahl, "Matthew," 784.

[155] See: W. Manson, *Luke*, 82f. With *τέκνων*, Stendahl, "Matthew," 784, observes that it is possible to take *ἀπό* as "over against." Meaning: "The Wisdom of God (moving towards

The basic similarity of thought is preserved, and Jesus remains the Wisdom of God.

Although Stendahl doubts any identification of Jesus with Wisdom in verse 19, he says that in verses 25-30, "Jesus assumes the function of Wisdom as described in Sirach 51.23-27."[156] Allen[157] lists these affinities in tabular form. The similarities are indeed impressive and some connection must surely be established.[158] However, there are also differences and it would seem fair to conclude that this is not the whole answer. The question of the extent to which Q is involved comes in here. Verses 28-30 have no parallel in Luke, and it would seem unlikely that Luke would have omitted them if they were originally a part of Q.[159] Kilpatrick concludes, "there is a change of subject matter between vv. 25-27 and vv. 28-30, and no

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its goal) cannot be hampered by those who claim to be the sons of Wisdom, i.e., the Pharisees and others who take offense."

[156] Ibid. Cf., School, 142.

[157] W. C. Allen, Matthew,

[158] Davies, op. cit., 156f; Bruce, op. cit., 49; E. Klöstermann, Das Matthäusevangelium, 103f.

[159] For a discussion of this problem see: G.D. Kilpatrick, The Origins of the Gospel according to St. Matthew, 27

necessary connection joining the two passages together."[160] Bultmann[161] has denied that there was originally any connection between the two sections. Of the latter he says, "It seems to me that Matt. 11.28-30 is a quotation from Jewish Wisdom literature put into the mouth of Jesus."[162]

Another point is the independence of verse 27, the well-known "Johannine thunderbolt." Although it is not out of place in any serious way, it must be allowed that it is more or less self-contained. Haenchen[163] contends that in the verse Jesus speaks as a Gnostic Redeemer. Similarily, Grant says of the language of verses 25-27 that it is "semi-Gnostic."[164] Grant further finds a tension between apocalyptic and Gnostic thought in the passage, "in the context of Jewish speculation about Israel, the Torah, and the Wisdom of God."[165] Again:

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[160] Ibid. Cf., R. M. Grant, Gnosticism and Early Christianity, 152.

[161] R. Bultmann, Jesus and the Word, 83; Theology, I, 48; History of the Synoptic Tradition, 159f.

[162] Ibid. In personal conversation, both Professors G. Quispel and A.F.J. Klijn mentioned their preference for a wisdom "form" in connection with this passage rather than an actual quotation from some now unknown Wisdom book.

[163] E. Haenchen, RGG (third edition, 1958), II, 1653.

[164] Grant, op. cit., 52

[165] Ibid.

There is a Wisdom-Christology in this passage which points toward the Gnostic speculations about Wisdom. But here it is not Gnostic; it is simply Christian, and it may go back to Jesus himself. If Jesus somehow identified himself with Israel, as many modern scholars have held, it is surely possible that he could have identified himself with the Wisdom of God. In any event, we can see that at a very early time he was so identified by Christians.[166]

Gnostic "elements" cannot be confined to verses 25-27.[167] Verses 28 and 30 are paralleled in the Gospel of Thomas.

> Jesus said:
> Come to Me, for easy
> is My yoke and My lordship is gentle,
> and you shall find repose for yourselves.
> Gospel of Thomas, 90

Verse 29 of Matthew is conspicuous for its absence from Thomas. It is possible that verses 28 and 29 were originally separate sayings, drawn together here by Matthew because of ἀνάπαυσις. It could be argued that Thomas represents an independent tradition at this point. Otherwise one would be required to ask why the omission was felt necessary.

The nature of the entire paragraph (25-30) inclines Stendahl to conclude:

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[166] Ibid., 53.

[167] It should be noted that verse 25 has a Pauline parallel in a passage already discussed: 1 Corinthians 1.26-29.

> . . . we are inclined to consider the passage as having originated from an interplay between actual words of Jesus and the formative creativity of a church similar to that behind the Fourth Gospel.[168]

Finally Otto summarizes the passage in terms of significance:

> The significant thing for us in his words, however, is that he does not summon men to Wisdom, as a mere expert or teacher or even pupil of Wisdom, but that he, like Wisdom, calls men to himself. He speaks in the name of Wisdom, indeed as Wisdom herself, That does not mean that he shared the doctrine of the incarnation as developed by later speculation, but it does mean that he--at least occasionally--knew himself to be so much the organ of divine Wisdom that his own person was identified with that of the very speaker who used the divine voice--a feature which is never found in the ancient prophets.[169]

IV. HEBREWS

Hebrews 1.1-3. Fragments of the Wisdom tradition are found in the opening verses of the epistle to the Hebrews.

> 1 Πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως πάλαι ὁ Θεὸς λαλήσας
> τοῖς πατράσιν ἐν τοῖς προφήταις 2 ἐπ' ἐσχάτου
> τῶν ἡμερῶν τούτων ἐλάλησεν ἡμῖν ἐν υἱῷ, ὃν
> ἔθηκεν κληρονόμον πάντων, δι' οὗ καὶ ἐποίησεν
> τοὺς αἰῶνας· 3 ὃς ὢν ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ
> χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, φέρων τε τὰ
> πάντα τῷ ῥήματι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ, καθαρισμὸν
> τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ποιησάμενος ἐκάθισεν ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς
> μεγαλωσύνης ἐν ὑψηλοῖς.

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[168] Stendahl, "Matthew," 784.

[169] R. Otto, The Kingdom of God and the Son of Man,

172. For a concise summary of the gospel picture of Jesus as Wisdom see A. Richardson, An Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament, 166.

Manson[170] observes four basic predications of Jesus in these verses:

1) He is the Messiah, the Son of God, the predestined Inheritor of all things (vv. 1-2a).
2) He is the Wisdom or Logos of God, through whom God made the worlds, and who upholds them (vv. 2b-3a).
3) He has effected the purification of our sins (v.3b).
4) He sits at God's right hand (v. 3c).

This statement of fundamentals in itself indicates that the author of Hebrews was deeply affected by the Wisdom tradition.

Even within the Wisdom tradition, we have seen that diverse sources seem to be represented. With regard to this passage from Hebrews, Moffatt[171] observes Platonic elements in the background. Further, he also feels that the passage shows Alexandrine[172] and, more specifically, Philonic[173] influence. Such conclusions certainly support Manson's claim that "the conjunction of the Messiah-concept and the Wisdom-concept first occurred . . . within the theology of the world-mission."[174] In view of the significance of this point it must now be asked just what specifics of the Wisdom tradition it is possible to notice in these verses.

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[170] W. Manson, Hebrews, 91.

[171] J. Moffatt, Hebrews, xxxi; cf. Richardson, op.cit., 160f.; Bultmann, Theology, I, 132, refers to the "cosmic figure" of Christ in Hebrews 1.

[172] Moffatt, op. cit., 6; cf. Sidebottom, The Christ of the Fourth Gospel, 59.

[173] Moffatt, op. cit., 6f. For a detailed systematic approach to the Philonic elements in Hebrews see C. Spicq, L'épitre aux Hébreux, vol. 1, 39-91.

First, Jesus is characterized as the agent of God at creation: *δι' οὗ καὶ ἐποίησεν τοὺς αἰῶνας* (2b). The creative activity of Wisdom has been noted both in Proverbs 8.22-30 and Wisdom of Solomon 8.4, both of which may be offered at least as parallels to the thought of Hebrews.[175] Further, "*τοὺς αἰῶνας* here, though never in Paul, is equivalent to *τὰ πάντα* in v. 3 (implied in *πάντων* above), i.e., the universe or world (11.3)."[176]

Even more emphatic is the influence on verse 3 of *Wisdom* 7.22-26, especially verse 26.[177]

> For she [Wisdom] is a reflection of eternal light,
> a spotless mirror of the working of God,
> and an image of his goodness.

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[174] W. Manson, *Hebrews*, 95.

[175] Moffatt, *op. cit.*, 5; Bruce, *op. cit.*, 48f.

[176] Moffatt, *loc. cit.*; The re-statement of the creative activity of *κύριος* in verses 10-12 with a quotation from Psalm 102.25-27 should be noted, cf. O. Cullmann, *op. cit.*, 2.

[177] Harris, *Prologue*, 13f.; C. C. Torrey, *The Apocryphal Literature*, 21; Richardson, *op. cit.*, 160f.

Bultmann goes so far as to suggest that Hebrews 1.2a is "only a paraphrase of the concept 'image' (*εἰκών*)."[178] Surely the words *ἀπαύγασμα* and *δόξα* reflect the thought of *Wisdom*. Further, following Bultmann, *χαρακτήρ* may stand for *εἰκών*.

Philonic influence is particularly evident in 2b, where it is said of Jesus that he offers his continual support to the created order through "upholding the universe by his word of power." Philo speaks in similar terms of the Logos.[179]

Finally, the author of Hebrews represents the Son's soteriological function as closely drawn into Wisdom speculation (3c). Indeed the role is fully developed here.

All of this causes Cullmann to speak of the similarities between these opening verses of Hebrews and John's prologue.

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[178] Bultmann, *Theology*, I, 132. See also F. W. Eltester, *ΕΙΚΩΝ in Neuen Testament* (Berlin: 1958).

[179] Moffatt, *op*. *cit*., 7, notes the following: *Mig.Ab.* 6, *ὁ λόγος* . . . *ὁ τῶν ὅλων κυβερνήτης πηδαλιουχεῖ τὰ σύμπαντα*; *Spec*. *Leg*.I. 81, *λόγος δ'ἐστὶν εἰκὼν θεοῦ, δι' οὗ σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἐδημιουργεῖτο*; *Plant*. 8, *λόγος δὲ ὁ ἀΐδιος θεοῦ τοῦ αἰωνίου τὸ ὀχυρώτατον καὶ βεβαιότατον ἔρεισμα τῶν ὅλων ἐστί*.

A clear parallel to the prologue of John becomes obvious here when we consider that the author mentions in the same sentence the creation of the world through the Son, and in the next verse says this son 'reflects the glory of God' and 'bears the stamp of his nature.' The word λόγος as such is missing, but this passage, exactly like John 1.1, connects the divine word in the Son with the creation of the world, and defines the eternal relationship of the Son to God the Father.[180]

V. JOHN

John 1.1-18. It is not the purpose at this point to gather purple patches from various authors for the purpose of tailoring a regal robe for the Christ of the Fourth Gospel. Indeed, such would be both a formidable and challenging task, for the Prologue has attracted the attention of some of the best minds in Christendom over a long period of time. Here, however, time and space demand limitation to the simplest statement of the present state of the investigation and an examination of the Wisdom elements of the document itself. The latter is perhaps the most important as the Prologue is the most complete Christological statement in the New Testament from the point of view of Wisdom speculation.

A considerable amount of space has already been devoted to an examination of various areas of Greek thought that may have sustained relationships to the biblical tradition. These need not be repeated in this connection. It should be noted, however, that for some time now commentators have been strengthening the position that these contacts with the Fourth Gospel were minimal, and at best not of extremely crucial importance.[181]

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[180] Cullmann, *op. cit.*, 261.

Further, Judaism and to a certain extent Hellenistic Judaism have occupied this study also. Again any repetition of detail is at this point unnecessary. With regard to Philo and the Fourth Gospel, Dodd's dictum should be noticed, "It has always been recognized that Johannine thought has some sort of affinity with that of Philo."[182]

With regard to more peculiarly Jewish backgrounds, it is in order here to notice the basic conclusions of Harris who has been influential in this area for a half-century now. Harris' detailed examination admits of concise summary. The summary should not be taken to mean that he has not been detailed in his work. He speaks for himself:

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[181] Harris, Prologue, 13; C. H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, 264f., C. K. Barrett, The Gospel according to St. John, 25-28; Sidebottom, op. cit., 29. For an index of articles on Logos (λόγος) which are related to the New Testament use of the term see B.M. Metzger, Index to Periodical Literature on Christ and the Gospels (Leiden: 1966), 442-444.

[182] Dodd, Fourth Gospel, 54. This view is established by the fact that Dodd, op. cit., spends an entire chapter ("Hellenistic Judaism: Philo of Alexandria," 54-73) examining the various affinities of thought.

> The suggestion arises . . . that *the way to Logos is through Sophia and that the latter is the ancestress of the former*.[183]
>
> . . . the Logos in the Prologue to John is a substitute for Sophia in a previously existing composition, and the language of the Prologue to the Gospel depends ultimately upon the eighth chapter of the Book of Proverbs. . . .
>
> Our hypothesis . . . involves (or almost involves) the consequence that the Prologue is a hymn in honour of Sophia, and that it need not be in that sense due to the same authorship as the Gospel itself.[184]
>
> It appears, then, that we can justify the evolution of the Johannine Prologue from the eighth chapter of Proverbs, and we can show the line of the evolution to have passed through the Sapiential books.[185]
>
> Thus behind the Only-Begotten Son of God to whom John introduces us, we see the Unique Daughter of God, who is His Wisdom, and we ought to understand the Only-Begotten Logos-Son as an evolution from the Only-Begotten Sophia-daughter.[186]

Though the neat conclusions of Harris are not without flaw, he did succeed in demonstrating that the Prologue is dependent upon Jewish Wisdom speculation. Other views have been presented, and indeed it is possible to see other elements at work. The point here however is that the Prologue will never be completely separated from its Jewish ancestry.[187]

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[183] Harris, *Prologue*, 4.

[184] *Ibid*., 6.

[185] *Ibid*., 12f.

[186] *Ibid*., 13.

If, in opposition to strictly Jewish backgrounds or Hellenistic Judaism of a Philonic sort, one is thinking of a brand of Hellenistic Judaism that might be styled "proto-Gnostic," such as conceived by Bultmann, it must be observed that we have not adequately examined this possibility. This is made all the more necessary by the fact that disagreement with certain of Bultmann's conclusions has already been expressed. It is to a summary of these views that this study now turns.

Bultmann's contributions in this are found primarily in two sources: 1) his essay, "Der religionsgeschichtliche Hintergrund des Prologs zum Johannes-evangelium," in the Gunkel Festschrift, *ΕΥΧΑΡΙΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ*, II (Göttingen: 1923),

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[187] Others who hold the primary background to the Prologue to be Jewish include: J.A.T. Robinson, *Twelve New Testament Studies*, 124; T.W. Manson, *On Paul and John*, 139f., 148; Grant, *op. cit.*, 167-169; Richardson, *op. cit.*, 161. For a typical defense of dependence upon Greek thought see: W. J. Deane, *The Book of Wisdom*, 15. With regard to the broader question of Jewish backgrounds to all of the Johannine writings see F.-M. Braun, *Jean le Théologien: les grandes traditions d'Israël et l'accord des écritures selon le Quatrième Évangile* (Paris: 1964), esp. 115-150.

1-26; and 2) Das Evangelium des Johannes, in the Meyer series (tenth edition, Göttingen: 1941), esp. 6-13. In the first of these, Bultmann attempted to show that emendations had been made on the earlier verses of the Prologue and that originally no mention was made of the incarnation until verse 14, "Deutlich handelt von der Menschwerdung erst v. 14: καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο."[188]

The first thirteen verses, he argued, dealt with the λόγος, a divine being with the same essence and function as the Jewish Sophia. In explaining why John has λόγος instead of σοφία, Bultmann prefers the view that it is a matter of simple substitution.[189] This naturally leads to the context of Alexandrian Judaism although he thinks "Spezifisch philonisch ist im Johannes-Prolog nichts. . . ."[190] Further, "Natürlich gehört Philos Logosspekulation in den gleichen religionsgeschichtlichen Zusammenhang, ist aber eine viel kompliziertere Bildung."[191] Nevertheless, for Bultmann this background explains the probabilities of the shift in terminology. The presence of cosmological elements both in Egyptian and Stoic thought would also have contributed to the development. Bultmann also observes the primary difference between Jewish Wisdom speculation and John. Whereas in the former Wisdom appeared at different times guiding different people, in John ". . . alles Licht auf den einen konzentriert ist, in dem der Logos Fleisch ward."[192]

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[188] Bultmann, "Hintergrund," 5.

[189] Ibid., 13f.

[190] Ibid., 14.

[191] Ibid.

Bultmann goes ahead to argue that *καὶ ὁ λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο* was a part of the original hymn or *Vorlage*, and that it must have applied to a historical character of the immediate past. He further holds that the hymn must have originated within the sect of the Baptist, and that it was therefore John who was first identified with the Sophia-Logos. Finally, he says that the hymn was Christianized when it was made to apply to Jesus.[193] However, in 1925, Bultmann published another essay[194] in which he examined sources within both Mandeism and Manicheism for background to the prologue. The result of this beginning ultimately expressed itself in the views put forward in his commentary a number of years later. It is this final position that has attracted so much attention.

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[192] *Ibid*., 16.
[193] *Ibid*., 24.

[194] R. Bultmann, "Die Bedeutung der neuerschlossenen Mandäischen und Manichäischen Quellen fur das Verständnis des Johannesevangelium," *ZNW* XXIV (1925), 100-146.

In his Johannes-kommentar, Bultmann, though not repudiating much of what he had said earlier, incorporated other elements which changed his position significantly. He rejects the Old Testament tradition of the "word of God" as unimportant to the understanding of the Johannine Logos.[195] Neither does he find the origin of the Prologue in Greek philosophical tradition or in Stoicism.[196] Positively, he argues that the Wisdom of the Old Testament does fit the concept of the Johannine Logos.[197] Further, and this is one of the important distinctions, this Wisdom was not original to Judaism, but was the product of foreign influence.

> Der Weisheitsmythos ist aber nur eine Variante des Offenbarer-Mythos, der in der hellenistischen und gnostischen Literatur verbreitet ist; und die Verwandtschaft des Joh-Prologs mit der judischen Weisheitsspekulation beruht darauf, dass beide auf die gleiche Tradition als ihre Quelle zurückgehen.[198]

The environment of Alexandria is still important as it offered an opportunity for interpenetration, especially for the Logos to assimilate the characteristics of Sophia. The significant thing in all this is of course that the Logos is argued to be a Gnostic figure.[199]

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[195] Bultmann, Johannes, 6f. For a detailed critique of Bultmann's proposals concerning the Gospel of John see D. M. Smith, The Composition and Order of the Fourth Gospel (New Haven and London: 1965). This is an extremely valuable book not only for its own observations, but also for many gathered from other sources. The footnotes and bibliography are also of particular value.

[196] Ibid., 9f. [197] Ibid., esp. 8.

[198] Ibid., 8f.

This Logos, in creating the world, dispersed himself in it. He only regains his identity when the structure disintegrates.

> . . . er wird erlöst, indem es sich selbst erlöst. Als Erlöser hat sich der Logos selbst in Menschengestalt in die niedere Welt begeben. Er hat sich, um die dämonischen Mächte der Finsternis zu täuschen und um die zu rettenden Menschen nicht zu erschrecken, in einen menschlichen Leib verkleidet. Natürlich könnte dies spezifisch gnostische Motiv nicht von den philosophischen Systemen übernommen werden. In den christlich gnostischen Systemen ist der menschgewordene Erlöser mit Jesus identifiziert worden. Indessen ist der Gedanke der Menschwerdung des Erlösers nicht etwa aus dem Christentum in die Gnosis gedrungen, sondern ist ursprünglich gnostisch; er ist vielmehr schon sehr früh vom Christentum übernommen und für die Christologie fruchtbar gemacht worden.[200]

The fact that in the Prologue creation is not a tragedy indicates to Bultmann that the Gnosis being adapted is an early form.[201] Further, he recognizes that the documents used to support his contention come from a later period. Surely he takes the strongest possible line of defense here in asserting that the myth itself shows signs of being much older than the documents.[202] With regard to the documents, he repeatedly finds the Odes of Solomon to contain the closest parallels to the Prologue.

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[199] Ibid., 9.

[200] Ibid., 10f.

[201] Ibid., 14.

[202] Ibid., 11f.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of his study is its recognition that this figure appears, "in verschiedenen Differenzierungen und unter verschiedenen Namen."[203] This is precisely where our basic disagreement lies. It must be observed that Bultmann's view is not as "unorthodox" as it has been made to appear; for the entire situation would take on a different character if it were posited that there were a number of different Redeemer figures instead of one figure in different manifestations, the products of the varied nature of Hellenistic Judaism rather than a single dominating phenomenon. This suggestion has however already been made.[204] Bultmann's views are thus summarized. It is now possible, within the total context of the present discussion, to analyse positively the Wisdom elements present in the Prologue.

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[203] *Ibid*., 11.

[204] *Supra* 164ff. For further notes on Bultmann see: Cullmann, *op. cit*., 252f., 263-266; Sidebottom, *op. cit*., 64, 105ff., etc. S. Neill, *The Interpretation of the New Testament*, esp. 308-311, has a critique of Bultmann particularly on the point that the dualism of the Fourth Gospel is not a Gnostic dualism, but at crucial points stands in direct contrast to the popular form of the Gnostic myth. It is not part of the present purpose to review it here, but it should be noted that Sidebottom's book is probably the most helpful of recent works on John. It presents the material, suggests the problems, asks the questions, but leaves the reader to make many of the decisions.

As a connecting link it is in order to notice Taylor's particularly penetrating summary.

> This perception [personal distinctions in God's being] means that, interpreting the origin of the Johannine Logos doctrine, Christian thought will not be able to rest content permanently with the suggestiveness of Gen. 1, but will be compelled to look for contributory factors in other directions, in the semi-personalized Logos of Philo, in Wisdom, in the Torah, and even, in periods of theological despair, in Gnosticism. Some vehicle of thought is necessary to bridge the gap between the Old Testament and John 1.1-18. Nevertheless, it is a question of a vehicle and not of motive power. The compelling urge which led the Evangelist to pen, or make use of, the Logos Hymn, is not any of the external factors which from time to time have been prepared, but the dynamic fact of Christ Himself. It was the fact that Christ was known and worshipped in the Church of his day which drove the Evangelist to identify Him with the Word of God in his endeavor to explain His person first to himself and then to his readers. He made use of the thought forms of his day, as all the great theologians have done, and must do, to give expression to his perception of the incomparable significance of Christ.[205]

Whatever else may be said, it surely can be argued that the fact of Christ is the most important fact for the author of the Prologue. Cullmann, approaching the same point from another angle, expresses a view which, in distinction to that of Bultmann, is here felt to be more nearly correct.

> Although I certainly favor reference to parallels drawn from the study of comparative religion, my understanding of the role these parallels play in explaining the Johannine Logos concept is essentially different from that of R. Bultmann. I seek the biblical

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[205] Taylor, Names, 164f.

> and Christian character of the prologue in its starting point, not only in a subsequent demythologizing process set in opposition to the mythological view which the evangelist is assumed simply to have accepted. Exactly contrary to Bultmann's way of thinking, the character of the Johannine universalism can be understood only by explaining the non-Christian parallels, not as the source of the evangelist's inspiration, but as foreign elements secondarily utilized by him.[206]

Among other things, this means for Cullmann that any earlier notions of general revelation were "completely subordinated" to the "one revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth."[207]

Several reasons have been suggested as to why John preferred *λόγος* to *σοφία*. It has already been mentioned that *σοφία* had the obvious disadvantage of being a feminine form. This was probably not a determining factor, but was nevertheless of some importance. It has been observed that *σοφία* had been misused in the Hellenistic world.[208] It was not John's purpose to compete with this type of speculation. Richardson argues further that the selection of terminology was made for "apologetic reasons."[209] While the total concept may well have arisen primarily out of Jewish thought, *λόγος* would have possessed, even at first contact, more or less favorable connotations in Greek circles. No single factor will provide a complete answer. It is our conclusion that λόγος was a considered choice which seemed to serve the need better than any other possibility.

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[206] Cullmann, *op. cit.*, 264f. [207] *Ibid.*, 254.

[208] Richardson, *op. cit.*, 160. Following Richardson, it is in order to cite Dodd's exhaustive examination of Hellenistic backgrounds to the gospel of John in *The Fourth Gospel*, 10-73, etc.

[209] *Ibid.*, 161.

Assuming that the thought is primarily Hebraic and, although John's interest is primarily historical, Sidebottom speculates as to the author's metaphysic.

> Thus he might have reflected that the Word was the expression of God's mind or that to find the word for anything is to make it known, but it would be more congenial to him to find such divine self-expression in events or actions (or in a person) than in any universal Reason or abstract Idea. Though then we with our pure Greek background might interpret this "truth" as "reality" and find comfort and illumination therein, John himself may not have intended this at all. . . . what *we* may consider the most "spiritual" of all, speculation upon absolute truth, belongs for John to the sphere of reality described as "that which is born of the flesh."[210]

Richardson makes the unequivocal statement, "In the Fourth Gospel and in the Apocalypse alike, the Wisdom-Word of God is the controlling theological conception."[211] Though one might not care to be so conclusive, it is surprising that Robinson, speaking more specifically, contends of the concept of Messiah (ὁ Χρίστος, etc.) that "This, rather than 'the Logos', is the category which controls his Christology in the body of the Gospel."[212] He concludes:

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[210] Sidebottom, *op. cit.*, 192.

[211] Richardson, *op. cit.*, 165.

> . . . the way of thinking reflected, for instance, in E. F. Scott's dictum that 'in the fourth Gospel the Messianic idea is replaced by that of the Logos' has exercised a mesmeric effect.[213]

The obvious point is simply that anything may quite easily be overdone. However, it should be pointed out that Robinson in his desire for truth overstates his case. Though Scott may have gone too far, statistics are not the only standards for judgement. In any case, the concept of *λόγος* has influenced all of the Johannine writings. Richardson saw this quite clearly:

> He [Christ] is present as the conquering Word proclaimed by the missionary Church; this truth is symbolized by the picture in the Apocalypse of the horseman upon the white horse, who came forth 'conquering and to conquer', and whose name is *ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ* (Rev. 6.2; 19.13). In the final visions of the Apocalypse the Johannine doctrine of the *λόγος* is consummated; the *λόγος* who was the *ἀρχή* of the first Creation (Rev. 3.14; Prov. 8.22) meets us again as the *τέλος* (Rev.21.6; 22.13): he is not only the Alpha, he is also the Omega.[214]

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[212] J.A.T. Robinson, *op*. *cit*., 114. This is a statistical conclusion based upon the fact that the Messiah-Christ title occurs in the gospels as follows: Matthew, 17 times; Mark, 7 times; Luke, 13 times; and John, 21 times.

[213] *Ibid*.

[214] Richardson, *op*. *cit*., 164f. It should be noted that the opening verses of 1 John are probably related to the Prologue. See: C.H. Dodd, *The Johannine Epistles*, 4f.; Taylor, *Names*, 165.

Having proceeded this far it is now in order to state specifically the Logos doctrine of the Fourth Gospel. This may be done concisely. *John presents the Logos, who is absolutely and completely identified with Jesus, as the pre-existent and divine agent of creation, revelation, and salvation.* Though extremely brief, this is an all-encompassing and far-reaching statement. It is to the elements of this assertion that the investigation now turns.

Pre-existence is mentioned twice with reasonable clarity: *Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος* . . . *πρὸς τὸν θεόν* . . . (v. 1); and *οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν*. Cullmann observes:

> We read in the Old Testament: 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.' In the Gospel of John we read: 'In the beginning was the Word, the Logos . . . all things were made through him.' The evangelist gives a new Genesis account, now presented in the light of the Mediator of revelation.[215]

John is concerned to establish the fact that the Word was with God at creation. This implies pre-existence, but this must not be taken to mean that John speculates either on the duration or the nature of that pre-existence. Further, ". . . whether *ἦν ποτε*, *ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*, whether there was anything before that, is to look outside the frame for the rest of the picture.[216] Statements of his pre-existence as from the lips of Jesus are found at two points in the gospel outside the Prologue: 8.58; 17.5. These thoughts may also be found elsewhere in the Johannine literature.

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[215] Cullman, *op. cit.*, 250.

> The conception reappears in Rev. 3.14, where Christ is called ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κτίσεως τοῦ θεοῦ, a title based upon Prov. 8.22. . .where ἀρχή should be understood as the principle of creation, not, of course, as the first created thing. The designation ἀρχή is used again in Rev. 21.6 and 22.13, verses which stress the Johannine conception of Christ as the first principle and goal of the creation, the beginning and the end (τὸ τέλος).[217]

The declaration that Jesus was divine is flatly expressed: . . . καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος (v. 1b). These words should be taken in no other way.[218] His activity in creation is put in slightly more detail: πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν. ὃ γέγονεν (v.3); and, . . . καὶ ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο. . . (v. 10).

Jesus as Revealer,[219] though fairly near the surface a number of times, is clearly seen in one complete assertion: θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακεν πώποτε· μονογενὴς θεὸς ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο (v. 18). It has been noted that *μονογενής* has long been a part of the Wisdom tradition.[220] Further, the beholding of his "glory" (v. 14) seems to have overtones of revelation. Closely related is the concept of "light,' which is widely known in these connections.[221] Jesus is referred to as such, more or less directly, five times in the Prologue. The symbolism is important here not only because of its "primeval religious significance," but also because the concept can "be grasped without being understood."[222] That is, it strikes home at all levels and increases in meaning as the individual increases in depth. Christ as the end (i.e., *ἡ χάρις καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια*) of the law (v. 17) also implies a certain revelatory activity.[223] The proximity of Torah to Wisdom has been repeatedly noted. Finally, it is possible to draw in at this point the rejection of verse 11, which recalls Enoch 42.1f.[224] There is implied in the rejection an unwillingness to accept the revelation made available in the Logos.

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[216] F. C. Burkitt, Church and Gnosis, 96.

[217] Richardson, op. cit., 161f.

[218] R. H. Strachan, The Fourth Gospel, 99, etc.

[219] Cullmann, op. cit., 258.

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[220] *Supra* *111f*. Bultmann, *Theology*, II, 35 sees Gnostic connection. The word *μονογενής* is found a number of times in the Johannine literature: John 1.14, 18; 3.16, 18; 1 John 4.9. So-called "non-theological" uses of the term may be found in Luke 7.12; 8.42; 9.38; cf. Hebrews 11.17. The word may also be considered as a synonym for *ἀγαπητός*, see Mark 1.11; Matthew 3.17; Luke 3.22; see also Mark 9.7; cf. 12.6.

[221] Grant, *op*. *cit*., 168.

[222] Sidebottom, *op*. *cit*., 193.

[223] For a discussion of the point see: Strachan, *op*. *cit*., 95f.

This revelation, though rejected by some, was not completely unsuccessful (v.12). To those who did receive him, *ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι* (v. 12). They were, "born . . . of the will . . . of God (v. 13). It is thus in the Prologue that Jesus' revelatory function becomes a soteriological one. Christ is the means of salvation.

All these characteristics, functions, etc., were a part of the incarnate reality, and were therefore intimately linked with Jesus. The startlingly new element is: *καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*. Nothing of this sort was ever said of Wisdom. Here it is attached to *ὁ λόγος*. It is therefore to be regarded as a new element in the Wisdom tradition. Grant, while regarding the Gospel as, "indubitably Jewish, but on the verge of Gnosticism,"[225] observes:

> The hymn could even be used by a Jewish Gnostic, were it not for the crucial sentence, "And the Word became flesh." This means that the divine creative Word, Wisdom, Name of God became a human being. Nothing could be more clearly un-Gnostic, or even anti-Gnostic. For it is an essential part of Gnostic theory to insist either that the divine Christ

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[224] *Supra* *66f*.

[225] Grant, *op*. *cit*., 169.

> was not human or that the divine Christ descended upon the human Jesus. John says, "The Word *became* flesh."226

This means historical encounter. Because of this, "The Christian faith is therefore not a philosophy, but a *kerugma*."[227]

The declaration, *καὶ ἐσκηνωσεν ἐν ὑμῖν*, seems to indicate that the author is recalling the *Shekinah*. Taylor observes:

> The Word . . . became flesh, and, using a verb which recalls the *Shekinah*, the visible dwelling of God among His people, he [John] says that He 'tabernacled among us, and we beheld his glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth' (1.14).228

VI. CONCLUSION

Thus God's Wisdom shows itself in John and in the New Testament. The qualities it possessed made it an inevitable choice in view of the needs of the early church, for that church was desperate for terms with which to express the Christ event. Though the meaningfulness of

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[226] *Ibid*., 169f.

[227] Richardson, *op*. *cit*., 162.

[228] Taylor, *Names*, 162. Cf. Grant, *op*. *cit*., 169. On Sirach 24.13 note *supra* *45ff*. It is of significance in understanding the background of the phrase in question to note that *σκηνόω* or derivatives occur four times in Sirach 24. For example: "He that created me pitched my tent (*σκήνη*), and said, Dwell thou (*κατασκηνόω*) in Jacob."

these forms has grown dim in the passing of time, and even though they may not be points of departure today, they still possess a tremendous depth as well as an encompassing versatility. This is well demonstrated for example in Bonhoeffer's notes.

> Christology is a peculiar discipline, because its subject is Christ himself, the Word, the Logos. Christology is the science of the Word of God. Christology is *logology*. Christology is *the* science, because it is concerned with the Logos. Were this Logos our own Logos, then christology would be a matter of the Logos reflecting upon itself. But this Logos is the Logos of God, where transcendence makes christology the crown of learning and whose coming from outside makes it the centre of scholarship. The subject remains transcendent and yet the Logos with whom we are concerned here is a person. This man is transcendent. [229]

Perhaps the most perplexing question in the New Testament area of this study has to do with the reasons why the *σοφία*-*λόγος* forms were not used more than they were. It has become our conviction that the available evidence may be interpreted to mean that the actual usage of these terms was more extensive in the early church before the writing of the New Testament books themselves. That is, by the latter half of the first century the use of these categories was on the decline, to be renewed only after the threat posed by the various forms of Gnostic speculation had passed. If this is felt to be an overstatement,

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[229] D. Bonhoeffer, *Christology*, 27f.

it is at least fair to observe that usage in the New Testament is often submerged or hidden, which in itself indicates a subtle but surely somewhat extensive awareness on the part of those who wrote the books as well as those who received them. Several reasons have been offered for this apparent suppression. As we have just implied, the Gnostic use of σοφία could not have been without adverse effect on more "orthodox" lines of development.[230] The New Testament evidence under consideration may therefore indicate gnosticizing tendencies at a very early period. From another world of thought, Philo's extensive use of λόγος could have militated against Paul's use of it in his Christological formulations.[231] Whatever other reasons there may have been surely these two are the most apparent.

However, having perused the New Testament, it is now in order to observe how these categories were used by the more or less "orthodox" writers of the second century.

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[230] Cf., e.g., Taylor, Names, 152; Richardson, op. cit., 161.

[231] Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

SECOND CENTURY "ORTHODOXY"

I. INTRODUCTION

Although the Wisdom tradition as a whole had an important influence on New Testament Christological thinking, we have seen that in the New Testament itself only the term λόγος was openly and unquestionably used as a formal Christological title. With the term σοφία, as mentioned earlier, it is our opinion that the New Testament evidence indicates some greater awareness of its implications that it openly discusses. That is, the "submerged" use of the term indicates a common understanding, which in turn would seem to indicate a greater employment in the period just prior to the writing of the New Testament itself.[1]

Whether or not it is agreed that it is possible to observe something of such a suppression in the New Testament, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that the writers of the second century found σοφία undesirable. This later suppression, although widely effective as far as one may observe, was never quite complete. In fact by the time of Origen, σοφία is seen to emerge as an important term in Christological speculation. In view of the suggestion that the second century suppression represents a reaction to Gnostic misuse, it should be mentioned that never once in all the extant writings of the "orthodox" authors is any specific objection on this ground stated.

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[1] It might be argued that the concepts surrounding this term were simply latent until a later period. We feel that this suggestion does not account for certain overtones coming from the evidence which we have referred to as an implied "awareness."

The New Testament use of the term λόγος as an established Christological form was continued into the second century without apparent interruption. It was as we shall see a category of some importance. It will become evident however that there was only a limited amount of constructive development during the period. Imaginative insight was not a common personal asset. This is particularly true of that amorphous group referred to as the "Apostolic Fathers." A number of reasons might be offered but most students of the period would agree that the writers of the New Testament possessed greater spiritual depth.[2]

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[2] Lawson (J. Lawson, *A Theological and Historical Introduction to the Apostolic Fathers*, 2) states that the writers of the New Testament were "possessed of more constructive spiritual genius." In a severe review Köster (*JBL* 81, 1962, 416ff.) argues that such a statement does not recognize the "complexity of the historical problem." Preoccupation with practical problems must be recognized (R.M. Grant, *Apostolic Fathers* I, esp. 7ff.). See further H. Köster, *Synoptische Uberlieferung bei den Apostolischen Vätern, T. & V*. 65 (Berlin: 1957).

What development there was is often difficult to trace because of a lack of evidence. Argument from silence always leaves a sense of uncertainty. However, there are items of interest. In the place of comparison and contrast perhaps the best approach is to view all the evidence--especially that of the Apostolic Fathers--as fragments of one much larger phenomenon. The present state of knowledge hardly admits of any other possibility. It is to the scattered remains of this second century Wisdom-Logos tradition that this investigation now turns.

It must be remembered that the classical form of Gnosticism as a Christian heresy both arose and at least began its decline during this period. Trends in the direction of Gnosticism have already been observed even in New Testament times. It would appear however that alongside the rise of the problem there was an increasing awareness of the inherent dangers to be found within it. The aspects of the movement that concern us will be examined in some detail later, but it must be kept in mind in the course of this chapter that the authors to occupy our attention were more or less aware of and more or less affected by the heresy of their own time. The fact that this contact is not always apparent complicates the problem even further.

The very title of this chapter--"Second Century 'Orthodoxy'"--could be misleading.[3] Two points are of importance. First, even to suggest a developed "orthodox" body is to overstep the reality. "Orthodoxy" itself was yet very much in the making. The point could perhaps be made in retrospect by distinguishing between those who were more or less in the mainstream of the development towards "orthodoxy" and those whose views were ultimately rejected as either heretical or simply inadequate. In addition to this however one must allow for particular views of individuals within the "orthodox" group, which were later decided to be untenable. It is our primary purpose here to gather a compendium of material from those writers of the second century who have something to say about Wisdom and/or Logos that is different from that proposed by the Gnostics.

Secondly, the "one larger phenomenon" included an attitude that may be described as one of "soul-searching." This was a genuine search for meaning in which all too often zeal was offered as a compensation for a lack of depth. This dynamic search for and at least partial realization of meaning occurred in the simple effort to take seriously the revelation contained in the New Testament.

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[3] A complete treatment of the problem raised here is to be found in H.E.W. Turner, The Pattern of Christian Truth (London: 1954). For a discussion relevant to this study see Cullen Story, "The nature of truth in the Gospel of Truth and in the writings of Justin Martyr; a study of the pattern of orthodoxy in the middle of the second Christian Century." Th.D. thesis, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1964 (microfilm from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan).

With regard to the second century Logos doctrine Bethune-Baker succinctly summarizes the preceding points as follows:

> That the doctrine was not fully realized, even by well-instructed leaders of Christian thought, is obvious; and its full application to the interpretation of the person of Jesus was not easily made. Now to one aspect and now to another preeminence is given. Now one relation, now another, is emphasized by different writers. The limitations of human thought and experience are such that we are perhaps justified in saying in such cases that only the particular aspect, the particular relation, was grasped by the writer or thinker in question. But such an inference--in view of the scanty character of the material available for our consideration--is at least always precarious; and it is often too readily assumed (in the case of early Christian writers) that the particular aspect of the question which is presented was the only one with which the writer was familiar.[4]

There are certain incidentals of method that will to some extent control the results of our investigation. The approach is again mainly chronological. Precision here is often impossible, but this does not seem to have materially affected the conclusion. We will not allow ourselves to become unnecessarily preoccupied with technical introductory matters. The primary concern is the thought of the second century church, although this must be gathered from individuals. We have arbitrarily set the second century as the limit for this study as our primary concern is to trace the "orthodox" line, to which Gnosticism made such a severe reaction.

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[4] J. F. Bethune-Baker, Early History of Christian Doctrine, 119f.

The evidence has been conservatively gathered. For example, any passage thought to have been subsequently inserted or appended and therefore not a part of the original document concerned is so noted. Such evidence is only included when it contributes substantially to the broader picture.

II. THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS

The use of the term Logos in the Apostolic Fathers is extremely limited. Such a fact makes a detailed examination not only possible but imperative. The nature and content of these earliest usages are most important guides to second century thought.

Clement of Rome. Clement does not mention a Logos doctrine as such, but there is a single reference that may reflect a familiarity with some sort of Logos speculation.

ἐν λόγῳ τῆς μεγαλωσύνης αὐτοῦ συνεστήσατο τὰ πάντα, καὶ ἐν λόγῳ δύναται αὐτὰ καταστρέψαι.

Corinthians 27[5]

One is continually plagued by the translation problem; should it be "Word, "Logos," or simply "word"? This decision can only depend on one's understanding of the author's own mentality which is often out of reach. In any case the possibility here of an allusion to Genesis 1, if not to John 1, is clear. Further, it has been held, "There is here at least an incipient doctrine of creation by the Logos of God."[6] It would certainly seem accurate to argue that if Clement recognized the doctrine at all it was an extremely undeveloped concept. In slightly more detail, Lightfoot argues that in the case of Clement a distinction must be made between "Logos-doctrine" and "Logos-terminology."[7] However, because of the mediatorial nature of Christ's role in the passage, he concludes, ". . . we can hardly deny his recognition of the *doctrine*, though we may see grave reasons for questioning his use of the *term*."[8]

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[5] Unless otherwise noted all quotations from the Greek text of the Apostolic Fathers follow Lightfoot. English translations are those found in the Loeb edition.

[6] Lawson, *Fathers*, 41

[7] J. B. Lightfoot, *The Apostolic Fathers*, I, 1,398, n.1.

[8] *Ibid*.

Ignatius. The epistles of Ignatius are limited by the immature theology mentioned earlier. This characteristic manifests itself most often in statements pointed in one direction which, though generally accurate if taken as they were probably intended originally, are often vulnerable from angles apparently unconsidered by the author. Bethune-Baker is as positive as possible in view of the circumstances.

> The central idea of Ignatius is the conquest of sin and Satan and of death, the renovation of man, in Christ, by virtue of his divinity in union with his manhood--the beginner of a new humanity: but he is content to insist on both divinity and humanity without attempting to distinguish the relation of the divine to the human.[9]

One example of Ignatius' limitation appears in an important Christological statement which it is possible to interpret to mean that the Logos became a person at the Incarnation.

> εἷς ἰατρός ἐστιν, σαρκικὸς καὶ πνευματικός, γεννητὸς
> καὶ ἀγέννητος, ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ Θεός, ἐν θανάτῳ
> ζωὴ ἀληθινή, καὶ ἐκ Μαρίας καὶ ἐκ Θεοῦ, πρῶτον
> παθητὸς, καὶ τότε ἀπαθής, Ἰησοῦς Χριστός ὁ
> κύριος ἡμῶν.
>
> Ephesians 7

The vulnerability lies in the phrases "passible and then impassible" and "generate and ingenerate," which speak of Christ's incarnate existence first and only subsequently of his heavenly state, while remaining silent about his pre-existence. Bethune-Baker argues that Ignatius used ἀγέννητος (unbegotten) when he meant to use ἀγένητος (without origin).[10] Lightfoot holds that ἀγέννητος can mean "that which is uncreate."[11] In either case even a cursory reading of Ignatius will show that Bethune-Baker is correct in his conclusion:

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[9] Bethune-Baker, op. cit., 121.

> We may feel sure that Ignatius did not intend to deny the existence of the Son in eternity, although the generation of which he speaks is that in time of the Virgin.[12]

Perhaps the most significant passage for our purpose in Ignatius introduces the concept that the Logos "proceeded from silence." It is this type of thing that Grant has in mind when he says, "Ignatius seems to go beyond John in the direction of gnosis, a gnosis rather like that of Menander--in form but not in content."[13] The passage reads:

> Be not led astray by strange doctrines or by old fables which are profitless. For if we are living until now according to Judaism, we confess that we have not received grace. For the divine prophets lived according to Jesus Christ. Therefore they were also persecuted, being inspired by his grace, to convince the disobedient that there is one God, who manifested himself through Jesus

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[10] *Ibid.*, 121f. On the confusion of these two words see Bethune-Baker's note (*Ibid.*). See also Swete, *Mark*, 337.

[11] Lightfoot, *Apostolic Fathers*, II, 90.

[12] Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.*, 122.

[13] R. M. Grant, *Gnosticism and Early Christianity*, 180.

> Christ his son, who is his Word proceeding from silence, (*ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών*) who in all respects was well-pleasing to him that sent him.[14]
>
> Magnesians 8

Silence here seems to have to do with that which had not been spoken or revealed.[15] Ignatius implies that in its original form the silent mystery was incompatible with and inaccessible to man. The two were of such divergent character that there was no middle ground, no meeting point. A revealer was required; that is, one had to go forth, to bring the unutterable to revelation. Ignatius contends that Jesus Christ was that revealer, *αὐτοῦ λόγος ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών*.

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[14] The phrase *ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών* (So A and a quotation from Severus) was so acutely gnostic in sound that later Christians felt obligated to alter it. K. Lake, *The Apostolic Fathers* (Loeb), I, 204, n.1 says: "GL read *λόγος ἀΐδιος οὐκ ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών*, but this is rightly regarded by recent editors as a doctrinal emendation due to fear of Gnostic theories in which *Σιγή* and *Θεός* were the original pair from which *Λόγος* emanated." See: Lightfoot, *Apostolic Fathers*, II, 2, 1, 126f.

Although the actual language is different there are conceivable affinities of thought here with a New Testament writer like the author of the Johannine literature. It has been variously debated. Cullmann (*Christology*, 258, n. 1) refers especially to Schlier (H. Schlier, *Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den Ignatiusbriefen*, *BZNW* 8, 1929) and notes further that Maurer (C. Maurer, *Ignatius von Antiochien und das Johannesevangelium*, *ATANT*, 1949) believes that Ignatius knew the Gospel of John, but he admits that Ignatius' "Logos" in this passage does not necessarily go back to John (pp. 41f.).

[15] For an investigation of *σιγή* in Ignatius, see V. Corwin, *St. Ignatius and Christianity in Antioch*, 116-130. The discussion is quite enlightening but it seems to me to go too far in suggesting of *Magnesians* 8, "Silence is not an attribute of God; it is God himself" (*Ibid*. 123). Silence can only be a means of describing the indescribable.

> As Logos implies the manifestation of Deity whether in His words or in His works, so Sige is the negation of this. . . . Hence the expression 'proceeding from silence' might be used at any point where there is a sudden transition from non-manifestation to manifestation. . . .[16]

It must be noted however that for Ignatius the Logos *is* the revelation which means that revelation is directly linked to incarnation. Jesus Christ was the incarnate revelation of God. Therefore, however vaguely, *λόγος* in the thought of Ignatius must be linked to Jesus.

Hermas. Hermas probably represents the poorest theology to be found among the Apostolic Fathers. It is even possible to show that it is inconsistent. The generally accepted conclusion is that this is due primarily to the limitations of the mind that produced it, although multiple authorship is possible.[17] Laeuchli cogently summarizes the situation with regard to Christology.

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[16] Lightfoot, *Apostolic Fathers*, II, 2, 1, 127. Cf. Lawson, *Fathers*, 122; V. A. Spence Little, *The Christology of the Apologists*, 47ff.

[17] On the plurality of the authorship of *Hermas* see S. Giet, *Hermas et les Pasteurs: les trois auteurs du Pasteur d'Hermas* (Paris: 1963).

> The Christ language of Hermas is a sad affair indeed. This is not simply because it is theologically poor. We could forgive an author, untouched by Gnosticism, illiterate in New Testament finesses, for mixing up Christ and the church (Sim. ix 1.2), for missing the distinction between servant and Lord in Christology (V.6.1), and for confounding son and pneuma (V.6.5). Terminology about Christ in the New Testament is not always as precise as a Thomist or Barthian theologian would like to have it presented. But the tragedy of Hermas is that his opus does not need language about Christ, not because the writer is so obviously confused about it, but because it does not mean much to him. The confusion is partly the result of a lack of concern. What makes sense to him is pragmatical--the status of the church and his desire to alter it. His language is so thoroughly penitential, admonitory, meritorious, that no type of christological language can live beside it. . . . The christological language is poor, not because Hermas has been confused after serious digging (which is often a good thing), but because the concern was never there. When he makes his one christological effort in the parable of the servant, he explains the Christ allegory with his penitential and meritorious language, which drives him to state the exaltation of Jesus as a reward (Sim. V.6).[18]

However it does seem possible to see dimly, through Hermas' limitations, traces of a Wisdom-Logos doctrine.[19] It is impossible to say whether or not Hermas himself was aware of it, nor is it possible to indicate the extent or character of development in the doctrine reflected.

In Vision I after Rhoda had accused Hermas of having illicit desires for her on an earlier occasion, Rhoda herself makes a brief declarative revelation to Hermas. In the first half of this revelation there is a curious mixture of terms which is noteworthy.

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[18] S. Laeuchli, The Language of Faith, 109f. Cf. Grant, op. cit., 123.

[19] See Little, op. cit., 63.

> "Lo, 'the God of the powers', whom I love, by his mighty power, and by his great wisdom 'created the world,' and by his glorious counsel surrounded his creation with beauty, and by his mighty word (*ῥῆμα*) 'fixed the Heaven and founded the earth upon the waters,' and by his own wisdom (*σοφία*) and forethought (*πρόνοια*) created his holy Church."
>
> *Shepherd of Hermas* V.I.3

Though *ῥῆμα* appears where one would expect *λόγος*, the passage contains a doctrine of creation mediated through the Word.[20] If *σοφία* were clearly present in the following line as the hypostatized figure familiar in the Jewish-Christian tradition one might conjecture a new element making its appearance in the Wisdom tradition, i.e., the foundation of the church by *σοφία*.[21] However, since the phrase is *σοφία καὶ πρόνοια* one must conclude that the hypostatization in the author's mind, if indeed there was one, was at least pointed in a Gnostic direction.

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[20] Cf. Psalm 33.6f. and 135.6. The use of *ῥῆμα* may be impossible to explain satisfactorily. Its usage here is exactly opposite the generally accepted use of *λόγοι* in the passages that enter our concern, in this case especially Psalm 33.6. Cf. E. Hatch and H. Redpath, *A Concordance to the Septuagint*, 881ff.

[21] On the relation between Church and Wisdom see *infra* 421ff.

Another relevant passage is found in Parable IX. The vision has to do with the tower which is perused in elaborate detail. This apocalyptic tower was built upon a great rock in which a door had been cut. In the vision both the rock and the door are said to represent the Son of God. In the following quotation one seems to discover a classic example of the doctrine of the pre-existence of the Son based on Proverts 8.27-30.

> "First of all, Sir," said I, "tell me this: What is the rock and the door?" "This rock and the door," said he, "is the Son of God." "How is it," said I, "Sir, that the rock is old, but the gate is new?" "Listen," said he, "and understand, foolish man. The Son of God is older than all his creation, so that he was the counsellor of his Creation to the Father, therefore the rock is also old." "But why is the gate new, Sir?"said I. "Because," said he, "He was manifested in the last days of the end of the world, for this reason the gate is new, that those who are to be saved may 'enter' through it 'into the kingdom of God.'"
> Shepherd of Hermas S.IX.12

The Son of God is for Hermas both old and new: old because he was the Father's adviser (σύμβουλος) in creation, new because of his incarnation, which was in Hermas' view a thing of the immediate past. Though the terminology is different the creative role here described was as we have seen a familiar function of Wisdom in the older portions of the Wisdom tradition, particularly Proverbs 8.

The cosmological role of the Son is mentioned by Hermas again a few paragraphs further down.

τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ μέγα ἐστὶ καὶ ἀχώρητον, καὶ τὸν κόσμον ὅλον βαστάζει *Shepherd of Hermas* S.IX.14

Although the terminology is again more or less unfamiliar the thought is similar to Hebrews 1.3b, φέρων τε τὰ πάντα τῷ ῥήματι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ. It is clear, as we have seen, that this New Testament context has been influenced by the Wisdom tradition and that the activity of the Son here described is an outgrowth of Wisdom's earlier role as an agent of creation.

These are the reflections of Hermas. Though they consist only of fragments of the Logos doctrine, the casual manner of their use indicates a frame of reference in which they would have been understood. They will in their way contribute to our understanding of the period.

The Epistle to Diognetus. This epistle is a highly regarded theological work belonging probably to the third quarter of the second century.[22] Though not fully adapted to the classic form, *Diognetus* is an apology. It is included here because of its traditional association with the Apostolic Fathers. In fact it serves as a transition from the Apostolic Fathers to the Apologists.

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[22] For an inclusive discussion of the dating problem and the various solutions that have been offered, see H. G. Meecham, *The Epistle to Diognetus*, 16ff.

With regard to its Christology some have held that, even though Father and Son were not identified, the author felt that the Son possessed a divine nature (i.e., Θεός).[23] Meecham himself refines the position by holding that "the author shared the view held by the apologists that in essence the Son is one with the Father whilst distinct in person and subordinate in function."[24] This leads to an examination of chapter VII for as we shall see the creative role suggested is definitely subordinate.

> . . . the passage does not make orthodoxy explicit. Nevertheless, it shows considerable power of discriminating thought, and a sense for the values of the Christian Gospel. It is therefore hard to suppose that the vagueness is due either to unorthodoxy or to superficiality of thought. The writer to Diognetus is not a theological bungler, but an accomplished theologian who in the present work chooses not to declare too explicitly the most sacred mysteries of the Faith. He will not cast his pearls before swine, and speak of the crucified and risen divine Son to one who is more likely to be moved to ridicule thereby, and to have his incipient sympathy with Christianity destroyed. So we have a careful but very reticent statement of the Logos doctrine, and then with this preparation duly made, a brief and equally reticent allusion to the general idea of Atonement. The matter is then left, until the Apology has done its work, and the reader comes back as a seeker.[25]

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[23] Ibid., 27. [24] Ibid.

[25] Lawson, Fathers, 288f.

The passage in question reads as follows:

> For it is not, as I said, an earthly discovery which was given to them, nor do they take such pains to guard some mortal invention, nor have they been entrusted with the dispensation of human mysteries. But in truth the Almighty and allcreating and invisible God himself founded among men the truth from heaven, and the holy and incomprehensible word, and established it in their hearts, not, as one might suppose, by sending some minister to men, or an angel, or ruler, or one of those who direct earthly things, or one of those who are entrusted with the dispensations in heaven, *but the very artificer and Creator of the universe himself, by whom he made the heavens* (*ἀλλ' αὐτὸν τὸν τεχνίτην καὶ δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων ᾧ τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ἔκτισεν*), by whom he enclosed the sea in its own bounds, whose mysteries all the elements guard faithfully; from whom the sun received the measure of the courses of the day, to whose command the moon is obedient to give light by night, whom the stars obey, following the course of the moon, by whom all things were ordered, and ordained, and placed in subjection, the heavens and the things in the heavens, the earth and the things in the earth, the sea and the things in the sea, fire, air, abyss, the things in the heights, the things in the depths, the things between them--him he sent to them.
>
> *The Epistle to Diognetus* VII

The supreme God is all powerful. Further, this invisible God is ultimately responsible for the created order. All this is contained in the title: *ὁ παντοκράτωρ καὶ παντοκτίστης καὶ ἀόρατος θεός*. It was this God who also revealed to man *τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν ἅγιον*.[26]

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[26] If it were separated from its context one might interpret this phrase to refer to Jesus, see N. Turner, *Grammatical Insights*, 8ff. However the wider context clearly indicates that the author considered the intermediary separately; indeed, as we have just indicated, this phrase refers to that which was to be revealed.

This the writer to Diognetus insists was not done through any quasi-qualified intermediary, but through αὔτον τὸν τεχνίτην καὶ δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων. The subtle nature of the passage has already been indicated. Although the specific titles of Wisdom and Logos are avoided both the language and the thought of the passage belong to the tradition commonly associated with those titles. It is in fact a theological reflection in some depth upon the truths contained in that world of thought. The Creator and his chief agent have become in a similar relationship the revealers of eternal truth. There is here a theological finesse which relates the two activities in a way found nowhere else in early Christian literature. Further the theological insight of the passage is matched by its insight into the tender compassion of the Father. His power is unquestionably recognized but it does not exert a force in the sense that man is deprived of his response in love. With regard to our area of consideration this passage is surely the high point and climax of the Apostolic Fathers.

Chapters XI and XII of Diognetus are commonly regarded as having a different source than chapters I-X.[27] The differences between the two sections make such a conclusion almost inevitable. Lack of evidence leaves authorship and date entirely open to speculation. Whether this material should even be considered a product of the second century is open to question. In spite of these uncertainties brief attention must be given to the opening lines of section XI.

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[27] Meecham, op. cit., 64ff. Cf. also L.W. Barnard, "The Enigma of the Epistle to Diognetus" in The Apostolic Fathers and their Background, 165-173.

> My speech is not strange, nor my inquiry unreasonable, but as a disciple of apostles I am becoming a teacher of the heathen. I administer worthily that which has been handed down to those who are becoming disciples of the truth. For who that has been properly taught, and has become a lover of the word does not seek to learn plainly the things which have been clearly shown by the word to disciples, to whom the Word appeared and revealed them, speaking boldly, not being perceived by the unbelieving, but relating them to disciples, who were held by him to be faithful and gained knowledge of the mysteries of the Father? And for his sake he sent the Word to appear to the world, who was dishonoured by the chosen people, was preached by apostles, was believed by the heathen. He was from the beginning, and appeared new, and was proved to be old, and is ever young, as he is born in the hearts of the saints. He is the eternal one, who today is accounted a Son. . . .
>
> *The Epistle to Diognetus* XI

The original Greek of the section underlined above is as follows:

> οὗ χάριν ἀπέστειλε λόγον, ἵνα κόσμῳ φανῇ ὅς ὑπὸ λαοῦ ἀτιμασθεὶς, διὰ ἀποστόλων κηρυχθεὶς, ὑπὸ ἐθνῶν ἐπιστεύθη. οὗτος ὁ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, ὁ καινὸς φανεὶς καὶ παλαιὸς εὑρεθεὶς καὶ πάντοτε νέος ἐν ἁγίων καρδίαις γεννώμενος·

The Logos was sent to "appear to the world". This appearance had as a basic purpose the making of a revelation. This Logos was "dishonoured by the people."

He existed from the beginning (*ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*), was found to be ancient (*παλαιὸς εὑρέθεις*), yet he appeared (at his incarnation?) as *καινός* and *πάντοτε νέος*.[27a] In short *οὗτος ὁ ἀεί*. And finally this eternal one is drawn into Sonship. Though the declaration of Sonship is made in the New Testament (e.g., *δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός*--John 1.14), it was only developed from a theological point of view in the later Fathers.[28] Although Kelly does not mention this passage specifically it might well be classed among what he calls "quasi-credal scraps."[29]

Thus we have the Logos tradition of the Apostolic Fathers. It consists largely of fragments with no developed formulation or presentation by any single author. It does seem to have been primarily cosmological in its focal point with its other aspects developing outward from this center. There does seem to have been a doctrine in existence though it was at best only partially developed and many may have been only vaguely aware of it. That is to say the doctrine seems often to have been poorly defined and lacking in thoughtful application. Yet on the other hand one must recognize that there were individuals like the writer of The Epistle to Diognetus who sensed the doctrine in some depth. Undoubtedly there was more than enough to serve as a starting point. It was in fact these early halting statements that finally developed into fourth century "orthodoxy."

[27a] Cf. Hermas, *supra*, 255.

[28] Hippolytus for one reflects such a doctrine. This was one of the reasons that R. H. Connolly (*JTS* XXXVII (1936), 2ff., XXXIX (1938), 357f.) argued that Hippolytus was the author of the closing sections of *Diognetus*. For a discussion of the point with references see Meecham, *op. cit.*, 145f. Concerning authorship see also *infra* 459, n. 3.

[29] J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 65ff.

III. THE APOLOGISTS

The sensitivity and awareness of Christianity, which was ever expanding in the second century, shows a new level of concern in the Apologists.

> Whereas the works of the Apostolic Fathers and of early Christianity were directed to the guidance and edification of the faithful, with the Greek Apologists the literature of the Church addresses itself for the first time to the outside world and enters the domain of culture and science.[30]

The title "Apologist" is attached to a number of men of this period because of their compulsion to make an open defense of Christianity. Perhaps the most encompassing purpose of these men was simply to increase understanding thereby enlarging sympathy and encouraging a more general acceptance. Addressed to the nobility, the very form of the writing constitutes an appeal to the literary classes.

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[30] J. Quasten, Patrology, I, 188.

Although it is doubtful if any of these documents reached the Emperor under whose reign they were written, the form itself was a distinct upward look on the part of the Church in terms of the social order. That is, the very presence of these books as a literary phenomenon suggests that some were convinced that Christianity possessed the potential of becoming a fully recognized and in the widest sense respectable religion. This represents a most remarkable faith in the future success of Christianity. Men with this clarity of vision whatever their shortcomings must represent the better thinkers of the period. It would certainly be a mistake to minimize the importance of their doctrinal reflections.

Justin Martyr. Justin is "considered the most important Apologist of the second century."[31] His definitely authentic writings that have been preserved--the two Apologies and the Dialogue with Trypho--were written near the middle of that period.[32] He is the first Apologist in the classic sense and his use and development of the Logos doctrine served as a landmark for second century theology.[33] There were other developments as we shall see but with regard to a Logos doctrine Justin represents the high-water mark of early second century speculative insight. He also recognizes Wisdom as a Christological title, but only so.

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[31] B. Altaner, Patrology, 120. J. Quasten, Patrology, I, 196, etc. It should be noted that the bibliographical suggestions in Quasten are particularly helpful.

[32] Ibid., 121f.

As an Apologist Justin was concerned "to render the doctrines of Christianity as acceptable as possible to the Gentiles, by pointing out features of resemblance between them and the tenets of the philosophers."[34] The church had at least partially recognized the difference between Jerusalem and Athens, etc. There was Gnosticism to be reckoned with as well as the Christian attitude toward Greek philosophy, not to mention various other aspects of contemporary culture. Justin's approach to this set of problems gave rise to considerable Logos speculation that probably would not have occurred otherwise.[35]

The fact that Justin's Logos doctrine was more closely related to the thought of the Greek world than it was to biblical forms will be observed at a number of points. This is to be expected in view of the fact that his appeal was directed toward the more philosophically oriented mind. It was Justin's conviction that in order to create universal appeal he must establish universal validity. Commenting on the presence of Johannine influence, Chadwick says:

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[33] W. A. Shotwell, The Biblical Exegesis of Justin Martyr, 1. For a study of Justin's theology see E. R. Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr (Jena: 1923). This work includes a useful but dated chapter on Justin's Logos doctrine; also Little, op. cit., esp. 90-140.

[34] J. Kaye, The First Apology of Justin Martyr, 35.

[35] In this area see Little, op. cit., 93f.

> While it is more probable than not that he [Justin] knew the fourth gospel, it is evident that characteristically Johannine themes did nothing to shape the essential pattern of his thinking. So we have the strange paradox that the man chiefly responsible for making the Logos idea at home in Christian theology was little influenced by St. John. It is not even certain that he had read Philo.[36]

The question of Justin's use of the Fourth Gospel is an important one as it appears that there is no clear evidence of such usage before Justin. The concern here is to establish as far as possible the earliest points of contact. Once the Johannine doctrine becomes an established part of patristic thought the question will not be so significant. Sanders has summarized the situation as follows:

> It is in the Apologists that the first really indisputable traces of the use of the Fourth Gospel are to be found. The traces in Justin are clearer

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[36] H. Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition, 4.

than those in the Epistle to Diognetus, in Tatian than in Justin, and in Theophilus than in Tatian.[37]

Sanders subsequently argues that in spite of the Johannine association there is a "nuance" about Justin's Logos doctrine that makes it necessary to link it with a "Logos-speculation independent of the Fourth Gospel."[38] Such a statement of course must at least include Philo.

With regard to Justin's relation to Philo, Shotwell confirms Chadwick's position. He says: "In the past, it has been assumed that Justin copied Philo. The present state of knowledge about Justin's Logos concept does not warrant this assumption."[39]

Wolfson[40] notes that Justin makes no effort himself to link his Logos doctrine with that of Philo but goes ahead to conclude that such an association must have existed. He finds what he considers to be conclusive evidence for this dependence in Justin's "two-fold stage theory."

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[37] J.N. Sanders, The Fourth Gospel in the Early Church, 20, see also 27-32. For a detailed review of the discussion concerning the relation between the Fourth Gospel and Justin see F.-M Braun, Jean le Théologien, (Paris: 1959), esp. 135ff.

[38] Sanders, loc. cit.

[39] Shotwell, op. cit., 113. Goodenough (Justin, 139-175) for example makes numerous references to Justin's dependence upon Philo.

[40] H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, 192.

> In Justin Martyr, the two-fold stage theory of the pre-existent Logos is expressed in his statement concerning the Logos that "before the works of creation it both was with the Father and was begotten." (Apol. II,6). The meaning of this statement is that prior to the creation of the world the Logos first was with God from eternity and then was begotten by Him.[41]

Wolfson concludes that Philonic influence continued from Justin to Clement of Alexandria and Lactantius.[42]

After reviewing Justin's possible relation to the Rabbis, Shotwell concludes:

> For years, Justin has been thought of as the philosopher who became a Christian. His simple Logos doctrine, his concept of philosophy, and his relation to Judaism indicate that he was basically the Christian who used philosophical concepts.[43]

Justin seems to have been one of the first to reflect on the fact that there were numerous titles for Christ that could be employed in the consideration of his significance. Justin himself reckoned that names of divine beings were derived from their "good deeds and functions."[44] In the Dialogue he twice[45] gathers these together. The two lists include the following: Jesus, Christ, Lord (singly and in various combinations), Savior, Just One, Man, Son of man, Holy One, Light, Son of God, Name, Redeemer, Helper, Priest (High Priest), King, Judge, Lamb, Word, Wisdom, Teacher, Rock (Stone), Righteous One, Angel, Master, and Apostle.

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[41] Ibid. See also H. Hegermann, Die Vorstellung vom Schöpfungsmittler im hellenistischen Judentum und Urchristentum (Texte und Untersuchungen 82, Berlin: 1961), 6ff., where he examines the Philonic tradition with special emphasis on points of contact with Colossians 1.

[42] Wolfson, loc. cit.

[43] Shotwell, op. cit., 115.

[44] Apology II, 6.

[45] Dialogue 100, 126.

Justin's breadth of understanding is particularly evident in this collection. In this way he credited Jesus with an extremely wide range of roles and functions. It has already been mentioned that the Wisdom title never progressed beyond this type of mention. It is quite another matter with Logos.

There can be no doubt that Justin developed his Logos doctrine for apologetic purposes. Therefore his treatment of the doctrine is primarily found in the Apologies. There is very little of it in the Dialogue. It is true that "When he spoke to Gentiles, he used the doctrine of the Logos to make his explanation acceptable."[46]

Justin's Logos doctrine has been described as "simple."[47] This is true if one is intending to suggest that it is not profound. It does possess a number of different facets and in this sense "simple" is not an apt description. These facts combine to suggest that a summary of Justin's doctrine will be reasonably easy and straightforward.

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[46] Shotwell, op. cit., 108.

[47] See note 43. For a view that generally depreciates the Christology of the Apologists see W. Sanday, Christologies Ancient and Modern, esp. 17.

First, for Justin the Logos who was the Son of God was clearly the pre-existent agent of creation.

> And His Son, who alone is properly called Son, the Word, who also was with Him and was begotten before the works when at first He created and arranged all things by Him, is called Christ, in reference to His being anointed and God's ordering all things through Him; this name itself also containing an unknown significance; as also the appellation "God" is not a name but an opinion implanted in the nature of men of a thing that can hardly be explained.[48]
>
> *Apology* II, 6.

The passage states its Logos doctrine simply. The subtlety of the thought expressed lies in the fact that Justin attempts to express the spiritual character of God--a high and lofty being done an injustice whenever any attempt is made to encompass him by means of human intelligence.

Justin reflects an unusual amount of theological insight when he says that *θεός* is not a name "but an opinion implanted in the nature of men" (*ἀλλά πράγματος* δυσεξηγήτου ἔμφυτος τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξα). That is, θεός has to do more with what men feel than with what they understand. Justin is here ultimately dependent upon Plato. In fact such dependence was commonplace by Justin's time.[49] Similar concepts may also be observed in Gnostic literature, especially in documents like the *Apocryphon of John*.[50]

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[48] The translation of the *Apologies* as well as the *Dialogue* is that found in the Anti-Nicene Christian Library. (This is true for the remainder of this chapter unless otherwise noted.) The Greek text of the *Apologies* is that of A.W.F. Blunt, *The Apologies of Justin Martyr* (Cambridge: 1911).

The Father's exact relation to the Son is put even more clearly in the *Dialogue*. There is no doubt that Justin envisioned the Son as having come into existence on a second level. The interesting thing in the following passage is the titles that Justin gives to the Son--including both σοφία and λόγος.

> "I shall give you another testimony, my friends," said I, "from the Scriptures, that God begat before all creatures a Beginning, [who was] a certain rational power [proceeding] from Himself, who is called by the Holy Spirit, now the Glory of the Lord, now the Son, again Wisdom, again an Angel, then God, and then Lord and Logos.

The latter half of the quotation in the original reads as follows:

> δύναμιν τινα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ λογικήν, ἥτις καὶ δόξα κυρίου ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος δὲ σοφία, ποτὲ δὲ ἄγγελος, ποτὲ δὲ θεός, ποτὲ δὲ κύριος καὶ λόγος.
>
> *Dialogue* 61.1

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[49] See Chadwick, *op. cit.*, esp. 9ff.

[50] See discussion *infra*, 418ff.

That Justin held the pre-existence of the Son is apparent in both of the preceding quotations although the Father alone remains uncreated. Though not specifically denied it seems fair to conclude that the eternal existence of the Son was not entertained by Justin. This would be to expect too much. It seems fair to conclude that he "apparently made no attempt to speculate about events in the timeless eternity which lay behind creation."[51] As Justin often states, the actual utterance of Logos took place simply anterior to Creation.[52] Justin accepts the concept developed in the Jewish-Christian tradition that God the Father was accompanied and/or assisted by another divine being at creation. Beyond this there is little that seems to belong directly to that tradition. At times the Logos is a revealer of sorts, as we shall see, but in a somewhat different way to the kind of thing that has been observed earlier.

Reflecting on the fact that the Logos was active in creation it seems to have occurred to Justin that this would imply existence as well as the possibility of activity in any period that followed. Justin's speculations in this regard concern themselves with the activity of the Logos as it was conceived both within and without the Jewish-Christian tradition. In this Justin was concerned especially to establish that peoples of different origins were attempting to comprehend the same phenomenon, a phenomenon which had to do with the creation of the world. By suggesting that the Logos manifested itself to human consciousness in these ways Justin in fact espouses a kind of a doctrine of general and special revelation. However as we have mentioned, Justin's concept of the Logos as outside the biblical tradition seems to have been derived largely from Greek philosophical thought.[53] It was a sort of seminal Logos to varying degrees present in every man. Yet even this Logos was the Christ.

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[51] Goodenough, Justin, 154f.

[52] Little, op. cit., 123.

> We have been taught that Christ is the first born of God, and we have declared above that He is the Word of whom every race of men were partakers. . . .
> Apology I, 46

For Justin such a proposal provided an explanation both for the insight and for the shortcomings of the philosophers. That is to say as far as what they saw was right and good it was the product of the Logos. Beyond that it was of their own doing.[54]

Within the Jewish tradition Justin saw a number of things that he credited to the Logos. Perhaps the most far-reaching was his conviction that the inspiration of the prophets was the work of the Spirit who was also the Logos.

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[53] Shotwell, op. cit., 2f.

[54] See Little, op. cit., 133f.

> τὸ πνεῦμα οὖν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ
> οὐδὲν ἄλλο νοῆσαι θέμις ἢ τὸν λόγον, ὃς καὶ
> πρωτότοκος τῷ θεῷ ἔστι . . . ὅτι δὲ οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ
> θεοφοροῦνται οἱ προφητεύοντες εἰ μὴ λόγῳ
> θείῳ. . . .
>
> *Apology* I, 33

It should be noted that Justin is as trinitarian in his views as one might expect for a man of his time--a period in which these points had not been altogether realized or completely worked out. On the grounds of the text noted above it would be possible to accuse him of holding a Spirit Christology. This does not seem to be the case however as is indicated elsewhere.

> Jesus Christ. . .is the Son of the true God Himself, and holding Him in the second place, and the prophetic Spirit in the third, we will prove.
>
> *Apology* I, 13

Justin's concept of the Logos in the Old Testament was not confined to the Spirit of prophecy. For example Justin argued that the angel who appeared to Abraham at Mamre was God but other than the supreme Father, presumably the Logos.[55] Justin also attached great significance to the burning bush out of which the angel spoke to Moses. This also was the work of the Logos.[56] Other examples of this sort of thing might be produced. Justin himself summarizes:

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[55] *Dialogue* 56.

[56] *Apology* I, 63.

> But so much is written for the sake of proving that Jesus the Christ is the Son of God and His Apostle, being of old the Word, and appearing sometimes in the form of fire, and sometimes in the likeness of angels; but now, by the will of God, having become man for the human race. He endured. . . .
>
> Apology I, 63

Something of the significance of Justin's belief that the Logos was operative outside the Jewish-Christian tradition has already been mentioned. It must now be demonstrated just what kind of thing Justin put forward. Perhaps most striking is the conviction that the Greek philosophers were at least partially inspired by the Logos.

> For whatever either lawgivers or philosophers uttered well, they elaborated by finding and contemplating some part of the Word. But since they did not know the whole of the Word, which is Christ, they often contradicted themselves.
>
> Apology II, 10[57]

Mention has already been made of Justin's conviction that the Logos was to some extent present in all races of men. The function of this Logos was to control right living in all men. It even meant that some who had been thought to be atheists were in fact Christians. This ideal life that Justin envisioned was one that was lived "reasonably," i.e., μετὰ λόγου. The complete statement is: καὶ οἱ μετὰ λόγου βιώσαντες Χριστιανοί εἰσι, κἂν ἄθεοι ἐνομίσθησαν.[58] We have already mentioned that Justin in his zeal to make the things of Christ appeal to non-Jews did not carefully consider the ultimate implication of his proposal. This necessarily leads to a certain critical evaluation of Justin's work.

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[57] Cf. Apology I, 5.

Realizing the importance of dialogue in history, Laeuchli in his book which concerns itself with "the problems of Christian language," explores Justin's attempt to identify these elements in the Greek and Jewish-Christian traditions.[59] Laeuchli observes that Justin's committment as well as his reaction to the accusations of the pagan world are penetrated with deep emotion, while his argument is logical, largely based on the forms of Greek philosophy. Laeuchli speaks both positively and negatively. He accuses Justin of essentially equating Christian and philosophical terms.[60] In the area of λόγος speculation he argues that Justin made this identification because he was "insensitive to the discrepancy between the Johannine Logos as Word and the Platonic logos as reason."[61] Further;

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[58] Apology I, 46. The opposite is ἄλογον or ἄνευ λόγου, Apology I, 46. Cf. Laeuchli, op. cit., 181 and Little, op. cit., 132f.

[59] Laeuchli, op. cit., intro., 178ff.

[60] Ibid., 181f.

> We naively educe two languages side by side as if they were harmonious while in reality they are antipodal. Because the conflict between the two is neither understood nor felt, the "new language" to which Justin has converted is not strong enough to infiltrate the language of his past to its roots. The liturgical and ethical sphere of speech is overpowered by the rationalistic structure of thought; the biblical Word can never be more than a marionette for the Stoic logos.[62]

Laeuchli recognizes the possibility--even the necessity--of using a language of "method" to convey the biblical language of "substance." That is to say, Christian truth may be couched in idiom current at any given time. The problem arises however--as in the case of Justin--when a distinction is not made between the two.

> The premise of identifying the biblical Word with the philosophical logos bars him from expressing his faith in the language of Christian theology. It threatens to surrender the intellectual content of faith to the non-Christian philosophy which he tries to convince of the Christian truth! No wonder Marcus Aurelius slashes the stubbornness of the Christians in disgust (Med. XI.3); if their underlying faith is homogeneous with philosophical beliefs to such an extent, why on earth do they need to die for it?[63]

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[61] Ibid., 182.

[62] Ibid., 183f. If one would accuse Justin of making Christianity into a philosophy, it must be remembered that he followed the widely accepted example of Philo who did a similar thing for Judaism.

[63] Laeuchli, op. cit., 184.

Justin's attempt to reconcile the specific revelation in Jesus of Nazareth and what he in effect considered to be an earlier revelation rooted primarily in Stoic and Platonic thought may have appeared sound on the surface but was inevitably destined to fail. The most fundamental reasons for this failure have been mentioned. Yet, in spite of his faults the Logos doctrine under Justin's influence moved into a new era. However short of the mark we may feel that Justin fell we must be on guard for evidence of his influence on later writers.

Tatian. Tatian has been described as a "Christian Apologist and Gnostic."[64] It would appear that he was more or less both of these things but at different times. He was converted to Christianity after finding the philosophic approach to life unsatisfying. His "Gnostic" activity came later and seems to have been climaxed by some sort of association with the Encratites, whether joining them or sharing in their establishment is not certain. This group seems to escape precise description. In fact the term itself may never have been a precise one. Although generally considered heretical[65] the Encratites are not consistently classified as Gnostics although there may have been certain affinities.

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[64] ODCC, 1323.

[65] On the difficulty of distinguishing "orthodoxy" at this particular point see R.M. Grant, "Tatian and his Bible" in Studia Patristica I (Texte und Untersuchungen 63),297-306.

Consistent with his basic movement from "orthodoxy" toward Gnosticism, what Logos doctrine is found in the Discourse is compatible with what we have styled "second century orthodoxy." At least one of the reasons for this is that Tatian was a pupil of Justin.[66] Within the sphere of Logos speculation this relationship is particularly evident in Tatian's repetition of Justin's illustrations that in the generation of the Logos there was no division of the original substance of the supreme God but that it was like a torch that kindled many fires or a word passed from one person to another, neither of which diminishes the content or character of its originator.[67]

In the little space Tatian devotes to the Logos his chief concern is how the appearance of a second "God" qualitatively affected the first.[68] Both Justin and Tatian were on their way toward realizing the problem of maintaining a plurality of heavenly beings who were fully divine--a problem complicated by the fact that one of them was at one time also fully human.

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[66] Tatian was probably influenced either directly or indirectly from a number of sources. At least affinities of thought may be observed. For a discussion of this point see M. Elze, Tatian und seine Theologie (Göttingen: 1960), 70-83.

[67] Discourse 5.

[68] Bethune-Baker, op. cit., 126.

The Discourse is a vehement and often derogatory treatment against the "enormities of heathenism." Here Tatian gathers the undesirable actions and concepts of his opponents for the purpose of discrediting both them and their views. Tatian's simple conclusion was that Christianity was to be preferred to the Greek way of life. He deplored the fact that in his own time the majority seemed to prefer precisely the thing that he hated. He dedicated himself to do what he could to reverse the situation. Somewhat perhaps in irony but also with an element of deliberate intent with the purpose of expressing this basic desire Tatian styled himself a "disciple of the barbaric philosophy."[69] This fundamental motivation is present even in his Logos doctrine.

The Logos in Tatian is "regarded mainly in relation to the world, as the principle on which it was made, and the vehicle of revelation."[70] Although Tatian himself nowhere specifically identifies his Logos with Jesus there can be no reasonable doubt that in his own mind he did so. In fact he does not use the names Jesus or Christ and hardly makes reference to Jesus' earthly life at all.[71] There can be no doubt that Tatian conceived agency in creation as one of the primary functions of the Logos. This is made explicit: καὶ καθάπερ ὁ λόγος ἐν ἀρχῇ γεννηθεὶς ἀντεγέννησε τὴν καθ' ἡμᾶς ποίησιν.[72]

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[69] Discourse 42.

[70] Bethune-Baker, op.cit. 127.

Tatian asserts, "God was in the beginning" (Θεὸς ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ). However he continues, "the beginning is the power of the Logos" (τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν λόγου δύναμιν).[73]

> That is to say, the Beginning marks the period when the Internal Logos, hitherto quiescent, assumes another character, becoming the potentiality of creation. . . . He is the Divine Reason considered as potentially capable of acting in conditions wherein the Transcendent Father does not move, viz: in the phenomenal world which the Logos originates as the Father's Intermediary.[74]

However for Tatian, God is "all" which means for the Logos doctrine that in former times the Logos was a self-contemplative aspect of the Divine Being whereas ἐν ἀρχῇ this became of such a nature as to be capable of acting in the world of material reality.[75] For this reason Bethune-Baker insists that for Tatian the pre-existence of the Logos is only "potential."[76] Eternal personal existence is simply outside the range of possibilities considered. It is clear in *Discourse* 5 that to whatever extent Tatian allowed personal existence it was dependent upon the Father who was the "ground of all being" (*τοῦ παντὸς ἡ ὑπόστασις*).

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[71] Little, op. cit., 192.

[72] Discourse 5. The text: I.C.T. Otto, Tatian Oratio ad Graecos (Jena: 1851).

[73] Discourse 5. [74] Little, op. cit., 182.

[75] Ibid., 182f.

The revelatory role of the Logos is not explored in detail. There are implications elsewhere but Tatian's most important statement in this regard is: *Ἡ λόγος μὲν ἔστι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ φῶς*.[77] Presumably Tatian is speaking here in terms deeply rooted in Logos speculation from the time of the thought embodied in the Johannine prologue where the figure of light is used to suggest the presence of a revealer.

These points summarize Tatian's Logos doctrine. They are indeed few and certainly are not developed by him in any detail. However, one has the feeling that the doctrine is just ready to become an openly recognized part of Christian understanding.

Theophilus. Theophilus succeeded to the bishopric of Antioch in the eighth year of Marcus Aurelius, that is late in the sixth decade of the second century. His apology or explanation to Autolycus is thought to have been written sometime after his installation.

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[76] Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.*, 127.

[77] *Discourse* 13.

Theophilus as we shall see attempted a bold step forward in human perception of the divine reality. God for him was above all One, yet manifesting certain distinctions. His speculations about these distinctions encompass the insight accredited to him. Somewhat in anticipation ". . . he intended to assert the eternity of the Word, and oneness with the Father."[78]

Of unity and diversity Theophilus says:

> . . . εἷς ἔστιν θεός.
>
> Autolycus II, 34

And yet:

> Εἰ γὰρ φῶς αὐτὸν εἴπω, ποίημα αὐτοῦ λέγω· εἰ λόγον εἴπω, ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ λέγω· νοῦν ἐὰν εἴπω φρόνησιν αὐτοῦ λέγω· πνεῦμα ἐὰν εἴπω, ἀναπνοὴν αὐτοῦ· σοφίαν ἐὰν εἴπω, γέννημα αὐτοῦ λέγω. . . .
>
> Autolycus I, 3

Although this kind of distinction is important it is not particularly profound. Of much greater significance is the fact that the writings of Theophilus preserve the first recorded reference to the Trinity. Speaking in the context of the days of the Genesis creation story Theophilus allegorizes:

> Ὡσαύτως καὶ αἱ τρεῖς ἡμέραι πρὸ τῶν φωστήρων γεγονυῖαι τύποι εἰσίν τῆς τριάδος, τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦ
>
> Autolycus II, 15

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[78] W. B. Flower, Theophilus to Autolycus, 31.

A noteworthy feature of this passage is of course that the triad consists of God, his Word and his Wisdom; thus Wisdom and Logos are distinguished. It is clear, however, from a wider reading of the letters to Autolycus that this was far from being a developed Trinitarian formulation.[79] Elsewhere this distinction between *λόγος* and *σοφία* is blurred by an apparent identification, for the Logos is described as *πνεῦμα*, *ἀρχή*, *σοφία* and *δύναμις ὑψίστου*.[80] Further, Theophilus manifests a doctrine of the Spirit, but it is vague and contradictory because of this mention of *σοφία* as a part of the triad.

> It is evident that he is giving interpretations of these divine hypostases similar to those common in the Alexandrian philosophy wherein Logos and Wisdom are but different modes of the same divine rational Effluence, which constituted God's self-revelation to the world.[81]

We must now turn our attention to an investigation of the methods with which Theophilus pursued his insight. More specifically it must be asked just when and how and in what ways the Logos became a distinct being. Concerning this series of questions, Theophilus himself says:

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[79] Little, *op. cit.*, 197f.

[80] *Autolycus* II.10. Harris' contention (*Prologue*, 21) that in Theophilus we find evidence of the process in which the Logos Christology absorbed the Wisdom Christology probably makes more order out of Theophilus than is warranted.

[81] Little, *op. cit.*, 199.

> . . . at first God was alone, and the Word in Him.
> *Autolycus* II, 22
>
> God, then, having His own Word internal (*ἐνδιάθετος*) within His own bowels, begat Him, emitting Him along with His own wisdom before all things.
> *Autolycus* II, 10
>
> Not as the poets and writers of myths talk of the sons of gods begotten from intercourse (with women), but as truth expounds, the Word, that always exists, residing (*ἐνδιάθετος*) within the heart of God. For before anything came into being He had Him as a counselor, being His own mind and thought. But when God wished to make all that he determined on, begot this Word, uttered (*προφορικός*), the first-born of all creation (*πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*), not Himself being emptied of the Word (Reason), but having begotten Reason, and always conversing with His Reason.
> *Autolycus* II, 22.

Using terminology ultimately of Stoic origin, Theophilus distinguished between *λόγος* as reason--a thing possessed within, i.e., mental, *ἐνδιάθετος*--and *λόγος* as *word*--a thing presented without, i.e., uttered, *προφορικός*.[82] Grant who sees this point to be of primary importance summarizes, "Theophilus, in formulating his Logos doctrine, is primarily interpreting the words of scripture, though in terms derived from Stoic-Philonic psychology."[83] Formerly, God possessed the *λόγος* within himself but subsequently gave him external existence outside himself. Like his predecessors, Theophilus did not conceive of the externalization in such a way as to eliminate the prior internal existence. That is, for Theophilus, God must always contain the *λόγος* within himself. The actual act of transition from the one to the other is spoken of in two ways. Possessing him within his bowels God emitted[84] the Logos. If the use of this word was intended to speak of anything other than the contrast between *ἐνδιάθετος* and *προφορικός* Theophilus does not say what it is. The second figure is that of a father begetting a son. In addition to the fact that *γεννάω* is used twice in the passages quoted above, elsewhere God is in fact referred to as Father and the Logos as Son.

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[82] For a discussion of this point see R. M. Grant, "Theophilus of Antioch to Autolycus," *HTR* XL (1947), 245ff.

[83] *Ibid*., 247.

It has been observed that Theophilus manifests a certain lack of precision not untypical of the period in which he lived. This was due mainly to the fact that he had neither conceived nor worked out exact formulations. In spite of this it is fair to observe that as separate entities both Word and Wisdom for Theophilus co-existed prior to the creation of the world.[85] When he moves toward identifying Word and Wisdom it is *ἀρχή* that serves as the connecting link. ". . . the reference to the Logos as Beginning (ἀρχή) leads at once to the introduction of the Sophia who is the Archē of the O. T."[86] That is, it is this common middle ground that makes identification possible.

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[84] *ἐξερυξάμενος*, from *ἐξερεύγομαι*, literally *vomit or belch forth*. G.W.H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford: 1961), 495.

[85] *Autolycus* II.10, etc.

> He has this Word as a helper in the things that were created by Him, and by Him He made all things. He is called "governing principle" (ἀρχή), because he rules (ἄρχειν), and is Lord (κυριεύω) of all things fashioned by Him. He, then, being Spirit of God, and governing principle, and wisdom, and power of the highest, came down upon the prophets, and through them spake of the creation of the world and of all other things.
>
> *Autolycus* II, 10.

With regard to functions, the first God is "both Father and Creator."[87] Though he is the Creator, Word and Wisdom serve as his agents: Ὁ θεὸς διὰ τοῦ λογοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς σοφίας ἐποίησε τὰ πάντα.[88] The Logos further served as God's σύμβουλος before creation.[89] In the creation of man these two functions seem to converge.

> Moreover, God is found, as if needing help, to say, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." But to no one else than to His own Word and Wisdom did he say, "Let us make."
>
> *Autolycus* II, 18.

Theophilus would have agreed that it is impossible to confine God in terms of time and space. Divine activities that require such limitations are performed by the Logos.

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[86] Harris, *Prologue*, 22.

[87] *Autolycus* II, 34.

[88] *Ibid*., I. 7.

[89] *Ibid*., II. 22. Cf. the Book of Wisdom 8.4 where αἱρετίς is translated "associate."

> θεὸς οὖν ὢν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἐκ θεοῦ πεφυκώς, ὁπόταν βούληται ὁ πατὴρ τῶν ὅλων, πέμπει αὐτὸν εἴς τινα τόπον, ὃς παραγινόμενος καὶ ἀκούεται καὶ ὁρᾶται, πεμπόμενος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ εὑρίσκεται
>
> Autolycus II. 22

Specifically, Theophilus interpreted God's presence in the Garden of Eden in this way.[90] Further, it was the Word who inspired the prophets. However, Moses is the only one specifically mentioned.[91] It may even be that Theophilus included the appearance of the Logos in Christ among these theophanies.

> The Logos προφορικός or φωνή is also the εὐάγγελος φωνή (III 13). And therefore we may conclude that in II 22 among the appearances of the Logos is included that in Christ--whose name Theophilus never mentions . . . . Though it is the Logos, not Christ, to whom Theophilus refers as the Son of God, his definitions are taken from the books of the New Testament, and he certainly knew the Fourth Gospel.[92]

It is fair to note as Bethune-Baker does that these distinctions of Theophilus arose primarily out of a desire to clarify God's relationship to the created order and therefore did not concern themselves with any "hypostatic distinction in the being of God himself."[93] This of course is by no means new. One may observe such a trend at least as early as Philo. Along with growing ideas of transcendence and a feeling that this world was at least inferior, if not evil, the need for intermediaries became more and more pressing. In summary, we see in Theophilus something of a confused step forward. It may not seem significant in retrospect, but it was this kind of theological conjecture--many times repeated--that finally produced the systematized doctrine of the church.

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[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid., II. 10.

[92] Grant, "Theophilus," 249. Little (op. cit., 209) notes that Theophilus is the first known Christian writer to make specific reference to the Logos passages of the Fourth Gospel.

Athenagoras. Athenagoras was the last and surely in early times the least known of the Christian apologists. His heritage as an "outsider" gave him an important insight into the Christian phenomenon.

> We know with certainty regarding Athenagoras, that he was an Athenian philosopher who had embraced Christianity, and that his Apology, or, as he styles it, "Embassy" (πρεσβεία), was presented to the Emperors Aurelius and Commodus about A. D. 177.[94]

Although Athenagoras does not employ the exact terminology found in Theophilus he clearly continues in the developing trinitarian tradition. If anything, his language conveys a clearer perception of these distinctions than that of his predecessors.

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[93] Bethune-Baker, op. cit., 128. Bethune-Baker includes Justin and Tatian in this judgement. Cf. Grant, "Theophilus," 248.

[94] ANCL II, 373.

> . . . we acknowledge a God, and a Son his Logos, and a Holy Spirit, united in essence,--the Father, the Son, the Spirit, because the Son is the Intelligence, Reason, Wisdom of the Father, and the Spirit an effluence, as light from fire. . . .
>
> *Supplicatio* 24

The Logos for Athenagoras was the Son. He developed this point rather carefully as we shall see. There seems to be just a trace of *σοφία* Christology in the quotation above. However, "When Logos, Nous, Sophia are used for the Son, all three are understood in the Greek meaning of the terms."[95] The third member of the triad named *σοφία* by Theophilus is here replaced by the Holy Spirit. Yet in all this it must be urged that Athenagoras' trinity--though clearly perceived--was not thereby distinctly divided. The three were in fact closely gathered into one. Bethune-Baker notes, ". . . the three names represent eternally existing distinctions within the being of the Divine itself."[96] Speaking of the purpose of the pious man's life, Athenagoras speaks of this unity and diversity. That purpose is:

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[95] Laeuchli, *op. cit.*, 170.

[96] Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.*, 129. Cf. Grant, "Theophilus," 246. For a treatment of Athenagoras' entire Christology see Little, *op. cit.*, 210-228.

> . . . to know God and the Logos who comes from Him: to see what is the unity of the Son in relation to the Father, what the communion of the Father with the Son, what the Spirit; what is the union (ἕνωσις) of all these and the distinction (διαίρεσις) of the united -- the Spirit, the Son, the Father.[97]
>
> *Supplicatio* 12

The relationship between the supreme God and the Logos was for Athenagoras primarily one of Father and Son. It is at this point that Athenagoras spoke most carefully and in greatest detail. For him, the meaning of this figure of speech was not as simple as the physical reality would make it appear. Athenagoras made the figure meaningful with a number of specific and penetrating observations.

First, in words with something of a polemic ring, Athenagoras says, "Nor let anyone think it ridiculous that God should have a Son."[98] It may well be that someone had been pointing out the logical impossibility of a spiritual being begetting a physical son. Further, Athenagoras conceived of the Logos as eternally a part of the Father.

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[97] The translation of this particular passage is that of Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.*, 128f.

[98] *Supplicatio* 10. Unless otherwise noted all succeeding quotations from Athenagoras derive from this section.

The development and use of this concept will be discussed later.

The Logos is "the first product (*γέννημα*) of the Father. Consistent with the tradition bequeathed to him, Athenagoras conceived of the Father as having established this distinction before proceeding to his other works.

> Since He "came forth" expressly for creative work, His "procession" from the Father into phenomenal existence must have occurred prior to time, that is, in eternity, though as the Son of God He is absolutely eternal.[99]

Again, the Son of God is *νοῦς καὶ λόγος τοῦ πατρός*. Moreover, any external function of the father performed in the material world seems to have been thought of as the responsibility of the Logos: *Ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ*. And finally, in concepts which are Johannine in nature, the filial relationship is given genuine and profound intimacy: *ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ*. And *Ὄντος δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐν πατρὶ καὶ πατρὸς ἐν υἱῷ*.

The supreme God, "the Maker and Framer of the world," is for Athenagoras:

> . . . uncreated, eternal, invisible, impassible, incomprehensible, illimitable, who is apprehended by the understanding only and the reason, who is encompassed by light, and beauty, and spirit, and power ineffable. . . .

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[99] Little, *op. cit.*, 221.

Though God the Father is the creator, the primary role of the Logos is in the agency of creation: *πρὸς αὐτὸν γὰρ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐγένετο*. This is stated a number of times. Yet, according to Athenagoras, the Logos accomplished this "without being himself a creature."[100]

> The distinctions in the being of God are thus conceived as self-existent, and the part which the Logos afterwards plays in the work of creation he only plays because he is already all that was required for the exercise of the special work of creation.[101]

It is therefore clear that although Athenagoras clearly visualized the distinctions he intended to make, he does so within the context of a closely drawn unity within the godhead. This unity--and therefore the Logos--was eternal.

Creation does not seem to have been conceived by Athenagoras as *ex nihilo*.

> He came forth to be the idea and energizing power of all material things, which lay like a nature without attributes, and an inactive earth, the grosser particles being mixed up with the lighter.

Although this creative role is primary, Athenagoras also saw the Logos as the agent through whom all the "lesser powers"--i.e., "angels and ministers"--were established.

Athenagoras' most important contribution to the Logos doctrine came from his insight into the eternal nature of the Son. By establishing the fact that the Logos was an integral and permanent part of the supreme God, Athenagoras made him not only pre-existent but also eternal. The entire λόγος concept provided a means of explaining the growing perception that the Son--to be fully God--must himself also be eternal.

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[100] Altaner, *op*. *cit*., 131.

[101] Bethune-Baker, *loc*. *cit*.

IV. THE TEACHERS AT ALEXANDRIA

Alexandria was for a long time one of the chief cultural centers of the ancient world. Included within a wide range of interests was a deep and continuing religious concern. We have already seen Philo's contribution to this tradition.[102] At this point we are concerned to single out Clement and Origen as two of the leading representatives of second century Christianity at Alexandria. Their speculations especially concerning the Logos contain important material relevant to this study.[103]

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[102] The section on Philo in Chapter II is important background here. It is interesting to note that Bigg in his Bampton Lectures on Christian Platonism (C. Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria, Oxford: 1913) began his study with Philo. It could not be seen in perspective otherwise.

[103] For an introductory article in this area see W. Völker, "Die Verwertung der Weisheits-Literatur bei den christlichen Alexandrinern," ZKG LXIV (1952/53), 1-33.

Clement of Alexandria.[104] Clement (c. 150-215) was an important figure in what is thought to have been a catechetical school. He left Alexandria however in about 202 under the stress of the persecution of Severus. He is known to have lived for a time both at Jerusalem and later at Antioch (Syria). He was followed in Alexandria by his pupil, Origen.

It is right to suggest that Clement (as well as Origen) was a "Gnostic" of sorts. Yet it must be immediately countered that, as he conceived his "Gnostic tendencies," they were perfectly harmonious with Christianity.[105] The correct distinction within this apparent paradox has been clearly seen.

> Hence the 'true Gnosis' of Clement and Origen is to be regarded as in a certain sense a progressive Christianization of the 'Gnosis falsely so called' of the Valentinians.[106]

Any further distinction had not yet been made.

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[104] For a perceptive synopsis of Clement's theology see H. Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition (Oxford: 1966), 31-65. It is illuminating to note that the chapter on Clement is entitled "The Liberal Puritan." In contrast the chapter on Origen is styled "The Illiberal Humanist."

[105] See Stromata IV. 21.

[106] G. Quispel, "The Jung Codex and its Significance," in The Jung Codex, ed. F. L. Cross, 61.

Clement's writings are not primarily doctrinal but were rather formulated with practical aims in mind. They were addressed directly to the heart of hearts of the man who was deeply concerned about specific standards of conduct for the wide variety of situations in which he might find himself. Many things come into Clement's view in this way, many of which modern Christians would consider either superficial or unimportant. His conception of the Logos is an integral part of this theme. Because of this character it is difficult to be as precise as one might like in defining his various doctrinal positions. However, a substantial portion of Clement's writing has survived and on the basis of careful perusal reconstruction is possible. In a word Clement left the work of systematization to those who desired to know what he did in fact believe.

Clement accepted a reasonably well-developed doctrine and therefore his own contribution to the developing reality assumes many things. His Logos is found in a multitude of associations and connections that surpass anything previously observed. The doctrine is so fundamental to Clement's way of thinking that it is rightly summarized, "The doctrine of the Logos is the centre and mainspring of the whole system of Clement."[107]

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[107] Bethune-Baker, op. cit., 133.

Although much of Clement's work has been preserved, much has also been lost. There are references to lost works as well as fragments that have been preserved in various places, but the three works that provide the bulk of our knowledge are: *The Exhortation* (*λόγος προτρεπτικός*), *The Instructor* (*παιδαγωγός*), and *The Miscellanies* or Stromateis (*στροματεῖς*). In all three of these works it is the doctrine of the Logos that serves as the force which binds many different elements into one complete whole.

> The three compositions are really parts of one whole. The central connecting idea is that of the Logos--the Word--the Son of God; whom in the first work he exhibits drawing men from the superstitions and corruptions of heathenism to faith; in the second, as training them by precepts and discipline; and in the last, as conducting them to that higher knowledge of the things of God, to which those only who devote themselves assiduously to spiritual, moral, and intellectual culture can attain. Ever before his eye is the grand form of the living personal Christ--the Word, who "was with God, and who was God, but who became man, and dwelt among us."[108]

The fundamental importance of Clement's Logos doctrine is evident in the fact that it directs the expression of his Christology. Yet there are points where his Christology goes beyond the framework of the Logos doctrine. Though it is perhaps impossible to determine the exact point where Logos becomes simply a title, surely it does occur in Clement. One should therefore expect *λόγος* to appear in passages where it is simply an appellation and carries with it no particular doctrinal overtones. The Logos doctrine was at such a point felt to be so well established that the writer did not consciously think of the doctrine as such when he used the title but allowed it to enter his writing without reflection.

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[108] *ANCL* IV, 15.

It is quite helpful in attempting to understand Clement's comprehension of the Logos doctrine to observe his approach in discussion. It should be noted that even in the following passages where Clement is most doctrinal his practical purpose manifests itself.

> Well, inasmuch as the Word was from the first, He was and is the divine source of all things; but inasmuch as He has now assumed the name of Christ, consecrated of old, and worthy of power, he has been called by me the New Song. This Word, then, the Christ, the cause of both our being at first (for He was in God) and of our well-being, this very Word has now appeared as man, He alone being both, both God and man--the Author of all blessings to us; by whom we, being taught to live well, are best on our way to life eternal.[109]
>
> Protrepticus I (6.5-7.1)

> Our instructor (παιδαγωγός) is like His Father God, whose son He is, sinless, blameless, and with a soul devoid of passion; God in the form of man, stainless, the minister of His Father's will, the Word who is God, who is in the Father, who is at the Father's right hand, and with the form of God is God. He is to us a spotless image; to Him we are to try with all our might to assimilate our

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[109] The text: C. Mondésert, Le Protreptique (Sources Chrétiennes 2, Paris: 1949).

> souls. He is wholly free from human passions; wherefore also He alone is judge, because He alone is sinless.[110]
>
> Paedagogus I.2 (4.1f.)

It is not necessary to read far in Clement to discover that his Logos doctrine is heavily dependent upon the New Testament Johannine literature. The Prologue to the gospel plays a particularly important role but connections may also be established elsewhere. For example, Clement says, "the word is truth."[111] The nearest the Prologue comes to this is the characterization of Jesus as the messenger of truth. In other instances Clement's statements are Johannine in thought and character but no exact parallels may be traced. In the Old Testament tradition he is especially familiar with Proverbs, particularly chapter eight which he applies to the Logos.

> Why repeat to you the mysteries of wisdom, and sayings from the writers of the son of the Hebrews, the master of wisdom? "The Lord created me the beginning of His ways, in order to His works." And, "The Lord giveth wisdom and from His face proceed knowledge and understanding." "How long wilt thou lie in bed, O sluggard; and when wilt thou be

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[110] The text: H. I. Marrou and M. Harl, Le Pédagogue (Sources Chrétiennes 70, Paris: 1960).

[111] Stromata II.4. Cf. John 17.17b. See again, Turner, Grammatical Insights, 8ff.

> aroused from sleep?" "but if thou show thyself
> no sluggard as a fountain thy harvest shall
> come," the "Word of the Father, the benign light,
> the Lord that bringeth light, faith to all, and
> salvation."[112]
>
> Protrepticus VIII

With regard to Wisdom, Clement establishes a link between his Logos doctrine and Jeremiah.

> It is he who made the earth by his power,
> who established the world by his wisdom,
> and by his understanding stretched out the heavens.
>
> Jeremiah 10.12

Immediately following this quotation, Clement speaks of σοφία, ἥ ἐστιν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ.[113] Elsewhere Clement suggests that Wisdom is a being very difficult to lay hold on.

> Wisdom . . . a being difficult to grasp and apprehend, ever receding and withdrawing from him who pursues. But He who is far off has--oh ineffable marvel! --come very near.
>
> Stromata II.2

It would appear that Wisdom usually suggested to Clement a kind of mystical truth that had little restriction and might appear in many different ways at different times.[114] Obviously, it was a very hazy and poorly defined concept.

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[112] The quotations indicated are cited in the ANCL text as coming from Proverbs in the following order: 8.22; 2.6; 6.9, 11, 23. Most questionable is 6.11. The rest are more or less clear with perhaps a slight question about 6.23.

[113] Protrepticus VIII.

[114] Stromata VI.17.

There can be no doubt that there was an overlap in Clement's mind between the two--*λόγος* and *σοφία*--but they were not in his thinking always identical.

Clement agrees with John--usually by means of approved quotation--that the Logos was in the beginning, God with God.[115] His role was a ministerial one however and Chadwick argues that for Clement this seems to safeguard monotheism.[116] It was for Clement through the Logos that all things were created. And it was this same Logos that assumed flesh in the person of Jesus.[117] He was the revealer of truth to man--himself both truth and light.[118] Though Clement does not make an issue of the point, his conception of pre-existence seems to have been eternal. The Logos "was in the beginning, and before the beginning."[119] Bethune-Baker summarizes:

> The general conception of Clement was certainly that the Logos--eternally equal with, but distinct from the Father, as His Son--was manifested all through the world's history, and at last was incarnate in the person of Jesus Christ.[120]

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[115] *Protrepticus* I.

[116] Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought*, 51.

[117] *Protrepticus* I, etc. [118] *Ibid*., XI.

[119] *Ibid*., I.

[120] Bethune-Baker, *op*. *cit*., 135.

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[115] *Protrepticus* I.

[116] Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought*, 51.

[117] *Protrepticus* I, etc.

[118] *Ibid*., XI.

[119] *Ibid*., I.

[120] Bethune-Baker, *op*. *cit*., 135.

In terms of its importance in the exposition of Christianity, Clement's Logos occupied the highest place. Early in this discussion this fact was associated with Clement's practical purpose. It is in order to conclude with a few examples of this important function of the Logos.

The intensely practical relevance of Clement's Logos is found in his concept of Teacher (παιδαγωγός).[121] Again in this term also Clement's emphasis is practical: "Our Instructor, the Word, therefore cures the unnatural passions of the soul by means of exhortations."[122] Moreover, the Logos is τὸ κέντρον τῆς σωτηρίας.[123] In short, all Christians "have through the philanthropy of the Word now become the sons of God."[124]

Thus, Clement presents his Logos doctrine. It is impossible to deny the power of the imagination behind it. As one might expect this development was continued in Origen.

Origen. It is important that Origen not only possessed one of the best minds in the early Church, but what is equally significant he also found opportunity, in often difficult circumstances, to exercise his abilities. His Wisdom-Logos reflections have indeed been the subject of detailed study.[125]

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[121] Παιδαγωγός is perennially difficult to translate. Both "teacher" and "tutor" fall short of its full meaning. Among both Romans and Greeks the name was used of trustworthy slaves who were given the duty of supervising the lives of boys belonging to the better classes. For Paul's famous usage see Galatians 3.24ff. Cf. 1 Corinthians 4.15.

[122] Paedagogus I.2 (6.1).

[123] Protrepticus XI (117.4).

[124] Ibid., II (27.3).

There are also grounds for objecting that Origen should not be grouped among those who are generally recognized as orthodox. Indeed he was ultimately condemned as a heretic but three centuries after his death! The entire question revolves around a definition of "orthodoxy" which as we have already observed was anything but a monolithic structure. Chadwick rightly saw this:

> . . . we tend to begin the study of Origen by asking whether or not he is orthodox, and find that we are continually driven back to the prior question: what is the essence of orthodoxy?[126]

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[125] E.g., J. Daniélou, Origen, esp. 251-275; E. DeFaye, Origen and His Work, esp. 99-117; etc. The importance of Origen in the development of the early tradition of the church has recently been carefully re-examined by R.P.C. Hanson, (Origen's Doctrine of Tradition, London: 1954 and Allegory and Event. London: 1959). Our investigation must confine itself to the most crucial points.

[126] Chadwick, Early Christian Thought, 123. Cf. G.W. Butterworth, Origen on First Principles, xxxi. Butterworth's translation of de Principiis is followed because it is based upon Koetschau's text which takes into account all of the Greek fragments available. Quotations are largely omitted here not only because of space considerations but also because even Rufinus' Latin text is a translation and at that one made disregarding basic guiding principles. Primarily, Rufinus thought it necessary to make certain corrections in Origen's thought, see Daniélou, op. cit., xi-xii.

It should be clear by now that the problem will not be removed.

Origen's speculations concerning the Logos doctrine unquestionably lie within the context of this still fluid "orthodoxy" which however was by this time on its way toward becoming the hardened doctrine of the Church. It is a fact that Origen received the tradition of the early Church that Jesus was both the Wisdom and the Logos of God. The latter was for Origen much the more important. Origen's work was done primarily in examining the various ramifications of such a doctrine. This was accomplished within the framework of the conviction that Christianity was worthy of the most profound philosophical type of formulation.[127] For our purposes the most important development within the doctrine had to do with the notion of the eternal existence of the Son. With Origen what had previously been more or less simple pre-existence (i.e., existence before the generation of the created order) became a more or less fully developed concept of eternal existence. Fairweather summarizes: "According to Origen, the Logos who appeared in Christ is the Word or Son of God, His Wisdom hypostatically existing, eternally begotten, and of like essence with the Father."[128]

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[127] DeFaye's entire work emphasizes this point, perhaps to extremes, cf. Daniélou, op. cit., xvi.

It should go without saying that for Origen the Logos was ultimately to be identified with Christ. The details of this relationship will be examined below. What must be noticed first is exactly what preceded this identification.

In the simplest terms the Son was both the Word and the Wisdom of God.[129] In terms more refined Wisdom was the ἀρχή (Beginning, or perhaps, First Principle) and the Logos was in the ἀρχή.[130] ". . . this makes Sophia a prior concept to Logos which expresses it."[131] As has already been mentioned, in all of this Origen conceived the necessity of eternal existence more clearly than his predecessors. One quotation will be sufficient to show the depth of his thinking on this point.

> And can anyone who has learned to regard God with feelings of reverence suppose or believe that God the Father ever existed, even for a single moment, without begetting this wisdom? For he would either say that God could not have begotten wisdom before he did beget her, so that he brought wisdom into being when she had not existed before, or else that he could have begotten

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[128] Wm. Fairweather, Origen and Greek Patristic Theology, 151. Although something of this sort with regard to the eternal nature of the Son-Logos was explored by Athenagoras (supra 288ff); it is more fully developed in Origen. The nature of this specific point indicates the difficulty attached to the realization of certain fundamentals that many since would be inclined to assume. See also Irenaeus, infra 309ff

[129] de Principiis I.1. It should be noted that most of these references could be duplicated many times over.

[130] Comm. on John I.22; 42.

[131] Harris, Prologue, 25.

> her and--what is profanity even to say about God--that he was unwilling to do so; each of which alternatives, as everyone can see, is absurd and impious, that is, either that God should advance from being unable to being able, or that, while being able, he should act as if he were not and should delay to beget wisdom.[132]
>
> *de Principiis* I.2.2

In many ways the functions of Origen's pre-existent Logos follow the tradition he received. He was God's agent in creation.[133] He was the source of inspiration for the prophets as well as being the revealer of divine truths on the wildest basis.[134] Further, there was a way in which the functions of the Logos within Christ were similar to that within the prophets. The difference was more one of degree than manner. This relationship for Origen had many facets and he examined them in detail.[135]

For Origen the Father was God transcendent while the Logos was God immanent.[136] As has been observed, in other authors such a dichotomy naturally inclined itself toward some form of subordinationalism. As DeFaye points out,[137] with the raw material Origen had to hand he could hardly have done anything else. Origen was one of those authors who wrote before the difficulties with regard to subordinationalism had been realized. No distinction had been made between subordinationalism as an extreme heretical view and a kind of functional subordinationalism which was not carried to extremes. One cannot fault a man for such an unawareness.

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[132] Butterworth, op. cit., 15f. For a discussion of Origen's insight on this point see Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought*, 84. Cf. also, Daniélou, *op. cit.*, 255f.

[133] *de Principiis* II. 1.4; *Comm. on John* I.42; etc.

[134] *de Principiis* preface; *contra Celsum* VI.65; *Comm. on John* I.42.

[135] *Ibid*.

[136] *de Principiis* I.1. For a note on Christ's immanence see Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought*, 84.

Origen conceived all rational souls as eternal. The soul given to Christ was no exception. The widely varying conditions of men on earth must be the result of deeds performed by their discarnate souls before becoming a part of humanity. Origen held that Christ's soul had separated itself from all others as being the most worthy. Indeed it was for this very reason that it was given to him.[138] Otherwise, Origen conceived the incarnate Lord to consist of the Logos and Jesus. He sometimes thought of these as separate entities; at other times they seem to fuse into one.[139] The purpose of the Logos in Jesus was that he might ultimately prevail over all evil. In fact the most fundamental purpose of the incarnation according to Origen was that all might be gathered into the perfection of the Logos.[140]

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[137] De Faye, op. cit., 102f. For Origen there was only one ὁ θεός; all other divine beings including the Logos were divine only by participation. Cf. Daniélou, op. cit., 252ff., 261.

[138] de Principiis II.6.6.

In terms that were typically Johannine, Origen knew the Logos Son of God as the lamb, the vine, the bread, the truth, the life, the resurrection, the door, and the way. He was also light and righteousness.

> Origen examines all these terms; each is used in order to throw light on some aspect of the influence of the Son of God since he became the Logos Jesus. In a general way, this influence incites to good, trains and evolves souls, and redeems. Qua good shepherd Christ Jesus leads men; qua light, he illumines them; qua vine, he inebriates them with the wine of the Ideal; he enables them to contemplate eternal Ideas, models and types; he is the master of ecstasy.[141]

Thus it may be seen that although Origen's concept of the Logos is on the one hand lofty and philosophical, it is on the other earthy and practical. It was along these lines that the best of philosophy and the Jewish

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[139] contra Celsum III.41; de Principiis II.6.2. Cf. Fairweather, op. cit., 155.

[140] contra Celsum VIII.72. Cf. Butterworth, op. cit., xxxiv.

[141] De Faye, op. cit., 108f. Cf. Daniélou, op. cit., 259.

Christian tradition was blended into the most comprehensive doctrine of the Logos yet to appear. The final crystallization cannot be far away nor can it excel in profundity. It can however as we shall see be more clearly conceived.

Thus we conclude our examination of Alexandrian Christianity. It should be repeated at this point that the primary interest of this chapter is the development of the Logos doctrine in what we have rather arbitrarily designated "second century orthodoxy." The purpose of this of course is to offer a background against which we may examine the Gnostic deviations which developed around the Wisdom and/or Logos theme(s). However, in order to offer the complete picture it is necessary to overstep the implied historical limits slightly. We have already done this in Origen (c. 185-254) whose contribution was made completely in the third century. Now we must retrace our steps chronologically for a look at Irenaeus (c. 130-200) who in many ways was the greatest Church Father of the second century. Finally, we must briefly examine Tertullian (c. 160-220) within whom we find important steps toward the final crystallization. This should not be taken to imply that there were no later changes. On the contrary things seem to have continued in a more or less fluid state until the overstatements of Arius which made it imperative that final definition and limitation be established within "orthodoxy." Nicea was a bold attempt to meet this need.

V. OTHERS

Irenaeus. Irenaeus (c. 130-200) is noted for his fight against various heresies in the early Church and his position of influence as Bishop of Lyons. He did not possess an extensive interest in speculative thought of the type found surrounding the Logos in earlier writers, particularly the Alexandrians. The single fact that dominated all his theological thought was the deeply held conviction concerning the incarnation--that God had in fact become man.

> solum autem verum et firmum magistrum sequens Verbum Dei, Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum: qui propter immensam suam dilectionem factus est quod sumus nos, uti nos perficeret quod et ipse.[142]
> adv. Haer. V. Preface

Even his Logos doctrine is subject to this cardinal belief.[143]

It is often evident that Irenaeus' doctrinal formulations were conceived in the shadow of controversy.

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[142] The text of Irenaeus followed here is that of W. W. Harvey (Sancti Irenaei, Cambridge: 1857). The divisions of adv. Haer. cited are those of Massuet.

[143] For a recent and apparently careful treatment of Irenaeus' Christology, including appropriate sections on the Logos (esp. 28-31, 104-118, 163-166), see A. Houssiau, La Christologie de Saint Irénée (Louvain: 1955).

Occasionally heretical teaching even suggests a line of thought to him which he would otherwise probably have omitted. It is however the rare instance in which his zeal causes him to overstate his case.

It should be noted before proceeding that Irenaeus reflects a concept of the Trinity roughly equal to that of his contemporaries--a three-fold distinction permeated by an underlying unity. This unity is so much a part of Irenaeus that Baker comments, "The Father is God revealing Himself; the Son is God revealed. The Father is the invisible of the Son, while the Son is the visible of the Father."[144] Wisdom finds a place in the scheme of Irenaeus but is identified with the Holy Spirit and serves as a companion of the Logos--Son.[145] Irenaeus always applies the Old Testament texts which personify Wisdom to the Holy Spirit.[146] These two--the Logos and Wisdom--are servants of the supreme God and are in turn served by the angels.[147] There is of course an obvious element of subordinationalism in such a delineation.[148]

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[144] Bethune-Baker, op. cit., 130f. These words are a paraphrase of Irenaeus. For a Gnostic passage remarkably similar see the Gospel of Truth, 24.9-32.

[145] This relationship and function is most clearly seen in adv. Haer. IV.20.3. The passage includes a quotation of Proverbs 3.19f., and 8.22-31. It should be noted that Irenaeus "réserve le titre Christ au Verbe incarné (Houssiau, op. cit., 105 n. 1). Whenever our finds an identification between Wisdom and the Holy Spirit (Theophilus, Irenaeus, etc.) one is at least reminded of the Gnostic parallel.

[146] J. Lawson, The Biblical Theology of Irenaeus, 125.

Irenaeus' conception of the functions of the Logos is largely that of the tradition which he received. As we shall see however there are certain unusual though minor additions to earlier thought as far as it is known. Surely the primary function is that of agent in creation.

> cum teneamus autem nos regulam veritatis, id est, quia sit unus Deus omnipotens, qui omnia condidit per Verbum suum, et aptavit, et fecit ex eo, quod non erat, ad hoc ut sint omnia.[149]
> adv. Haer. I.22.1

Somewhat later Irenaeus is quite specific with regard to the work of the Logos in the creation of man.

> Et hic [the Logos] est de quo Scriptura ait; Et plasmavit Deus hominem, limum terrae accipiens, et insufflavit in faciem ejus flatum vitae.
> adv. Haer. IV.20.1

Although the general work of creation has been a consistent part of the work of the Logos since New Testament times, this specific link with Genesis 2.7 is new. The fact that

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[147] adv. Haer. IV.7.4.

[148] Lawson, Irenaeus, 129ff., argues that that which might be called "subordinalization" in Irenaeus is more apparent than real. Again, "functional subordinationalism" may be a useful distinction.

[149] The passage is followed by a quotation of Psalm 33.6 and John 1.3. It should again be noted that we have felt it sufficient to give minimum references to most of the points made in this discussion. Most of them could of course be duplicated, sometimes profusely. Cf. Houssiau, op. cit., 106ff.

Irenaeus felt free to make such an association must be an indication of a wide acceptance of the basic doctrine.

No less traditional is Irenaeus' conception of the agency of the Logos in revelation. The fact that Logos and Son are used alternately in the text is typical of Irenaeus.

> Neque enim Patrem cognoscere quis potest, nisi Verbo Dei, id est, nisi Filio revelante; neque Filium, nisi Patris beneplacito. Bonum autem placitum Patris Filius perficit: mittit enim Pater; mittitur autem et venit Filius.
>
> adv. Haer. IV.6.3

Irenaeus viewed this revelational role as a continuing grace beginning in the Old Testament and following through human history. Houssiau summarizes:

> La vie humaine du Fils est ainsi replacée dans le cadre général de la présence continue du Verbe aupres de l'humanité. La connaissance du Père, propre a l'Ancien Testament, est donc communiquée par le Fils, son révélateur unique.[150]

It was for Irenaeus just this pre-existent agent of creation and revelation who became man, taking for himself human flesh. It is significant that Irenaeus drew all three of these elements together in a single passage.

> Ostenso manifeste, quod in principio Verbum existens apud Deum, per quem omnia facta sunt, qui et semper aderat generi humano, hunc in nouissimis temporibus secundum praefinitum tempus a Patre, unitum suo plasmati, passibilem hominem factum.
>
> adv. Haer. III.18.1

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[150] Houssiau, op. cit., 111.

It was in fact his flesh as well as his life that he gave for mankind.[151]

Irenaeus' belief in the eternal pre-existence of the Logos is one of a number of things worked out in opposition to the heretics.[152] Irenaeus states his own conviction precisely when he says of man:

> Non enim infectus es, o homo, neque semper coexistebas Deo, sicut proprium ejus Verbum.
> *adv. Haer*. II.25.3.

Irenaeus mentions the Logos in many other connections. Again in traditional fashion, it was he who appeared to various observers in many different forms. He revealed himself to the patriarchs and prophets, indeed he manifested himself in specific incidents right through biblical history.[153] The Logos is for Irenaeus *vere Dominus*.[154] He is Son of Man, Savior and Judge.[155] He is the giver of light and life.[156] Perhaps most striking is that the Logos is *caput Ecclesiae*.[157] The fact that Irenaeus always linked the Logos with Jesus has been taken to mean that he does not identify "the divine element in Christ with the world-idea or Reason of God.[158]

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[151] *adv. Haer*. V.1.1.

[152] Bethune-Baker, *op. cit*., 130.

[153] *adv. Haer*. III.6.1, IV.20.8-12. The Gnostics made use of a similar concept. The *Gospel of Philip* elaborates just how the *ΛΟΓΟC* was thought to join itself to humanity, including of course Jesus. See esp. sayings 23, 113 and 116.

[154] *adv. Haer*. III.6.1.

[155] *Ibid*., III.18.6, III.17.1, IV.20.2.

Thus Irenaeus accepted and influenced the developing Logos tradition. It should be evident that as the authors of this period built upon the foundation of the Logos doctrine they continued to enlarge upon the original design. This is certainly true of Irenaeus. There is a basic truth here in spite of the fact that it would be difficult to achieve common agreement as to what exactly the "earliest" doctrine or the "original" design might have been. It might also be objected that these very terms suggest a state of affairs which never existed. Yet, as we have seen, as one pursues the development of the doctrine a line must somewhere be crossed where the Logos doctrine itself is no longer a guiding or determining principle, but the term

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[156] *Ibid*., I.9.2, Iv.5.2.

[157] *Ibid*., V.18.2; cf. Colossians 1.18.

[158] Lawson, *Irenaeus*, 136. Although Irenaeus linked the *λόγος* with Jesus he rejected Theophilus' use of the Stoic contrast between the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and the *λόγος προφορικός*. See Grant, "Theophilus of Antioch to Autolycus," *HTR* XL (1947) 229, cf. *adv*. *Haer*. II.13.2 and II.28.4f.

Logos itself is simply another name for Jesus. When this point is reached one might argue that it is time for this investigation to be drawn to a close, for the Logos doctrine has been established and is operative and in all appearances is widely accepted as a legitimate form in which to speak of Jesus' deeds. On the other hand, however, one must recognize that this is also another stage in the development of the doctrine. Indeed, it is an important stage in which the original impetus has expressed itself in full fruit. It is the final stage of growth and it must be recognized that the only alternatives to follow are either a firm and continuing support from the Church or inevitable deterioration. The latter prevailed mainly because the more concrete notion of sonship proved more useful as the mission of the Church moved into areas where the Logos type of speculation was unfamiliar and moreover did not appeal to the different turn of mind.

Tertullian. It would appear then from the available evidence that the Logos doctrine which developed in the early Church was virtually complete by the end of the second century. That is to say that at least the great bulk of the elements of the doctrine were in existence by that time.[159] The form of the doctrine at the turn of the new century seems however to have been at best quasi-organized. Although apparently no final statement had been attempted such was inevitable. As we have noted this was in the most final sense still a full century away. There is however what may be described as a semi-final statement in the extant writings of Tertullian. It would have been difficult to find a better man for this intermediate step. Tertullian received training in legal affairs and thus it has been claimed: ". . . he may be said to have created the language of western theology, which owes its characteristic precision to his legally trained mind."[160] Tertullian will therefore serve as the last figure in this investigation of "second century orthodoxy" as he provides a logical terminus slightly beyond our prescribed historical limits.[161]

It is immediately apparent that for Tertullian the Son, Word, and Wisdom of God all refer without question to that being who received flesh through Mary and was commonly referred to as Jesus Christ. What is more important for our purposes here is the nature of the relationship between this being and God the Father, and indeed just how Tertullian conceived these things to have come to pass.

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[159] A. Harnack (Outlines of the History of Dogma, 166f.) argues that in spite of its development, knowledge of such a doctrine at this time was at best only scattered.

[160] ODCC, 1334.

[161] The material for the following summary of Tertullian is taken primarily from Against Praxeas 5-8, 18, 19, 25-27, and Against Hermogenes 18. Although these passages represent the primary places where Tertullian discusses the Logos in detail they may be verified elsewhere. See especially Against Marcion I, 1, 5; II, 4,27; III.14,15; IV. 9, 13, 18, 19, 25, 33; V, 8.

Hermogenes had argued that creation was not ex nihilo but that it rather consisted of an imposition of form by God on material already in existence. Tertullian countered by arguing that God made all things "through" and "with" his Wisdom, which in this passage is for Tertullian the "Spirit" of 1 Corinthians 2.11. At this point Wisdom itself seems at least to include matter if not be identified with it.[162] In the passage he quotes in full Proverbs 8.27-31. The Proverbs passage is indeed the foundation of Tertullian's understanding in this area and reference is made to it a number of times. Tertullian further argues that Wisdom was "born and created" because if it were not it could only be coexistent with God. This for Tertullian was impossible without argument; God only is eternal.

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[162] It should be noted that Tertullian is generally trinitarian in outlook, cf. e.g., Against Praxeas 8. There is however the odd reference that is unsettling in one way or another. Tertullian did distinguish between the Word of God and God's word and the Spirit of God and God's Spirit, cf. Against Praxeas 27. Further, on occasion he refers to Wisdom as an attribute of God as opposed to a hypostatized figure, cf. Against Praxeas 26.

Such an argument leads Tertullian to a subordinationalist conclusion about which more will be said later. First, however, we must examine Tertullian's conception of the developments within the godhead prior to creation.

Praxeas was one of many who found it difficult if not impossible to reconcile the concept of Monarchy with that of Trinity. Tertullian's reply consists of a most perceptive argument which holds both in what was then perhaps the best tension yet to be achieved.

In the argument against Hermogenes there is little indication of any existence being attributed to the Word prior to its prolation (for original Greek προβολή). Tertullian begins the section against Praxeas by arguing that in the earliest conceivable pre-temporal period God was alone. He urges the point and just when his reader is about to conclude that this is indeed Tertullian's meaning, he suggests that even then God was not entirely alone.

> ceterum ne tunc quidem solus: habebat enim secum quam habebat in semetipso rationem, suam scilicet. rationalis enim deus, et ratio in ipso prius, et ita ab ipso omnia: quae ratio sensus ipsius est. hanc Graeci λόγον dicunt, quo vocabulo etiam sermonem appellamus. . . .[163]
>
> Against Praxeas 5

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[163] The text: E. Evans, Tertullian's Treatise Against Praxeas (London: 1948).

After emphasizing the existence of Reason or Word within God before its prolation, Tertullian illustrates by observing that words are a part of every mental projection. He argues that words are a kind of second being within every individual. He conceives God to have made the Word a separate entity by agitating it within himself.

Tertullian continues the development of his argument by holding that the statement ascribed to God in Genesis 1.3, "Let there be light," referred in fact to the prolation of the Word as a second being. He styles the incident as "the perfect nativity of the Word." He asserts that in this way the Word was made equal with God--his "first-begotten," indeed his "only-begotten."

He goes ahead to attribute a certain substance to the Word. Just what Tertullian intends to convey is not altogether clear. He anticipates Praxeas' objection that words are empty, devoid of power by holding that nothing empty could possibly proceed from a being of such substance as God. If Praxeas should object that God is Spirit, Tertullian informs his readers that even spirits have a bodily substance of their own kind. For us, Tertullian's arguments are at this point at their least convincing. However, one must remember that the Stoics a long while before Tertullian had held a similar position.

The Word then is conceived as a prolation outwards from the supreme God. Tertullian admits that this concept possesses certain similarities to the heretical doctrine espoused by Valentinus. He urges first of all that one should not avoid truth just because it is manipulated by the heretics to their own advantage. Yet in this case he points out that there is an important difference. He accuses Valentinus of conceiving his prolations in such a way as to make them separate and distinct beings. Tertullian argues that such a view destroys their unity which for him is absolute. One must hold both unity and diversity. The unity in the god-head, i.e., the relationship of the Father to the Son, is likened to the root that puts forth the tree, the fountain that puts forth the river, and the sun that puts forth the ray. He views each of these incidentals of the physical world as analogous to the God-Word relationship; they are two distinct entities inseparably joined together.

Although Tertullian does speak of equality between God and the Word, he more often speaks in terms that imply or occasionally even directly declare the subordinate position of the Word. When he argued for the eternity of the Father against Hermogenes one observation he made from the fact that the Word was a created being was that the Father was older and therefore automatically to be regarded as superior. For Tertullian the uncreated being was unquestionably in the more honored position.

Tertullian's preoccupation with the nature of relationships creates a lack of interest in the various functions of the Word. His basic conviction here is that the Word was God's agent in creation. Tertullian however held a broad concept of this activity. One specific function of the Word here was fulfilled in his role as counselor to God even in what might be called the planning stages of their future activity. In fact Tertullian conceived the Word as working intimately with the Father completely through the entire activity, from the conception of the idea onwards. Application of the Logos in detail to any other area of activity seems to be lacking in Tertullian. It may not however be concluded from such a lack of evidence that Tertullian denied other associations.

It would certainly seem fair to conclude that Tertullian conceived the unity and the diversity of the godhead more clearly than most of his predecessors. He had a remarkable ability to penetrate the sometimes misty language of revelation for the hard core of basic facts contained therein. Combined with this he had an outstanding ability to express himself in a clarity rarely surpassed. Indeed his capabilities tend to cause us to overlook his shortcomings. Perhaps not altogether because of him, and yet in all fairness, it is correct to say that after Tertullian there was little that was new remaining to be said about the Logos of God.[164]

VI. CONCLUSION

The evidence that remains of the development of the Logos doctrine of the early Church consists of scattered bits and pieces. This is by now self-evident. It would be extremely speculative to draw extensive or highly imaginative conclusions. That the doctrine did evolve during the period is evident. In one place or another and at one time or another we have a certain insight into almost every element of which the doctrine is composed. However, we do not have anything like the complete picture of the theorist's dream. What we do have is an extensive insight into one area of a situation seething with ferment out of which emerged the fully developed doctrines of Christianity. In the case of the Logos doctrine it is regrettable that after all the agonizing struggle the doctrine itself did not throughout the history of Christianity continue to be an essential part of the faith.

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[164] It might be objected that we have not included here an examination of the Epistula Apostolorum. Somewhat arbitrarily we have decided, because of its character, to use it as a point from which to begin our examination of Gnostic thought, infra 332ff.

CHAPTER V

THE GNOSTIC SPECULATION (I)

I. INTRODUCTION

Sensing the curious and peculiar complexity found within Gnosticism, Kraeling once said:

> Gnosticism is not an easy task-mistress. Her world is not that of great minds and paramount personalities, but rather that of the many little folk. They were all men with a vision, these Gnostics. They made room in their minds for the whole world, so far as they knew it. Yet the product of their efforts was invariably a conglomeration rather than a creation. This characteristic of their work is responsible, of course, for the elements. It is responsible, however, also for the difficulties inherent in the study of Gnosticism. Because they were conglomerations, the Gnostic systems disintegrated over night, to be replaced on the morrow by newer and more daring constructions. To look into the Gnostic world is thus to gaze into a kaleidoscope, and to behold a limited mass of material blending at each turn into new shapes and groups, with ever changing color and significance. Gnosticism is that part of the Hellenistic melting-pot most violently boiling.[1]

This assessment is particularly penetrating, especially in view of the fact that it was written forty years ago, before the discoveries which made the current interest in Gnostic studies possible. It is not our purpose here to take issue with those aspects of the statement which the work since that time has clarified or altered.

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[1] C. H. Kraeling, Anthropos and Son of Man, 4.

For example, surely later evaluation has a more elevated opinion of some at least of the personalities of the movement. We would only underline the complicated and ever changing evolutionary nature of the Gnostic complex. This lack of stability has its effect on every study in this area. Having recognized that our work is forced to tolerate this debilitating factor, we may proceed.[2]

The investigation of a specific theme within such a broad and varied movement as Gnosticism must assume a fundamental knowledge of its broader aspects. What we say here by way of introduction will have to do largely with the psychology or turn of mind which demanded a response of such extensive proportions. One would assume that there were real reasons behind such a movement. We are therefore concerned to ask what they were and how they related themselves to the specific interest of this investigation. We must therefore concern ourselves briefly with origins and their motivating force.[3]

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[2] This factor also largely dictates the approach made to the material. Although it may prove tiresome to continue to deal with evidence primarily in terms of isolated documents, it is necessary to preserve the specific form of the Sophia myth wherever it may be found.

[3] Books of introduction would include: R. Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting (London: 1956); R. M. Grant, Gnosticism and Early Christianity (New York: 1959); H. Jonas, The Gnostic Religion (Boston: 1963); and R. McL. Wilson, The Gnostic Problem (London: 1958). This is only the barest suggestion for English

The problem of Gnostic origins is a complex one which has resulted in widely varying views on the part of different scholars. We should perhaps note simply that there are at least four major theories, which have been held both individually and in various combinations.[4] They are: 1) "Oriental" religion (meaning different things to different people, but generally referring to eastern sources--Zoroastrian, Mesopotamian, even Indian), 2) heterodox Judaism, 3) heterodox Christianity, and 4) late Hellenistic philosophy. Surely Grant is right when he continues:

> There are aspects of truth in all these theories and it is possible that no one of them does justice either to the complexity of the phenomena or to the underlying unity of Gnostic thought.[5]

We mention this here particularly because we shall see that the Sophia myth itself gives evidence of a varying background of developmental relationships. The separate documents must speak for themselves, but one obvious feature will prove to be the extent to which an individual narrative has been integrated with Christian sources.

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readers. However, with these sources and the bibliographies in them, one could certainly be made aware of the history of Gnosticism as well as the present state of research. For a detailed list of periodical and other articles see S. Giversen, "Nag Hammadi Bibliography 1948-1963," Studia Theologica 17 (1963), 139-187.

[4] Grant, Anthology, 16.

[5] Ibid.

One should perhaps hasten to add that Gnosticism is generally recognized to be profoundly non-Christian, whatever influence Christianity may have had on certain sections of the movement. The fact that Gnosticism possesses this non-Christian character gives rise to one of the most perplexing problems in the study of Gnostic origins. On the one hand there are scholars who argue direct from this non-Christian character to a pre-Christian origin, but what is non-Christian is not necessarily also pre-Christian. It is certainly possible to isolate elements in the organized Gnostic systems that are known to be pre-Christian, but this proves nothing for the systems into which these elements were combined. It is our position here that the developed systems reflected in the documents--that is, the advanced stage of the synthesis--are in fact a second century phenomenon.[6] In many cases the documents as we now have them show clear signs of Christian influence, and some are definitely of Christian Gnostic origin. On the other hand some are such as to suggest the Christianization of older material, which is yet distinctly Gnostic, so that the traditional conception of Gnosticism as merely a second century Christian heresy is no longer completely adequate.

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[6] It should perhaps be mentioned again that we consider it a profound methodological error to employ second century documents to describe first century phenomena. See supra 166f.

Although the question of origins is not primary here, it should be pointed out that the very history of the involvements of Sophia will give a limited measure of insight into the kind of borrowing and adorning that did occur. At the same time it must be urged that this speaks positively of only one area of Gnostic speculation. Many other things were happening in diverse ways alongside this particular phenomenon.

It is a well known fact that the different Gnostic systems vary widely. Within this there was also the call to individual diversity. However, underlying the various manifestations of Gnosticism were certain unifying doctrines. The Sophia myth itself, for example, penetrated almost all sections of the Gnostic movement from Simon Magus' relation with Helen onward.[7] This occurred simply because of its association with certain fundamental beliefs within Gnosticism--namely, the attempt to explain the evil nature of the world in terms of a pre-mundane fall and its desire to reconcile man to the transcendent God. It will not be too anticipatory to quote Wilson's summary of Gnostic common denominators.

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[7] See adv. Haer. I.23.1-4. Simon claimed that he had found in the prostitute whom he had "redeemed" the lowest and final degradation of "the Mother of all." This, as we shall see, has close affinities with the more developed Sophia myth of later years.

> The various Gnostic systems described by the early Fathers differ on points of detail, but the basic elements common to them all are 1) a distinction between the unknown and transcendent true God on the one hand and the Demiurge or creator of this world on the other, the latter being commonly identified with the God of the Old Testament; 2) the belief that man is essentially akin to the divine, a spark of the heavenly light imprisoned in a material body and subjected in this world to the dominance of the Demiurge and his powers; 3) a myth narrating some kind of pre-mundane fall, to account for man's present state and his yearning for deliverance; and 4) the means, the saving gnosis, by which that deliverance is effected and man awakened to the consciousness of his own true nature and heavenly origin. This deliverance, and the eventual return of the imprisoned sparks of light to their heavenly abode, means in time the return of this world to its primordial chaos, and is strenuously opposed at all points by the hostile powers.[8]

In spite of this kernel of underlying unity, Gnosticism is known for its diversity. This diversity, as we have indicated, is present even in the Sophia myth itself. While attempting to avoid entanglement in the intricacies of finer distinctions--at least at this point--it is necessary to recognize a fundamental dichotomy.

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[8] Wilson, Gnosis, 4. Cf. R. M. Grant, Anthology, 15.

There is first the cruder, more mystically oriented, eastern Gnosticism, mainly Syrian-Egyptian in locus and often associated with the terms "Sethian-Ophite" and "Barbelognostic." As the distinctions between these two groups are extremely difficult to make, it might perhaps be better here to speak simply of "non-Valentinian" Gnosticism.[9] The second division would of course be the Valentinians. These were generally speaking more western (Valentinus, Heracleon, Ptolemy), i. e., Italy, etc. although there was an Oriental school (Theodotus, etc.). More unified in character, this group represents a more sophisticated type of Gnosticism, tending toward more philosophically oriented conceptual forms, although these distinctions are not without exception. Even within these basic divisions it is easy to see how one's commitment to a great extent controlled the total outlook that subsequently developed. Perhaps needless to say, we shall see that the Sophia myth itself developed somewhat independently in these two areas.

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[9] This is in fact the division made by Wilckens (Weisheit und Torheit, 118ff.) in his "ausservalentinianischen Gnosis." The kind of disagreement that exists here is exemplified by the fact that Schenke (TLZ 84 (1959), col. 246) on the one hand thinks that the Hypostasis of the Archons and the Schrift ohne Titel belong to a branch of Barbelo-Gnosis, while Doresse (Secret Books, 159) on the other hand holds that they are Sethian-Ophite in origin. Although we will find occasion to agree substantially with Schenke, the safer course may perhaps lie in Puech's suggestion that they are "mutually related" (The Jung Codex, 25). On Egyptian gnosticism generally see W. Till, "Die Gnosis in Aegypten," La Parola del Passato, 4 (1949), 230-249.

It has been urged that at least some Gnostics were the earliest theologians of the Church. This must surely be true if one is thinking of the valiant attempt to express the essence of Christianity in philosophical terms current in the second century.[10] This must be recognized as a genuine attempt of the first order, even in view of its limitations. The desire to occupy such an avant-garde position is always faced with great difficulties. Such was surely the case with the Gnostics.

Glorious as the attempt may have been, their desire for philosophical expression was a part of a complex that led to ultimate failure. Matter was judged on a priori grounds to be evil. Their Christology therefore incorporated a natural disdain for any physical aspect of Jesus. All this resulted in a many-sided docetic view which was ultimately not enough foundation to carry the superstructure placed upon it. In his assessment of Gnostic Christology and its docetic tendencies leading away from a genuinely historical Jesus, Mackintosh once said, "Ambiguity on this point disqualified Gnosticism as a substitute for a faith that clung to history, and in that history found very God."[11] Surely this judgment must stand.

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[10] F. C. Burkitt (Church and Gnosis, 58) argued along these lines some thirty years ago. Grant (Gnosticism and Early Christianity) includes a chapter entitled "From Myth to Philosophy" in which he discusses the principles of such an evolution. It may be that Grant plays down the philosophical element too much. There is also the question of what one means by "philosophy." There was the more profound serious sort as well as a more popular and vague type. See infra on discussion of the Epistula Apostolorum and the Hermetica.

In terminology characteristically penetrating, Laeuchli makes essentially the same point in greater depth and with modern "scientific" precision.

> The shift of _mysterion_ marks the renunciation of Christology in favor of a Christosophy in which redemptive history becomes myth. The _mysterion_ is Jesus; Jesus is the _mysterion_. In the light of our discussion on Christ and gnosis we understand how such a statement grasps only one direction of faith, the mystery as intellectual and spiritual object, the mystery as an expression of the perpendicular in religion.[12]

The structure of our study which indicates a clear distinction between "orthodoxy" and heresy reflects a greater confidence in the exact line of division between the two areas than is really possible. We have already mentioned that in the second century the situation was still very much in a fluid state, and it was not yet possible for reflective judgment to point out what was more or less correct or incorrect. Apparently, many of those

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[11] H. R. Mackintosh, _The Person of Jesus Christ_, 135.

[12] S. Laeuchli, _The Language of Faith_, 51.

Christians who were tending in the direction of Gnosticism did so quite deliberately but without fully realizing what the end result of their unusual interests might be. In fact many of them would probably have felt that they were the only true Christians, perhaps even down to the time of Irenaeus' writing, i.e. circa 180. This is primarily the old problem of heresy neither recognizing itself nor being recognized until a considerable amount of development had occurred. One could give examples that would indicate a number of unusual intermediate positions, which in themselves reflect inconsistencies both on the "orthodox" and heretical sides. It is these intermediate items that are the most perplexing, and the one piece of this kind of evidence that demands consideration here is the Epistula Apostolorum.

Epistula Apostolorum. Although Wilckens includes the Epistula Apostolorum in his survey of Gnostic source material, most classify it, as do Puech and Quispel, as a "stray product of early Christian literature."[13]

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[13] Wilckens, Weisheit und Torheit, 131f. H. C. Puech and G. Quispel, "Les écrits gnostiques du Codex Jung," VC 8 (1954), 11. The most recent study of this document is that of M. Hornschuh (Studien zur Epistula Apostolorum, Berlin: 1965). Hornschuh (cf. esp. pp. 1-8) confirms earlier opinion that this work reflects a certain Gnostic character, but thinks it was for the purpose of showing the ultimate fallibility of the Gnostic position. It may have had this purpose although it is not openly a polemic treatise. See also Betz's review (TLZ 1966, 516ff.).

Duensing explains how such divergent elements may exist alongside each other in the same document.

> The writing is a remarkable document from the time of the battle between Christianity and Gnosticism. It shows how the young Christianity prevailed against this opponent but at the same time experienced a change of its thought forms, arising not from the soil of ordinary Christianity but from Gnosticism, which caused the writing to be dropped in a later period.[14]

The document shows its Christian character most in its inclusion of innumerable references, direct and indirect, to Gospel material. It even reflects a Logos doctrine, roughly equal to that of the Johannine prologue.[15] Yet at the same time the treatise is in the typical form of Gnostic gospels. That is to say that it consists of a dialogue between the resurrected Jesus and his disciples.[16]

Of particular interest here is Jesus' description of his descent and appearance in the world. It occurs just at the beginning of the main body of teaching material.

> Then our Lord and Savior said to us, "Stand up and I will reveal to you what is on earth, and what is above heaven, and your resurrection that is in the Kingdom of heaven, concerning which my Father has sent me, that I may take up you and those who believe in me."

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[14] H. Duensing in Hennecke, Apocrypha (English translation) Vol. 1, 190. Immediately following (190f.) the article argues the probability of an early second century date of writing.

[15] See Epistula Apostolorum 3, 14, 39, etc.

[16] Cf. Hornschuh, *op. cit.*, 4f.

> And what he revealed is this, as he said to us, "While I was coming from the Father †of† all, passing by the heavens, wherein I put on the wisdom of the Father and by his power clothed myself in his power, I was †in† the heavens. And passing by the angels and archangels in their form as one of them, I passed by the orders, dominions, and princes, possessing the measure of the wisdom of the Father who sent me. And the archangels Michael and Gabriel, Raphael and Uriel followed me until the fifth firmament of heaven, while I appeared as one of them. This kind of power was given me by the Father. Then I made the archangels to become distracted with the voice and go up to the altar of the Father and serve the Father in his work until I should return to him. I did this thus in the likeness (or, form?) of his wisdom. For I became all in all with them, that I having . . . the will of the mercy of the Father and perfected the glory of him who sent me, might return to him. *Epistula Apostolorum*, 13-14.[17]

There are a number of typically Gnostic elements evident in the foregoing quotation. First we see the concept of a series of heavens through which the Redeemer is required to pass, securing passage from one to another by assuming the appearance and character of the archon of each heaven. The whole concept of a descending and ascending Redeemer is found regularly in the various Gnostic systems. It is also present in Christian sources, and therefore it becomes a question of relationships. As we have argued earlier we feel that Christianity is primary here, although there would probably have been a certain amount of cross-fertilization at a very early period.

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[17] This is the English translation in Hennecke, *Apocrypha* (English translation), vol. 1, 197f.

This problem quickly becomes quite involved and final answers may never be obtained. The document under consideration is an excellent example of the kind of blending that was possible during the period.[18]

The Redeemer of the passage is deeply involved with the "wisdom" of God. Three different times the passage speaks of the relationship. First the Redeemer "put on" the "wisdom" of God, later he "possessed" it, and finally it was in its "likeness" that he accomplished his passage through the heavens.

It must be urged that all of these concepts could have been developed out of the Jewish-Christian tradition as we know it. At the time this document was written, this could have been a quite legitimate--though highly speculative--form of the Christian Savior, come to take the redeemed above to their Father. In spite of its obvious affinities with Gnostic thought, the passage is profoundly Christian. The Jesus of the gospels appears clearly without the slightest ambiguity.

What we have here may simply be an extremely vivid example from an intermediate stage of the evolution of "orthodoxy", in which the blending of history (however the participants may have conceived of it) with mythical and mystical elements occurred. Such a stage would have been decisive, as both "orthodoxy" and heresy were laying the foundation for their own separate identities. What we may well have here then is the uneasy presence of two rival groups emerging within the same fellowship prior to their final separation. As we shall see later it is quite probable that it was this very kind of thing, combined with the open threat of a developed and organized Gnosticism of subsequent years, that made it impossible for emerging Christianity to use effectively to any great degree the Christological potential of the Wisdom category. In any case, the mixture present in the Epistula Apostolorum is quite unique.

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[18] Again, cf. Hornschuh, op. cit.

One thing that the preceding discussion makes clear is that the Gnostic Sophia myth was the product of a series of "natural" developments, most of which occurred within the framework of the Jewish-Christian tradition. To a point which is extremely difficult to determine, this development, at least within the Christian tradition, is considered to be the legitimate articulation of or about revealed truth. That is to say once again, that the line between "orthodoxy" and heresy is extremely vague when precise definitions are required. To grossly oversimplify, the Gnostic myth is a case of carrying a perfectly right and good thing to disqualifying extremes. In the case of the Epistula Apostolorum the judgment of the later church was that the bounds of propriety had already been exceeded.

Poimandres and the Corpus Hermeticum. We cannot proceed without having at least a cursory look at one other remnant of a turn of mind roughly contemporary with the Gnostics, i.e. the Corpus Hermeticum.[19] Linked together perhaps most by a similar and sympathetic turn of mind, the men represented in this collection of documents were seeking to discover a "philosophical justification for religion," religion being their primary concern. Although these documents are mainly of third century origin, the thought expressed has much in common with earlier material. Dodd,[20] for example, explores in detail possible links with the Fourth Gospel.

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[19] Introductory summaries of the Hermetica may be found in W. Scott, Hermetica, vol. 1 (which also contains the text and an English translation. Begun in 1924, this four-volumned work was completed in 1936 by A. S. Ferguson) and in C. H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, 10-53 (on Book 1 see esp. 30ff.). See also C. H. Dodd, The Bible and the Greeks, esp. 99ff. Perhaps the best text now available is that in the Budé series, edited by A. D. Nock and A. J. Festugière (Paris: 1945, second edition, 1960). Some kind of relationship to Gnostic thought is confirmed by the fact that at least some of the Hermetic literature has been found in the Nag Hamadi collection. See J. M. Robinson, "The Coptic Gnostic Library Today," NTS 14 (1968), 356-401. Robinson notes that M. Krause and P. Labib are to publish the text (Gnostische und hermetische Schriften aus Codex II und VI, 1968). See also J. Doresse, "Hermès et la gnose à propos de l'Asclépius copte," Novum Testamentum I (1956), 54ff.

[20] C. H. Dodd, The Fourth Gospel, 10-53.

The *Hermetica*, for this study especially *Ἑρμοῦ τρισμεγίστου Ποιμάνδρης*, seems to be of an origin mainly independent of Christian sources. The men of the movement were certainly eclectic in method, showing at least traces of a number of different influences. They felt no obligation either to the Stoics, or Platonists, but rather borrowed that which they felt useful from both, an approach which had been popular for some time (*supra*, cf. Philo). The specific form of this combination is similar to that of Plotinus. Further, the writers of the Hermetic literature were not Gnostics to be sure, but they show a common heritage in their emphasis on *γνῶσις* as a means of salvation. For example, it is once said: *τοῦτο μόνον σωτήριον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστίν, ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ θεοῦ* (*C. H*. X. 15). Again, although there may be traces of Egyptian influence, these documents are primarily Greek in character. Their main Jewish link is bound up with Genesis 1, which however is the basis for Book 1, *Poimandres*, as well as the point of our concern here. A summary of this cosmogony--or mythical expansion of the creation narrative follows.

After the opening interchange in which Revealer and Seer identify themselves and clarify their relationship, Poimandres explains that he is the Light, Mind or God, and that the *φωτεινὸς λόγος* is the Son of God. Upon reflection the Seer observes that the Light is not simple, but consists of innumerable powers all of which go to make up *τὸ ἀρχέτυπον εἶδος*. When asked about the origin of the elements, Poimandres answers that after receiving the Word, the Counsel of God beheld the beautiful world and imitated it.

> Next, Mind, or God, being Life and Light, gave birth to another mind, the Creator. This Demiurge created the seven planets, whose administration is called Fate. This accomplished, the Word of God, which had previously descended upon matter, leapt upward and was united with the *νοῦς δημιουργός*. Together they imparted a rotary movement to the planets, and this rotation caused life to appear in the lower elements of earth and water. Since, however, the *λόγος* had deserted this lower sphere, the living things it produced were *ἄλογα ζῷα*.
>
> Now comes a fresh stage. The Father of all, Mind, being Life and Light, gave birth to a Man, like to Himself, having his Father's image, and delivered all created things into his hand. Man beheld the created universe, and desired himself to create. Receiving permission from His Father, he descended into the sphere of the Demiurge. The planetary beings imparted to him their own qualities, and thus equipped he reached the lower sphere, displaying to it the beautiful form of God. Lower nature fell in love with the human form divine. Man returned her love, and they came together. 'And hence', says the seer, 'of all living things on earth man is twofold, mortal because of the body, but immortal because of the essential man'; for from this union of divine Man with Nature sprang the ancestors of the human race. Thus 'from Life and Light man became soul and mind, soul from Life and mind from Light'. Then God spoke with a holy word, 'Increase by increase and multiply by multiplying, all ye creatures, and let rational man recognize that he is immortal and that the cause of death is love of the body'.[21]

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[21] *Ibid*., 31f.

This cosmogony manifests clearly a mythically oriented elaboration of the Genesis creation narrative in terms of the Platonic-Stoic philosophy. The remainder of the book elaborates the essential story given above.

Perhaps the most important observation to make has to do with the character of this cosmogony. It is not specifically Gnostic. It rather reflects a borrowing or an "influence" of the same type evident in Gnostic literature. That is, both the Hermetic and Gnostic writers borrowed from many of the same sources. The additional perspective offered by an examination of Poimandres makes it possible to see something of What was happening in this period as well as a little of How. Our examination of the Gnostic material to follow will confirm this.

Before discussing certain aspects of the Sophia myth as an introduction to the investigation of the documents themselves, it is in order to say something about our purposes and goals in the selection of evidence. First, at the risk of being burdensome, we have felt it necessary in a study of this nature to be reasonably inclusive, simply because we are working with something basically new at this point. However, as we proceeded we discovered our attention centering more and more on the Nag Hammadi collection. Among other things this made it possible to work on the living edge of scholarly endeavor. Documents and other references of secondary importance will be relegated to footnotes.[22]

One rather serious result of this set of circumstances is that our investigation will not always pursue a specific line of argument. There is simply not enough evidence to follow. In our examination of the documents themselves it will become largely a matter of pointing out affinities as well as differences and assessing significance.

When examining the Gnostic material one is struck most perhaps by the vast differences between it and the generally continuous material examined in the earlier part of our study. Time spent observing similarities should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the Gnostic world is uniquely and profoundly different. One of our basic problems here is to attempt some account of the differences within our prescribed area of consideration while at the same time carefully examining the similarities.

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[22] Among the documents we have not found necessary to examine in detail is the Gospel of Thomas (A. Guillaumont, et al., The Gospel According to Thomas, Leiden: 1959). It should be noted, however, that J. E. Ménard announced a paper to be read at the Oxford Congress of Patristic Studies (September 1967) entitled, "La Sagesse et le Logion 3 de l'Évangile selon Thomas." This paper has not yet been made available to us.

To what extent does the Gnostic material reflect a survival of New Testament soteriological concepts? Is it possible to observe any relation to Old Testament Wisdom speculation? Or, how much is genuinely new? These and other questions must be given certain consideration as we proceed.

In the course of our investigation the feeling emerged strongly that the only way to observe just how the Sophia myth was developed and used by different Gnostic authors was to preserve document identity. Therefore our concern centered on the examination of the documents themselves in order to observe specific manifestations of the myth. If the study becomes laborious to the reader, one offers the defense that it attempts to examine all of the material now at hand. An awareness of Irenaeus' account proved necessary as background, but our primary concern was to see as clearly as possible the various forms of the Sophia figure, hoping finally to say something about their relation to "orthodoxy." Again, the Gnostic phenomena are reviewed here in detail that we might better understand what ultimately happened within the "orthodox" tradition that led to the couching of the Christ event in terms of the "Wisdom of God." Some sort of brief evaluation as well as summary will be possible at the conclusion of the study. At that point we will include some assessment of the evidence as well as an evaluation of its significance.

Of all the documents omitted from this study as such, we need only explain our neglect of the Pistis Sophia.[23] This omission was made solely on the grounds of its generally recognized inferior quality. The stilted character of the document, which is reflected in the extremely artificial quality of the disciples' questions and responses, made it impossible to place it on the same plane with much more noble efforts. Till, speaking of the Apocryphon of John, compares it with the Pistis Sophia (and the two Books of Jeu).

> The Gnostic doctrine as we can gather it from the Apocryphon of John is on a high intellectual and moral level. If we compare it with what we find in the Gnostic works of the Codex Askewianus and the Codex Brucianus, especially in the Pistis Sophia and the two Books of Yeû, which are later than the Apocryphon of John by a hundred years or rather more, we find something entirely different. Of all the well-articulated system of the Apocryphon of John with its fullness of meaning, we find only sparse and scattered fragments which have lost all sense, just as single little stones out of a beautiful

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[23] See Schmidt's edition of the Coptic text (C. Schmidt, Pistis Sophia (Hauniae: 1925). English translation and notes may be found in: G. Horner, Pistis Sophia (London: 1924) and, G. R. S. Mead, Pistis Sophia (First edition, London: 1896; revised, 1921).

> mosaic lose all their meaning apart from their connection with the whole. Nothing of Philosophical thought is left; the exuberantly growing excrescences of oriental fantasy have suffocated everything else.[24]

The fundamental elements of the Sophia myth are reasonably easy to put in outline. As we have noted, the Gnostics conceived the Primal God as transcendent, beyond the reach of the created order. In order to bridge the gap between this transcendence and the evil earthly reality, they developed a series of emanations; in Valentinian speculation for example the usual number was thirty. Sophia--the last--was guilty of a desire either for unwarranted knowledge, or as in other accounts for creation beyond her capacity. What follows has to do with reclaiming that which was lost in Sophia's fall. As our study continues it will become increasingly evident that these basic elements were conceived as combined in a number of ways. We turn to the myth itself.

> ὁ δὲ βουληθεὶς αἰὼν τὸ ὑπὲρ τὴν γνῶσιν λαβεῖν
> ἐν ἀγνωσίᾳ καὶ ἀμορφίᾳ ἐγένετο.
> *Excerpta Theodoto* 31

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[24] W. C. Till, "The Gnostic Apocryphon of John," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* III (1952), 21f. See also F. Legge in the "Introduction" to Horner's translation, xlii; F. C. Burkitt, *op. cit.*, 67; and Wilckens, *Weisheit und Torheit*, 125. A summary of the activity of Sophia in *Pistis Sophia* may be found in Doresse, *Secret Books*, 69f.

Thus we have what must be the briefest possible form of the Sophia myth. As we have said, Sophia's motivation is expressed in different ways. Burkitt concisely summarized all of them when he said, "Sophia had had a glimpse of something better than she had been able to imagine, and she wanted it for herself."[25] In this role, this mythological figure became the scapegoat for a number of theological difficulties which confronted the Gnostics.

The one element that demands the most admiration in this entire area of thought is the degree to which the Gnostics were able to elevate the supreme God. In this of course they shared with Philo. However, in their resultant disdain for the material world they went considerably beyond Philo. For God to be God for these Gnostics, he had to be this kind of being. Such a lofty concept is of course not without its difficulties, and in their case became the foundation stone for extensive elaboration.

The fact that when thinking in this vein the material world rather automatically became evil, the exact and extreme opposite of the spiritual world, caused the Gnostics to develope a hierarchy of beings to bridge the gap if there was to be any contact at all between the two.

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[25] Burkitt, op. cit., 51.

The Gnostics were not unique in this. However, once there was a general commitment to this kind of imaginative speculation, it was almost inevitable that it should be carried to elaborate extremes. This is, of course, exactly what happened. As abstraction and personification in Gnostic cosmological speculation continued, there could only be a lowering of any practical concept of the divine element which was in contact with the material world. This must surely have been a factor in the depths imposed upon Sophia--a high and noble being in the earlier tradition but, with the Gnostics, cast into the depths of degradation.

The descent into the depths by Sophia began with a pre-cosmic temptation and fall. We shall have occasion to hear this reiterated several times. One aspect of Gnostic motivation here must have been to explain the evil quality of the world, without attributing it to the supreme Father. We shall see that the Gnostics ultimately failed in this attempt. They could easily attribute the action to Sophia, but they could not avoid the ever-present problem of the supreme God, in the end of the day, being responsible for the vacuum in which the action occurred. We shall see further, however, that it was only the authors of the higher forms of the myth who clearly saw this problem.

Probing more deeply, Zandee is interested in the Sophia myth in terms of an analysis of the Gnostic mentality. He sees two things of great importance, the desire of the Gnostics to escape from the world of evil, and their "high-handedness" in trying to do so.

> Man's aim therefore is to escape from his imprisonment within the world by rising above his material environment. Sophia is the self-projection, upon the heavenly sphere, of the man who calls out of the depths to God for deliverance.

And:

> It (the name "Sophia") is the projection, on the transcendent plane, of man's misdirected philosophy, which high-handedly seeks to mount to the Highest Being, without awaiting the enlightenment of divine revelation.[26]

Our judgement is that these elements were certainly present in the Gnostic mentality; it is merely a question of extent. One would expect such a thing to vary from author to author. This possibility must be kept in mind as we examine the documents.

We are not deeply concerned here to explore the possible sources from which the Gnostics drew in their formulation of the Sophia myth. Our concern rather lies in observing how the Jewish-Christian tradition manifested itself in the myth, being committed to the thesis that it did do so.[27] We might say in passing, however vague it may seem, that in the course of the study we have come to the firm conclusion that the Gnostics drew from many different sources, most outside the Jewish-Christian tradition. It may be that this should have been self-evident.

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[26] J. Zandee, "Gnostic Ideas on the Fall and Salvation," NVMEN 11 (1964), 19f., 23.

To say the very least, the connection between Wisdom in the Jewish-Christian literature and the Sophia myth in its various forms is a perplexing one. Jonas insists that it is impossible to reconstruct the development.[28] Surely something may be said in this regard in spite of the difficulties.

Although there is certainly an irregular edge to the Jewish-Christian Wisdom tradition, it is all more or less of one piece. In addition, is is reasonable to assume that there were reasons for the Gnostic development. It is of course extremely difficult, if not impossible, to be exactly sure what they might have been. The extremely speculative nature of Gnosticism would have resulted in rare background questionings. The emphasis was on the future. Once such a link was made, as that with Wisdom-Sophia, however insignificant the reason, in all probability it would have continued more or less without question. Although more adequate answers may be possible later in our study, it is in order to suggest certain lines of thought at this point.

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[27] In a recent Ph.D. thesis at Cambridge, McRae (G.W. McRae, Some Elements of Jewish Apocalyptic and Mystical Tradition and their Relation to Gnostic Literature, Cambridge: 1966) established beyond any reasonable doubt Gnostic dependence on Jewish sources with regard to the Sophia myth.

[28] Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, 176f. (adv. Haer. I.23.1-4).

It is fair to assume that the Sophia myth would be logical, at least from a Gnostic point of view. The question is: What was that point of view? Wisdom had been thought of for a long time as an agent of creation. Therefore it would serve Gnostic purposes best if she could remain in this position. That is, it would require less manipulation. Although the Gnostics may have ultimately failed in their attempt to dissociate the origin of evil from the supreme God, in their view at least, it remained in the divine world. Jonas, among others, points out that the most singular feature of Valentinianism was its attempt to fix the origin of evil within the Godhead itself. For the Gnostics, matter was evil desire in material form. It had no proper origin. Could the fact that in the earlier tradition, Wisdom--to change terms--had become flesh, i.e., evil, have anything to do with it? It would appear that we may only ask. Only certain procedural points remain before beginning our analysis.

The term λόγος was used by the Gnostics both in general and specific ways. As a general term it was used in a number of ways not unlike that of the Christian tradition. As a specific term it was used to refer to various mythical figures as we shall see. Although the term found many purposes, there was no proper Logos myth in Gnosticism. We have therefore made it our policy in the following analysis to mention those usages that have some significant association with our area of interest. We might anticipate that little or no pattern will emerge from these observations. As we have said, our primary concern is the Gnostic Sophia and its relation to the "orthodox" world.

The Sophia myth was of no small importance both inside and outside the Valentinian system.[29] It was here, however, that the myth achieved its most sophisticated form.

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[29] The mundane speculations of Simon Magus (adv. Haer. I.23.1-4) certainly fit into this at some point. Simon's scheme may indeed be a primitive form of the Barbelognostic system. However, since we are solely dependent upon Christian sources for our knowledge of Simon, we have judged his system (?) to be outside our concern here. For a careful treatment of Simon, including his concept of the origin of the world, based on the available secondary sources, see Jonas, Gnostic Religion, 103ff.

We have found it convenient to examine first Irenaeus and the other early Fathers as they attempt to summarize the Valentinian system. This will provide a standard of comparison, as we have mentioned, with which to continue. We shall then turn to the myth as it appears in the Sethian-Ophite and/or Barbelognostic systems. Our examination of the Valentinian sources will comprise our concluding chapter.

II. THE "ORTHODOX" REFLECTION OF THE VALENTINIAN SOPHIA MYTH[30]

The Earlier Form.[31] Within the scheme of the thirty Aeons which made up the Pleroma only Nous, the first and

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[30] The ensuing summary was taken from the following primary sources: Irenaeus, *Against Heresies* I.1-8, (abbreviation: *adv*. *Haer*., the text: W. Harvey, *Sancti Irenaei*, Cambridge: 1857. It should be noted however that we follow Massuet's division throughout.); Tertullian, *Against the Valentinians* (*Val*., the text: R. F. Refoulé, *Traité de la Prescription contre les Hérétiques*, *Sources Chrétiennes* 46, Paris: 1957); Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* XXIV-L, (*Ref*., the text: P. Wendland, *Hippolytus Werke*, *Die Griechischen Schriftsteller*, *Hippolytus 3 Band*, Leipzig: 1916); and Clement of Alexandria, *Excerpts from Theodotus* (*Excerpta*, the text: R. P. Casey, *The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria*, London: 1934; F. Sagnard, *Clément d'Alexandrie Extraits de Theodote*, *Sources Chrétiennes* 23, Paris: 1948).

Principal secondary sources were: F. Sagnard, *La Gnose Valentinienne* (Paris: 1947); W. Harvey, *op*. *cit*.; Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion*; Casey, *op*. *cit*. Sagnard was particularly helpful in the reconstruction of this myth, not only with his text of "La Grande Notice" but also with notes, parallels, and material from other sources. See only begotten of Bythus (the female companions Sige and Alethia being virtually disregarded[32]), knew his Father, who was in fact the Supreme Father or Propator. Nous had an inclination to make the Father known to the other Aeons but, while he was still considering the means he should use, was persuaded otherwise by Sige. Although the remaining Aeons did not know the Father, they were not in a state of complete ignorance. That is to say, they knew that there was a Propator even though they did not know anything about him. As we shall see, this relative ignorance is of crucial importance to the Valentinian scheme.

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also, G. Quispel, "The Original Doctrine of Valentine," VC I (1947), 43-73.

The long-respected account given by Irenaeus serves in the account given here as the organizational backbone while the other sources offer standards of comparison. Translations are largely composite being formulated from that of the ANCL, modified by notes from Sagnard and Harvey, with comparison where possible with Grant, Anthology.

[31] Irenaeus first reflects a basic form (adv. Haer. I.2.1f) which is followed by the elaborations of "others" (adv. Haer. I.2.3ff.). From the very outset the stage is set for variations.

[32] Hippolytus, (ANCL, Ref. VI.24, Wendland. VI.29), mentions that the heretics themselves vary on this point, especially with regard to the Supreme God. Some seem to find it impossible to conceive of him as having a consort while others find it equally impossible to conceive of him producing anything without a female companion. Because of its very nature one should expect this point to return from time to time.

Sophia experienced a great passion to *know* the Father,[33] but without her consort Theletos. Others of the Aeons had similar desires but controlled them. In accordance with Platonic (and Neo-Platonic) principles, Sophia was the most vulnerable of the Aeons because she was the last, farthest from true divinity both in time and place. She has therefore been described as "ambiguous," meaning that she wavered between the spiritual and the physical worlds.

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[33] This is Sophia's motivation according to Irenaeus and Tertullian, that is to *know* what was in fact beyond knowledge. Later in his expanded version of the myth Irenaeus mentions Sophia's "inquisitive searching after the Father" (*adv*. *Haer*. I.3.1). Hippolytus presents a different explanation. He says, "She wished to emulate the Father, and to produce [offspring] of herself without a marital partner, that she might achieve a work in no wise inferior to [that of] the Father" (*Ref*. VI.25, Wendland VI.30). Irenaeus mentions Hippolytus' version as that stated "by others." Thus the Fathers reflect a difference in the sources available to them. *The Apocryphon of John* Codex II (58.1, *infra* 378f.) suggests that Sophia was motivated by "the invincible power that was within her." The Berlin Codex and Codex III mention simply "desire." Both the *Hypostasis of the Archons* (142.5ff., *infra* 397) and the *Schrift ohne Titel* (146.14ff. *infra* 400) speak of Sophia's compulsion to imitate the supreme Father. There is therefore a certain correlation between Irenaeus "A", the *Apocryphon of John* BG and Codex III on the one hand and Irenaeus "B", Hippolytus, the *Apocryphon of John* Codex II, etc. on the other, which may contribute to establishing the priority of BG and Codex III (see discussion *infra* 379, n.73). In sharp contrast to the above sources, the *Fourth Treatise* (76.2ff., *infra* 451f.) seems to exonerate Sophia, making her desire to arise out of "superabundant love." Such a development is striking and will occupy our attention further in the conclusion. For relevant notes in this area see Jonas, *Gnostic Religion*, 183, see note 11, 182f., and Sagnard, *op. cit*., 149.

Sophia acted under a "pretense of love" (*πρόφασιν*[34] *μὲν ἀγάπης*), but the real motivation was "temerity" (*τόλμης*, *temeritatis*). She desired to comprehend the greatness of the Father (*ἤθελε γάρ*, *ὡς λέγουσιν*, *τὸ μέγεθος αὐτοῦ καταλαβεῖν*). When she had stretched herself to the extent of being in danger of being absorbed by the Father's "sweetness" her movement was restrained by Horos, that Power which supports and preserves all things. Indeed, without Horos, disaster for Sophia was inevitable, *εἰ μὴ τη στηριζούση καὶ ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἀρρήτου μεγέθους φυλασσούση τὰ ὅλα συνέτυχε δυνάμει*.[35] It was Horos in fact who demonstrated to her the impossibility of her desire and persuaded her to give up her quest and return to her place in the Pleroma.

It would appear that Irenaeus intended his readers to understand that this was in fact a simple presentation of the Sophia Myth, yet one that was considered complete at least by some. If this is true it presents certain difficulties, for it is not at all clear what theological purpose the myth in this form might have served. There is no pre-cosmic fall, no specific mention of any formless material to be known as matter and to provide the substance out of which the physical order required to be created,[36] nor therefore is there any explanation of the purpose of the physical world, all of which are central to the theology of the Gnostics.[37] The fact that Irenaeus immediately indicated that there were other presentations which "mythologize" (*μυθολογεῖν*) this basic form seems to confirm the judgement above, i.e., that this was at some time and for a certain group *the* Sophia myth.

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[34] Sagnard, *op*. *cit*., has *προφάσει*. Cf., 33 n.4, "Lat.: *sub occasione*, Tert.: *sub praetexto*."

[35] Cf. *adv*. *Haer*. I.3.5, where an explanation is given of Horos' double function--i.e., of supporting and separating. For a notation of other verbs used to speak of the relationship between Horos and Sophia, see Sagnard, *op*. *cit*., 150, etc.

The preceding then should probably be taken as a fairly early form of the Sophia myth,[38] one current before more extensive elaboration occurred. As has been observed we have come to expect and should not be surprised by wide variation and rapid development as a part especially of Valentinian principle.[39] Some similar explanation may well be offered for that problematic account of Valentinus' Sophia myth in Tertullian,[40] where a single Sophia figure is referred to as both masculine and feminine and, even more puzzling, seems to be cast in roles normally associated with 1) the Sophia above, 2) the Sophia beneath--Achamoth, and even possibly, 3) the Demiurge.[41]

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[36] The residue of Sophia's experience seems to be entirely mental. The things Horos persuaded her to put aside consisted of: 1) her "passion," and 2) her "original design" (*προτέραν ἐνθύμησιν*). It is possible of course for "passion" to be interpreted in terms of substance even at this stage.

[37] For a broader discussion of the purpose of Valentinian speculation in particular, see Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion*, 177f., etc.

[38] The problem of relationships between earlier and later forms will raise itself a number of times in the following discussion.

The Later Form. The first specific mentioned by Irenaeus after suggesting that there were other more elaborate explanations of the passion and restoration of Sophia is that from Sophia's passion there came forth an

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[39] Cf. *adv*. *Haer*. I.18.5.

[40] Tertullian, *Against All Heresies* IV. In the course of the analysis of the documents, we shall see that there is a certain amount of textual support for some aspects of Tertullian's account. However, it comes mainly from non-Valentinian sources and one is left with the feeling that the problem really lies in Tertullian's failure to distinguish clearly between the various systems.

[41] It should go without saying that the views of Valentinus were not necessarily those of the Valentinians. Irenaeus himself (*adv*. *Haer*. I.1.2) indicates that he is dealing with "the disciples of Ptolemaeus, whose school may be described as a bud from that of Valentinus." Grobel (*The Gospel of Truth*, 14) observed that the system described by Irenaeus was at least three times removed from Valentinus. "It is: (1) *Irenaeus*' never quite sympathetic account of the system (*ὑπόθεσις* I.8.1) taught by anonymous (2) *disciples* of (3) *Ptolemy*, who had been a direct pupil of Valentinus."

"amorphous substance" (ούσίαν ἄμορφον).[42] Since it was the product of a female being only, it could not be conceived as possessing form, as the Gnostics generally considered this the function of the male partner in procreation. The substance produced by Sophia was the objectification of her desire toward the Father.[43] The passions resulting from Sophia's desire consisted of ignorance, grief, fear, and bewilderment.[44]

In response to the supplications of Sophia, joined sympathetically by the other Aeons, the Father without conjunction (ἀσύζυγος) produced Horos.[45] By the intervention of Horos Sophia was purified, established, and restored.

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[42] Meaning "unformed matter." See Harvey, *op. cit.*, vol.I.17.

[43] There is running through the speculation a duality which is often quite obvious. In this case the enthymesis of Sophia, i.e., material substance, is a parallel product to the enthymesis of Bythus earlier, i.e., intelligent being--Nous.

[44] τῆς ἀγνοίας, καὶ τῆς λύπης, καὶ τοῦ φοβοῦ, καὶ τῆς ἐκπλήξεως, *adv. Haer.* I.2.3. There are minor variations in the passions from passage to passage. For a note on this point, see Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion*, 187f.

[45] Cf. *Ref.* VI.26, Wendland VI.31; *Val.*X.

Διὰ δὲ τοῦ Ὅρου τούτου φασὶ κεκάθαρθαι καὶ ἐστηρίχθαι τὴν Σοφίαν, καὶ ἀποκατασταθῆναι τῇ συζυγίᾳ.

adv. *Haer*. I.2.4.

Although Sophia herself remained within the Pleroma, her enthymesis was taken from her and banished outside. This substance possessed something of the nature of an Aeon, but was shapeless and without form.

After this the Father produced through Monogenes (Nous) the final pair of Aeons--Christos and the Holy Spirit. It was their task to prevent any of the other Aeons falling into a predicament like that of Sophia. This was a genuine danger, as great confusion and uncertainty had arisen among the Aeons themselves as a result of Sophia's passion. Though the text of Irenaeus is difficult at this point, it is clear that Christos with his companion taught the other Aeons something about the Father.[46] This creation of a certain equality among the members of Pleroma resulted in "perfect rest" (*ἀληθινὴν ἀνάπαυσιν*) among them. It was in this perfect condition and in agreement with all concerned that the Aeons, each contributing his or her most precious element or characteristic, united to produce Jesus (Soter), the "perfect fruit" (τέλειον καρπόν) of the Pleroma. This Jesus was a spiritual being.

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[46] *adv*. *Haer*. I.2.5; cf. *Val*. XI.

After the production of Soter attention shifts to those events outside the Pleroma that concern the enthymesis of Sophia, now to be known as Achamoth.[47] The "darkness and vacuity" to which Achamoth was banished became to her the cause of extreme anxiety. Christos, having pity on her, descended and imparted figure to her substance. This giving of form to Achamoth did not convey intelligence, but rather resulted in an "Awakened awareness of her separation from the Pleroma."[48] Jonas continues:

> This initiates a redemptional task whose accomplishment requires a long detour of suffering and divine interventions. Since Christos was not meant actually

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[47] One must resist speculating on the fact that in this form the title corresponds to the Hebrew feminine plural. The plurality of Sophias in the Valentinian system is surely not dependent upon a plural noun form.

The organization of the Valentinian system is therefore reasonably clear. First, there is the Pleroma composed of the Aeons (the exact number varies--usually 30) with the Father at the head and Sophia in the last position. Outside the Pleroma but above the Creator God of the Old Testament--known usually as the Demiurge--is Achamoth. In addition to this the Demiurge is above the seven heavens, thus reckoning from Achamoth downwards to the physical world there is a second Ogdoad.

With regard to origins, Albright (W.F. Albright, From the Stone Age to Christianity, Garden City, N.Y.; 1957,369) argues that the myth of the "Lesser Sophia" is of Canaanite-Aramaean origin, dating perhaps as early as the seventh century B.C.

[48] Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, 186. Although the treatise De Resurrectione (M.Malinine, et al., De Resurrectione,

to leave the Pleroma, his main task being within it, and since on the other hand the imperfect female hypostasis could be made perfect only through a permanent spiritual pairing, her first formation over the Cross was all Christos could do for her.[49]

Having become aware of her circumstances Achamoth was deeply moved by a desire to move toward the light world. It was necessary for Horos to prevent the realization of Achamoth's desire, because she did not possess the qualities essentially a part of those beings within the Pleroma.[50] This lack was of course the reason for her initial banishment. The obstruction by Horos was again the cause of great frustration. The associated "passions" were similar to those specified in the passion of the first Sophia, the exception

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Zurich und Stuttgart: 1963) is of Valentinian origin, it reflects only the barest traces of a Sophia myth. As its title indicates its concern was elsewhere. In connection with the context under consideration *De Resurrectione* urges that the Pleroma is "strong" (*ⲭⲱⲣⲉ*) and overwhelms the cosmos in importance.

[49] *Ibid*. For a note on the significance of the Cross here see Jonas, same reference, n.16. The point is specifically made in Excerpta 42:

Ὁ σταυρὸς τοῦ ἐν πληρώματι Ὅρου σημεῖόν ἐστιν· χωρίζει γὰρ τοὺς ἀπίστους τῶν ἀπιστῶν ὡς ἐκεῖνος τὸν κόσμον τοῦ πληρώματος.

[50] For the role of Horos here see Sagnard, *op. cit.*, 161f.

being that "bewilderment" (ἔκπληξις) is replaced by "perplexity" (ἀπορία).[51] The basic difference between the two Sophia figures is that in the first the passion was the result of degeneration, whereas in the second it was an essential part of her nature. Irenaeus speaking of Achamoth says:

> καὶ οὐ καθάπερ ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῆς, ἡ πρώτη Σοφία Αἰών, ἑτεροίωσιν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἶχεν, ἀλλὰ ἐναντιότητα.
>
> *adv*. *Haer*. I.4.2

The passions of Achamoth were to become the material substance of which the world itself was later to be formed.

> Ταύτην σύνταξιν [of passions] καὶ οὐσίαν τῆς ὕλης γεγενῆθαι λέγουσιν, ἐξ ἧς ὅδε ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν.
>
> *adv*. *Haer*. I.4.2

Even the Demiurge was formed of Achamoth's passion.[52] The speculation was worked out in such detail that even the various passions or their attendant manifestations were associated with specific types of material substance.

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[51] Jonas (*The Gnostic Religion*, 188) suggests "consternation" or "shock" for ἔκπληξις and "bewilderment" for ἀπορία. It would appear that the difference in these variations really lies in the choice of words, and not in any matter of substance.

[52] Attention has already been called to the fact that the Gnostics commonly identified the Demiurge with the Creator God of the Old Testament.

Ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν δακρύων αὐτῆς γεγονέναι πασαν ἔνυγρον οὐσίαν, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ γέλωτος τὴν φωτεινήν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς λύπης καὶ ἐκπλήξεως τὰ σωματικὰ τοῦ κοσμοῦ στοιχεῖα.

adv. *Haer*. I.4.2

After her awakening and her unsuccessful attempt to ascend to the world of light, Achamoth became the suppliant of the Light--i.e., Christos--which had come to her earlier but had also departed.[53] As his function was one to be fulfilled on the other side of the Limit (Horos), Soter was sent to her.[54] Soter assumed an a agency in creation consonant with Colossians 1.16. Or, as it is stated in Excerpta 45, "Thus through the appearance of the Savior, Wisdom came into being (*ἡ Σοφία γίνεται*) and the elements without were created."

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[53] There is a certain parallel here in the concept that the Holy Spirit departed from man after the Fall (see Tatian, *Oratio ad Graecos*, VII). Similarly in the system of Justin the Gnostic Elohim abandoned Eden after learning of his origin (Hippolytus, *Ref*. X.11). Something of the same sort seems to be expressed even earlier in Enoch 42 where Wisdom is said to have returned to heaven because she could find no dwelling place among the children of men. The essential question of course would have to do with whether or not the Enoch passage lies at the root of this series of developments.

[54] Hippolytus suggests (*Ref*. VI.27, Wendland VI.32) that when he was sent Soter was intended to be Achamoth's consort. However, Irenaeus (*adv*. *Haer*. I.7.1) does not draw this in until the consummation.

The question of course arises as to how Sophia should now be spoken of as coming into existence as she was originally one of the primordial aeons. Part of the answer of course lies in the division between Sophia (above) and Achamoth (below). Originally Achamoth received form only with regard to substance, (*τὴν κατ' οὐσίαν μόνον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν κατὰ γνῶσιν* *adv. Haer*. I.4.1). Only at this later stage of development did Soter impart "to her form as respected intelligence" (*κἀ'κεινον μορφῶσαι αὐτὴν μορφωσιν τὴν κατὰ γνῶσιν* *adv. Haer*. I.4.5), and heal her passions.

The presence of these passions is important. They could not be destroyed as they had acquired a certain permanence. Soter therefore separated them from her and changed them from incorporeal passions into unorganized matter.

The sequence of this development is carefully explained in *Excerpta* 46.

> First, therefore, he drew these things from immaterial passion and chance and transformed them into matter still incorporeal, then in a similar manner into compound substance and bodies. For it was not possible for passion to be brought into being by a single process and he endowed the bodies with properties suitable to their nature.[55]

This creation possessed a dual nature, one evil from her passions, the other subject to suffering from her conversion.[56]

The preceding creation should be thought of as an ideal one out of which, as we have already observed, the Demiurge himself was created. As we have also seen, subsequent to his own creation, the Demiurge assumed the role of Creator and produced the material world. That he did so in ignorance of all those above him, thinking himself to be the Supreme God, is of vital importance to the Gnostic scheme, for his ignorance provided a vacuum in which the Gnostics placed their complex system.

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[55] Translations of Excerpta are from Casey, op. cit., unless otherwise noted.

[56] Of this creation before creation, Jonas (The Gnostic Religion, 189) says:

> Thus, by the Savior's appearance, on the one hand is the Sophia freed of her passions and on the other hand are the things external founded; and thereby the Savior "potentially" brings on (makes possible) the subsequent demiurgical creation.

Ταῦτα δὲ τὸν Δημιουργὸν φάσκουσιν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ μὲν ᾠῆσθαι ‹κατὰ πάντα› κατασκευάζειν, πεποιηκέναι δ'αὐτὰ τῆς Ἀχαμὼθ προβαλλούσης.[57]

adv. Haer. I.5.3

When Soter descended to Achamoth, a company of angels attended him. Through contemplation of these angels, Achamoth produced a "spiritual nature." This she placed in the Demiurge without his knowledge, and he in turn placed it within his own creation, again in ignorance.[58] Salvation consists in the reviving through gnosis of this spiritual or divine "spark."

> The gnosis itself is finally brought down to a sufficiently readied mankind by Jesus[59] unified with Christos, descending upon the human Jesus at his baptism in the Jordan and departing from him before his passion so that Death was deceived. The suffering of the mortal Jesus had no other significance than that of a stratagem. The real "passion" was the pre-cosmic one of the upper and lower Sophia, and it was what made salvation necessary, not what brought salvation. Nor was

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[57] This must however be modified by *adv. Haer.* I. 17.2, where a vague knowledge is given place.

[58] Cf. *Excerpta* 53. In all this activity outside the Pleroma, Achamoth is a "type" of the Propator and the Demiurge of Nous.

[59] One of Irenaeus' most striking statements of this point is as follows:

τὸν Κύριον ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις τοῦ κοσμοῦ χρόνοις διὰ τοῦτο ἐληλυθέναι ἐπὶ τὸ πάθος λέγουσιν, ἵνα ἐπιδείξῃ τὸ περὶ τὸν ἔσχατον τῶν Αἰώνων γεγονὸς πάθος καὶ δι'αὐτοῦ τοῦ τέλους ἐμφήνῃ τὸ τέλος τῆς περὶ τοὺς Αἰῶνας πραγματείας.

adv. Haer. I.8.2

> there ever an "original sin" of man, a guilt of the human soul: there was, instead, the time-preceding guilt of an Aeon, a divine upheaval, whose reparation in its course required the creation of the world and that of man. Thus the world, unbeknown to its immediate author, is for the sake of salvation, not salvation for the sake of what happened within creation and to creation. And the real object of salvation is the godhead itself, its theme the divine integrity.[60]

The perfection of knowledge,[61] according to the Valentinians, will initiate the consummation. Achamoth and her consort Soter will return to the Pleroma, the full extent of which will serve as their nuptial chamber. They will take the spiritual ones of the earth with them. The Demiurge with the righteous ones of the animal nature will assume the place of Achamoth, and the material world will be destroyed.[62] With this the Pleroma is restored in integrity, the original mistake put right, the pre-cosmic loss regained, and matter and soul--the result of the fall--dissolved.[63] Gnosis at this point will have achieved the goal entrusted to it.

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[60] Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, 195f. For the union of Jesus and Christos see Excerpta 59. Hippolytus (Ref. VI.31, Wendland VI.36) notes that the Valentinians recognize three Christs, 1) the consort of the Holy Spirit, 2) Soter--the "Joint Fruit of the Pleroma," and 3) the Christ of Mary. Jonas in the passage mentioned above notes that in some Gnostic documents (esp. The Gospel of Truth) Jesus' "passion" does play a role of some importance.

[61] The ignorance of the Demiurge was terminated at the coming of Soter, adv. Haer. I.7.1,4.

[62] Cf. esp. adv. Haer. I.7.5.

III. NON-VALENTINIAN SOURCES

The Sethian-Ophite Gnostics of Irenaeus. The description of the Sethian-Ophites given in Irenaeus includes another Gnostic cosmogony.[64] Again, it is similar in its basic construction and purpose to that of the Valentinians. At the same time it manifests variations/deviations of the sort one has come to expect. That portion of Irenaeus' account which involves the Sophia figure(s) may be summarized as follows.

The "First Light" (primum lumen) produced a son by means of his Ennoea which went forth from him. This son was called "Son of man" or "Second Man." Below these was the Holy Spirit. "He" was called "the first woman." From these three, both males "shedding light" upon the Holy Spirit, came a third male who was called "Christ."

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[63] Cf. Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, 196.

[64] adv. Haer. I.30. Such a title as "Sethian-Ophite" must only represent an approximation. In the early accounts Theodoret identified them, while Epiphanius distinguished between them (see Harvey, op. cit., 226 n.3).

To this point one might observe that the description is relatively simple. This simplicity is to be quickly interrupted however by the difficulty which resulted from the inadequacy of the Holy Spirit.

The "light" of the first two males proved to be more than the Holy Spirit could contain and as a result she brought forth two distinct and different beings. Christ is described as a product of the "right side." He therefore tended upward by nature and immediately became an "incorruptible aeon" with his mother. The other portion, namely that of the "left side," fell downward from the sphere of its origin. It was called "Sinistra, Prunicus, and Sophia." This being, though tending downward, did possess something of the "light" of its progenitors. Sophia's descent resulted in contact with the "waters" which she not only set in motion but from which she also assumed a body.

When this being began to regret its action it could do nothing because of the cumbersome nature of its watery body. It was ultimately able through great effort to make a partial recovery by means of the "light" originally imparted to it. While still in possession of its watery body, and after making a certain return upward, it formed the visible heaven. There followed a separation motivated by Sophia's "desire" in which her spirit returned to the heavenly sphere while her "body" remained below. This discarded material substance was called "a female from a female" (foeminam a foemina).[65]

This lower figure--only later referred to as Ialdabaoth--possessed a creative power similar to that of his mother. Through this power seven others were generated, each giving rise to the one beneath itself, to form the Hebdomad.

Ialdabaoth was contemptuous of his mother's power. This contempt, based on the fact that he had his own creative power, was manifest in his own creation. Thus, the Hebdomad were found striving among themselves about the supreme power. This grieved Ialdabaoth and drove him to another creation. This son was called Nous and took the twisted form of a serpent. It was from this one that the Ophites (ὄφις-serpent) took their name.

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[65] Cf. Apocalypse of James 35.11. It should by now have become evident that Irenaeus indicates an easy movement from male to neuter to female, etc., in the conceptual world of these Gnostics. The particular usage was apparently determined by nothing more than whichever form seemed most suitable in any given circumstance.

After this Irenaeus records that on a certain occasion when Ialdabaoth's spirit was elated, he announced, "Ego Pater et Deus, et super me nemo." Such blasphemy caused his mother Sophia to respond, "Noli mentiri, Ialdabaoth: est enim super te pater omnium primus Anthropus, et Anthropus filius Anthropi." Only at this point did Ialdabaoth's creation come to know that there were other powers above their progenitor. In this partial description it would seem that Ialdabaoth's proposal of creation was in fact an attempt to control a potential rebellion. At the same time Sophia turned the whole thing to her advantage as a means of stripping the powers of their spiritual element, a quality originally imparted by Achamoth. The powers accomplished the creation only to discover that the man they had created could not lift himself from the ground. In view of this problem they consulted Sophia. She suggested that Ialdabaoth "breathe into" man the necessary spirit. This was her scheme for making Ialdabaoth remove from himself the ability to challenge those powers above himself. It was in this way that man acquired mind and thought (Nun et Enthymesin) and became a servant of the First Man.

Irenaeus makes it quite clear that these Sethian-Ophites integrated their theology into the framework of the biblical narrative far beyond the creation. With specific regard to Ialdabaoth, this was done in some detail. It was Ialdabaoth who planned to strip Adam of his power through the woman. Further, it was he who ultimately cast Adam and Eve out of paradise. He was responsible for the flood. He made a covenant with Abraham and worked through Moses. He spoke through the prophets. Indeed he was even used as the instrument through whom John the Baptist and Jesus were born and prepared for their role in the redemption of the fragments of the light world present in the material order. The character of this role recalls that of the Logos in a number of second century "orthodox" writers.

Although Irenaeus does not enumerate as many specific things, it is apparent that Sophia was also active within history, usually in opposition to Ialdabaoth. Two early items mentioned are that it was she who restored to Adam and Eve a measure of light whereby they knew that they were naked, and that they possessed material bodies that were subject to death. Further, it was she who prevented Ialdabaoth destroying mankind completely in the flood by saving Noah and his family. Finally, it was Sophia who was the primary progenitor of John and Jesus, although Ialdabaoth was instrumental in their production as we have observed. This leads to a consideration of the redemptive activity of Jesus-Christ-Sophia which was of cardinal importance for these Gnostics.

Although the importance of this redemptive activity cannot be denied, the account given below is restricted by the limited amount of information given by Irenaeus and the indication of almost casual integration with biblical concepts at certain points, some of which give rise to questions that cannot be answered.

When she could find no rest above or below, Sophia begged help from her mother. The Holy Spirit in turn asked the First Man to send Christ to her, which request was granted. When he had descended and upon recognizing Sophia, Christ announced his advent through John. He also adopted Jesus beforehand that he might have a "pure vessel" into which to come, and that "through a son of that Ialdabaoth the woman might be announced by Christ."[66] Christ stripped the heavenly beings of their powers, upon which the fragments of light rushed to him. He clothed his sister Sophia with the light and they rejoiced as bridegroom and bride. Then Christ, united to Sophia, descended into Jesus. In typical Gnostic adoptionist terms, we are told that this union continued from Jesus' baptism until just before his crucifixion, during which time Jesus performed many mighty works. It was only Jesus, therefore, who was subjected to crucifixion, and it was through the thoughtfulness of Christ--now separated--that Jesus was subsequently raised and given new existence. After his resurrection, Jesus lived on earth eighteen months and taught a select group whenever knowledge came to him from above.

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[66] adv. Haer. I.30.11. The passage is problematic. The Latin text reads: et uti per filium ejus Ialdabaoth foemina a Christo annuntiaretur. The proper name "Ialdabaoth" is of course indeclinable and may therefore be taken to agree either with filium or ejus. The Latin could be rendered: "Through her (Sophia's) son Ialdabaoth. . .", but this would be difficult. Hence the translation in the text, which could be interpreted: "Through a son (Christ) of that Ialdabaoth (the human race?). . . ." One wonders if this is not the way the speculation is moving. Although Harvey notes no biblical references at this point, one may further wonder in this case whether there is any association with the imagery of the Lucan Infancy narrative.

A Gnostic "Christology" which unites Christ and Sophia and joins them to Jesus is of extreme importance for this study. We cannot resist the conclusion that such a concept is much nearer "orthodoxy" than may first appear and that such may indeed provide an important nexus between the Gnostic and "orthodox" worlds. The whole of the concept here is Gnostic to be sure, but the way Sophia is conceived to have been active both before and during Jesus' ministry merits careful attention. This is much like the way in which the more "orthodox" tradition conceived both of the hypostatized figures Wisdom and Logos, particularly of course the Logos after the identification was established with Jesus. One might even argue that the role assigned to Sophia in its dual aspect before and during Jesus' ministry takes the biblical view into account more clearly than does contemporary "orthodoxy." Surely it is more than a specific point where fertile Gnostic imagination chanced to be basically the same in kind (greater in depth?) to that found in the "orthodox" world. Most scholars would agree that the Gnostic view was extreme. However, it would appear that one can occasionally catch a glimpse of the kind of reasoning that made it possible for the Gnostics to move from the less to the more speculative world of thought. It has in fact become our conviction that the Gnostic Sophia myth was largely the result of just such an elaboration.

The Apocryphon of John.[67] AJn propagates a Sophia

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[67] The shorter version of this treatise has been known for some time. It was in fact acquired by the Royal Library in Berlin in 1896. This text with notes and a German translation was published by Till (W. C. Till, Die Gnostischen Schriften des Koptischen Papyrus Berolinensis 8502, Texte und Untersuchungen LX, Berlin: 1955) along with variants of another copy of the same version from Nag Hammadi. An English translation of certain sections made from Till's German by E. R. Hardy may be found in Grant, Anthology, 69-85. Selections (with other notes and bibliography) may also be found in Hennecke, Apocrypha (English translation), vol. 1, 314-331.

The three different versions of AJn found at Nag Hammadi have recently been published in one volume with comparative apparatus (M. Krause und P. Labib, Die Drei Versionen des Apokryphon des Johannes im Koptischen Museum myth similar in a number of its fundamental aspects to that of the Valentinians. Although quite respectable from

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zu Alt-Kairo, Wiesbaden: 1962). The longer of these three versions, i. e., that of Codex II (according to the designation of the Coptic museum), has also been published separately (S. Giversen, Apocryphon Johannis, Acta Theologica Danica V, Copenhagen: 1963).

Giverson's work is based on photographs of the Ms which are in the possession of the Coptic Museum. A photographic edition containing AJn was published by Labib, Coptic Gnostic Papyri in the Coptic Museum at Old Cairo, vol. 1 (Cairo: 1956), plates 47-80. Our study here is based upon Giversen's work largely because of the accessibility of his English translation. The other versions were compared to this.

Any comparison with Irenaeus is omitted here because of the question of relationships between the two sources (i. e., AJn and adv. Haer. I.29). Many years ago Schmidt (C. Schmidt, "Irenaeus und seine Quelle in Adv. Haer. i, 29," Philotesia: Paul Kleinert, Berlin: 1907, 315-336) argued that Irenaeus must have possessed a copy of AJn and used it (perhaps sometimes with questionable intention) when he wrote adv. Haer. I.29. It has recently been realized that the situation is considerably more complicated than was originally thought. The two documents clearly reflect the same system. Of this there can be little doubt (cf. Sagnard, La gnose valentinienne, 445f.). But did Irenaeus know AJn itself, or some earlier document upon which what is now known (in its various versions) is dependent? See Wilson, Gnosis, 103ff. and H. M. Schenke, "Das literarische Problem des Apokryphron Johannis" ZRGG 14 (1962), 57ff. In any case one can be reasonably sure that AJn did in fact arise out of Barbelognosis and that here we have to do with the source material of Valentinianism.

On a somewhat different line, Doresse (Secret Books, 210f.) argues that Irenaeus must have known an earlier form of AJn than is represented in our texts. In our opinion his most penetrating observation about Irenaeus is that "He would have thundered with indignation, of which there would certainly have been echoes in his book, if in the copy that he read, this writing had already been attributed to Jesus in person."

General summaries of the teaching of AJn may be found in the following sources: Doresse, op. cit., 200-212; Giversen, op. cit., 139-150; W. C. Till, "The Gnostic Apocryphon of John," Journal of Ecclesiastical History III (1952), 14-22.

a conceptual point of view, we shall see that it is not up to the standard to be observed among the Valentinians. We prefer to reserve judgement as to which particular Gnostic group the document originally belonged. It is enough here to suggest that it belongs to the Syrian-Egyptian type of Gnostic speculation--as do all the documents under our miscellaneous heading.[68]

The series of emanations that comprise divine activity prior to the establishment of the material order as such is recorded in *AJn* (Codex II) may be described as follows.[69] The highest Father produced Barbelo (apparently to be thought of primarily as his female aspect) as the result of contemplating his own image in the figurative water of spiritual light. Four others (Prognosis, Incorruptibility, Eternal Life, and Truth) were added to make up the Father's "eternal Pentad." Christ (the "only son") and Nous followed. Then the Word (*ϣⲁϫⲉ*)[70] came forth through whom Christ created the All.

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[68] For a summary of Barbelo-Gnostic theology as it is found in the Berlin Codex, see Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion*, 199-205.

[69] The details to follow were taken from *AJn* (Codex II) 52.21-57.24 and are in substantial agreement with the Berlin Codex.

[70] The Berlin Codex (31.15-17) has *ⲗⲟⲅⲟⲥ*.

Subsequent to this, Christ revealed four other "lights." Four "powers" then appeared which were attached to these "lights." Each of these "powers" possessed three "aeons." The last "power" Phronesis, attached to the last "light" Eleleth, had as its "aeons" Perfection (ϪⲰⲔ), Peace (εἰρήνη), and Sophia (σοφία). The fact that Sophia is "the last of the last"--a position similar in its own way to that of the Valentinian system--lays the ground for her fall. The section closes with an account of the creation of the "perfect man" Adamas. He and his seed were placed over the first three "lights". The ignorant and obstinate souls were placed in the fourth.

The narrative of Sophia's illegitimate creation follows immediately.

57.25 But (δέ) Epinoia's (ἐπίνοια) Sophia (σοφία) since
she is an aeon (αἰών)
conceived a thought from herself with
the invisible (ἀόρατος) spirit's (πνεῦμα) Enthymesis
(ἐνθύμησις)
and Prognosis (πρόγνωσις); she would reveal
an image from herself without [the will] of
the spirit (πνεῦμα)
30 although he did not approve (εὐδοκεῖν) it and
[without] her fellow
and without his thought. But (δέ) although
her male element (πρόσωπον) did not approve
(συνευδοκεῖν) it
and (δέ) although she did not find her fellow
and (δέ) thought it without (χωρίς) the will
of the spirit (πνεῦμα)
35 and the knowledge of her fellow she brought
it forth.
58.1 But (δέ) because of the invincible power in her,
her thought was not ineffective (ἄργος) and

an imperfect thing was revealed from her,
and it was different from her appearance
because she had created it without her fellow,
and it bore no likeness to the mother's shape
and it had another form (μορφή). But (δέ)
when she with
her will had seen that it was of a type (τύπος)
which was different,
with a dragon's (δράκων) with a lion's face and its
eyes[71]
were like burning lightning which
flashes, she cast it from her away from
that place (τόπος) in order that none
of the immortal ones should see it for (γάρ)
she had created it
in ignorance, and she surrounded it with
a cloud of light and she placed a throne (θρόνος)
in the midst of the cloud that nobody
should see it except (εἰ μήτι) the holy spirit (πνεῦμα)
who is called "the mother of the living ones."
But she called his name: "Ialtabaoth."

The following points should be noted specifically. Sophia brought forth her own thought by means of typical Gnostic emanation (57.26). Her production is described as the result of her "thought" and not of her "fall" as in Valentinianism. However, this should be taken as simply antecedent to the Valentinian view and not as materially different. Sophia's action was solely her own (57.29ff.). The presence of the "invincible power" (ⲦϬⲞⲘ ⲚⲀⲦϪⲢⲞ) within her explains the necessity of what happened, i. e., because of the power within her, her thought was not ineffective.

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[71] Although there would appear to be something missing after δράκων Giversen makes no note of his apparently incomplete translation. Till (BG 37.20f.) translates: "da es von Schlangen- und Löwen-Aussehen war." The mythical picture may be that of a creature with a dragon's body and a lion's head.

The Berlin Codex and Codex III put the root of Sophia's action within her "desire" (="passion" for the Father).[72] Such an expression is suggestive of human passion and Codex II is consistent with its general practice of obscuring such crudities.[73] Sophia's creation took a form (μορφή) different from her own (58.4ff.). Again, this happened simply because she did not have the power to impart form to it. Such was thought to belong to the male partner in procreation. When Sophia saw her mistake she attempted to hide it (58.11ff.). This reflects the fact that once her thought had been brought to materialization it could neither be denied nor destroyed. Sophia named her creation Ialtabaoth (58.19). He became a creator himself and although his activities manifest a wide range they are fairly closely integrated with the Old Testament. A detailed description of his activities follows that portion of the text quoted above.

Somewhat later in the text Sophia's growing awareness and consequent repentance is described in detail.

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[72] BG 37.11: ⲠⲈⲠⲢⲞⲨⲚⲒⲔⲞⲚ: CII 15.3: ⲠⲈⲪⲢⲞⲨⲢⲒⲔⲞⲚ.

[73] See Giversen, op. cit., 194f. The more primitive thought is of course the earlier. One may therefore see the direction of development with regard to one specific item. The real question lies in the extent to which a generalization might be formed from such a specific. Cf. our earlier discussion supra 353, note 33. We agree with the generally held view that AJn of Codex II is later than its more abbreviated counterpart (see Wilson, Gnosis, 103ff.). In our opinion, Giversen (op. cit., esp. 277f.) misinterprets the evidence to draw the opposite conclusion.

One of the striking things about it is that it suggests that Sophia only gradually realized that what she had done was in fact wrong. In giving beginning to another being she had lost something herself. Her experience is so intimately described that the passage must be quoted.

61.13 "The mother began (ἄρχεσθαι) now
to go to and fro. She knew the lack
15 through that, that her germ of light was diminished, and
she was darkened because her partner had not
agreed (συμφωνεῖν) with her." But (δέ) I said,
"Lord, what does it mean 'she went to and fro'"? But (δέ) he
smiled and said, "Do not think it is,
20 as Moses said, 'above the
waters'! No, but (ἀλλά) when she had seen
the wickedness (κακία) which had arisen and the robbery which
her son had committed, she repented (μετανοεῖν),
and (when she had seen) that an oblivion had come over her in
25 the darkness of ignorance, she began (ἄρχεσθαι) to be ashamed
while she moved. But (δέ) the movement, that is the going to and fro.
But (δέ) Authades[74] (αὐθάδης) took a power from
his mother; however (γάρ) he was ignorant
because (γάρ) he thought that there existed [no] other
30 but (εἰ μήτι) his mother. And (δέ) [he saw] the multitude
of angels (ἄγγελος) which [he had] made, and he felt himself
superior to them. But (δέ) when the mother had
recognized the veil[75] of darkness
because he was not created perfect and she knew

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[74] This is not properly a title. The reference is undoubtedly to Ialtabaoth and means "the impudent, complacent obstinate one" (Giversen, op. cit., 234).

[75] ⲁⲧϩⲃⲥⲱ; BG 46.10: ⲉⲫⲟⲩϩⲉ.

35 that her partner did not agree (συμφωνεῖν) with
her she repented (μετανοεῖν)
62.1 with much weeping, and the whole Pleroma (πλήρωμα)
heard the prayer of her repentance (μετάνοια) and
praised for her sake
the invisible (ἀόρατος), virginal (παρθενικος)
5 spirit (πνεῦμα). The holy spirit (πνευμα) poured
upon her
something of their total Pleroma (πνεῦμα)
for (γάρ) her partner did not come to her,
but (ἀλλά) from the Pleroma (πλήρωμα) came something to her
to fulfill her want, and she
10 was not brought to her own aeon (αἰών)
but (ἀλλά) to the heaven of her son, that she should
be in the ninth until she had restored her
want. And a voice came to her from the eternal (αἰών)
high heaven: 'Man exists and the son of man'".

We see here that Sophia's repentance was rooted in her delayed but yet acute realization that the deed she had done was wrong. This is the most fundamental thought in the passage. Sophia had acted--but without her partner (61.16f.). However, only her diminishing "germ of light" caused her to realize this (61.15f.). This diminishing light is a way of speaking of the "power" that her imperfect offspring had taken from her (61.27f.). Sophia's shame was the result of the "oblivion" which came over her "in the darkness of ignorance" (61.24f.). This is a penetrating statement from a more philosophical point of view and may represent an alteration from the Berlin Codex which at this point describes the fallen Sophia as a desperate woman walking back and forth in the darkness (45.14f.).[76] Such a change would be consistent with the tendency apparent in Codex II to soften harsh anthropomorphisms. Of Sophia's suffering in this system, Jonas says, "it comes *after* the facts that arose from her aberration and is thus a mere emotional episode compared to the crucial, literally 'substantial' role it plays in the Valentinian system."[77]

In positive response to Sophia's repentance the entire Pleroma united in common voice to praise "the invisible, virginal spirit (62.1ff.).[78] Then, in contrast to the other versions of this apocryphon, Sophia is *not* reunited with her partner (at least not at this point, 62.7).[79] The writer of *AJn* Codex II is explicit on this point for the apparent purpose of being able to describe what was in fact granted to Sophia over against this negative. Sophia was given "something" designed for her own appropriation to fill up her deficiency (62.8f.). As a result of this bequest, Sophia once again became a complete being. The sequence is concluded when Sophia is placed in the nonad where she is to await her recovery. Nothing is said of Sophia's restoration to the Pleroma, reunion, marital bliss, etc. Rather, at least from appearances, the narrative moves away from a direct description of Sophia's situation.

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[76] Giversen, *op*. *cit*., 280; cf. 235f. That BG here interprets *ἐπιφέρεσθαι* on its own terms yet clearly alluding to and making it consistent with Genesis 1.2 see S. Giversen, "The Apocryphon of John and Genesis," *Studia Theologica* 17 (1963), 68.

[77] Jonas, *Gnostic Religion*, 202.

[78] The reference here is to the Father of the All.

[79] The Berlin Codex (47.2ff.) suggests that both Sophia's partner and "a spirit from the Perfection" were given to her. Though not directly relevant to this study, an area for future consideration would be the various things--however vague or incomplete--that are granted to different "fallen" figures. One has the feeling that some interesting associations might emerge.

At this point a "voice" from the "eternal high heaven" said, "Man exists and the son of man" (62.14).[79a] The Protarchon Ialtabaoth thought it was his mother. As a result "the perfect Pronoia . . . the father of the all . . . was revealed" (62.20ff.). The Protarchon and the "powers" observing the reflected image in the water determined to create man (62.31ff.). An incredibly detailed account of their actions follows. Three hundred and sixty-five angels (as well as others) were involved in the various aspects of the creation (67.2ff.). Yet "their work" did not move until the power of the "mother" was blown into his face (67.15ff.). The creation was immediately stronger than the powers so they placed him in the "lowest region" (68.2ff.). Adam was however given "an Epinoia of light" (68.17). It was called Zoé and was to help the entire creation, teaching the way to "go up." This Epinoia was designed to be "a restoration of the mother's want" (68.27f.).[79b] Zoé (Eve)[79c] is only later identified with Sophia and her purpose openly stated.

[79a] Cf. Irenaeus, supra 370, etc.

> 71.20 . . . our sister
> Sophia (σοφία) who came down in innocence
> (ἄκακος)
> in order to remove the want.
> Therefore she was called "Zoé" (ζωή),--that is
> the mother of all living--by the
> 25 Pronoia (πρόνοια) of the heavenly Authentia
> (αὐθεντία), and through
> her they tasted the perfect (τέλειος) Gnosis
> (γνῶσις).

Thus the basis is laid for the reconstitution of the spiritual world.

[79b] See 69.15f. and 71.6f. for some of the specific functions of this Epinoia.

[79c] The Epinoia seems to have come into Eve from Adam. This is dependent upon a Gnostic speculative interpretation concerning the "rib" (71.1ff.). Later we are told that the "Epinoia of the living light" revealed herself in Eve (72.10ff.).

The use that is made of the person of Eve in the Gnostic texts might repay investigation. There are cases when Eve is Zoé--the "Epinoia of Light"--a figure of good. Other times one gets the impression that the Gnostics could not throw off the original Jewish tradition. Is this simple inconsistency--or what?

Sophia Jesu Christi.[80] Till's edition of the Berlin text of this document includes variants from another version of the same writing from the Nag Hammadi collection, as well as variants to those parts of the treatise paralleled in the Epistle of Eugnostos.[81] This letter written by Eugnostos, who was a "spokesman for the Great Seth," is distinguished by the absence of the narrative material--largely questions put to the resurrected Jesus and the introductory words of his replies--which is found in SJC. The question of relationships between these documents, outside our scope here, has been variously debated.[82]

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[80] The Coptic text along with a German translation and introductory notes has been published by Till (W. C. Till, Die Gnostischen Schriften des Koptischen Papyrus Berolinensis 8502, Texte und Untersuchungen LX, Berlin: 1955). The Berlin manuscript has of course been known for some time, being the same one that contains the Apocryphon of John, as noted earlier. Doresse (op. cit., 86 n. 41) notes C. Schmidt's original article ("Ein vorirenaisches gnostisches Originalwerk . . .," in Sitzungsber. d. kgl. preussichen Akademie d. Wiss., 1896, 839-47). See also: H.M. Schenke, "Das System der Sophia Jesu Christi" ZRGG 14 (1962), 262-278.

Among other things, SJC reflects a greater female encroachment into the biblical concept of the fatherhood of God than is usually found in the Gnostic documents. This may be a sign of the inward deterioration of the movement. Laeuchli (The Language of Faith, 33 n.22, 34) observes that this is a "biological necessity in metaphysical expression." Further, "The consequence of this terminological transmutation is inevitable: with such a deflated concept, later Gnosticism must lift God above fatherhood.

[81] For a complete table of these parallels, see Till, op. cit., 53f.

One should begin by urging the difficulty of penetrating the finer points of our author's imagination. On the other hand, one must hasten to add that the main lines of his thought are fairly clear. Although the treatise may be described generally as "typically Gnostic," at least by nature and subject matter, it also possesses a certain undeniable individuality. This will become increasingly evident as the discussion proceeds. With regard to the origin of the document it would appear that, even though there are certain similarities with various elements in Irenaeus' descriptions of heresy, it is as yet impossible to link it with any specific group. Again, "Syrian-Egyptian" is adequate definition.

The supreme god in *SJC* is sometimes referred to as *προπάτωρ*. The other divine beings emanate from this one.

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[82] Wilson, *Gnosis*, 112ff., summarizes the development of the discussion in some detail. Sources include: Till, *op. cit.*, 54f.; Doresse, *Secret Books*, 54; Puech, in Hennecke *New Testament Apocrypha*, I, 248; Schenke, *ZRGG* 14 (1962), 264ff. As Wilson notes (*op. cit.* 114), final checking cannot take place until the text of *Eugnostos* is published; Krause however (Mullus: *Jahrb. f. Antike u Christentum, Erganzungsband* 1, Munster: 1964, 215ff.) cogently argues that *Eugnostos* is the older document because it presents a coherent text, whereas *SJC* is often confused because of the material incorporated into it (e.g., questions which do not fit the answers given to them, etc.).

Schenke observes that the discussion in SJC concerns four pairs of aeons, resulting in three different Sophia figures.[83] They are:

Propator--πρόγνωσις (87.4-8)
Father--Great Sophia (94.7-95.4)
Christ--Agape Sophia (99.3-18)
Soter--Pistis Sophia (102.15-103.9)

The section translated below, in which the titles and pronouns are sometimes confusing, describes the beginning of the Primal Man and his companion Sophia. It seems that it is the προπάτωρ who appears here under the guise of the "self-generated" and "self-created." Till, retaining the ambiguity of the text, comments:

> Durch(?) den αὐτοφυής und αὐτοκτίστος Vater trat der erste Mensch als unsterbliches, mannlich-weibliches Wesen ins Dasein (94, 1ff.). Die grosse Sophia war von Anfang an zur Paargenossin des "Erklärers" bestimmt (94, 19ff.).[84]

The passage is offered as a response to Matthew's question, "How (πῶς) did man appear?"[85]

93.16 The perfect (τέλειος) Savior (σωτήρ) said: "I
desire that you come to know
that he who appeared
unbounded (ἀπέραντον) before the All,
94.1 the self-generated (αὐτοφυής), self-created
(αὐτοκτίστος)
Father, is perfected
in the brilliant light,

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[83] H.-M Schenke, ZRGG 14 (1962), 353.

[84] Till, op. cit., 57.

[85] The translation is our own, although Till's German was used as a standard of comparison.

(and) is indescribable, (and) he
understands (νοεῖν) the beginning (ἀρχή) so that his
likeness manifests a greater power.
In that hour the light
of that beginning (ἀρχή)
appeared in a Primal
Man, immortal (ἀθάνατος),
male-female, so that
through that immortal
man they might attain
salvation and awake (νήφειν)
in nakedness through
the Interpreter who was
sent, who with you (is)
an end of the poverty of the
robber, his companion is
95.1 Sophia the great, whom he appointed
from the beginning in himself
a συζυγία through the self-
generated (αὐτογενής) Father. Through
this immortal man then (ἄρα)
we appeared first
in godliness and lordship,
for the Father spoke
to him, the man, the αὐτοπάτωρ, who appeared
(and) created for himself a
great Aeon, his name
--ὀγδοάς--(is) commensurate with his
greatness. . . ."

A few lines further down our author speaks of Christ and Sophia. It is not altogether clear whether these two are to be thought of as identical with, or as counterparts to, the earlier figures. Probability would favor the latter. At this point there is no parallel in the *Epistle of Eugnostos*. The passage is introduced with a question from Bartholomew.

98.7 Then
Bartholomew said to him:
"How was he called
in the gospel,
namely the Man and the Son
of Man? Which of them

is the Son?"
The Holy One said:
15 "I desire that you come to know
The Primal Man
who, it is said,
begat their νοῦς. Then
99.1 this one consorted (ἐνθυμεῖσθαι) with
the great Sophia, his
companion, he revealed
his πρωτογενέτωρ--
5 a male-female offspring
this one whose male name
is πρωτογενέτωρ,
the Son of God,
who is the Christ; his
10 female name is
πρωτογενέτειρα, Sophia,
the Mother of the All, whom
some call
Love (ἀγάπη). For the πρωτογενέτωρ
15 --who is called
the Christ--has
power (ἐξουσία) through
his Father. He created for himself
a host of angels (ἄγγελος) without
100.1 number. . . ."

Further down, similar language is found again. This time, however, the text leads away toward thoughts of an eschatological nature. On this occasion the question is put into the mouth of an unnamed disciple who wants to know how the higher entities were able to descend into the world of human experience. Within the mythical material of the reply there is an emphasis on the male-female aspect of the emanation, along with an indication of specific functions, etc. We are told that at this point *SJC* "interpolates a different exposition" to that found in the Epistle of

Eugnostos in reply to the question of the unnamed disciple.[86]

102.14 The perfect (τέλειος)
Savior (σωτήρ) said: "The Son
of Man consorted (συμφωνεῖν) with
Sophia his συζυγία,
he revealed himself in a
103.1 [great Light] as male-
[female. His] manliness
is called
Savior (σωτήρ),
5 the Creator of all things;
but his womanliness (is called)
Sophia, παγγενέτειρα,
whom some call
Pistis.[87]
10 All those who come into
the world (κόσμος) are sent
through this One
even as a drop out
of the light of the world
15 of the παντοκράτωρ.
They guard it through him.
And the chain of his nakedness
bound him to the will of
104.1 Sophia, so that this
thing was revealed to
the whole world (κόσμος) in
poverty because of his
5 pride and his blindness
and his ignorance; then (ϫε)
he was given a name. But I
came from the place (τόπος)
above by means of the will of
10 the great Light. I delivered
every creature. I destroyed
the work of the robber's graves.
I woke him that he might
bear fruit in abundance,
15 namely, the drop that
was sent
through Sophia. . . ."

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[86] Doresse, op. cit., 199.

[87] Cf. 99.14 above where similar language is used of Agape Sophia.

Although elements of the cosmogonic myth are obvious in the quotations above, they are not the point of concern. They rather function as a foundation for other things. This is not to suggest that the text is mythically vague or lethargic. It is neither, as the quotations also clearly establish. It would perhaps be fair to describe SJC as the most mythically dominated of the more philosophic attempts to expound Gnostic thought. Consistent with all this, the text is without exposition of the myths it does contain. Indeed even mythical clarity is secondary. That is to say that a knowledge of them is presupposed. Mythical philosophy is primary.[88]

Early in the document the author speaks of past attempts to know God. He insists that they were all falsely grounded in one way or another and therefore failed. The implication is of course that final and definitive conclusions will be forthcoming if only the reader will be patient. One must observe that the author skilfully preserves an astonishing amount of modesty in such a personally exalting suggestion. With regard to what our author says positively after his deprecation of past attempts, Doresse, speaking of the Epistle of Eugnostos, says:

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[88] For a detailed comparison of the various aspects of the systems in SJC and the Apocryphon of John see Schenke, ZRGG 14 (1962), 352ff.

> Eugnostos then begins to describe the universe as unbegotten. The God of truth is immortal, ineffable, unknowable, without beginning. He is called Father of the universe. He has a likeness which is proper to him, which cannot be seen but by himself. He is altogether intelligence, an ennoïa, a thinking, a reflecting, a reasoning and a power, which are, in their turn, the sources of the universe, all born from the first knowledge--from the prescience--of the Unbegotten.
>
> Many people have been mistaken because they have not conceived the distinction made here: that what is born of destruction is destructible, but what is born of incorruptibility is indestructible.[89]

It is from this point that our author proceeds to explicate a typical series of Gnostic emanations, some of which we have quoted. These of course are only portions of a whole in which one of the prevailing themes is the descent into multiplicity with the subsequent ascent into unity. With these general points in mind we turn to specific observations concerning the earlier quotations.

It is reasonably clear in the first quotation that the Primal Man, who was immortal and male-female, was thought of by our author as the pair composed of the Interpreter and Sophia (94.7ff.). In any case, the mythical facts are not the point of concern. The passage is directed toward the great purpose of the Interpreter (ⲡⲣⲉϥⲃⲱⲗ) who was to serve as the "end of the poverty of the robber" (94.17ff.). Or, to put the same work in other terms, the objects of the

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[89] Doresse, *op. cit.*,193.

Interpreter's concern were to "awake in nakedness" (94.14f.). That is, the spiritual ones should be made aware of the divine spark within them and therefore be recalled to their rightful place. If the Interpreter and "the great Sophia" were in fact thought of as predecessors of Christ and Sophia (ἀγάπη and πίστις, 99.14; 103.9) by the author of SJC, this restoration of spiritual wealth was not accomplished by the former directly but through the latter indirectly.

It is interesting to note in the last quotation that the manly nature of the Son of Man is associated with his role as Savior (σωτήρ, 103.2ff.). There is nothing more here than the fact that salvation is a primary theme. Further, the "drops" from the light world which are to be awakened are within the created order because of him (103.10ff.). The description of the Son of Man as "the Creator of all things" (103.5) is not in fact out of place here. However, there is in some of the language a tone which is elsewhere regularly associated with Ialdabaoth or the Demiurge. One has the feeling that, right through the document, concepts of a purer Gnostic origin have been assimilated with others from the Christian tradition. The Son of Man--Sophia as creator--savior in these passages blends just such diverse concepts.

In the concluding lines of the last quotation (104.7ff.) the "I" of the "perfect Savior" (i.e., the resurrected Jesus) seems to set itself over against the Son of Man. It would appear once more that in this document we have to do with at least two different things which have been blended into a union that is not always harmonious or consistent. However, the typical Gnostic adoptionist concept would have separated the two prior to the crucifixion. Such a concept may be reflected here.

There is in SJC a descending and ascending figure that in some sense imparted knowledge. The giving of knowledge is spoken of most often in terms of awakening an awareness. Such activity should only be viewed as a part of the concern of a much larger Gnostic-Christian redeemer-savior figure.[90] Only an attempt to grasp the more complete figure, though frustratingly difficult, will prove adequate.

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[90] We have expressed our broader disagreement with Wilckens earlier, but we must say here that we feel his view of SJC (and AJn, see Weisheit und Torheit, 125ff.) emphasizes, to the point of inadequacy on other matters, the concept of the sending of a Redeemer-Savior figure who brings knowledge which is designed to lead to salvation. In our opinion, Wilckens was at this point overly influenced by his commitment to the existence of a "Redeemer myth." To say the least, such a view must make any broader attempt difficult, as it implies a theological limitation--arising out of the conviction concerning the "Redeemer myth"--which affects the possibility of understanding the more complete figure.

Towards the end of *SJC*, beyond the material paralleled in the *Epistle of Eugnostos*, there appears a miscellaneous collection of Gnostic teaching.[91] In an approach by now quite familiar, Mary asks the resurrected Jesus, "Holy Christ, where did your disciples (*μαθητής*) come from, where are they going, and (*ἤ*) what will they do there?" (117.13ff.). In the process of answering these questions (see esp.118), Jesus alludes to Sophia's original error which resulted finally in the creation of the material order, which itself in turn made necessary a "veil" to separate the upper and lower worlds.

The myth reflected would appear to be of a more standard form than the sort of thing observed earlier in the document. This is to say that nothing really unique is to be found here. The allusive character of the reference makes this virtually impossible. For this reason the passage is not of crucial importance. Interest lies in the nature of the reference and in the fact that it was included at all.

The allusion itself is such that it would require a knowledge of the myth to be understood. As has been stressed repeatedly, this is the sort of thing that would once again indicate a fairly wide acceptance of this particular mythical form. The fact that it comes near the end of the document calls attention to itself. This may be explained either by the fact that the allusion occurs in response to a question directed to another point, or by the fact that this part of the epistle is in reality part of an addition to another letter, i.e., the _Epistle of Eugnostos._ Perhaps the most interesting point to be made is that the allusion includes a peculiarly clear reference to the substantial nature of Sophia's error in a reference to its enduring quality (118.15ff.). Once it became material substance its very presence demanded that it be taken into account.

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[91] Doresse, *op*. *cit*., 199f.

This then is the Sophia myth as it appears in _SJC_. Precise conclusions are as yet out of reach. This particular elaboration of the mythical forms offers a great insight into the way the Gnostics were the victims of their own mythical imagination. Once the door was opened to speculations of this sort, the inevitable result was a lack of control over the speculations and ultimate disaster to the whole movement. _SJC_--beyond all else--bears vivid witness to the violence of the encounter between the Jewish-Christian tradition and the outside world. These elements will become increasingly clear as this investigation moves toward conclusion.

Hypostasis of the Archons.[92] Although the actual formulation follows a different pattern, this document appears to summarize, in extremely brief compass, Gnostic teaching very much like that found in the *Schrift ohne Titel*. Indeed we include it here--and especially so since the critical edition is not yet available--primarily as an introduction to the longer treatise.

The document somewhat strangely begins with a description of the work of the Demiurge. This figure, like Sophia's offspring in the *Schrift ohne Titel* (and also in this document further on), arrogantly claimed to be the supreme God. His claim is challenged by a "voice from on high" (142.23ff.).[93] The creation of this material world is described thus:

142.2 And the great angel (*ἄγγελος*)
Eleleth, understanding (*ⲙⲛ̄ⲧⲣⲙ̄ⲛ̄ϩⲏⲧ*), said to me [Norea]:
Above in the limitless Aeons
exists imperishability. The Sophia
who is called Pistis wished

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[92] Known occasionally in German as *Das Wesen der Archonten*, the Coptic text of this treatise is presently available only in the plates in Labib (*Coptic Gnostic Papri in the Coptic Museum at Old Cairo*, vol. 1, Cairo: 1956). Photographic plates of a better quality are now in the hands of an international team of scholars. A critical edition of the text edited by R.A. Bullard with notes and English translation may be expected in due course. A German translation is available in Leipoldt-Schenke (*Koptisch-gnostische Schriften aus den Papyrus-Codices von Nag-Hamadi*, Hamburg-Bergstedt: 1960, 67-78).

[93] It is Sophia and Zoē who challenge Ialdabaoth.

> to accomplish a thing alone without a partner. And
> her work (ἔργον) became an image of heaven so that
> a veil (καταπέτασμα) exists between those of the
> upper region
> 10 and the Aeons who are below. And a
> shadow came into being beneath the veil (καταπέτασμα).
> And that shadow became matter (ὕλη).

The document continues with the claim to supremacy of the being created from this matter. It becomes apparent that "light" was lacking within the creation.

> 142.28 And
> immediately Sophia stretched forth her finger
> 30 (and) brought the light into
> matter (ὕλη). And she followed it down
> 32 into the region (μέρος) of chaos. And she went
> back (ἀναχωρεῖν)
> up to her light.

After this Samael (Ialdabaoth, Sacla) makes his declaration of supremacy. Pistis Sophia and her daughter Zoē challenge him (143.4ff.). The activity of Sophia (and Zoē) in this document is concluded when they install Sabaoth, who had recognized the superior powers during interchange with Ialdabaoth, in the seventh heaven (143.19ff.).[94]

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[94] The exact relation between the *Schrift ohne Titel*, the *Hypostasis of the Archons*, the *Apocryphon of John*, etc., is still very much undecided. After raising a number of specific questions concerning the relationships and interrelationships of these documents, Wilson (*Gnosis and the New Testament*, 128f.) concludes, "At present we are still scarcely beyond the stage of noting the similarities and collecting the material." In this regard one must observe that there is a certain similarity (duplication?) here between Sophia (higher and lower) and Zoē and Eve as in the *Apocryphon of John*. It remains doubtful to us, however, if any satisfactory disentanglement is yet possible. See the discussion of the *Schrift ohne Titel*, *infra* 402.

Schrift ohne Titel, Codex II.[95] Schenke holds that both *UW* and *Das Wesen der Archonten* represent "eine Spielart der Barbelo-Gnosis."[96] Such a position suggests proximity while avoiding identification. This is surely true and justifies our bringing together a miscellaneous collection of more or less closely related systems. In as much as *UW* is a treatise on the beginning of the world, Sophia plays an important role. Doresse translates the opening lines as follows:

145.24 Though (ἐπειδή) all the gods
and men in the universe (κόσμος) say,
26 "Nothing existed before the Chaos," I,
for my part, will prove (ἀποδεικνύειν)
to you that they
28 are all mistaken (πλανάσθαι), for they
never knew the nature (σύστασις)
of Chaos, nor its root. . . .[97]

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[95] An introduction and German translation of the first part were published by H.-M. Schenke, "Vom Ursprung der Welt: Eine titellose gnostische Abhandlung aus dem Funde von Nag-Hamadi," *TLZ* 84 (1959), cols. 243-256. The full Coptic text with a new German translation and complete notes may be found in A. Böhlig und P. Labib, *Die Koptisch-gnostische Schrift ohne Titel aus Codex II von Nag Hammadi* (Berlin: 1962). Doresse (*Secret Books*, 165-176) summarizes the work including some quotations.

Schenke (*op. cit.*, 246) suggests the descriptive title "Die Abhandlung (λόγος) uber den Ursprung (ἀρχή) der Welt (κόσμος)." He abbreviates this "UW" which, partly because of its suggestiveness in English, we adopt here.

[96] *Ibid*.

[97] Doresse, *Secret Books*, 165. Subsequent translations of *UW* are ours.

Our author goes ahead to contend that even the darkness before chaos was the result of some sort of creative work. At the true beginning, he argues, only the immortals would have existed. It is in this way that he creates a need for a description and explanation of the primordial activity of Sophia. As Sophia's original motivation varies from source to source it is important to notice that here it is mentioned early on that *he* desired *to imitate* the First Light.

146.14 ⲁϥⲟⲩ
ⲱϣ ⲁϥϣⲱⲡⲉ ⲛⲛⲟⲩⲉⲣⲅⲟⲛ ⲉϥⲉ⟨ⲓ⟩ⲛⲉ
16 ⲙⲡⲟⲩⲟⲉⲓⲛ ⲉⲧϣⲟⲟⲡ ⲛϣⲟⲣⲡ

The creation brought forth by Sophia was characterized by "darkness." It was out of this darkness that even chaos emerged. A veil separated the creation from the light world. In fact the action of Sophia out of which chaos came was also the cause for the veil. In all of this, "powers" were at work and "jealousy" (ⲕⲱϩ) was one of the primary results. Ultimately water and darkness prevailed (146.16-147.28). Our author employs all of this to lead up to an account of Sophia's reactions to her own experience which are climaxed by her formation of Ialdabaoth.

147.29 When Pistis saw what had come into
existence out of her defect she was disturbed.
The disturbance revealed itself in a
work (ἔργον) of fear. But (δέ) it fled into
chaos. She (Pistis) devoted herself that [she

Our author goes ahead to contend that even the darkness before chaos was the result of some sort of creative work. At the true beginning, he argues, only the immortals would have existed. It is in this way that he creates a need for a description and explanation of the primordial activity of Sophia. As Sophia's original motivation varies from source to source it is important to notice that here it is mentioned early on that he desired to imitate the First Light.

146.14 ⲁϥⲟⲩ
ⲱϣ ⲁϥϣⲱⲡⲉ ⲛⲛⲟⲩⲉⲣⲅⲟⲛ ⲉϥⲉ⟨ⲓ⟩ⲛⲉ
16 ⲙⲡⲟⲩⲟⲉⲓⲛ ⲉⲧϣⲟⲟⲡ ⲛϣⲟⲣⲡ

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existence out of her defect she was disturbed.
The disturbance revealed itself in a
work (ἔργον) of fear. But (δέ) it fled into
chaos. She (Pistis) devoted herself that [she

might give breath]
to her apparition in the abyss [which is]
148.1 the lowest part [of all] the heaven. Pistis
Sophia willed that that which
possessed no spirit (πνεῦμα) receive
a kind (τύπος) of form
and rule (ἄρχειν) over matter and over all its
5 power (δύναμις). There appeared first
an archon out of (the) water,
who was in the form of a lion, who was male-female,(and)
who had a great power (ἐξουσία) within
himself, although (δέ) he did not know
10 from whence he came. When Pistis Sophia
saw him who stirred in the depth of the water,
she said to him, "Young man (νεανίσκος),
rule over (διαπερᾶν)[98] this place," which is
the interpretation
"Ialdabaoth." Since that day the beginning (ἀρχή)
15 of the Word (ϣⲁϫⲉ) was revealed, the one who touched
gods and angels (ἄγγελοι) and men.
And he who was brought into existence
through the Word (ϣⲁϫⲉ)
was perfected, namely gods and angels (ἄγγελος)
and men.

This is our author's account of the most basic creative activity of Sophia. The document continues with a typical Gnostic proliferation of other characters and lower creations. Ialdabaoth was finally made aware of his mother's greatness when, upon his declaration of his own self-sufficiency and supremacy, Sophia challenged his assertion with a devastating cry that was heard throughout the heavens (151.11ff.). At the conclusion of the interchange, Sophia returned to the light (151.30ff.).[99]

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[98] Our author apparently intends for the expression νεανίσκε διαπέρα to stand for the Hebrew יַלְדָּא בְּעוּט. Cf. Schenke, *op. cit.*, 249 n.22. This is a legitimate though rare meaning for διαπεράω. See Liddell-Scott *Greek-English Lexicon* (Seventh Edition, Oxford: 1883), 354.

One important aspect of *UW*, in contrast to most other Gnostic sources, is that Sophia, Sophia-Zoē, is intimately involved in the creation of man. One supposes however that Sophia-Zoē is something less than Pistis Sophia, for in the *Hypostasis of the Archons* Zoē is described as the daughter of Sophia (143.18ff., etc.).[100] In *UW*, however, the two figures are united and identified as the companion of Sabaoth.[101] Sophia's involvement in the creation first of a "male-female" being and only later in that of Adam may be summarized as follows.

The lower characters of the spirit world had creative ability, but it was limited and as a result caused them difficulty. Sophia-Zoē, "the one who is by Sabaoth" (161.13), was amused when she saw the ridiculous situation in which the lower powers had entangled themselves. As a result she created what is described as a "male-female" (*ⲚϨⲞⲨⲦⲤϨⲒⲘⲈ*) being (161.24f., 30).

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[99] Cf. e.g. *adv*. *Haer*. I. 30.

[100] See Schenke, *ZRGG* 14 (1962), 353.

[101] Cf. 163.12, 31; 169.27. For the relation to Sabaoth see 152.28.

> 161.30 The
> Greeks (Ἕλλην) call him Hermaphrodites
> 32 but (δέ) his mother the Hebrews (Ἑβραῖος)
> call Ēve of Zoē.

The account again continues in its multifarious aspects. Later, Sophia is involved in the creation of Adam (161.35ff.). Adam was formed by the lower powers but they were unable to impart a spirit to him. This condition continued for forty days!

> 163.11 But in this
> fortieth day Sophia-Zoē sent
> her breath (ⲚⲒϤⲈ) to Adam, the one who had no
> soul (ψυχή).

It is in these ways that we find Sophia characterized in UW. We must now ask how these things relate to the document's more nearly "orthodox" Christian elements.

UW is a document belonging to Christian Gnosis at least in the sense that it manifests a freedom to speak of "Christ" or "Jesus Christ" although it does so only rarely (153.26; 162.17). This figure is described as being near Sabaoth, i.e., in the heavens, and like the Savior (σωτήρ, 153.25ff.).

The term λόγος is found only once in UW (173.14). Of this usage Böhlig, after approving of the Logos as an "Offenbarer des Verborgenen," says, "Es liegt nahe, an Jesus als mythischen Christus zu denken, weil ja auch ein Jesuswort zitiert ist."[102] The saying (173.17ff.) is one found in the synoptics--Mk. 4.22; Mt. 10.26; Lk. 8.17. Mark reads, "For there is nothing hid, except to come to light." With the saying of Jesus in the context, the link between him and *λόγος* is obvious.

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[102] Böhlig-Labib, Schrift ohne Titel, 102.

We have seen in an earlier quotation that the Word (*ϣⲁϫⲉ* not *λόγος*) was drawn into creative contexts (148.14ff.). Indeed it is asserted that perfection in the created order was achieved through *ⲡϣⲁϫⲉ* and included "gods and angels and men." It must also be recalled however that the wider context characterizes Pistis Sophia as the creator. It is interesting to note that elsewhere Pistis is referred to in the phrase *ⲡϣⲁϫⲉ* *ⲛⲧⲡⲓⲥⲧⲓⲥ* (152.1; 163.7). Part of the significance of this link must lie in the fact that the author was making at least some effort to draw the two terms into one figure. It would appear to the remote observer that such usage would at least slightly blur the distinction between Jesus and Pistis.

It must be urged that this kind of thinking is not extremely remote from what we have consistently referred to as "orthodox." Although in *UW* Pistis is the creative figure and Jesus something else, surely the most tangible aspect of Jesus' association (whether by selection or imposition) with the *σοφία*-*λόγος* figure(s) was identification with the instrument of creation.

We thus conclude our examination of the Sophia myth in the "non-Valentinian" sources. We are now ready to observe its presence in the obvious counterpart--i.e., those documents generally considered to be Valentinian. It should be repeated that this methodical listing of the various forms of the Sophia myth is the result of the conviction that the best analysis of developments may be made by looking at specific forms of the myth. What we hope to bring out in this approach is an emphasis upon the complexity of the phenomena out of which "orthodoxy" finally emerged. There are of course many variations within the myth as it is presented in the documents. These are the result of progressive re-thinking and adaptation. Again, Irenaeus' account serves as background, but in order to realize our goal of observing the complexity of the situation, it is necessary to go beyond Irenaeus into the thinking of the Gnostics themselves.[103] In this way we may get a more completely accurate view of the nature of the situation against which Christianity so violently reacted--often in negative ways--and yet which nevertheless left its mark upon the Church.

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[103] We take this view even though we feel that Irenaeus is reasonably dependable. See W. Foerster, Von Valentin zu Heracleon; Sagnard, op. cit.; Wilson, Gnosis, 86. It should be apparent however that any opinion of Irenaeus on this point is also dependent upon the documents.

CHAPTER VI

THE GNOSTIC SPECULATION (II)

I. INTRODUCTION

Although, for the purposes of this study, we have recognized the fundamental east-west dichotomy that was present within Gnosticism, we have not found it necessary, for the same purposes, to establish any finer distinctions within these broader lines. It should be pointed out, however, that when we speak of "Valentinianism," we can be somewhat more secure in the feeling that we understand our object. That is to say that their complex of thought is not quite so elusive to our "western" minds as our earlier sources seem to be. However, even here, we do not intend to argue in any detail the Valentinian origin of the documents examined under this title. It is for this reason that we speak of them as reflecting a myth of the "Valentinian type," i.e., of the type described under that name by Irenaeus and the other early Fathers who discussed the heresy. Although a myth of the Valentinian type would point in the direction of Valentinian origin, one could not be sure on that basis alone. Such a conclusion would require a wider base, and a careful examination of differences as well.

The "non-Valentinian" systems observed in the previous chapter manifest a three part division between Sophia, the Demiurge (in whatever form) and the evil world. In the same area Valentinianism reflects a fourfold system. Another character is discovered in the figure of Achamoth. When considering origins and relationships one must ask whether the latter should be considered an amplification of the former, or the former a reduction of the latter. The more common view as we have seen is to discover in the Apocryphon of John the source material for Valentinianism. This of course would make the fourfold system dependent upon the simpler threefold arrangement. Achamoth is then viewed as a later duplication of Sophia.

We follow this line here. Generally speaking we have come to view Gnosticism as a movement away from the Jewish-Christian tradition. Perhaps this is clear. However, this does not mean that at a later stage of development a certain "Christianization" might not take place. On occasion entire documents may have been remodeled in this way. Further, it is at least conceivable that such a reconstruction does not necessarily mean a reversal in the basic trend of the movement. In this way one may observe a movement away from the biblical tradition and at the same time a curious return to it.

II. GNOSTIC DOCUMENTS WHICH REFLECT A SOPHIA MYTH OF THE VALENTINIAN TYPE

The First Apocalypse of James.[1] As its name implies, this document is in the form of a revelation from the Lord to James. The James concerned is addressed "my brother" (ⲡⲁⲥⲟⲛ). The portion of the work that is of concern to us here contains instruction with regard to the perfected soul's re-ascent from the world of darkness to the world of light. This theme was of some importance for the Gnostics, as they taught that the ascent would not be successful unless the ascending soul knew what questions to expect from the various powers that would obstruct its way, as well as what answers it should offer in return. The importance of this passage is underlined by the fact that the two Sophia figures and a number of related elements appear quite clearly in association with a discussion of another subject. We quote the passage in its entirety with comment to follow.[2]

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[1] The text is that of A. Böhlig and P. Labib, _Koptisch-gnostische Apokalypsen aus Codex V von Nag Hammadi_ (Halle-Wittenberg: 1963). For a discussion of the history of research and identification of documents (with bibliography, etc.) bearing the name of "James" see: Puech in Hennecke, _Apocrypha_ (English translation) vol. 1, 333-338.

33.11 When
you come into their hands
one of them will say
to you, one of their watchers:
15 Who are you? or (ἤ), From whence are
you? You will say to him: I
am a son and I am from
the Father. He will say to you:
What kind of a son are you? and,
20 To what father do you belong? You
will say to him: I [3] am from
the pre-[existent] Father,
yet (δέ) a son who is in the
Pre-existent (One). [He will say][4]
25 to you: [Why were you sent?]
You will say [to him: I came from]
the [Pre-existent (One)]
I [saw all that are ours
and (all that are) alien.
30 He will say to you: Who are]
34.1 these aliens? You will say to him:
They are not alien altogether
but (ἀλλά) they are from Achamoth,
i.e., the female. And
5 she created this, bringing the race (*γένος*)
down out of
pre-existence. Thus (*ἄρα*) they are not
alien, but (*ἀλλά*) of ourselves.
They are indeed (*μέν*) ours, because the one
10 who is Lord over them is from
the Pre-existent (One).
But (*δέ*) they are alien in this respect (*κατά*),

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[2] The translation was made in consultation with R. McL. Wilson. Important points of dependence on Böhlig's German translation are noted.

[3] The replies to be made to the "powers" found in lines 21ff. sustain a very close relationship to Irenaeus (*adv. Haer*. I.21.4). See Böhlig-Labib, *Apokalypsen aus Codex V*, 43. Cf. also, *The Gospel of Thomas* 50.

[4] The reconstruction of lines 25-30 is based on Schenke's review of Böhlig-Labib, *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung* 61 (1966) Nr 1/2, cols. 23-34. See esp. cols. 28f. The reconstruction is largely dependent on Irenaeus, *adv. Haer*. I.21.4.

that the Pre-existent (One) did not
associate (κοινωνεῖν) with her then (τότε) when
she was
15 about to create them, He will say to you again:
Where will you go? You will say
to him: To the place from which I am
come, I shall go there again
But (δέ) when you say this you will escape
20 their attack (πόλεμος). But (δέ) when
you come into the hands
[of the] three powers
which remove the souls (ψυχή)
forcibly (στερητίμα) to that place
25 . . . . You will[5]
[say to them: I am a] ves [sel] (σκε[ῦος])
many times [more valuable than the woman
who created you. . . .]
35. (lines 1-3 partially mutilated)
3 you
yourselves will not be
5 sober (νήφειν). But (δέ) I shall cry
above to the imperishable Gnosis (γνῶσις),
that is Sophia, who
is with the Father, (and) who is the mother
of Achamoth. There is no father
10 of Achamoth, nor (οὔτε) is there any
male consort (σύζυγος), But she is
a female from a
female. She created you
without a male, being
15 alone, not knowing the things which
[live in] her mother, and thinking
that she alone existed.
But (δέ) [I] shall cry above
to her mother. And then (τότε)
20 they shall be troubled, they shall
undertake something against[6] their

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[5] The reconstruction (lines 25-28) is again based on Schenke, *OLZ* 61, col. 29. Schenke in turn is dependent once more on Irenaeus, *adv. Haer.* I.21.4.

[6] The translation here is largely dependent upon the German of Böhlig-Labib (*Apokalypsen aus Codex V*, 45). The verbal root ϬⲚϬⲚ according to Crum (824 a, b) has two possibilities: 1) ϬⲰⲚϨ, *to wring*, *nip off*, or 2) ϬⲚϬⲚ, *to make music* with instrument or voice. The parallel in Irenaeus (*adv. Haer* I.21.4) to the passage at 35.19 is as follows:

root (origin?) and the race (*γένος*) of
their mother. [But (*δέ*)] you
will go above to your
25 own. . . .
(35.25-36.1, an apparent total of five lines,
is mutilated.)
36.2 [the] type (*τύπος*) of [the] twelve
disciples (*μαθητής*) and the twelve
pairs, [the sons of][7]
5 Achamoth, which being
interpreted (*ἑρμηνεύειν*) is Sophia.
As (*δέ*) for me, who I am,
and the imperishable Sophia
through whom you will be saved,
10 and all the sons of the One who
is, the things which they knew
and hid within themselves,
you will hide in yourself.

The passages of 1 *AJk* paralleled in Irenaeus are found in his treatment of the Marcosians who according to Irenaeus represented a branch of Valentinianism. In addition to the statement of Irenaeus, the opinion that the writer of 1 *AJk* was a Valentinian is established by the fact that he reflects a commitment to a developed Sophia

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Τούτους δὲ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Δημιουργὸν ἀκούσαντας σφόδρα ταραχθῆναι, καὶ καταγνῶναι αὐτῶν τῆς ῥίζης καὶ τοῦ γένους τῆς μητρός. The Greek verb *καταγινώσκω* means *to find fault with*, *blame*. The question here of course is whether or not they condemned (or damned) their root.

[7] Böhlig's restoration "the sons of" presents some question as the thought of the Dodecad being the sons of Achamoth is foreign to the Valentinian Sophia myth as it is commonly known. Schenke (*OLZ* 61, col. 29) suggests *[ⲉⲧ ⲙⲡⲥⲁ ⲛⲧⲡ]ⲉ ⟨ⲉ⟩*, which he translates, "die sich befinden oberhalb der." One is inclined to conclude that some such suggestion is to be preferred.

myth of the Valentinian type. It is to the various elements of this reflection that we turn our attention.

The most important section of the above quotation for our purposes is 35.5-17. A number of details are attested in the passage. Sophia, who is in the Father's presence, was the mother of Achamoth.[8] Perhaps the most striking thing about the passage is that it elevates Gnosis to the point of identifying it with Sophia. That is simply, gnosis is Sophia, Sophia is gnosis. One is disappointed that the author himself does not draw out any of the implications.

Achamoth on the other hand had neither father nor male consort (ⲘⲠⲈ ⲈⲒⲰⲦ ϢⲰⲠⲈ ⲚⲚⲀⲬⲀⲘⲰⲐ ⲞⲨⲦⲈ [ⲞⲨⲤⲨⲌ]ⲨⲄⲞⲤ ⲚϨⲞⲞⲨⲦ). This meant, in thoughts typically Valentinian, that she was entirely a female production ([Ⲟ]Ⲩ[ⲤϨⲒ]ⲘⲈ ⲦⲈ ⲈⲂⲞⲖ ϨⲚ ⲚⲞⲨⲤϨⲒⲘ[Ⲉ]) and that she created the lower order by her own efforts alone.

Further, Achamoth is characterized as being almost completely ignorant! She thought that she was alone. She had no knowledge that there were other beings who knew life through her mother, Sophia. Nor did she have any knowledge of any other beings who existed beside or above Sophia in the Pleroma. That is to say, she was unaware that there were any beings that she had not created herself. This all means, of course, that Achamoth thought she was the most supreme of beings. In this Achamoth manifests a characteristic usually associated with the Demiurge. This overlap has already been mentioned. Ordinarily it is the God of the Old Testament who is ignorant, e.g., Samael in the *Hypostasis of the Archons*.

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[8] It is in order to note that the ancient writer clearly understood the names Sophia and Achamoth to be identical in meaning (36.5).

One other passage, 1 *AJk* 34.2ff., demands close attention. Generally speaking, Gnostics conceived of three types of men, "the material one" (*τὸ μὲν ὑλικόν*) or "the left one" (*ἀριστερόν*), "the psychic one", and "the spiritual one" (*τὸ δὲ πνευματικόν*).[9] Of the three, only the destinies of the psychic could be influenced. At one point Irenaeus calls the psychic "those of the right," but goes ahead to speak in more typical terms of their being in the midst and capable of either ascending or descending.[10] In this conception they are caught in the tension between the two extremes. Those of this group that are capable of redemption possess a divine spark, put there by Sophia, and open to enlightenment through gnosis.

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[9] *adv. Haer*. I.6.1.

[10] The assessment of the status of the psychic, or those in the center, was not always optimistic. For example, the *Gospel of Philip* 63, speaks in very disparaging terms, e.g., "God forbid that I should be found in them." In this passage the "Midst" seems to be conceived almost as a kind of Hades, a place one would not care to be found.

Another element included in 1 AJk 34.2ff., is the fact, already observed, that the material order is the product of female generation only. The dual nature of man (probably "those of the middle") is discussed in the passage. This one is described as both "ours" (ⲚⲈⲦⲈ ⲚⲞⲨⲚ ⲚⲈ) and "alien" (ϢⲘⲘⲞ).[11] He is "ours" because his "Lord" was from the "Pre-existent One." He belongs to those capable of enlightenment. He is "alien" in a depreciating sense because the "Pre-existent One" did not "associate" with Achamoth in his creation. However, the final judgement in the passage is that he is not alien, at least not altogether. In this kind of context it must be recognized that the verb "associate" (κοινωνεῖν) may possess sexual overtones.[12]

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[11] "Alien" is a familiar and recurring term in the Gnostic documents. The term possesses a basic dichotomy. It may be used to refer to things that properly belong to the spiritual world, e.g. the alien Light, etc. Or on the other hand it may be used to refer to the world into which these elements come. The Gnostic may therefore think of himself as alien to the world, or the world may be alien to him. The realization of his "alienness" is the first step in his redemption and is therefore a good thing. For the way in which this concept was hypostatized into something like divinity see Jonas, Gnostic Religion, 49ff.

[12] One trusts that it is not necessary to point out possible sexual implications every time they occur. They exist of course right through the various systems. In all fairness, the founders of the movement probably intended to employ this sort of thing only as a part of the myth. However, since the earliest heresiologists many of the Gnostics have at least been accused of taking advantage of their myths in analogous ways in order to achieve the realization of their own sexual desires.

These points fit with the traditionally known Valentinian cosmogony as well as that sect's teaching with regard to man, his origin, nature, and destiny. Again, the extent to which this kind of thing penetrates the document demonstrates its popularity, as well as its general acceptance.

The Gospel of Philip.[13] It was possible for the Gnostic to think of Jesus' flesh as somehow perfect.[14] This is striking in view of the usual depreciation of all material substance. The difference seems to lie in the fact that it was Jesus' flesh, not normal human flesh. This perfect flesh is said both to possess the λόγος and to be the λόγος.[15] EP 113 seems to speak of flesh generally in terms of λόγος, the point being that the Gnostic should strive for an identity between his flesh and that of Christ. The exact origin of such teaching is not clear, but it would at least be possible for it to arise out of a Gnostic interpretation of John 1.14. Further however Jesus is explicitly called the Logos in EP 3.[16] One can hardly resist the conclusion that what appears to us as confusion, was perfectly understandable to the Gnostics themselves. However, one must be mindful of the fact that the possibility of multiple sources behind this "gospel" may account for the "confusion."

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[13] Basic bibliography would include: W. C. Till, Das Evangelium nach Philippus, Berlin: 1963; H. M. Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus: Ein Evangelium der Valentinianer aus dem Funde von Nag Hamadi," TLZ 84 (1959), cols. 1-26, reprinted in Leipoldt-Schenke, Koptisch-gnostische Schriften aus den Papyrus-Codices von Nag-Hamadi (Hamberg-Bergstedt: 1960). That EP is Valentinian see ibid., 34f. For Schenke's later review with revisions see "Die Arbeit am Philippus-Evangelium" TLZ 90 (1965) cols. 321-332. See also P. Labib, Coptic Gnostic Papyri in the Coptic Museum at Old Cairo (Cairo: 1956), 90-134; R. McL. Wilson, The Gospel of Philip (London: 1962). For the most recent comprehensive work on Philip see J. E. Ménard, L'Évangile selon Philippe (Strasbourg: 1967).

[14] EP 23. Cf. Wilson, Philip, 87ff. esp.

[15] EP 23. Also in EP 123 (131.11ff.) a saying is attributed to the Logos, the first part of which according to canonical sources (Mt. 3.10; Lk. 3.9) was spoken originally by John the Baptist. Wilson (Philip, 187) says, ". . . whether this logos is the Logos or the word of Scripture is not

Although the precise situation is again somewhat confused, the question of the relation between the Holy Spirit and Achamoth is raised in EP. Wilson notes:

> References to the Holy Spirit are common enough, but it is difficult to be certain which of them refer to the Holy Spirit of Christian theology, and which to the Gnostic Sophia-Achamoth, who as we know from Irenaeus was also called 'Holy Spirit.'[17]

While recognizing the problem we must confine our attention to those occurrences which seem more certainly to be

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entirely clear." If the former is the case it may simply be that the author is confused himself as to the origin of the logion.

[16] See also EP 123 (Labib 132.7ff.) where a saying of Jesus (John 8.32) is attributed to the Logos. Cf. also EP 116, although this case must be considered a little more doubtful.

[17] Wilson, Philip, 14.

associated with the latter and manifest at least some connection with the Sophia myth as well.[18]

The saying in *EP* 74 may refer to the Holy Spirit, but no certainty in this conclusion seems possible.[19]

> 117.4 (74) Through
> the Holy Spirit we are indeed born,
> but we are born again through
> Christ. In the two we are anointed through
> the Spirit, and when we have been born we are
> united.[20]

Questions arise first concerning the division and translation of the text. Schenke and Segelberg translate, "We are born again but through Christ we are born again a second time and anointed with the Spirit. When we were born (=born again) we were united." Till feels that ϩⲙ̄ ⲡⲥⲛⲁⲩ cannot mean"a second time." Then too a different division between sayings 73 and 74 may make better sense. Schenke prefers to take "through the spirit" (line 4f.) as the final words of saying 73. However, if they properly belong to saying 74, we have a distinction between birth through the Spirit and rebirth through Christ.

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[18] The term "Holy Spirit" in *EP* seems to be used in at least three distinct senses: 1) of the third member of the Trinity, e.g., 11, 33; 2) of the Gnostic Anthropos, e.g., 40; and 3) of Achamoth, e.g., 16, 17, 26, 34, 74. Such a list can of course be little more than opinion, with varying degrees of certainty.

[19] See Wilson, *Philip*, 137f. where he notes the difference of opinion between Segelberg (E. Segelberg, "The Coptic Gnostic Gospel according to Philip and its Sacramental System" *NUMEN* VII (1960, 189-200), Schenke, Till, and himself.

[20] The translation of *EP* is that of Wilson in comparison with Schenke, Till, and the Coptic text.

> Two interpretations then seem possible: (a) the passage refers only to the 'spiritual,' who are born of the Spirit and then reborn through Christ; or (b) the 'Holy Spirit' of line 5 is Sophia-Achamoth, and the reference is to natural birth. In the latter case all men are born 'through the Holy Spirit,' but only the Gnostic is reborn 'through Christ.'[21]

Two additional points require attention in this connection because of their language and an apparent extension of associations. We have seen that the ignorance of Achamoth or the Demiurge is an important part of the Sophia myth. In what appears to be an extension of this principle, it is interesting to note that in EP 16, the Holy Spirit (Achamoth) exercises control over the archons in their ignorance.[22] We have also seen that Achamoth is regarded as the totally feminine production of Sophia.[23] The First Apocalypse of James expresses it, "a female from a female" ([ⲟ]ⲩ[ⲥϩⲓ]ⲙⲉ ⲧⲉ ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩⲛ ⲛⲟⲩⲥϩⲓⲙ[ⲉ]).[24] In similar language EP 17 asserts that Mary could not have conceived of the Holy Spirit, for "When did a woman ever conceive of a woman?" (ⲁϣ ⲛϩⲟⲟⲩ ⲉⲛⲉϩ ⲡⲉⲛⲧⲁⲥϩⲓⲙⲉ ⲱ̄ ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩⲛ̄ ⲥϩⲓⲙⲉ).

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[21] Wilson, Philip, 137.

[22] Ibid., 80.

[23] adv. Haer., I.2.2f., etc.

[24] The First Apocalypse of James 35.12f.

The name *Σοφία* occurs in only three "sayings" of *EP*.[25] Twice she (Achamoth) is described as "barren" (*στεῖρα*): (36) "But Sophia is barren, without child" (*ⲧⲥⲟⲫⲓⲁ ⲇⲉ ⲟⲩⲥⲧⲉⲓⲣ[ⲁ ⲧⲉ ⲁϫⲛ] ϣⲏⲣⲉ*),[26] (55) "The Sophia whom they call barren is the mother of the angels" (*ⲧⲥⲟⲫⲓⲁ ⲉⲧⲟⲩⲙⲟⲩ[ⲧⲉ ⲉⲣⲟⲥ] ϫⲉ ⲧⲥⲧⲓⲣⲁ ⲛ̄ⲧⲟⲥ ⲧⲉ ⲧⲙⲁⲁ[ⲩ ⲛⲛⲁⲅⲅ]ⲉⲗⲟⲥ*). The lacunae here are such that they present sizable difficulties. Indeed, little may be concluded with certainty.[27]

There is, however, an association in *EP* 36 with salt (*ϩⲙⲟⲩ*, 107.34) which is in harmony with the idea of barrenness.[28] What is perhaps more important here is that there is a long-standing proverbial connection between salt and wisdom.[29] Although the connection is admittedly loose, it may well have been sufficient suggestion to the author's mind for him to mention Sophia in the context. There also seems to be a paradoxical implication connected with barrenness in the former "saying," which is in fact evident in the latter, where Sophia is styled "the mother of the angels." It is not difficult to imagine how barrenness might have been associated with the unseemliness of the whole series of events that surround the enthymesis of Sophia.

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[25] I.e., 36, 39, and 55.

[26] The translation is Wilson's, the reconstruction of the text, Till's.

[27] Because of the nature of the lacunae reconstructions (cf. e.g., Schenke in Leipoldt-Schenke, *op. cit.*) are to varying degrees questionable. Indeed, with regard to saying 36, Wilson (*Philip* 101) judges any reconstruction "highly precarious." Schenke agrees (On *Philip* generally see H.-M. Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus" *TLZ* 84 (1959), cols. 1-26). As such evidence would not bear the weight of any firm conclusions it is omitted here.

[28] Wilson, *Philip*, 99f.

[29] Cf. Mt. 5.13; Col. 4.6, etc. Hastings *DB* (2nd Ed.), 878.

On the other hand the assertion that Sophia was in fact "the mother of the angels" may be a reference to the planetary powers mentioned in Irenaeus.[30] Irenaeus records in this passage that these powers were fashioned by the Demiurge, who was the "child" of Achamoth.[31]

> . . . it may also refer, however, to an earlier section (Iren. i.4.5), where Achamoth conceives a spiritual embryo after the likeness of the guards who accompanied the Savior. The latter, however, are not angels but their earthly counterparts, the 'spirituals.'[32]

Further, it is remarkable to note that in Irenaeus' account of Simon Magus, Simon's companion Helen was referred to as "the Mother of all, through whom in the beginning he (Simon) had the idea of making angels and archangels."[33] This quotation is particularly striking when one remembers that the myth associated with Simon is thought to be an early form of that belonging to the Barbelognostic system!

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[30] adv. Haer. I.5.2.

[31] For the possibilities here, see Wilson, Philip, 115f.

[32] Ibid., 116.

[33] adv. Haer. I.23.2.

The fact that the same contrast between barrenness and abundance has been associated with the Church has not been overlooked.[34] 2 Clement 2 includes a quotation of Isaiah 54.1 with reference to the Church. The Isaiah passage reads in full:

> Sing, o barren one, who did not bear;
> break forth into singing and cry aloud,
> you who have not been in travail!
> For the children of the desolate one will be more
> than the children of her that is married,
> says the Lord.

Further, Ephesians 5.25-33 characterizes the Church as the Bride of Christ, a figure at least paralleled by Sophia as the bride of the Savior in Valentinian theory, or by Helen, the companion of Simon Magus in his unorthodox scheme. Daniélou cites Schlier as a proponent of the view that the early Church was identified with God's pre-existent Wisdom.[35] Schlier's argument depends on his interpretation of Ephesians 3.10f. He argues that Paul was influenced by a "spéculation gnostique." Daniélou argues, "Il est évident qu'il y a ici une relation entre la Sagesse et l'Église. Mais il est dit seulement que l'Église *manifeste* la Sagesse de Dieu."[36] This observation clearly notes the absence of any identification between the church and the Wisdom of God in the Ephesians passage. Here the church is only the medium through which God's wisdom is made known.

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[34] E.g., see Wilson, Philip, 101.

[35] J. Daniélou, Theologie du Judéo-Christianisme, 337. See H, Schlier, Christus und die Kirche im Epheserbrief, (Tübingen: 1930).

On the other hand Kretschmar has argued that a line of trinitarian thinking existed in the early history of Christianity--both inside and outside "orthodoxy"-- wherein the third person of the Trinity, Wisdom identified with the Holy Spirit, was more or less made equal to the church.[37] Kretschmar finds evidence for this view in such varied sources as Theophilus of Antioch, Hermas, Hegesippus, Pseudo-Clement and the *Epistula Apostolorum*.[38]

After rejecting both the views of Schlier and Kretschmar, Daniélou in a penetrating statement concludes:

> Ainsi nous sommes confirmés dans notre vue que la préexistence de l'Église dans le judéo-christianisme n'est pas celle de la Sagesse hypostatique, mais la préexistence intentionnelle dans le dessein de Dieu. Il existe bien cependant une assimilation de l'Église et de la Sagesse. Mais cette doctrine est *proprement gnostique*. Et ce n'est pas elle qui, comme le pense

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[36] Daniélou, *op. cit.*, 337f., (emphasis mine).

[37] Kretschmar, *Studien zur frühchristlichen Trinitätstheologie*, 27-62.

[38] *Ibid*. For a critical review of relevant passages see also Danielou, *op. cit.*, 338.

> Schlier, est la source de la pensée chrétienne primitive, mais au contraire elle est une déformation de la doctrine judéo-chretienne, en faisant de l'Église un éon préexistant dans le Plérôme, qui la met sur le même plan que Logos, Pneuma ou Sophia.[39]

It is in order at this point to examine the theme of marriage in EP and its relation to the Sophia myth.[40] This "mystery" has attracted the attention of men of every sort and background, not least those of the Jewish-Christian and Valentinian Gnostic traditions. Indeed it would appear that the Valentinians, using Christian sources at least verbally, made the very most of the mystery of marriage.[41] It will be recalled that Valentinian eschatology made a great thing out of the idea that at the consummation there would be a conjugal union between Sophia and Soter in the Pleroma which would serve as their bridal chamber. In conjunction with this it was taught that the "spiritual ones" taken up with the lower Sophia would be joined to the angels about Soter.[42] It is widely known that the Gnostics developed various practices to anticipate this heavenly realization, some of which, probably because of abuse, have been severely critized from Irenaeus to the present day. With regard to the present discussion, Grant summarizes, "What the Gospel of Philip reveals to us is a highly significant picture of salvation as equivalent to marriage and of marriage as an archetype of salvation.[43] This is of course consistent with the original Sophia myth, and though the precise connection is elusive there can be no doubt that it is real. The principal manifestation lies in the characterization of Soter as the "bridegroom," Sophia as the "bride," and the Pleroma as the symbolic bridal chamber.[44]

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[39] Ibid., 338, (emphasis mine). For a similar rejection emphasizing that these thoughts are genuinely Pauline, see E. Percy, Die Probleme der Kolosser-und Epheserbrief, 327f.

[40] For a careful study of the marriage theme in its entirety see R. M. Grant, "The Mystery of Marriage in the Gospel of Philip," VC XV (1961), 129-40. The extent of this theme in EP is demonstrated by the fact that in his index under "Marriage, Bridegroom, Bride," Wilson (Philip, 197) lists 20 sayings. If Grant and Schenke are correct, it would appear to be possible to find traces elsewhere also.

[41] Grant, "Marriage," 131.

"Saying" 39 contains the most explicit mention of Sophia--indeed of the two Sophia figures--to be found in EP, yet even here in order to penetrate the most likely meaning of the author, it is necessary to become entangled in typical Gnostic uncertainty. Omitting the apparent dittography[45] the passage reads:

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[42] adv. Haer. I.7.1. That this basic structure is present in EP, see Schenke, op. cit., 34f.; Wilson, Philip, 20.

[43] Grant, "Marriage," 138.

[44] In this connection, Schenke, loc. cit., cites "sayings" 26 (106.11-14), 61, and 67. Grant finds similar material in "saying" 82 ("Marriage," 137) but this admits of alternative interpretation (Wilson, Philip, 145-47).

[45] For an explanation, see Wilson, Philip, 102.

> 108.10 (39) Echamoth is one thing and
> Echmoth another. Echamoth is simply Sophia,
> but Echmoth the Sophia of death. . . . .
> . . . . , which is the one
> which knows death, which is called the
> 15 little Sophia.

Surely the most immediately striking aspect of this "saying" is the fact that the original Hebrew root חָכְמָה is used both of the higher and lower Sophia figures. The tradition generally, from Irenaeus onwards, prefers Achamoth (and variants) for the lower figure only. The author does introduce a difference of vocalization, however, and there seems to be an implication that this is significant, although it is not explained.[46] One should hasten to add, however, that there is certainly no reason why the term should not be employed of both figures. The passage is unique in its description of Achamoth as "the Sophia of death." However, there is a certain standard of comparison in the fact that in Irenaeus the higher Sophia is described as *ἄφθαρτος*.[47] It may indeed be that Achamoth is so described here because death, suffering, etc., only came into existence after her separation from the light world.[48] Grant goes so far as to suggest a linguistic association with the Hebrew word מוֹת ("death").[49] However, this line of thought does not precisely satisfy the suggestion that the lower Sophia "knew" death. One can hardly resist the idea that this particular verbal usage indicates that the author is thinking in the area of the experiences of Achamoth herself, perhaps her own "death" as a purely spiritual being--an experience with causal connections to the suggestion above, as well as more personally her own. Finally, Achamoth is described as "the little Sophia." Regardless of its origin[50] the expression seems to mean simply that she is secondary, dependent, of less significance.

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[46] Neither is this phenomenon attested or explained elsewhere.

[47] *adv. Haer*. I.21.5.

[48] Wilson, *Philip*, 102f.

This then is the Sophia speculation as it appears in *EP*. The basic structure is more or less typical of developed Gnostic thought. However, a number of the aspects of the myth discussed above have no parallels elsewhere in Gnostic literature. The importance of the myth is unquestionable if it could be used in these ways and be understood without explanation.

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[49] R. M. Grant, "Two Gnostic Gospels," *JBL* 79 (1960), 7. Grant offers no explanation for the first half of the word which would of course be problematic.

[50] *Ibid*. Cf. Wilson, *Philip*, 103.

The Gospel of Truth.[51] Several years ago now Grobel described EV as a "Valentinian meditation on the gospel."[52] It is certainly a "meditation," at least in the sense that it is a reflection--a reflection upon the meaning (for Christian-Gnosis) of the "Christ event." Such a description suggests the elusive and esoteric character of the material concerned. This discussion must be limited by this inherent character.

Assuming that EV originally sustained a relationship to Valentinian thought (whether written by Valentinus himself or some other we prefer to reserve judgement), we must raise a more important question for this study. Was the document the product of earlier, less sophisticated theorization, or does it belong to a later more fully developed state of Valentinian speculation? One might think that such a question would be rather easy to decide. Just the opposite has been the case.

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[51] As EV has received more attention than any other Gnostic document apart from the Gospel of Thomas (if it is Gnostic!), we omit any attempt at a complete bibliographical survey. For the text see M. Malinine, et. al., Evangelium Veritatis (Zurich: 1956), and Supplementum (Zurich und Stuttgart: 1961). Older literature is reviewed in Hennecke-Schneemelcher, New Testament Apocrypha, 233ff.; see also J. Menard, L'évangile de Vérité (Paris: 1962); and E. Haenchen in Theologisch Rundschau 30 (1964).

[52] K. Grobel, The Gospel of Truth, passim. Cf. EV37.3. That the document is Valentinian see Puech in Hennecke (Eng. tr.) vol. 1, 240f. Others who agree include: Grant, Jonas, Quispel, and van Unnik. van Unnik (The Jung Codex, 97-100, esp. 100) goes so far as to suggest that the document was written by Valentinus himself. Cf. Grobel, op. cit., 26.

It should be noted in contrast that Schenke (Die Herkunft des sogenannten Evangelium Veritatis, Berlin: 1958, 20-25 esp.) and others have argued against the Valentinian origin of EV. Schenke (ibid., 26-29) examines the similarities between EV and The Odes of Solomon as a possible frame of reference. Cf. Arai (Die Christologie des Evangelium Veritatis, 9ff.) and J. Munck, ("Evangelium Veritatis and Greek Usage as to Book Titles," Studia Theologica, 17 (1963), 133-138).

The question of date is also considered (with references) by Puech in the article in Hennecke.

In the article just referred to, van Unnik argues that EV was produced at an early stage in the development of Valentinian theory. He observes the absence of "what the ecclesiastical writers make the principal point of their description,"[54] namely, 1) an elaborate system of aeons, 2) the fall of Sophia, 3) the Demiurge over against the highest God, and 4) the concept that the Father was unknowable (in EV he is just forgotten). He concludes:

> All this points to a stage in Valentinian doctrine which is prior to its later development in such a teacher as Ptolemaeus, or even in Valentinus himself as his doctrine is described in Irenaeus, *adv. Haer.* I.11, or Pseudo-Tertullian.[55]

Grobel follows a line similar to that of van Unnik.[56] After reviewing a group of items in EV dissimilar or at variance to the commonly received Valentinian tradition, necessarily much the same as that of van Unnik, Grobel very significantly adds his analysis of what he refers to as the Planē (πλάνη-error) myth.[57] Grobel speaks of a "veiled" or "blurred" mythology with the exception of six instances which deal with Planē.[58] Because of the roles in which Planē is cast, as well as the absence of Sophia, Grobel concludes that Planē must have been the forerunner of Sophia in the developed Valentinian system.

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[54] van Unnik, *The Jung Codex*, 98.

[55] *Ibid*.

[56] Grobel, *op. cit.*, 21ff.

It should be mentioned that the term ⲥⲟⲫⲓⲁ is found only once in *EV* (23.18). The passage is difficult but in all likelihood the reference is not to the mythological character. Grobel urges that the verb in the context (ⲣ̄ⲙⲉⲗⲉⲧⲁ, "meditate") militates against such a possibility.[59] He further argues that the wisdom concerned is that of the believer (knower) which is conferred "by the Book." In contrast to this we must now examine the passages in *EV* that deal with Planē on what appears to be a mythological basis.

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[57] *Ibid*., 23f.

[58] *Ibid*., 24. Grobel rejects 22.21, 24; 31.25; 32.37 (He overlooks 35.18) as being "simple appellatives."

[59] *Ibid*., 23, 87f. It should be noted that ⲙⲛ̄ⲧⲣ̄ⲙ̄ⲛ̄ϩⲏⲧ is also found only once in *EV* (33.8f.). As the passage is extremely difficult and only very indirectly related to this study, it is omitted. For a complete discussion of the questions involved see R. McL. Wilson, "A Note on the Gospel of Truth" (33.8-9), *NTS* 9 (1962/3), 295ff.

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17.14 Because of this,
Planē (πλάνη) took confidence. She set to work
upon her substance (ὕλη)
in a void
in her ignorance of the
Truth. She was at work upon a molded figure (πλάσμα),
preparing as best she could with
20 beauty the substitute for the
Truth. But this did not mean a defeat for Him,
the unthinkably Incomprehensible One,
for (γάρ) they were naught--this anguish
and this Forgetting and this deceitful figure (πλάσμα)
25 --whereas the abiding Truth
is unchangeable,
unperturbed, unembellishable
Therefore look with scorn (καταφρονεῖτε) upon
Planē (πλάνη): she was so
30 rootless (that) she was in
a fog concerning the Father, occupied with
preparing labors (ἔργον) and
forgettings and terrors, so that
by means of them she might entice Those-
35 of-the-Middle and take them captive (αἰχμαλωτίζειν).
Planē's (πλάνη) Forgetting was
not a (divine) manifestation; it did not constitute a
18.1 . . . . . . with the Father. The Forgetting
did not arise under the hand of the Father, though
it did arise because of Him,
but what arises in Him is Gnosis,
5 which made its appearance in order
that (ἵνα) Forgetting might be destroyed
and the Father be known. Since (ἐπειδή)
Forgetting arose because the Father
was not known, then (τότε)
10 from the moment on when the Father becomes known,
Forgetting will not be. This is

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[60] The fog which was the result of the anguish and terror produced by ignorance of the Father (17.9-14). The translation of *EV* is that of Grobel (*op. cit.*) in comparison with that of W. W. Isenberg (in Grant, *Anthology*, 146-161). Points of interest were compared with the Coptic text as well as with Schenke (*op. cit.*).

For a summary of Valentinian teaching on Creation and related themes, see Jonas, *Gnostic Religion* 190ff.

the Gospel (εὐαγγέλιον) of that which they are seeking,
it has revealed him to the
initiate through the mercies
of the Father (as) the secret mystery (μυστήριον),
Jesus the Christ through whom
it has illumined those who by reason of Forgetting
were in the darkness; it illumined them.
It gave them a Way,
and (δέ) the Way is the Truth which
it showed them. Because of this,
Plané (πλάνη) was enraged at it,
she persecuted it: she was endangered by it,
and brought to naught. . . .

Translation here is difficult because Coptic has only two genders. Occasionally it is difficult to decide between masculine and neuter. Further, if in 18.13ff. the pronouns rendered "it" are taken as masculine, there is the question to whom they refer, the Father or Jesus. The version presented above takes them to refer consistently to the same antecedent, namely "the Gospel"(18.12). Thus there is an apparent identification between Jesus and the Gospel. That is, the Gospel--embodied in Jesus--was for our writer the final and complete annihilation of Forgetting. Both he and it equal perfect Gnosis.[61]

Gnosis and Jesus are related to Plané in one other passage:

26.18 Plané (πλάνη)
was in agony, not perceiving
what she should do; being
pained at heart she beat herself, she
slashed (?) herself, because she understood
nothing. Because of the fact (ἐπειδή) that
Gnosis, who is her annihilation,

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[61] This suggestion is at least consistent. If one considered every possible combination in translating these pronouns there would be a bewildering array of possibilities.

25 approached her,
Plané (πλάνη) with all her "manifestations"[61a]
is empty,
having nothing within.

The only element that may be related to the Sophia myth is Plane's activity as a creative figure (17.15ff.).[62] However, even here her action is not the primary concern. The thought is centered upon Plane's relation to material things which could only stand as a poor substitute for Truth, the one thing she could not possess (17.21). That is, the myth is present only as a reflection.

Grobel asks, "May it be that this Plane myth is the mother in Valentinus' own teaching of the later Sophia myth . . . ?"[63] As we have implied, we must answer this question negatively. Jonas has put the reasons most clearly.[64]

Jonas penetrates the very heart of Valentinian soteriology in his analysis by concentrating on the importance of

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[61a] For ϯⲏ see Grobel, *op*. *cit*., 107.

[62] It might be argued that this thought is more nearly "orthodox" than Gnostic. It is best to note that it partakes of both worlds--as does the entire document. That Plane may equal the Demiurge see Jonas, *Gnostic Religion*, 190.

[63] Grobel, *op*. *cit*., 24.

[64] See Jonas, *Gnostic Religion*, 309-319; "Evangelium Veritatis," *Gnomon* 32 (1960), 327-335 (This is Jonas' review of the text edited by Malinine, Puech, and Quispel); "Evangelium Veritatis and the Valentinian Speculation," *Studia Patristica* VI, (*Texte und Untersuchungen* 81, Berlin: 1962), 96-111. Cf. Doresse, *Secret Books*, 240.

Gnosis.[65] The fundamental principle revolves around the fact that Gnosis is the ultimate and final undoing of Sophia's original mistake. Only in this way can the original cosmogonic disaster be put right.

Jonas observes two passages in EV that contain what he prefers to call the "formula"--that is, the formula regarding Gnosis in the Valentinian system. The first (18.7-16) is included in the quotation above. The second is as follows:

> 24.28 For (ἐπειδή) the Lack arose
> because the Father was not known,
> 30 but when the Father is known,
> then (τότε) the Lack will not exist
> from that moment.

These two quotations closely correspond to a passage in Irenaeus which Jonas is inclined to feel describes the Valentinians generally and not the Marcosians specifically.[66] The importance of this quotation demands its inclusion here.

> One must not perform the mystery of the ineffable and invisible power through visible and corruptible things of creation, nor that of the unthinkable and immaterial beings through sensible and corporeal things. Perfect salvation is the cognition itself of the ineffable greatness: for since through "Ignorance" came about "Defect" and "Passion," the whole system springing from the Ignorance is dissolved by knowledge. Therefore, knowledge is salvation of the inner man; nor is it psychical, for even the soul is a product of the defect and is a lodging to the spirit: spiritual therefore must also be the form of salvation.

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[65] As is rather typical of Jonas, his argument virtually defies summary. We regret that more space cannot be allowed here for an analysis of his articles.

[66] Jonas, Gnostic Religion, 318.

> Through knowledge, then, is saved the inner, spiritual man; so that to us suffices the knowledge of universal being: this is the true salvation.[67]
> adv. Haer. I.21.1

One may wonder if the Valentinians were as accomplished philosophically as Jonas seems to think. Yet at the same time one must recognize the penetrating importance of Gnosis in their thinking. The advanced state of the Gnostic theology reflected in EV justifies Jonas' conclusion that it can only be understood if the complete mythos is presupposed.

> . . . the speculative passages of the GT are not merely an abridgment or summary of some fuller version: they point up, in their symbolic contraction, the essence of the doctrine, stripped of its vast mythological accessories and reduced to its philosophical core.[68]

The "either-or" represented by Grobel and Jonas is extremely important and will obviously influence the answer to any other questions asked about EV.[69] Although we have cast our lot with Jonas, the views of van Unnik and Grobel must be respected. The fact that it was possible for two so divergent conclusions to emerge from the same evidence is significant. Surely such must be vivid evidence of the complex nature of the questions facing scholars with regard to the problem of relationships in this difficult area.

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[67] Both the translation and emphasis are that of Jonas, Gnostic Religion, 176.

[68] Ibid., 317.

[69] After committing himself on this fundamental issue Jonas finds it possible to detect other traces of a developed Valentinian system. Cf. e.g., Gnostic Religion, 315f.

Although *EV* is not a "gospel" in the ordinary sense of that term, the fact that it is a "Valentinian meditation *on* the gospel" means among other things that it reflects a deep Christian commitment--including, if you will, a Christology.[70] Indeed the fact that the writer held Christ in the highest esteem is immediately evident upon the most casual reading. It must surely be true that of all the Gnostic documents in our possession *EV* reflects the most fascinating combination of things both Gnostic and Christian.[71] With regard to the Christology however, the term "Logos"[72] plays an important role in spite of the fact that Irenaeus indicates that the Valentinians used this name for the Aeon produced by Monogenes and Aletheia.[73]

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[70] The challenge of articulating this Christology has been nobly taken up by S. Arai (*Die Christologie des Evangelium Veritatis*, Leiden: 1964). We must confine our attention here primarily to the *λόγος*-*ϢⲈϪⲈ* aspect of this Christology. See also Laeuchli, *The Language of Faith*, 43ff.

[71] Most "orthodox" Christians of the second century would probably have approved of *EV* by giving it their own Christian interpretation if they had heard it as a sermon.

[72] Arai (*op. cit.*, 72 n.3) insists that no distinction can be established between *λόγος* and *ϢⲈϪⲈ* in *EV*.

[73] *adv. Haer.* I.1.1.

For the writer of *EV* the term Logos was not an ambiguous one to be used either of the written gospel or Jesus, as the inclination of the moment might have suggested, but rather for him it seems to draw the common elements of the two separate things into a single entity. Again, Jesus was for him the embodiment of the gospel. This concept in *EV* must not be dismissed as an ambiguity. With these things in mind we turn to the language of *EV*.

The Logos is spoken of as being "in the thought and mind of the Father" (16.25f), or "in a silent grace" (37.11f.).[74] He was the "first to emerge" from the Father (37.9, 16).[75] "Father" again being the antecedent, the Logos is "the fruit of His heart and face-form (*ⲞⲨⲘⲞⲨⲚⲠ̄*) of His will" (23.35ff.). He "came from the Pleroma" (*πλήρωμα*), and "passes through the Totality" (16.34f., 23.33ff.).[76] Indeed he "supports the Totality" and performs a redemptive function toward them, "causing them to return within the Father" (24.3ff.). He is called *Soter* (*σωτήρ*) because that is his work, i.e., "the redemption (*ⲥⲱⲧⲉ*)[77] of those who were a-Gnostic of the Father" (16.36ff.).

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[74] This line has been variously interpreted. The translation suggested is based on that of Arai (op. cit., 73), "in der schweigenden Gnade." Grobel (op. cit., 172) proposes, "characterized by a silent grace." Cf. Ignatius, *Magnesians* 8, *supra* 250ff.

[75] That the aeon Logos was not the "first to emerge" ordinarily in Valentinian theory see H. Ringgren, "The Gospel of Truth and Valentinian Gnosticism," *Studia Theologica* 18 (1964), 58.

[76] "Totality" stands for *ⲠⲦⲎⲢϤ̄*. Where the verb permits Grobel translates "Totality of creatures." This phrase was selected he says, "to include all men but exclude neither supernatural beings nor all created things, though clearly *persons* are primarily intended, probably human," (*op.cit.*,39). See also *infra* 447, n. 100.

These last thoughts introduce the primary function of the Logos. He is the medium through which the Father is made known.[78] There can be no reasonable doubt that Arai is exactly right when he says that "das 'Wort' hauptsächlich zur Darstellung der Gottesoffenbarung durch Christus benutzt wird."[79]

Ringgren summarizes:

> One might ask whether this [23.33-24.8] reflects the Stoic idea of the *logos* as the principle of the universe or the divine Word of John 1. In any case it is clear that the Savior-Word is a manifestation of the Father's loving will and that his task is to make the fallen beings from the heavenly world return to their origin, to the Father.[80]

When Arai raises the question, "Wie offenbart sich der Vater durch das Wort?" he is led to a discussion of *EV* 23.18-34.9.[81] He notes that of all the characteristics

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[77] Grobel (*op. cit.*, 37) doubts a bilingual pun.

[78] The author of *EV* at this point is perfectly in accord with the "orthodox" tradition.

[79] Arai, *op. cit.*, 73.

[80] Ringgren, *loc. cit.*

[81] *Ibid.*, 73ff.

(Wesenszüge) of the Father that stand in relation to the Word, the characteristic of love is always related with a difference.[82] Attention is focused on 23.30f.

ϯⲁⲅⲁⲡⲏ ⲛ̄ⲧⲟ
ⲟⲧϥ̄ ⲁⲥⲣ̄ ⲟⲩⲥⲱⲙⲁ ϩⲓⲱⲱϥ

Grobel translates: "The *love* for It has become a *body* upon It(?)."[83] Arai responds, "Diese Übersetzung ist kaum anzunehmen."[84] He suggests in return: "Seine Liebe (ἀγάπη) ist Leib (σῶμα) in ihm geworden."[85] Obviously such a translation suggests a thought far beyond Grobel's almost apologetic conclusion, "Some kind of incarnation . . . Pauline . . . the Church."[86] All of this leads Arai to examine the context surrounding the other uses of ἀγάπη in *EV*.

The comparison lacks depth because there are only two other passages in which the word is used. They are nevertheless important. The first is 34.31.

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[82] *Ibid*., 75. It should be noted that there are two apparent typographical errors on page 75. In line eight of the text 34,3 should be 34,31; and in line twelve 33,29-34 should be 34,29-34.

[83] Grobel, *op*. *cit*., 88. The fact that Grobel saw here a "Hymn on the Perfect Book" has exercised a controlling influence on his translation.

[84] Arai, *op*. *cit*., 74 n.3.

[85] *Ibid*., 74.

[86] Grobel, *op*. *cit*., 89, 91.

34.29 He abolished the separation
and brought the Pleroma (πλήρωμα)
which is hot with love (ἀγάπη), in order that
32 the coldness might be no more.
But (ἀλλά) the Reunion is due to
34 the perfect Thought.[87]

Arai sees here the love that abolished the separation and delivered the oneness. This leads to the second passage where over "the true brothers," i.e., the saved, "flows the love of the Lord" (43.5-7). Arai concludes:

> Das besagt, dass ἀγάπη im EuVer schlechthin die Liebe des Vaters zu den Menschen bedeutet. Daraus schliessen wir die Bedeutung unseres Passus wie folgt: Der Vater hat die Menschen so geliebt, dass er sein Wort Leib werden liess, damit dieses die Menschen im Leib erlöse. Denselben Sachverhalt kann der Verfasser des EuVer folgendermassen ausdrucken: "Es (=das Wort) empfangt die Gestalt des Alls" (24.4f.), oder ähnlich wie unser Passus--aber ohne Motiv der ἀγάπη--: "Eine Stimme allein war es (=das Wort) nicht, sondern es wurde Leib (σῶμα)." (26,8f.).[88]

Arai continues by pointing out that if his exposition is correct it is possible to see a certain common ground between *EV* and John's gospel.[89] He then quotes Stauffer on ἀγάπη with approval, "ἀγάπη ist ganz ausgesprochen die herabsteigende Liebe, nicht genug, sie ist eine himmlische

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[87] For the most part, Arai seems to agree with Grobel's translation, except perhaps for 33f. which he translates: "sondern (ἀλλά) die Einheit des vollkommenen Denkens." The translation of 34.31 is Grobel's. An alternative might be: "the warm fulness of love."

[88] Arai, *op*. *cit*., 75.

[89] *Ibid*., 76. Cf. Jn. 3.16 and 1 Jn. 4.9. See also C. K. Barrett, "The Theological Vocabulary of the Fourth Gospel and the Gospel of Truth" in *Current Issues in New Testament Interpretation*, eds. W. Klassen and G. F. Snyder.

Wirklichkeit, die gewissermassen von Stufe zu Stufe sich niedersenkt in diese Welt."[90]

Arai observes[91] that such an exposition of God's love is nowhere else to be found in Gnostic writings. And that though the similarity between the two documents is genuine enough, it is made much less significant by certain dissimilarities. Arai observes a substantial difference in spirit. Barrett[92] makes this specific in three ways. In contrast with the Fourth Gospel, Barrett holds that EV: 1) does not entertain the same radical view of God's love, 2) knows little of God's love for the world, so important in John, and 3) is not "sacrificial" but is rather "acquisitive." Arai argues that it was the basic tendency of the Gnostics to disassociate themselves from the physical world that demanded the use of σωμα as noted above, as over against the Johannine σάρξ. That is to say, these Gnostics at least were in fact quite willing to speak of "body," but rather carefully avoided the implications of "flesh."

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[90] E. Stauffer, TWNT I, 53

[91] Arai, op. cit., 76.

[92] Barrett, op. cit.

Therefore, whether the term is the *σάρξ* of the "orthodox" or the *σῶμα* of the Gnostics, it was the Father's love given to man of which both desired to speak. The rather obvious conclusion is that the Gnostics represented by *EV* were just as concerned to convey the message of the Father's gift to man as were their more orthodox opponents, although they were ultimately judged unorthodox in their attempt.

The "Fourth Treatise" of the Jung Codex.[93] It is in order that *VT* be introduced by Zandee:

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[93] *The Fourth Treatise* (*Vierten Traktat*, abv. *VT*, also occasionally referred to as "The Treatise on the Three Natures" --a title however which seems to be declining in popularity--) has not yet been published. Considerable portions are, however included in the photographic plates in Labib, *Coptic Gnostic Papyri in the Coptic Museum at Old Cairo*, vol.1 (Cairo: 1956). The Coptic text originally included pages 51-134(?) of the Codex. It is now thought that the plates presented in Labib include pages 59-82 and 87-90. Our concern (*infra*) is here with pages 75-82. These pages are composed of the following plate numbers in Labib: 12, 11, 14, 13, 22, 21, 16, 15 (in this order). Although we shall continue to refer to the document as "*VT*", it should be noted that it has been decided that there are at least three tractates here. The divisions are as follows: Tractate I, 51-103; Tractate II, 104-108; Tractate III, 108.13-end. It should also be noted that all the references in Zandee's "Messina" paper (*infra*) were taken from "Tractate I."

The text has been examined along rather broad lines by J. Zandee, *The Terminology of Plotinus and of Some Gnostic Writings, Mainly the Fourth Treatise of the Jung Codex* (Istanbul: 1961), and "Gnostic Ideas on the Fall and Salvation" *NUMEN* XI, 1 (1964), 13-74. Professor Zandee also read a paper at the Messina conference on Gnosticism (April, 1966). It was entitled "Die person der Sophia in der vierten Schrift des Codex Jung,"(see *Le Origini dello Gnosticismo*, ed. V. Bianchi, Leiden: 1967). However, many of the same points made in the paper were also discussed in our seminars (*infra*)

> This work contains the whole of the Valentinian thought-world, beginning with a description of the Transcendent God and ending with *ἀποκατάστασις*. The notion of the three classes of men, viz. pneumatics, psychics, and hylics, is fully dealt with. One can only regret that there are many disturbing lacunae and that the Coptic seems not always to be pure, which renders translation more difficult.[94]

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and it is now difficult to say precisely where we came to certain opinions. It would be virtually impossible to treat this paper accurately without the complete text of *VT* at hand. As we shall see, even Professor Zandee has apparently altered his opinion about certain elements in the treatise.

See also: H.C. Puech and G. Quispel, "Le quatrieme escrit gnostique du Codex Jung," *Vigiliae Christianne* IX (1955), 65-102. This article examines primarily the concept of God the Father in *VT*.

When it became apparent that *VT* contained important material for this study, an effort was made through my advisor, R. McL. Wilson, to contact Professor Zandee about the possibility of conferring (these two are a part of an international team of scholars presently at work on the document). In response Professor Zandee kindly suggested a series of meetings in which the two of us would read together a selection of the pages in Labib dealing with the Sophia myth (i.e., 75-82). Pre-publication agreements made it impossible to go beyond these limits. (It might be added that due to the difficulty of the material, these pages provided more than enough work for the time at our disposal.) These conferences were held in the summer of 1966.

The insight obtained from these meetings makes it possible to say that *VT* will eventually contribute very significantly to our understanding of Valentinian theology in its more philosophical-mystical form. Fortunately, a number of important passages concerning an erring aeon (Sophia), as well as a Logos figure, occur in the plates from Labib. Needless to say, I am deeply indebted to Professor Zandee for what appears here concerning *VT*. The passages offered in translation here should be regarded as no more than a preliminary draft of better things. Only the final publication, which will comprise the work of a number of scholars, will offer anything like an adequate basis for thorough investigation. In this survey we can do little more than introduce the subject.

[94] Zandee, "Gnostic Ideas," 16.

One specific that affects this study is that the title "Sophia" is not used (at least in pages 75-82) but the author refers to Sophia obliquely by means of a circumlocution such as "one of the aeons." The point concerned is often clearly a reference to the Sophia myth as it is known elsewhere. Further, as we shall see, it is possible to gather data about a Logos figure. The distinction between these two is complicated by the occasional use of *λογος* as the equivalent of *ἀιῶν*, and especially so when this occurs in a context that seems to speak of Sophia.

The question of the extent or nature of personification/hypostatization reflected in the document is an important one. Of *VT* 75.27 specifically Zandee says, "Here Sophia is not yet personified but is rather a facet of the revolutionary aeon."[95] It is not clear just how widely he might apply this conclusion. It does seem that Zandee views a more complete "personification" as a phenomenon yet to appear. Of the *λόγος* he says elsewhere, "In the 4th treatise of the Jung Codex, however, the logos is not a separate hypostasis, but it is a function of the Father, through which He executes his creation, his world-plan and his salvation-"economy."[96] As in the *Gospel of Truth*, there are also grounds here for asking whether or not we have a discussion of both these figures actually post-hypostatization, that is a "demythologization" along philosophical lines of more mythical presentations found elsewhere. Any final solution to this question must be delayed however until more complete study is possible.

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[95] *Ibid.*, 25. It will be observed that Zandee's use of "personify" and "hypostasis" is not altogether clear.

[96] Zandee, *Terminology of Plotinus*, 29.

Although plagued by the confusion of terms mentioned earlier, there does appear to be a figure--however vague--called or thought of in terms of λόγος in VT. It appears to be quite Gnostic in character even though at times one may hear overtones that may have been formulated against a Christian background. As Zandee has had access to the document as a whole for some time, it is in order to let him speak. The passage quoted earlier is included for completeness.

> In Gnosticism the logos occurs as a hypostasis, it is true. As the couple, Logos-Life, it constitutes a part of the second tetrad. In the 4th treatise of the Jung Codex, however, the logos is not a separate hypostasis, but it is a function of the Father, through which He executes his creation, his world-plan and his salvation-"economy." The logos brings forth the aeons (4th tr. 60,35). Thus the logos is the link between the Father and the next stratum of reality. A fixed salvation-planning (οἰκονομία) is the cause of its origin (4th tr. 77,9/10). The imperfection of creation is encompassed in the planning of the logos as it was the case in Plotinus. "For the logos becomes a cause for those who originate. He added still more to them to cause embarrassment. Contemptibleness came instead of completion." (4th tr. 80, 11-15). The logos creates man, through the demiurge, with a lack of

> knowledge in order that he should receive knowledge that the exalted One exists (4th tr. 105, 18sqq.). Thus, it is a well considered plan of the logos to create man without an innate knowledge of God which he could be proud of, but to create him as an imperfect one in order that he might seek for God and gradually get acquainted with him. Within this return and μετάνοια is the final aim of the logos (4th tr.81, 20/21). "The logos did this work through those whom he had appointed in order to procure assistance for the confirmation of those who originated for his sake, thinking that he might implore the salvation-"economia" (οἰκονομία) for all those who came forth from him" (4th tr. 91, 10sqq.). "The 'economy' of everything which is below has been committed to him" (4th tr. 95, 21.)[97]

This quotation gives the impression that the Logos in VT is a reasonably definite figure. However, Zandee seems either to have altered his interpretation of some of these passages--a thing not to be deprecated--or he is confused in the same way as the writer of VT seems to have been. Of the seven passages cited in the paragraph, three appear in the plates examined by us. It is interesting to note that all three (77,9/10; 80,11-15; 81,20/21) appear in support of a Sophia figure (higher or lower) in the paper read at Messina. All of which indicates the complexity of the problems and also causes one to await eagerly the publication of the document.[98]

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[97] Ibid.

[98] That Zandee sees λόγος in VT as a word with different meanings see "Gnostic Ideas," 55. Zandee should not be criticized on this point at all. Admittedly VT, by its nature and textual problems, is among the most difficult of Gnostic texts. Zandee himself observes that everytime he reads it he sees something differently, or indeed for the first time.

The translation to follow is comprised of a selection of passages from VT 75-82 that concern the Sophia myth.[99]

75.13 For there is a limit (ὅρος)
for the word while it is in the Pleroma (πλήρωμα),
15 that they may be silent concerning the incomprehensibility
of the Father, but (δε) that they may speak
concerning the wish to comprehend him. It occurred to
one of the aeons (αἰῶν) to attempt
to understand what is incomprehensible.
20 He glorifies it and the
ineffability of the Father even more.
The logos (λόγος) of the oneness
is not (out of?) one, it is not out of
the Father of the All, nor
25 out of the one who brought them forth.
For he who brought forth the All (is) the Father.
For the aeon (αἰῶν) was one out of those
to whom wisdom (σοφία) was given, who was
first, each one
30 as his thought, of whom he wished
that they should be brought forth. Therefore
he assumed a nature (φύσις) of wisdom (σοφία),
that he might investigate the system
which is hidden as a fruit (κάρπος) of
35 wisdom (σοφία). For the free will (αὐτεξουσία)
which was brought forth with
the All, was a cause
for this single one, in this way, that he might do
76.1 that which he wished, nothing
restraining him. For
this intention (προαίρεσις) of the logos (λόγος)
was something good.
5 He went forward, he glorified
the Father although (κάν) he set hand
to an impossible task,
wishing to bring forth one
who was perfect out of a
10 mixture, who was not
like him, not having the one
who gave a command to him, for

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[99] It should be noted that due to our lack of experience with Coptic, the condition of the plates to hand, the present state of research, etc., we found it impossible to give complete notes of lacunae and emendations. As a partial list could be misleading, all have been omitted pending the critical edition of the text.

this aeon was (the) last one when he
brought them forth in (κατά) harmony
15 with one another, and he was a son
of his greatness. And before
he brought forth something else to the glory of
this Will from the mixing of the All,[100]
he acted in a greatness
20 of thought out of a superabundant
love (ἀγάπη). He went forward
to this one who was above surrounded by
the perfect glory. For
not without the will of the Father
25 was this logos (λόγος) brought forth which
is this one. And without him[101]
he will not go forward, but (ἀλλά)
the Father brought him forth for
those of whom he knew that it was fitting
30 that they come into being. For the Father
and the All have withdrawn themselves
outside him that he should be
strengthened, namely to the limit
which the Father has fixed. For
35 he (Sophia) did not originate from the nearness and
the incomprehensibility but (ἀλλά) according to the
will
77,1 of the Father and that
the things may originate which would
originate for a dispensation (οἰκονομία)
which would not be despised, while it would not
originate
5 from the revelation of the Pleroma (πλήρωμα).
Therefore it is not fitting
to accuse the movement which is the logos (λόγος),
but (ἀλλά) it is fitting that we speak of
the movement of the logos (λόγος), that it is a cause
10 of a dispensation (οἰκονομία) which has been
determined to
originate. For the logos (λόγος) brought forth
himself, being perfect as a single one,
to the glory of the Father who
willed him and was well-pleased with him.

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[100] Zandee here translates ⲠⲦⲎⲢϤ "aeons." In Gnostic usage this Coptic term is the equivalent of τὸ πάν, "all things," "the universe," "the All."

[101] The language (cf. line 32) sounds like that used of Horos. However, the context deals with Sophia which makes any reference to Horos awkward. We follow Zandee in leaving the question open.

15 Because he wished to get hold on them
he brought them forth in shadows
and images (εἴδωλον) and likenesses.
Because he was not able to bear the sight of
the light but (ἀλλά) looked into
20 the depth (βάθος), he became double-minded on
account of
this. It was a division which grieved
him and a turning away because of the
double-mindedness and the division, a forgetfulness
and an ignorance of him and
25 reality, namely his pride and his
expectation to comprehend
the incomprehensible one. It became dense for him
and it was in him. The illnesses
which accompanied him
30 when he had exceeded himself
originated from
double-mindedness, namely from the fact
that he did not achieve his attack
on the glory of the Father whose exaltedness
35 is without limits. Now this one
did not attain him for he did not receive him.
For the one which he brought forth out of himself
78.1 as an aeon(αἰών), as a single unity,
ran upward unto that
which was his and unto his kinsman (συγγενής)
in the Pleroma. He abandoned
5 that which had originated from lack,
those (passions) which came forth from him
as a fantasy (φαντασία) as if they were not his.
For when he had brought it forth,
he who brought it forth out of himself
10 when he was still perfect
became weak according to the nature (φύσις)
of a woman who had abandoned
her husband. For from that
which he lacked himself
15 originated those who came into being
out of his thought and his pride,
out of his perfect composition.
He abandoned it. He went
above to those who were his. He was
20 in the Pleroma (πλήρωμα), being
a thought for him, for he was
saved from his passion.
For he who ran to the height and he
who drew him unto himself were not

25 idle, but they brought forth
a fruit (κάρπος) from the Pleroma (πλήρωμα).
They overturned those things
which originated from the lack. For the things
which originated from the thought
30 of pride were similar
to the Pleroma (πλήρωμα)[102]
being likenesses of them
and images (εἴδωλον) and shadows
and fantasies (φαντασία) which were deprived of
35 the logos (λόγος) and the light. Those
who are of the empty thought
are not at all real off-spring. Therefore
79.1 their end will become as
their beginning out of him who had
not come into being, so that they return again unto
that
which will not exist.

. . . .

80.30 For, because the logos (λόγοι)
was in this condition
of instability
he did not continue to bring forth
(anything) as emanations,
35 which are fulnesses (πλήρωμα)
of the glory which came into being to the glory
of the Father. But (ἀλλά) he begat
81.1 (them) in weakness, they being small
and separated from him in the diseases, those
from whom he also kept himself separated.

. . . .

81.22 The logos (λόγος) turned
to the Pleroma (πλήρωμα) and the thought
which turned from evil
25 and returned to the good.
As to the return, the thought
of that which existed followed it
and also the entreaty on behalf of the man who turns
himself to the good.
30 For he who is in the Pleroma (πλήρωμα)
prayed him first and
he remembered then his brother
one by one and all the rest
together, then all of them.

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[102] Zandee would translate πλήρωμα "aeons."

35 Before all those
82.1 was the entreaty of the Father.
He was a help that he should
bring him back to himself
and the All. For it was a cause
5 for him that he (Sophia) should remember
the pre-existent things, namely their
remembrance of him.

Our text begins (75.13ff.) with a striking distinction. The aeons are not to speak of the incomprehensibility of the Father but they may discuss their own desire to know him. That is, the "deficiency" placed within the aeons by the Father may be approached but the source of that "deficiency" may not. The distinction itself suggests an alluring temptation, one for which only the Father can be ultimately responsible.[103] In this context Sophia is introduced in terms of "one of the aeons" who wanted to make an attempt on the Father's "incomprehensibility"(75.7ff.). Although Zandee uses feminine pronouns in his articles, it should be remembered that "Sophia" is always masculine in this document. Reference has already been made to the translation problem associated with Coptic pronouns.[104] In addition "Sophia" is here always called a λόγος and never referred to as ΣΟΦΙΑ.

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[103] For a discussion of this fundamental Valentinian principle, see Jonas, Gnostic Religion, 174ff.

[104] See supra 431.

What are the implications of a Sophia myth without "Sophia"? Such a phenomenon could not be the result of coincidence. Zandee's statement "not yet personified"[105] might lead one to conclude that he feels we have here an early stage of the myth. He should not be so interpreted. The fact that the treatise deals "theologically" with the whole of the Valentinian thought world would argue in favor of the document being the product of later speculation which apparently was more philosophical in character.

As we shall continue to observe, this is basically the same myth as that found in the *Apocryphon of John* and Valentinianism but with "Sophia" giving place to a logos. "Sophia" seems to be suffering a fate similar to that of *σοφία* in Christological speculation where the feminine aspects of the category receded before the masculine, which were alone of course felt to be appropriate for Jesus.

But why did this happen here to "Sophia"? The question cannot be explored adequately of course until the complete text of *VT* is published. At that time one should look for "theological" reasons from a Gnostic point of view. In short, why did "Sophia's" feminity become problematic? To what extent, if any, were the circumstances within Gnosticism similar to those within the "orthodox" tradition?

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[105] Zandee, "Gnostic Ideas," 25.

Zandee suggests that ΛΟΓΟϹ in 75.22 means "a way of thinking." It would appear that the author was attempting to ask just who was responsible for such a state of affairs. The disconcerting answer lurking always in the shadows was the Father himself, but this the author seems compelled to avoid. He would have found it difficult to give theological justification for such a conclusion.

The Father had given "wisdom" to all the aeons(75.27f.). It was this "nature of wisdom" expressed in terms of "free-will"(αὐτεξουσία) that became the cause of "Sophia's" illegitimate deed (75.31ff.). "Free-will" here is misused to make a decision against instead of for God. "Sophia's" fault is that she inquired into God's incomprehensible being."[106] The author conveniently overlooks the fact that even this αὐτεξουσία must have been directly linked with the Father. This of course is consistent with his apparent intention of avoiding the involvement of the Father in the responsibility of "Sophia's" fall. With regard to "Sophia," the implication is that he did not realize that to comprehend God is to be bigger than he.

Very early in our quotation the idea is implied that the action of the erring aeon was fundamentally good (75.20f.). Now (76.2ff.) our author states it openly.

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[106] *Ibid*.

This "last" aeon, a "son" of the Father's "greatness," gave great glory to the Father even though he set his hand to an "impossible task" (76.5ff.). "Sophia" indeed "acted in a greatness of thought out of a superabundant love" (76.19ff.). As we have observed Irenaeus called this love a "pretense." In sharp contrast the writer of VT makes an emphatic case for the genuineness of "Sophia's" motivation.

As we know from other sources, "Sophia's" attempt was destined to failure from the start. The "passion," moving in a direction not originally anticipated, finally expressed itself in the creation of the material world. There can be no doubt that VT speaks of these things, but it does so in language that is not typical. We are told that the "movement of the logos" should not be reproached, but rather it is right and good to speak of it (77.6ff.). "Sophia" became the "cause" of a "dispensation" that had been "determined to originate" (77.9ff.). That is to say that even "Sophia's" sin was a part of the Father's plan. The resultant creation was not complete, but consisted of "shadows and images and likenesses" (77.16f.). This creation was actually the product of the "double-mindedness" of "Sophia" which was a result of the fact that he had looked into the "depth" and could not comprehend it (77.18f.).

Reference is made to this creation as "illnesses" of "Sophia" and, to express the causal factor in other terms, they are themselves material evidence of the failure of his "attack on the glory of the Father" (77.28ff.). When the "passion" that was aroused in "Sophia" affected his stability, any further attempt to complete his purpose was immediately stopped (80.30ff.). Indeed even the things that were created were products of his "weakness" and not of his power as originally intended (80.37ff.).

The appearance of two "Sophia" figures ("Sophia" and Achamoth, higher and lower) is not as clear in VT as it is elsewhere. The entire approach, use of terms, etc., made by our author complicates the situation. However, Zandee sees a suggestion of the appearance of Achamoth in 77.11f. Clearer allusion is perhaps found later when the erring aeon is spoken of as returning to the Pleroma and therefore abandoning "that which had originated from lack" (77.37-78.5). The same type of thing occurs further down. When "Sophia" had this tumultuous experience he became weak, as a woman without a husband. Our author is here too philosophical to call "Sophia" a woman. He therefore uses this facet of the myth only as a comparison. "Sophia," our text continues, deserted all the substance created from deficiency to return "to those who were his" (78.8ff.). "He was saved from his passion" (78.21f.).

Repentance as such is more clearly visible later. "Sophia" we are told "turned to the Pleroma" (81.22f.). A certain identity is established in the passage with both the "thought" and the "man" that returns to the "good" (81.23ff.). To each one there is the call to "remembrance." In imagery somewhat more typical, it is "remembrance" of the original condition that provides the impetus toward reunion with the Father.

All of this is claimaxed by the production of the "fruit from the Pleroma" (78.23ff.). In contrast to Irenaeus' account where the fruit--Jesus, or Soter--is the product of all aeons, VT suggests that the "fruit" was brought forth by the Father and "Sophia" only. It was the production of this one that set in train the process that was ultimately to result in salvation. In terms of VT this means that for those who are to be saved, "their end will become as their beginning" (79.1f.). At this point the complete cycle toward perfection will have become a reality.

We thus obtain an insight, however small, into the Fourth Treatise of the Jung Codex. The document represents an important attempt on the part of the Valentinian Gnostics to make the myths of their tradition serve the best and most ideal purposes. The writing of this treatise was apparently motivated by the realization that these myths, to be useful, must have their significance "drawn out." This "drawing out" was done, as we have said, by means of a philosophical-mystical exegesis of the mythical material. However rewarding our study may have been, it can only be enlarged and refined when it is possible to examine the complete document in detail.

Thus we have the Valentinian Sophia myth as it appears in the documents available at the present time. Our observations have largely already been made. Perhaps one should mention again the remarkable agreement with the descriptions of the Fathers. The variations that appear are almost without exception those that one might expect, given an awareness of Gnostic presuppositions. Our broader summary follows.

CONCLUSION

One reason for beginning a study of this type is that a certain unexplored area seems to deserve attention. There are often many unknowns, however, and the ultimate destination is never assured at the outset. What might be referred to as the "Research Myth" leads one to await startling conclusions that will have far-reaching effects upon scholarship. When these conclusions are not forthcoming, a more accurate conception of the character of most research begins to emerge. One then finds the task to lie in examining more or less widely held views as carefully as possible. In fact, the results of this study have been for the most part to document such views. This is true even though we have not undertaken a detailed comparison between Irenaeus and the documents. The points repeated here--whatever their degree of certainty or vagueness--are intended to summarize our convictions as well as our intuitions about this area of research.

The first four chapters, i. e., the attempt to trace the backgrounds as well as the "orthodox" development of thought in the areas concerned, have revealed a generally continuous conceptual world. Although even here the evidence is often patchy and incomplete, the development of doctrines is reasonably clear. Any detailed repetition in this area is felt to be unnecessary.

Although there is what may be viewed as a continuous development here, it should be observed that the "orthodox" writers of the second century do not regularly manifest a clear relation to earlier developments. There are for example the Gnostic leanings of some of these writers, the curious fact that a man like Justin reflects no intimate awareness of the writings of either Philo or the apostle John,[1] and perhaps most important there is the remarkable neglect of the Christological potential of the term *σοφία*.[2] Although the first two items must be judged as mainly outside our concern, something must be said about this observation concerning *σοφία*. This particular observation may represent a reaction to Gnostic misuse. One does not suppose that the Christians of the period played the part of the offended child, complaining that someone had taken what was rightfully theirs. Rather, one imagines that in view of what the Gnostics were doing with this term, those of the "orthodox" tradition were simply reluctant to become involved mainly for fear of being misunderstood.

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[1] Cf. *supra* 265f.

[2] *Supra* 336.

Although second century "orthodoxy" did not employ σοφία in its Christological statements as it might have, the awareness was there and the available evidence may represent more of substance than one may discern at this late date. For example, the author of the *Epistle to Diognetus* employed thought forms belonging to the σοφία-λόγος tradition even though he was reluctant to openly use the terminology.

The real break--if the type of dependence observed may be so described--comes with the emergence of the Gnostics. The dependence of much Gnostic thought upon Christian sources is clear, although there are many unanswered questions. Yet at the same time one is compelled to observe a vast difference between the two, psychologically as well as doctrinally. The speculative approach of the Gnostics will always prove difficult to "western" minds.[4] When the

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[3] *Supra* 256ff. A completely new problem would arise here if Valentinus is the author of *Diognetus*. See S.Pétrement, "Valentin est-il l'auteur de l'épître à Diognète?", *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses* 46 (1966), 34-62.

[4] One has observed the publication of a new book, C. J. Bleeker, *Egyptian Festivals* (Leiden: 1968), which advertises an approach "from the cultic angle." The author holds that Egyptologists tend to overestimate the value of doctrine and myth. He punctuates his view by contending that it is doubtful that there were any proper theologians in Egypt. The Egyptian, he argues, found religious expression in the cult.

This view, of which we have not had opportunity of serious investigation, seems to fit remarkably with certain feelings we have come to hold with regard to Egyptian Gnosticism. Without pursuing it further, this serves to point out differences are stressed in this way the question arises, Why did the Gnostics feel any need to borrow from Christian sources at all? There might well be many answers to such a question, not the least of which would be the background of individual converts as they came within the sphere of Gnosticism. With regard however to the more general Sophia figure, one imagines that the association of concepts within creative contexts was impossible for the Gnostics to deny. They simply found it unnecessary to attempt any complete reconstruction. It was easier to build on old foundations. Further, even the Gnostic absorption with and commitment to the thesis that the material world was evil by nature could have been at least partly a reinterpretation of biblical sources. The primary point here is that one can only be fascinated by the fact that in spite of the great differences between the Gnostic and orthodox worlds, there are also many similarities (relationships?).

What then are the major points in the developing sequence of the *σοφία*-*λόγος* tradition? In answer to this question we can give only the briefest and at that somewhat repetitious sketch of what we have examined in the course of this study. First there was the realization of the existence

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once again that "western" minds will always find these areas unnatural and may attempt to fit them into conceptual moulds which are inadequate simply because they are oriented to another culture.

of wisdom as a body of truth which by its very nature penetrated the fabric of human existence. Hand in hand with this observation was of course the desire to lay hold of that reality.

When it was realized that this so-called "body of truth" was a part of the created order, it was also recognized that it had always been so, i.e., since creation. This led to a concept of presence at creation and later to involvement in the act of creation itself. Obviously there is also involved here the very tedious movement from wisdom as a characteristic to wisdom as a personification and finally to Wisdom as a hypostasis. "Simple pre-existence" and involvement in creation led finally to the positing of "eternal pre-existence."

Involved in all this is the concept of rejection. The wise way was commonly rejected, which made it comparitively easy to speak of Wisdom descending to man and then upon being rejected returning to its former place (Enoch 42). In this context Wisdom plays, at least by implication, the part of teacher-revealer. All of these elements were a part of the tradition prior to the appearance of Jesus, but his presence surely drew them together in a way that had not occurred previously.

Although by its very nature the evidence is not conclusive, one is inclined to feel safe in the opinion that the *σοφία*-*λόγος* tradition was one through all this development. Further, there was surely a period when for all practical purposes the split had taken place between "orthodoxy" and Gnosticism but had not been realized. We have seen items possessing a curious character (e.g. *The Epistula Apostolorum*) which may be the product of such a period. But then the final separation gradually became clear and the two movements were for the most part independent, free to develop in their own ways.[5] This situation may then have been punctuated at least occasionally by later points of contact, some of which may have been significant.[6]

No inconsistency is implied in holding that Irenaeus' representation of the Gnostics is reasonably fair and that Gnosticism was a rapidly developing phenomenon. Reasonably clear evidence for both conclusions comes from the documents themselves. The developing nature of Gnosticism is particularly clear within Valentinianism in the difference of opinion concerning the *Gospel of Truth*.[7] Although it is now generally held that this document originated later than was first thought, it was possible at one time for knowledgeable scholars to argue otherwise.

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[5] For a suggestion concerning a possible line of development within Gnosticism see *infra* 466.

[6] See *supra* 407f., *infra* 465f.

[7] *Supra* 425ff.

We have found the HOW of this development, particularly within Gnosticism, virtually impossible to document. We see one position, then another; yet one is left to speculate as to the way in which these changes came about. Occasionally, one may be able to see a certain theological desirability, perhaps even necessity. Although the example represents a gross over-simplification, this principle seems to apply in a special way to the Fourth Treatise. Sophia's motivation is said there to arise out of "a superabundant love."[8] It is easy to see that such a view is vastly more desirable theologically than malformed desire.

The limited amount of "orthodox" involvement in debate with the Gnostics--at least as far as the evidence seems to indicate--may have an interesting dimension. One feels with regard particularly to later stages of development that it may be possible to observe elements that could have been the result of theological struggle, that is, struggle within Gnosticism itself. Such a struggle may also carry overtones of internal disintegration. Within Valentinianism one example may be observed in the confusion or at least overlap between the Demiurge and Achamoth.[9] Although this specific line of development may represent a genuine attempt at unity, a certain amount of confusion would have been the inevitable result. In retrospect, one might have expected this sort of thing. Orthodox aloofness from the situation--again as far as the available evidence seems to indicate--may represent a shrewd insight. It may have been the conviction of some that the simplest and quickest solution to the Gnostic problem was to let it come to its own end. Like certain other movements, Gnosticism might have lasted longer if it had met a greater and more clearly defined opposition. All this may be just so much speculation (the leaders of "orthodoxy" may simply have felt incompetent), but it would be agreed that the churning character of Gnosticism would certainly have inclined it toward a violent end.

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[8] Fourth Treatise 76.19ff.

The fact that there are "non-Christian Jewish Gnostic texts, . . . scarcely-Gnostic Christian texts, non-Christian Gnostic texts secondarily Christianized, . . . Christian Gnostic texts,"[10] etc, clearly indicates an extremely complex situation. The question of questions within Gnostic studies concerns lines of development and their relationships.

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[9] Supra 404.

[10] The terminology of the announcement in the bulletin of the American Academy of Religion with regard to their national meeting, Dallas, October, 1968.

The earliest text at our disposal seems to be the Apocryphon of John. It reflects a myth involving Sophia and Ialdabaoth (who was obviously identified with Yahweh of the Old Testament). Later in Valentinian thought we have observed Sophia-Achamoth-Demiurge.[11] This may be an early stage of a movement which eventually ran out into fantasy. The Fourth Treatise could represent a still later stage in which both Sophia and Achamoth were being quietly suppressed. This would also fit with the observation that the later stages of the movement were inclined to be more philosophical in character.[12]

Irenaeus of course speaks of the Barbelognostics as the fore-runner of Valentinus. Most scholars accept this. In view then of a certain curious "Christianization" process at a later stage[13] we seem to have here a parabola --from the less biblical to the more biblical and then back again. Viewing the phenomenon from the other side, there may be something similar in the concept that

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[11] See supra 406ff.

[12] Ibid. More will be said shortly about the psychology of such a development.

[13] Supra 407f.

Gnosticism as a second century heresy began by means of certain elements in the Christian community assimilating outside factors in such a way that a non-Christian reality finally emerged. As we shall see again, this is only one way of viewing this phenomenon.[14]

Also the Valentinian system seems to be founded upon the idea that everything on the level of this world has already been prefigured on two higher planes: 1) the Pleroma itself where the pre-cosmic "fall" occurred, and 2) the lower but still supernatural level of Achamoth, Ialdabaoth and the planetary powers. It would not be difficult to imagine a line of development which began with Sophia as an intermediary, comparable to Philo's Logos, intended to separate God from mere matter. However, with the Gnostic reversal of biblical values it became necessary to identify the God of the Old Testament with the intermediary. Then the Demiurge entered, in spite of the advantages of Sophia, first as a lower offshoot of Sophia, later as the product of Sophia's own lower nature Achamoth, and finally as in the Fourth Treatise almost supplanting Sophia herself. This is of course quite speculative, but it does seem to fit with the available evidence.

One other point should be observed in this connection. Jonas has referred to the original pre-cosmic fall as the

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[14] Infra 467f.

"tragic split in the godhead." This incident of course was the thing that set the whole process moving. The resultant introduction of Sophia to some extent disturbed the original dualism. The introduction of Achamoth not only effected a shift in the tragic split but also restored a radical dualism: God-Sophia/Achamoth-Demiurge. Included here also is the ambivalence of knowledge, wisdom--indeed all human achievement. Everything possesses the ability to serve ends either good or bad.

How then may the broader lines of development and the relationship(s) between Christianity and Gnosticism be sketched? Such a persistent question demands closer attention although final conclusions on this point may never be reached.

It seems legitimately possible to speak of the question of relationships in a number of different ways: 1) as roughly parallel to each other but with a more or less common source, 2) as having their origin in a common source but after a point striking out on their own divergent ways, 3) as roughly parallel but independent movements, 4) as parallel but with a number of more or less important points of contact, or 5) as two more or less independent developing objects moving toward one another, for a time merging, but also separating at a later point to pursue their independent ways. Then too there is the possibility that Christianity was only one of a number of different elements which contributed to Gnosticism. This view would urge the fact that many of the earliest roots of Gnosticism may now be lost.[15]

All of these views (and there may be others) have something to recommend them. Some may of course be more desirable than others, but none gives a final solution. It may be that we should let each one speak as it would and thereby glean whatever truth may be found in these models. Surely, such an approach would underscore the complexity of the problem.

One facet of interest which is relevant here is the fact that the shift from σοφία to λόγος seems to have been largely complete prior to the appearance of Jesus. This may mean that Gnosticism was reaching back to something older for its Sophia figure. Then too this may not be an "either-or" situation. Gnostic sources may be using earlier ideas and concepts as well as working within their own contemporary awareness. It might be observed that early Christianity did something along this line when they wanted to speak of the incarnation.

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[15] Wilckens in the works cited earlier argues this.

As we have seen, the complexity of this situation in the second century makes it very difficult to say with any certainty just when that which was essentially one tradition became two. On the one hand there were Christians who were to one degree or another infected with gnostic tendencies and on the other hand there were Gnostics who in many ways were sensitively Christian in their thinking. One may only consider the reality of two separate entities --Christianity and Gnosticism--when Gnosticism began to generally reflect a cosmogony essentially different, i.e., when a hierarchy of beings appeared in their speculations concerning the origin of the material world.

We have seen also that there may be links from Gnosticism directly back to Judaism, as well as links to things Christian mainly contemporary with the Gnostics. In the finished product these things are so fused into one that they are essentially impossible to differentiate.

The links between the Jewish-Christian tradition and Gnosticism with regard to Sophia are many and frequent, as well as of varying intensity and importance. The Sophia of the earlier Jewish-Christian tradition may often be seen within Gnosticism, although she is almost always much more elaborately dressed. Torah associations, formerly considered to be of great importance, tend to fade. Descent and re-ascent are very much a part of the Gnostic Sophia myth, but the elements that make it up are considerably different from those found in the earlier Jewish-Christian tradition. The same may be said for the concept of rejection, which is of course a part of the same theme. Formerly Wisdom was rejected by mankind because they were incapable of seeing its value,[16] whereas in Gnosticism whatever a given Sophia figure suffered in the way of rejection was mainly the result of her own doing.

We have observed that prior to the New Testament there was as far as one can tell, no link made between Wisdom--however it may have been conceived--and any messianic figure.[17] This is of course simply an observation and therefore must remain an argument from silence. Such is always vulnerable certainly, but this silence is quite profound! Surely it is not too much to assume that if the link had ever been made it would have been preserved in the literature. We prefer to think that up until the realization of the incarnation the concept of Wisdom only contained what Manson referred to as "Messianic potential." This at least ties in with the work of both Colpe and Schenke who attempted to show that the "redeemed Redeemer" was not a primal element in Gnosis but rather came in at a fairly advanced stage.

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[16] This is perhaps most clearly developed in Enoch 42. However, cf. the Logos in John's prologue, 1.11.

[17] See supra vii, 156 and 219f.

It has long been recognized that the projection of myth by the Gnostics, arising out of a real life situation, was to a large extent the projection of their own inner being. At a later stage the myth was "interiorized." That is, it was returned to the speculators and applied psychologically, even occasionally becoming mystic in character.[18] Evidence of this sort of thing is seen for example in the Sophia Jesu Christi where the Sophia myth undoubtedly lies in the background, but its development or even discussion is not the point of concern.[19] An elaboration has been made for other reasons. The same author is therefore consistent when he views the creation as spiritual and indestructible.[20] One must assume a view of the Gnostic Sophia myth which allows for the free operation of this principle.

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[18] The most recent repetition of this thesis was made by H. Jonas in a paper entitled, "Myth and Mysticism: A Study of Objectification and Interiorization in Religious Thought," read at the national meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Dallas, October, 1968. Although Jonas developed his argument using descent and reascent as his example, the same principle could-be applied to the figure of Sophia.

[19] Supra 387ff.

As we have seen, another factor in the elaboration of the Gnostic Sophia myth is the multiplication of the central figure. Again, this would be expected as the natural result of basic presuppositions. The distinction between Sophia and Achamoth would probably have been fairly early. In the Schrift ohne Titel one wonders if any distinction is made between Sophia Zoé and Pistis Sophia, while in the Hypostasis of the Archons Zoé is described as the daughter of Sophia.[21] Yet another delineation has been observed in the Sophia Jesu Christi. As we have observed, Schenke there distinguishes the Great Sophia, Agape Sophia and Pistis Sophia.[22] Surely this sort of speculative freedom could not exist long without devastating results. Something similar may be found in the multiplication of Christ, Soter, and Jesus.

In spite of what may have ultimately led to internal disintegration, there are at least occasional elements within Gnosticism that are sensitively Christian and demonstrate an awareness worthy of note. For example, see the way in which Sophia's repentance is described in the Apocryphon of John 61.13ff.[23] Repentance is of course a part of the Sophia myth, yet it is not usually stressed in this way. One could easily imagine the author's insight to have come as the result of earlier Christian experience. This is made more impressive when it is remembered that this suffering was "non-substantial."[24]

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[20] Supra 389, however cf. 393. Evidence for this point could of course be greatly expanded. As mentioned elsewhere, the Fourth Treatise must represent the end point of such a development as far as the documents now in our possession are concerned.

[21] Supra 399.

[22] Supra 384.

Among those items seeming to merit repetition here is the combining of Christ, Sophia, and Jesus in the "Sethian-Ophite" system as described by Irenaeus.[25] The character of this phenomenon as presented by Irenaeus is without doubt Gnostic. This must be granted. Yet in the combination itself--if a Christian were granted his own definition of terms--it might be possible to construct a figure almost "orthodox" in character. This is what is meant when it is suggested that such a concept is not extremely far removed from Christianity. Again, one feels that there may have been a number of things within

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[23] Supra 379. Cf. the description of the same element within the Pleroma, 62.1ff.

[24] Supra 380f. See Jonas, Gnostic Religion, 202.

[25] Supra 371.

Gnosticism that many "average" Christians would have accepted if no question were raised with regard to the definition of terms.

Neither *ⲖⲞⲄⲞⲤ* or *ϢⲀϪⲈ* has been extensively involved in our examination of Gnostic material. We are therefore inclined to feel that the unusual occurrence of *ⲠϢⲀϪⲈ ⲚⲦⲠⲒⲤⲦⲒⲤ* in the *Schrift ohne Titel* (152.1; 163.7) has greater significance than it may be possible to discern.[26] Again, the motivation may have been genuine enough, but a certain confusion must have been the inevitable result to that person only casually involved. Then too, it could be argued here also that Christian influence has been at work. Again, pecularities of this sort demonstrate that although the character of the Gnostic world was quite distinct from that of the "orthodox," the relationships between the two were real also.

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The evidence as a whole therefore, though not finally conclusive, seems reasonably clear. At least the broad lines of development suggested in this study seem fairly certain. It may be that Jonas' negative judgment in this area observed earlier should be judged as too severe.[27] One feels that the apparently emerging "history of religions" approach to Gnostic studies generally will show that much of what has been observed here within one aspect of Gnostic thought contains trends which are true of the Gnostic movement as a whole.[28] If this is true this study will prove to be more significant than it is now possible to determine. One must remain reluctant to project on the basis of this study alone. That is, we must be true to the scholarly principles we have espoused. Only time will determine whether or not our intuitions are correct.

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[26] See discussion *supra* 401.

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[27] See *supra* vi, 348, also *Gnostic Religion*, 176f.

[28] For the latest published report of the status of the Nag Hammadi library see J. M. Robinson, "The Coptic Gnostic Library Today," *NTS* 14 (1968), 356-401. An opportunity to update this material was given to Robinson at the national meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Dallas, October, 1968. In this connection Robinson himself predicted the shift in emphasis within Gnostic studies as mentioned above.

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B. Gnostic: The history of many Gnostic texts is complicated and therefore often confusing. It was thought best to trace the history of each text in a footnote at the beginning of the section of the thesis dealing with the text in question. For page references to each text see the Table of Contents.

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